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(11524)

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For 18

F.O.

PART LXXXI.

407

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

CLOSED
UNTIL 7

AFFAIRS

OF

EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

184

January to June 1919.

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1	To Sir R. Wingate ...	1	Jan. 1, 1919	Mixed courts. Reports substance of a circular letter dated 4th May, 1918, from the Bâtonnier to the members of the Mixed Bar, in which it is suggested that the presentation of a summary or translation in French of all documents should be insisted on. Requests observations on this point, seeing that English is one of the official languages of the mixed courts	1
2	" " " ...	1596 Tel.	1,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Situation fully appreciated from his despatches and letters. Willing to assist Ministers to recede from their position without loss of dignity, though it is not easy to do so without appearing to yield to pressure. No objection to Ministers coming in February. They will be assured of sympathetic welcome, though it is unlikely that Secretary of State can see them before March. Perhaps unreasonable attitude of Ministers is partly due to fear that constitutional reforms proposed by Sir W. Brunyate may be approved by His Majesty's Government without their being given a chance to express their opinion. He is to reassure them, and to state that, while His Majesty's Government recognise that important reforms may be necessary, no steps in this direction will be taken without full consultation with Sultan and Ministers, and if they desire it, consultation shall take place in London. He may give assurance that, far from wishing to repress Egyptian individuality, His Majesty's Government's earnest desire is to see Egypt develop in prosperity and enlightenment and take rightful place as a leading Islamic Power	1
3	Sir R. Rodd ...	598 c	Dec. 28, 1918	Banco di Roma. Reports on. Considers its political activities are at an end	2
4	Sir R. Wingate ...	1 Tel.	Jan. 1, 1919	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Rights enjoyed by Egypt under Turkish suzerainty amounted to almost complete autonomy, and firmans, taken as a whole, have for effect to define rights enjoyed by Turkey as suzerain Power, rather than to define autonomy of Egyptian Government. Adly Pasha's idea probably was that Great Britain's rights under Protectorate should be limitatively defined. Sir R. Wingate has always assumed that our intention was, when convenient, to issue something in nature of a firman to the Sultan, in which position would be defined somewhat more clearly than was done in communication addressed to Sultan Hussein on his accession	3
5	" " " ...	11 Tel.	2,	Egyptian nationality law. Agrees that Ottoman subjects ordinarily resident in Egypt should become Egyptian subjects. He recalls that Egyptian Ministers were not willing to give full rights of citizenship to Syrians and Armenians resident in Egypt. At present is unable to consult Ministers, but has little doubt that their attitude remains unaltered. For purposes of nationality does not wish to insist on return of persons at present abroad who	3

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7	To Sir R. Wingate ...	5	3,	Future organisation of Royal Air Force. Transmits copy of No. 6 and requests observations of Egyptian Government	4
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11	" " " ...	25 Tel.	4,	Prolongation of mixed courts. Agrees to Cairo telegram No. 1943 of 1918 subject to modification that extension should be for nine months only	7
12	Sir R. Wingate ...	331	Dec. 16, 1918	Suez Canal Company and judicial reform. Transmits note by Sir W. Brunyate giving reasons for not meeting the Company's request that a new central tribunal should be established in the canal zone	7
13	" " " ...	347	22,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Transmits copy of letter from President of British Chamber of Commerce of Egypt expressing disquietude with which British business circles view agitation	7
14	" " " ...	40 Tel.	Jan. 8, 1919	Passages for civilians to Europe. Enquires what arrangements have been made	8
15	Sir R. Rodd ...	13	7,	Said Idris-el-Jenussi. Reports arrival of Said Reda, brother of Said Idris, to congratulate the King of Italy on the victory of the Allies. Said Reda expressed hostility of the Senussi confraternity to the Turks, and was ready to assist the Government of Cirenaica in retaining tranquillity	8

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40	Mr. Balfour ...	268 Tel	10,	Judicial reform. Repeats telegram to Cairo. Is not clear that work is being concentrated on essential legislation. Desires laws of secondary importance to be dealt with in interval between promulgation of principal codes and their coming into force. It is essential that work should be completed within next few months, and it is out of the question to postpone introduction of new system until end of 1920 ...	23
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42	Sir M. Cheetham ...	241 Tel.	13,	Future organisation of R.A.F. Refers to No. 7. Railways and Frontier District Administration consider aircraft would be useful for patrolling the line from Kantara and Rafa and other desert regions. Their employment for postal services would be extravagant and unnecessary. If establishment of R.A.F. entails increase in Egyptian Government's contribution towards Army of Occupation, fresh basis of contribution would have to be settled by negotiation with the Egyptian Government. Sirdar would welcome Air Force unit as an adjunct to normal British garrison. At present, general utilisation of aircraft for civil purposes would be financially prohibitive, with possible exception of a Cairo to Khartoum postal service ...	23
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	" " ...	294 Tel.	24,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Sultan and Ministers appeal for solution of political crisis. Change in atmosphere increasingly obvious. Rushdy and Adly Pashas have lost popularity, and fact that they have had to wait so long for answer from London has diminished their prestige. Saad Zaghlul is trusted by no one. Agita-	

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				tion is dying out, or is at any rate quiescent. Noteworthy feature is that agitation has throughout been entirely pacific in character. Present movement cannot be compared in importance with that of Mustafa Kamel (a former Nationalist leader), "and there seems no reason why it should affect the decisions of His Majesty's Government on constitutional questions and proper form to be given to the Protectorate"	40
56	To Sir M. Cheetham...	268 Tel.	Feb. 26, 1919	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Question of visit to England of Rushdy and Adly Pashas, and of Saad Pasha Zaghlul and other Nationalist leaders, has been considered in communication with Sir R. Wingate. Nationalist leaders have openly placed themselves at head of movement to sever connection between Egypt and Great Britain, and have organised agitation throughout country. To facilitate their journey to England or to receive them at Foreign Office would imply measure of countenance to which they are not entitled, and of which they would make some illegitimate use, as they did of their original reception at the Residency. His Majesty's Government adhere to their previous attitude. Invitation to Ministers to proceed to England forthwith should be renewed ..	41
57	Sir M. Cheetham ...	313 Tel.	28,	Refers to No 47. Considers that Sir W. Brunyate should not leave Ministry of Finance until certain outstanding questions are cleared up	41
58	Italian Ambassador...	...	27,	Judicial reform. Capitulations Commission has prepared draft law for the organisation of unified Tribunals. Promulgation of such law before examination by Italian Government might compromise Italian interests. Italian Government's general assent to proposed abolition of the Capitulations does not imply that the change can be effected without preliminary understanding	42
59	To Sir M. Cheetham	290 Tel.	Mar. 4,	Appointment of advisers. Refers to No. 57. Sir W. Brunyate should continue to act as Financial Adviser until Sir R. Crawford's arrival. Nothing should be said about the retention by Sir W. Brunyate of his seat on the Council of Ministers at present except to Sir W. Brunyate himself	42
60	Sir M. Cheetham ...	333 Tel.	2,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 56. Decision communicated to Sultan and Rushdy Pasha. Latter maintains his resignation, which Sultan has accepted. Sirry and Sarwat Pashas invited to form nucleus of new Cabinet. Neither has refused, but impossible to say as yet on what terms they would accept	43
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64	" "	348 Tel. Very Urgent	6.	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Acceptance of Rushdy Pasha's resignation was severe rebuff to Saad Zaghlul. He is now endeavouring to prevent formation of new government, and politicians who would have accepted office are being dissuaded by threats against their lives. On 3rd March, he, with his adherents, went to Abdin Palace, and on being refused admission left signed petition addressed to Sultan. Document which is being forwarded (see No. 74), repudiates Protectorate, warns Sultan against Residency, and includes thinly-veiled threats against him if he continues to take part in creation of Ministry. Sir M. Cheetham considers that we cannot afford to pass over campaign of intimidation. Has asked General Officer Commanding in Egypt to send for Saad Zaghlul and his followers and to warn them. Sultan is shaken by this impudent summons, and has appealed to him for protection from further insults. Sir M. Cheetham has consulted advisers who consider obvious course is internment of Saad Zaghlul outside Egypt, preferably in India or Ceylon. Saad has long ceased to listen to reason, and spends his time in gambling. Moderate and more sensible Egyptians wonder why we have permitted movement to go on so long unchecked. Recommends his immediate arrest and deportation, and asks for early reply	44
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67	" "	37 Commercial	19,	Swiss trade with Egypt. Controversy between Swiss commercial community in Egypt and Swiss Government relative to Mr. Alfred Kuiser	57
68	" "	360 Tel.	Mar. 8,	Said Mahommed Idris. Italian Minister says Idris wishes to go to Palestine at end of April. Italian Government have refused request	58
69	" "	361 Tel.	9,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Saad Zaghlul Pasha, Ismail Sidky Pasha, Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, and Hamed El Basal Pasha have been arrested and sent to Malta. Thinks that action, for which Sultan has expressed warm thanks, will be sufficient for the moment, but is not at all sanguine that independence movement will be checked by it. First	

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70	Sir M. Cheetham ...	368 Tel.	Mar. 10, 1919	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Deportation of Saad Zaghlul led to outbreak of feeling among students of higher colleges. Noisy demonstration yesterday with difficulty broken up by police. Larger demonstration to-day when students were joined by riff-raff of Cairo. Military took over from police. Considerable damage done and one or more persons reported killed. Some evidence that Nationalist leaders were opposed to this outbreak, but, headed by Aly Shaarawy Pasha, they are organising anti-Protectorate petitions to Sultan ...	58
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75	" " ...	378 Tel.	Pl,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Further rioting in Cairo, demonstrators attempting to withdraw officials from Government offices and students from schools. Clerks in Ministries of Public Works and Education yielded to pressure and absented themselves. Most disquieting feature is strike of advocates. Provinces quiet. In Cairo immediate problem is to restore order; as regards districts he has recommended Commander-in-chief to send detachments to provincial centres to forestall disturbances and reassure British and foreign inhabitants. Does not recommend further deportations at present, but severe measures will be taken at once if they appear advisable. ...	63
76	To Mr. Balfour ...	1427	15,	Spanish recognition of Protectorate. Transmits No. 53. Action of Spanish Government is designed to strengthen their position in future negotiations with France concerning Morocco. His Majesty's Government would be ill-advised to give probable cause of annoyance to French Government by agreeing to the Spanish proposal. Suggests that Spanish failure to co-operate in negotiations for internationalism of Tangier might be made reason for refusal ...	64

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79	Earl Curzon of Kedleston	...	18,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Speech in House of Lords describing situation in Egypt ...	65
80	Parliamentary question	...	18,	Mixed Courts. Language question. Q. Whether attention has been called to a letter published in the Egyptian press by Sir W. Brunyate expressing his views as to the use of English, and whether this letter is approved by His Majesty's Government?—A. Sir W. Brunyate has only expressed a purely personal opinion that so long as any widespread demand exists for facilities for hearing cases in French such facilities should be provided...	66
81	Sir M. Cheetham ...	389 Tel.	13,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. More rioting and pillage in Cairo. Leaders are students of El Azhar University. It is difficult to follow them up as British troops should not go too near El Azhar mosque. Is considering advisability of military proclamation containing assurances given by His Majesty's Government to Sultan and Ministers ...	66
82	" " ...	393 Tel. Very Urgent	15,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Disturbances continue in Cairo, and trouble has occurred in Damietta and Mansoura. Telegraph lines have been cut in several places in Lower Egypt. Agitation is being directed by remainder of Nationalist Committee with headquarters at Saad Zaghlul's house. Reason most frequently expressed by natives for bitter feeling which has arisen is that British policy will not allow Egyptians to be heard and ventilate their grievances. Is impressed by sources from which he has heard this. For present military authorities must continue to suppress disorder, but he would be glad to be informed whether at some not distant date it would be possible for His Majesty's Government to relax restrictions on departure of Egyptians. Would it represent any inconvenience if so-called Egyptian patriots were allowed to visit France and England? We are encountering stronger resistance than might have been expected, and religious sentiment may add to our difficulties. This, if aroused, will spread to villages and cause trouble among fellahen, who have hitherto been quiet outside movement ...	66
83	" " ...	394 Tel.	15,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Large crowds have assembled at Kaliub and Wasta, holding up trains, destroying permanent way and cutting telegraph wires. All communications with Upper Egypt are interrupted. No reports of attacks on foreigners, except rumoured murder of English official of railways at Wasta. Men in railway workshops struck work ...	66

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				this morning. Advocates refusal to appear before native Courts has become general. Situation is grave. General Officer Commanding (Egypt) agrees that large number of troops will be needed to restore and maintain communications and guarantee food supplies for Cairo. Great danger is outbreak of fanaticism. Cessation of work has been preached in some mosques. If it were not for this danger, best policy would probably be to intern in Egypt remainder of Zaghlul's Committee. Alternative is to discover ground for reconciliation, and he may wish to recommend concession to native feeling. Begs therefore for urgent reply to question as to whether Egyptians may be allowed to leave Egypt	68
84	To Sir M. Cheetham	349 Tel.	Mar. 17, 1919	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Question of Nationalist leaders being allowed to come to Europe is not so much one of inconvenience in England as present and future effect in Egypt. There is no common ground on which His Majesty's Government can meet them, as they are committed to sever British connection. To allow them to visit England now would make it appear that His Majesty's Government were yielding to force when persuasion had failed. Attention should be concentrated on restoration of law and order, and he will have full support of His Majesty's Government. He should endeavour to rally sober elements among native population	68
85	Mr. Balfour	518 Tel.	18,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Restoration of order and formation of competent government must be immediately and unconditionally carried through. In meantime there need be no concealment of our readiness, when this has been accomplished, to discuss in London alleged grievances with Egyptian Ministers. If they think their task would be better performed if they were accompanied or followed by Nationalists	69
86	Sir M. Cheetham	400 Tel. Urgent	16,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Further disturbances and destruction of railways. Fellahs have been instigated to interrupt communications, but they are threatening to attack private property. Decent Egyptians are trying to come to understanding with extremists who are reported to be themselves frightened at spirit which has been aroused. General Bullfin arrived to-day to take command in General Allenby's absence. He will report after hearing his views	69
87	" "	403 Tel. Very Urgent.	17,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. General Bullfin proposes with forces at his command to safeguard railway communication between Cairo and Alexandria, and, if possible, keep up line to Port Said. Impossible at same time to restore communications with Upper Egypt. He wishes Egyptian Ministry to be formed to co-operate with army in pacifying country. Sir M. Cheetham considers that if destruction of communications continue and attacks are made on Europeans repression must cause great sacrifice of human life, but must succeed as population are unarmed. Adly Pasha has suggested that	

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				Great Britain should receive mandate for Egypt from Peace Conference. Sir M. Cheetham considers that several courses are open: (1) Publication of statement that Peace Conference has recognised British protectorate over Egypt. (2) Similar statement that Great Britain has accepted a mandate. (3) Removal of all restrictions on Egyptians travelling to Europe. (4) Immediate despatch of Commission to Egypt. If we are to make concessions we should act as quickly as possible	70
88	Lord Curzon to Mr. Balfour	328 Tel.	Mar. 19, 1919	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Sir M. Cheetham's telegrams disclose serious situation. Hopes General Allenby can return to Egypt. Is consulting Sir R. Wingate as to situation and concerting with military authorities in London	71
89	Sir M. Cheetham	406 Tel.	18,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. Widespread extension of demonstrations and destruction of communications. No communication other than by wireless and aeroplane between Cairo and provinces	71
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123	" "	465 Tel. Very Urgent	31,	Egyptian Nationalist movement. In reply to his address to notables at Residency (see No. 114), received long memorandum signed by extremists describing agitation as due to general feeling that Egyptian views have not been allowed expression. Sent for ex-Ministers and asked their views. They asked him to remove all restriction on travel from Egypt.	

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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Egypt and the Soudan.

PART LXXXI.

No. 1.

Mr. Balfour to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 1.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 1, 1919.

AN English member of the Mixed Bar in Egypt has recently communicated to the Foreign Office a copy of a circular letter, bearing the date 4th May, 1918, which was addressed by the Bâtonnier, M. Palagi, to the members of the Bar.

The letter states that the President of the Mixed Courts had given his approval to a report presented by a special committee for studying the question of the improvement which might be introduced in the matter of preparing cases for the Courts, and proceeds to set forth a list of rules suggested by the above-mentioned committee for facilitating the work of the judges and for the better safeguarding of the interests of the parties.

The majority of these rules deal with technicalities of no present concern, but I must draw your attention to one which—under the heading 7 in the circular letter—reads as follows: "Présentation d'une traduction française de tous documents écrits ou au moins de la partie essentielle des documents écrits dans une autre langue, spécialement dans la langue arabe, les interprètes n'ayant pas le temps matériel de faire ces traductions."

Seeing that English is one of the official languages of the Mixed Tribunals and that there should therefore be no member of the Tribunal or the staff of the Courts who is not able to understand that language, the proposal that documents "in any other language" should be translated into French appears hardly warrantable, and I should be glad to receive your observations on the subject.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

No. 2.

Mr. Balfour to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 1596.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 1, 1919.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1928, 1941, and 1944.

Your despatches and letters have been received, and I fully appreciate the situation. I gather from you that the two Ministers now realise that their precipitate action in resigning has placed them in a false position, and that they are anxious to recede from it if this can be done without loss of dignity. I am quite willing to facilitate the process in so far as is possible, although it is not easy to do so without appearing to yield to pressure. Moreover, Rushdy Pasha's letter, reported in your telegram No. 1941, betrays a disposition to connect the question of Egyptian reforms with the

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Peace negotiations. It cannot be too clearly understood that, while His Majesty's Government are prepared to adopt a most sympathetic and liberal attitude towards legitimate Egyptian aspirations, their future relations with the Egyptians concern only the Egyptians and themselves. This was explained in my telegram No. 1509.

Your original suggestion was that the two Ministers, accompanied by Sir M. Cheetham and Sir W. Brunyate, should come to London at once in order to discuss a programme of Egyptian reforms. This was out of the question at a moment when our undivided attention must be devoted to the preliminary phases of the Peace Conference in Paris. In consenting to March next for any such discussions, I have fixed a date which is not only the earliest possible, but will probably prove earlier than is convenient.

The above arrangement still holds good, but if you consider that the mere presence here of Egyptian Ministers would have a pacifying effect in Egypt and ease the situation, and if, after considering the danger of appearing to yield to pressure, you are prepared to recommend that they should be allowed to come before March, I have no objection to their arriving during the course of February. They will be assured of a sympathetic welcome, although it is unlikely that I can see them before March. In no case can they be permitted to go to Paris during the session of the Peace Conference.

It has occurred to me, after reading the note from Rushdy Pasha enclosed in your despatch No. 309, that the unreasonable attitude of the Ministers may be due, in part at least, to alarm lest the proposed constitutional reforms submitted by Sir W. Brunyate might be approved by His Majesty's Government without their being given an opportunity of expressing their opinion. You are authorised to reassure them on this head, and to state that, while His Majesty's Government recognise that important reforms may be necessary, no steps will be taken in this direction without full consultation with the Sultan and his Ministers, and if they so desire the consultation shall take place in London.

As regards the last paragraph of your telegram No. 1944, you may certainly give an assurance to the effect that, far from wishing to repress Egyptian individuality, it is our earnest desire to see Egypt develop in prosperity and enlightenment, and take her rightful place as a leading Islamic Power. Indeed, the aspirations to which you refer seem perfectly legitimate and worthy of encouragement.

No. 3.

Sir R. Rodd to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 2, 1919.)

(No. 598. Commercial.)

Sir,

Rome, December 28, 1918.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 1412 of the 21st November last on the subject of commercial enterprise in Egypt by the Banco di Roma, on which my observations are invited, I have the honour to report that it is in my opinion extremely improbable that the present administration of the Banco di Roma has any political ends in view, or any other object but to secure profitable business. Under the former presidency of Commendatore Pacelli, the Banco di Roma undoubtedly lent itself to political work in Cyrenaica and Tripoli, and was also engaged in various underground transactions with the ex-Khedive. Its enterprises in Tripolitania were disastrous to the bank, which failed to obtain from the Italian Government a compensation which was claimed for pioneer work. The intrigue with the ex-Khedive was also defeated. Such heavy losses were sustained that a first and then again a second reduction of capital became necessary. The administration of the bank was completely changed, and now it only occupies a very modest fourth place among the commercial banks of Italy. There is, I think, no doubt that its political activities are at an end and that the lessons of the past have been taken to heart.

Mr. Capel Cure, whom I have consulted, is quite in agreement with me in this estimate.

A copy of this despatch will be forwarded to the High Commissioner in Cairo.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

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No. 4.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 1, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 1558, last sentence. Rights enjoyed by Egypt under Turkish suzerainty amounted, as is known, to almost complete autonomy, and Firmans, taken as a whole, have for effect to define rights enjoyed by Turkey as suzerain Power rather than to define autonomy of Egyptian Government.

In conversation reported in my telegram No. 1901 Sir W. Brunyate put to Adly Pasha that Great Britain's rights under protectorate might more properly be compared with her rights under occupation than with Turkey's rights by reason of her suzerainty.

I think it possible that what was really in Adly's mind was that Turkish rights were limitatively defined by the Firmans, and that it was desirable that respective rights of Great Britain and Egypt under protectorate should be similarly defined. The two cases are so essentially different that I imagine it will be found necessary to describe discretionary powers of protecting Power in somewhat wide terms, but I have always understood our intention was, when a convenient time came, to issue something of the nature of Firman to Sultan, in which position would be defined somewhat more clearly than was the case in communication addressed to Sultan Hussein on his accession.

No. 5.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 2, 1919.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1568 and 1596.

I agree that all Ottoman subjects ordinarily resident in Egypt ought to become Egyptian subjects unless they notify us within a fixed time of their desire to retain Ottoman nationality and in that case leave Egypt within another fixed time. You will however remember that Egyptian nationality law proposed in 1914 broke down owing to unwillingness of Egyptian Ministers to accord to Syrians and Armenians resident in Egypt full rights of Egyptian citizens and free admission to Government service.

2. I am at present unable to consult Ministers, but I have little doubt that their attitude remains unaltered. Such Syrians, &c., if born in Egypt or resident there for fifteen years at least are already treated as Egyptians for all purposes, and I agree that we ought to insist on like treatment even where the residence has been shorter if there was genuine residence before the war, but I should be glad to have support of an Egyptian Ministry for this proposal in advance.

3. As regards persons at present abroad who have some connection with Egypt, I should not wish to insist on their return to Egypt within a fixed time as a condition of their recognition as Egyptians, provided that on the facts such recognition is proper.

4. There are, however, two categories of cases to consider. A limited number of individuals who could properly claim to be Egyptians are of undoubtedly Ottoman sympathies, and we should be well content for them to retain Ottoman nationality and remain abroad. A second category is that of persons who had formerly some connection with Egypt or were even born there but have since practically severed connection. Such persons we have no desire whatever to retain as Egyptians, though it might possibly be proper to do so, if Ottoman Government so desired.

5. The most difficult question which will arise will however be between us and the various States which are being carved out of Ottoman Empire. I think it probable, for instance, that numbers of Syrians and Armenians would wish to continue resident in Egypt but to take on some form of Syrian or Armenian nationality. This is course which Egyptian Ministers would probably favour, but may be contrary to sound policy. It is true that such questions do not directly arise on a treaty with Ottoman Empire, but they appear to me to be closely connected with Treaty of Peace by which the new States will come into existence.

6. In the circumstances I had already been led, before receiving your telegram

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No. 1596, to ask myself whether there might be some exceptions to assurance by you to Egyptian Ministers that beyond recognition of Protectorate nothing affecting Egypt would arise at Peace Conference, and while Ministers fully understand that they cannot be present at Peace Conference and have explicitly so stated, it had occurred to me that presence of an Egyptian Minister as a technical adviser might be of some utility to you in dealing with this and any similar question.

7. I fully appreciate suggestion in your telegram last mentioned of danger of appearing to yield to pressure, but it occurs to me that that danger would be materially lessened if one Minister only now proceed to London to act as a technical adviser on lines I have suggested, being followed by his colleagues at or about time originally offered. Such a solution would have further advantage that we should retain services here of one of the two Ministers, which would materially assist despatch of necessary business.

8. I cannot undertake that above proposal would be accepted by Ministers as an adequate means of escape from situation in which they find themselves, but should it meet with your approval I will submit it to His Highness the Sultan of Egypt, and point out to him how much it is in the interests of himself and his country to support it.

9. I will so far as necessary reassure the Sultan of Egypt and the Ministers as to constitutional reforms submitted by Sir W. Brunyate, but I ought to observe that they were in fact submitted to a commission of which Ministers were members at the request of commission itself, that they are no more than logical outcome of suggestions initiated by Adley Pasha, and that, as appears from papers now being transmitted to you, they are largely concurred in by some at least of Ministers.

No. 6.

Foreign Office to Air Ministry.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1919.*

I AM directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state, for the information of the Air Council, that their letter of the 22nd November, on the subject of the future organisation of the Royal Air Force in Egypt, the Soudan, and Mesopotamia, has received his careful consideration. Mr. Balfour has consulted the Director of Military Intelligence and the Secretary of State for India, and now desires to make the following observations:—

1. The establishment proposed for Egypt and the Soudan would appear adequate.
2. The establishment proposed for Mesopotamia would appear adequate. Mesopotamia should, for the present at any rate, be affiliated to Egypt owing to the greater facilities for control which this disposition would afford.
3. The question of the utilisation of service aircraft for civil purposes requires the consideration of the Indian and Egyptian Governments. Mr. Balfour is obtaining their views and hopes to be able to express an opinion on the matter shortly.
4. The arrangement whereby Egypt contributes towards the cost of the army of occupation in peace time would appear to be applicable to the present case. Mr. Balfour is, however, obtaining the opinion of His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt on this point.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

No. 7.

Mr. Balfour to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1919.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the Air Council,* together with a copy of my reply† thereto.

2. You will observe that in the second paragraph of their letter the Air Council assume that the service units of the Royal Air Force to be established in Egypt will be administered on a similar financial basis to units of the British army maintained there

* Not printed.

† See No. 6.

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in times of peace. In my reply I have assented provisionally, but have stated that I am asking for your observations. I should be glad to receive them.

3. The Air Council, in the fourth paragraph of their letter, raise the question of the possible use of service aircraft for civil purposes. The Government of India, who have been consulted with regard to Mesopotamia, are considering the matter, and I have not yet been acquainted with their views thereon. I should be glad to learn whether the Egyptian Government are of opinion that service aircraft would be of use for police work, postal services, &c.

4. The Air Council are anxious to receive a reply as early as possible, and I should be obliged if you would telegraph your observations.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

No. 8.

Mr. Balfour to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 4.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 3, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of the 7th January last, relative to the question of the use of English as the official language of the new Egyptian Courts and the application of English principles of law in the drafting of the codes, I transmit to you herewith a copy of correspondence with the Manchester Chamber of Commerce on the subject.

I shall be glad to learn to what extent the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, which were forwarded in my above-mentioned despatch, can, in your opinion and that of Sir W. Brunyate, be carried into effect, and, in particular, whether you agree that the consent of the French Government should be asked to a time limit of ten years being placed upon the admissibility of French as one of the judicial languages.

The French Delegates were informed at the last meeting held to discuss the draft of the Egypt-Morocco Convention that the draft Judicature Law was subject to certain modifications at the hands of the Capitulations Commission, including changes bearing upon the language question.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office.

Sir,

Chamber of Commerce, Manchester, December 17, 1918.

EGYPTIAN Law Courts and the English language.

In April of last year a letter was addressed to Sir F. R. Wingate, the High Commissioner for Egypt, urging that the Capitulations Commission and the Advisory Committee on Egyptian Legislation should recommend (1) the establishment of English as the official European language of Egypt at the earliest possible moment, and (2) the incorporation in the Egyptian legal code and procedure of such items of English law and procedure as may be practicable.

The Chamber has since understood (under date 23rd May, 1918) that their views were to have been placed before the Capitulations Commission, and that the commission was in general sympathy with the views of the Chamber so far as they were consistent with existing circumstances.

Quite lately, however, the Chamber has had reason to believe that the old system is to be perpetuated in so far, at least, as the belittling of the English language is concerned.

I am instructed to hand you the enclosed copy of the original letter sent to Sir F. R. Wingate, and am respectfully to urge that you should press upon the British representative the great importance of securing for the English language and the British law the position which they ought to have in a country which owes so much to British assistance and guidance.

I am, &c.

WALTER SPECKMAN, *Secretary.*

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Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Sir R. Wingate.

Sir, *Manchester, April 6, 1918.*

EGYPT: Legal reforms.

I subjoin copy of the resolution supported by the Board of Directors of this Chamber which has been unanimously adopted by the Egypt, Levant, and North Africa Section of the Chamber.

The Board of Directors realise that British interests suffer a grave disadvantage owing to the fact that the English language is not the official European language of the country—French or Italian having the preference in all legal proceedings. This is a manifestly incongruous state of affairs in view of the British protectorate over the country, and my directors certainly consider that the time has arrived when a change should be made in this respect.

The resolution is as follows:—

“That the Egypt, Levant, and North Africa Section of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce strongly urge the Capitulations Commission and the Advisory Committee on Egyptian Legislation to recommend (a) the establishment of English as the official European language of Egypt at the earliest possible moment; and (b) the incorporation in the Egyptian legal code and procedure of such items of English law and procedure as may be practicable.”

I am earnestly to commend this subject to your notice.

A copy of this communication has been addressed to Mr. Liddell, Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Egyptian Legislation in London.

I am, &c.

WALTER SPECKMAN, *Secretary.*

No. 9.

Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1919.*

WITH reference to your letter* of the 17th ultimo relating to the new courts of law to be established in Egypt on the abolition of the Capitulations, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Balfour to state that he sympathises generally with the views put forward by the Chamber of Commerce regarding the question of the use of the English language and the application, when possible, of English principles of law in the preparation of the new codes, and I am to add that he is already in correspondence with the authorities in Egypt on these subjects.

I am, &c.

W. TYRRELL.

No. 10.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 4, 1919.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 297, Secret, of the 24th November, forwarding copies of Sir W. Brunyate's note on constitutional reform in Egypt, which I have read with great interest.

2. I understand that you will comment upon the note in due course, and I shall be glad to learn the general impression which it has created, although I gather from your despatch No. 309 of the 5th December, 1918, that Sir W. Brunyate's proposals have aroused some concern and apprehension in native circles.

3. In the meantime I should be glad if you would express to Sir W. Brunyate my appreciation of his able and interesting report.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* See No. 8.

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No. 11.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 1943 of 26th December: Prolongation of Mixed Courts.

I agree, subject to modification, that extension should be for nine months only.

Please act accordingly.

No. 12.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 6, 1919.)

(No. 331.)

Sir, *Cairo, December 16, 1918.*

I COMMUNICATED to Sir William Brunyate the extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Suez Canal Company, which formed the enclosure in your despatch No. 289 of the 25th ultimo.

The attached note, which I received from Sir William Brunyate in reply, sets forth the reasons which make it difficult at present to meet the company's wishes that a new Central Tribunal should be established in the Canal zone.

I share Sir W. Brunyate's views on this matter.

I have, &c.

R. WINGATE.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Note by Sir W. Brunyate.

The Residency,

YOUR No. 275 of the 9th December, 1918.

I also had received a copy of Count de Serionne's letter to Rushdi Pasha of the 29th July, 1918, and have discussed the matter both with the Count and also with the Capitulations Commission. The report of the last-mentioned discussion will be found in *procès-verbal* No. 116, which will be sent home under cover of my next confidential memorandum. Briefly, the question is one of the difference between French and English usages. In France every town of importance has its own Tribunal of First Instance. While we propose no such centralisation here, our Central Tribunals are on an average to serve a population of 1,500,000, and it is difficult to justify, at a time when we shall be short of judges, the setting up of a Central Tribunal for a population of 100,000 or so, which is to be found in the Canal zone.

It has to be observed that the mere passage of ships through the Canal will not necessarily give rise to any volume of litigation, and experience has in fact shown that no great volume of litigation is at present pleaded before the Mansourah Tribunal. Zagazig will in any case be slightly more convenient as being decidedly more accessible than Mansourah, and we are quite ready to consider the setting up of a new Central Tribunal in the Canal zone when the volume of work comes to justify it. Comparison of our Mudiria judge with the French *juge de paix* is, I venture to submit, scarcely fair to the new organisation. Not only is his civil jurisdiction, up to £ E. 200, greatly in excess of that of the French *juge de paix*, but the draft Judicature Law permits of the delegation to the Mudiria judge under the Procedure Code of any powers of the Central Tribunal which can be exercised by a single judge, a provision which should enable all applications to be dealt with on the spot.

I must confess that I am not much enamoured of a system under which occasional maritime cases will be tried at Zagazig, and in accordance with English traditions I should much prefer to see them tried in Cairo. But the latter course is impossible, and so soon as Cairo and Alexandria are excluded there is no reason to suppose that a better justice would be administered at Port Said than at Zagazig.

The best proof of the absence of any great volume of litigation in connection with Port Said at the present time is the absence of any serious Bar in that town.

Enclosure returned herewith.

Ministry of Finance,
December 12, 1918

(Signed) W. E. BRUNYATE.

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No. 13.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 6, 1919.)

(No. 347.)

Sir,

Cairo, December 22, 1918.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter I have received from the President of the British Chamber of Commerce of Egypt, expressing, from the financial and commercial point of view, the opinion of the Alexandria and Cairo Committees of the Chamber concerning the present agitation in this country.

I have, &c.

R. WINGATE.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Mr. Carver (British Chamber of Commerce of Egypt) to Sir R. Wingate.

Excellency,

Alexandria, December 17, 1918.

IN view of the very grave danger of financial and commercial interests of any concessions in the direction of self-government being granted to Egypt at the present time, the Alexandria and Cairo Committees of this Chamber venture to bring to your Excellency's notice the following expression of opinion, and hope that it may be found possible to forward it immediately to the Home Government.

"The Committees of the British Chamber of Commerce in Egypt view with disquietude the increasing agitation among certain classes in Egypt.

"This unsettled state of public feeling, which cannot fail to be prejudicial not only to British financial and trade interests, but also to the general welfare of Egypt, is, in the opinion of this Chamber, fostered to a great extent by a misconception of what, it is hoped, are the real intentions of His Majesty's Government.

"The Committees of this Chamber therefore respectfully urge that a public statement be made at an early date, clearly defining Great Britain's resolution to exercise absolute control over Egypt's destinies."

I have, &c.

PERCY W. CARVER, *President.*

No. 14.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 40)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, January 8, 1919.

MY telegram No. 1873.

I should be glad to know whether it has been possible to make arrangements for passages to Europe for Egyptian and Soudanese civilians.

No. 15.

Sir R. Rodd to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 13.)

Sir,

Rome, January 7, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report the arrival of Said Reda, the brother of Said Idris-el-Senussi, accompanied by several magnates of the confraternity, on a mission to congratulate the King of Italy on the victory of the Allies.

The mission remained for two or three days in Naples, while the President of the United States was in the capital, and came on here immediately after his departure. They have been entertained by the Minister of the Colonies and were to-day received by the King.

Said Reda in his address said that many of the Arabs, who were inclined by tradition to worship military power, had been deluded by Germany's boast of her invincibility. It was a matter of pride to his brother that he had not been so deceived, and had preferred the cause of justice, even when success seemed denied to it, to that

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aggression even when it appeared to triumph. Said Idris, continuing in the tradition of the Senussi confraternity which had always proclaimed the Turks to be the enemies of the Arab nations, had done all that was in his power to assist the Government of the colony in maintaining tranquillity in Cyrenaica.

He excused himself for speaking through his brother as mouthpiece at such length of himself, but the most humble as well as the greatest might take pride in having to the best of his ability contributed to a solution of this great conflict.

The King replied, expressing his satisfaction that this mission from Said Idris had set a seal on the solidarity of good relations with the confraternity, who had loyally co-operated during the world's war. The prosperity of the population of Cyrenaica and the free development of their religious and civil life would be the constant care of himself and of his Government.

The mission will remain a few days longer in Italy and pay visits to various points of interest.

Scarcely anyone would, I think, have ventured to anticipate, up to a very recent date, that a complimentary mission from the Senussi confraternity would be visiting the King of Italy in his capital, and addressing him in terms both respectful and dignified, which implied a complete recognition of sovereignty. While no doubt the Arabs are, as Said Idris suggested in his message, quick to appreciate the lesson of military success, it cannot be denied that what had taken place affords concrete evidence of the success of the policy inaugurated two years ago in co-operation with His Majesty's Government, after the defeat of Said Ahmed in the oases. That policy was dictated from Rome and Commendatore Agnesa, who urged it in spite of the hesitancy of the local military authorities, as well as Colonel Talbot, who contributed so much to carrying through the agreements with Said Idris, deserve every credit. Italy has much to thank the British authorities for in the achievement of this satisfactory result.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioner at Cairo.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

No. 16.

Count de Salis to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Rome, January 5, 1919.

ON receipt of your despatch No. 110 of the 26th November last relative to the appointment of a Vicar Apostolic of British nationality in Egypt I spoke again to the Cardinal Secretary of State reminding him of the name of Father Couturier as being, in the opinion of Sir R. Wingate, that of a candidate well fitted for the office.

Cardinal Gasparri undertook to bring the matter again before Propaganda, and he has now forwarded, to me a *pro-memoriâ* on the subject drawn up by that Congregation.

According to this *pro-memoriâ*, of which translation is enclosed herewith, the nomination of a successor to Mgr. Briante, Vicar Apostolic of Alexandria, who has resigned, is being considered. A "terna," or list of three names, has been submitted, the first name of which is Father Rossetti, ex-Apostolic prefect of Tripoli, and the third that of a British subject, Father Egan. I understand that the second name is that of an Italian Franciscan. In this case it is the Minister-General of the Franciscans who presents the "terna."

The Vicar of the Nile Delta, Mgr. Duret (Superior of the African Missions of Lyons) also wishes to have a successor or a coadjutor, but in this case the candidates appear to be limited to members of the African Missions Society of Lyons, in whose hands the Vicariate lies. The society has, however, an Irish province from which a British subject might be chosen. But there now arises a difficulty. It had been decided to raise the Vicariate to an Episcopal See with the title of Heliopolis, in which locality a church, with other buildings, has been offered by Baron Empain, the Belgian financier, on condition that during his lifetime the bishop should be Belgian or French.

On the outbreak of war the matter was left in suspense, but recently the Propa-

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ganda has communicated with the present Vicar Apostolic with a view to re-opening negotiations with Baron Empain.

I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to Sir R. Wingate.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Pro-memoria respecting appointment of a new Prelate in Egypt.

IN Egypt there are two Apostolic Vicariates of the Latin rite, that of Alexandria and that of the Nile Delta, which is under the direction of the African Missions Society of Lyons. The Apostolic Vicar of Alexandria, Mgr. Briante, is resigning, and the Minister-General of the Franciscans has already presented a "terna" for his successor. The first name on this "terna" is that of the Rev. Bonaventura Rossetti, formerly Apostolic Prefect of Tripoli, the third is that of an Englishman, Father Egan.

The Apostolic Vicar of the Nile Delta is Mgr. Duret (French) the Superior of the African Missions Society of Lyons. He, too, wishes to resign or to have a coadjutor, a member of course of his society. The society has an Irish province and, according to Mgr. Duret, might furnish a good English candidate as Bishop.

There is, however, a difficulty.

The Vicariate of the Nile Delta was to have been raised to a bishopric—the project was approved by the Propaganda in July 1914—to be called the See of Heliopolis, and a splendid church, with a residence for the Bishop, &c., had been offered by Baron Empain, a Belgian gentleman who owns vast property at Heliopolis, on condition that during his lifetime the bishop should be a Belgian or a Frenchman.

The Propaganda, which had already issued to Mgr. Duret a legal mandate to take possession in its name of the church and buildings which were to form the seat of the diocese, was obliged to suspend action in view of the outbreak of war. Quite recently the congregation instructed Mgr. Duret to state whether he considered it desirable to re-open negotiations with Baron Empain in regard to the cession of the buildings in question, and of course under the same conditions as already approved.

No. 17.

Count de Salis to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, January 14, 1919.

FOLLOWING sent to Cairo to day, unnumbered: Apostolic Vicars in Egypt.

I have sent you despatch dated 5th January explaining how matter at present stands. You will see from it that in the case of Alexandria submission of names of candidates for post is made by Master-General of Franciscans, while in the case of Nile Delta names are submitted by African Missions Society.

In the circumstances it is very difficult to obtain appointment of a candidate not recommended by either.

In the case of Nile Delta matter is further complicated by fact that Belgian financier, Empain, has offered large donation on condition of appointment Belgian or Frenchman.

Perhaps you can bring pressure to bear on him. Vatican are going to raise this post from a Vicariate to a Bishopric.

No. 18.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 14, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 6.*

Treasury are prepared to introduce into Parliament legislation modifying existing statutes with regard to Sudan Loan guarantee and necessary bill is being drafted

* Not printed.

forthwith. They wish to discuss exact terms with delegates of Sudan Government and this Department as soon as convenient.

In meantime Treasury desire that any estimates prepared by Sudan Government should be immediately revised in light of present prices.

Treasury will communicate further with regard to extent of revised scheme.

With regard to balance of loan of 500,000l. Treasury understand that in view of proposed legislation National Debt Commissioners would postpone deposit of fresh bonds until legislation has been obtained.

Similarly, Treasury would be glad to postpone further advance of 250,000l. until this legislation is obtained, unless this course would seriously inconvenience Sudan Government.

Please telegraph names of Sudan delegates and views of Sudan Government as to proposal to postpone advance of 250,000l.

Sir M. Macdonald has been informed.

No. 19.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 14, 1919.)

(No. 313.)

Sir,

Cairo, December 7, 1918.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 296 of the 23rd November I have the honour to forward herewith a commentary which I have received from Sir William Brunyate on the draft Penal Code.*

I have, &c.

REGINALD WINGATE.

No. 20.

Note communicated by French Embassy, January 16, 1919.

LE Gouvernement français a été saisi par le Gouvernement égyptien d'une proposition tendant au renouvellement des pouvoirs des tribunaux mixtes pour neuf mois, du 1^{er} février au 31 octobre 1919.

Le Chargé d'Affaires de France a reçu pour instructions de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères que le Gouvernement de la République consentait à ce que les pouvoirs des tribunaux mixtes fussent prorogés jusqu'au 31 octobre prochain.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 15 janvier 1919.

No. 21.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 17, 1919.)

(No. 352.)

[Extract.]

Cairo, December 27, 1918.

SINCE the arrival of the new French agent and consul-general, M. Lefèvre Pontalis, last summer, I have been somewhat struck by the querulous and indeed at moments almost unfriendly tone of the official communications which from time to time he has addressed to me. These communications were generally in regard to comparatively unimportant matters such as cases of disputed nationality and other kindred questions which form the stock-in-trade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was inclined to attribute this departure from the traditions of his predecessor M. Defrance, who had shown himself in this sort of questions very conciliatory to the activities of a young, able, but somewhat tactless secretary named M. Cosme, who was all too ready to voice the grievances of the small but vocal French colony. I did not, therefore, pay much attention to the change of attitude beyond taking special care to meet, wherever possible, the wishes of the French agency, even when I considered their demands rather unreasonable.

* Printed separately.

The French Minister on arriving in this country seemed to have made up his mind that while events had moved in London and Paris since 1904 the outlook of the Anglo-Egyptian official had remained unchanged, and that there was a *parti-pris* of hostility to the French in Egypt. I was at a loss to know on what grounds he had formed this erroneous opinion, but evidently he himself gradually abandoned it under the pressure of facts, as his present campaign is directed against the Egyptian as opposed to the British official. His manner and point of view was possibly the result of ill-health and a long residence in Siam, for he recently made a sort of apology to me and complained to me of nervous irritation due to many years spent in hot and enervating climates. I do not at all admit that his complaints in the past have been always justified, and he gives me the impression of being both somewhat ill-informed and inclined to jump to conclusions on insufficient evidence and study of the question, as in the Fakre case. Still there is no doubt that he is convinced that the state of Egypt is not anything like sufficiently advanced for the sort of local government and administration which he considers there is an increasing tendency to introduce here. At ordinary times his views might not have much importance, all the more so as the French and British system, with regard to the administration of colonies and protectorates, differs so radically as to make it almost impossible for the one to understand the other. As he said to me himself, "L'Algérie est un Département de la France." Now, however, at a moment when there is not only a sharp recrudescence of nationalism, but also when the final negotiations are proceeding with France for the abolition of the capitulations, the opinions of the French representative, even if ill-founded, carry considerable weight, and may well have an echo in Paris and London.

I saw M. Lefèvre-Pontalis myself not long after his conversation with Mr. Greg, and he fully confirmed and amplified all that he had then said. The necessity of an increased number of Englishmen in the police appeared to strike him as perhaps the most urgent consideration. He complained that numerous incidents had taken place in the provinces where Frenchmen and French interest had, he regretted to say, been treated with scant respect, but though he brought with him a large *dossier*, he only specified one or two instances, and those of trifling importance. He next touched on the impending judicial modifications in the present legal system, and alluded to a fear entertained by some of his compatriots lest the adoption of English methods of administering justice should weaken the power of the Executive to obtain convictions and to repress crime. He also, somewhat inconsistently, gave expression to an apprehension lest the introduction in a country where bribery and corruption are the rule and not the exception, as part of the legal machinery, of affidavits and statutory declarations should lead to the Courts attaching undue weight to any statement supported by an oath or sanctioned by a criminal penalty. It appears to be the fact that the English principle of insisting on the best available evidence, a principle which is notably absent from French law, has been distorted in the minds of many lawyers of the foreign colonies into a revival of the mediæval practice of counting witnesses as distinguished from weighing evidence.

Mr. Gary, the American agent and consul-general, has adopted very much the same tone, and has given me to understand that while the United States Government are most sympathetically disposed towards the maintenance of an effective British control in Egypt, they wish Great Britain to be fully responsible for the administration of the country. Mr. Gary had occasion to complain of the recent action of the Alexandria International Municipality in taxing some American Mission property in Alexandria, according to him unjustly. The Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amos, entirely endorses Mr. Gary's views, and all that is possible has been done to induce the municipality to go back on their decision. They, however, will not do so, and the Ministry of the Interior, on which the municipality depends, has declared itself unable to bring any pressure to bear, however much they may differ from the municipality in the matter. This appeared to Mr. Gary altogether objectionable, and he said that in the future he trusted that neither Egyptian nor foreigner would stand between America and Great Britain in this country. Like M. Lefèvre-Pontalis, he emphasised the necessity of direct contact with the real rulers of Egypt. The above case is not a very good one, as however unjust the decision of the municipality may be, it is always open to the American Mission to bring an action before the Mixed Courts. None the less, the tone and attitude of the American representative are significant, and there is little doubt that he has reported to his Government much in the sense of the French Minister's conversations with Mr. Greg and myself.

No. 22.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 17.)(No. 5.)
Sir,

Cairo, January 2, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 279 of the 20th November last, and to inform you that I have consulted Sir W. Brunyate and Judge Grain on the question of conferring upon the British Consular Court in Egypt a divorce jurisdiction terminable when the new law of judicial organisation comes into force. I attach copies of their observations.

At the time when he wrote his observations, Judge Grain had not seen Sir W. Brunyate's minute. I communicated it to him, and he informed me in reply that its contents do not necessitate the modification of the views he had expressed.

I have, &c.

REGINALD WINGATE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

Observations by Sir William Brunyate on Foreign Office Despatch No. 279 of November 20, 1918.

HOWEVER early the date at which we may be able to set up our new Courts, I think it possible that there may still be a transitory period during which we should ask to have matters of personal status left to the Consular Courts, and, in view of the comparative simplicity of the procedure for extending the jurisdiction of our Consular Court, I should therefore recommend that divorce jurisdiction be conferred on His Majesty's Supreme Court in Egypt without delay. I feel that were I to express any other opinion I should, in the event of any serious delay in conferring the like jurisdiction upon our new Courts, have laid myself open to a charge of undue optimism, with consequent prejudice to the interests of persons in the position of Mrs. Casdagli. It occurs to me that the extra work which would be thrown upon Judge Grain by such extension of his jurisdiction would be comparatively small, as the decision now arrived at that it is possible for a British subject to obtain an Egyptian domicile leaves intact the existing situation under which very large numbers of us have kept our domicile of origin.

The above observations are made subject to the general concurrence of Judge Grain. There is, however, one point as to which I feel some anxiety. I conceive it to be possible that it will be found that considerable numbers of persons of Maltese origin have in fact obtained an Egyptian domicile, and it occurs to me, in the absence of specific information as to the law of Malta, that in all probability divorce is not recognised in that island. Should then divorce jurisdiction be conferred on the Supreme Court in respect of persons of Maltese origin with an Egyptian domicile, a change of the substantive law might be involved which might raise delicate political questions.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

Observations by Judge Grain on Foreign Office Despatch No. 279 of November 20, 1918.

I AGREE that if consular jurisdiction continues to exist for an unlimited length of time it would be necessary to confer divorce jurisdiction on His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court in Egypt.

By an unlimited length of time I mean more than a year, and I consider that one year would be the extreme limit.

2. I have no knowledge regarding the new codes for procedure and law in the new judicial organisation, and am therefore not in a position to say whether questions of personal status have been considered and legislated for.

Nor am I in a position to say whether the new scheme of judicial organisation is sufficiently advanced to enable it to be put into operation within a short period.

3. In my opinion there would be very few genuine British subjects in Egypt who could be held to have acquired an Egyptian domicile, and it appears to me doubtful

whether it is necessary at the present moment to legislate for persons who in reality are only British subjects in name.

4. There are a large number of Maltese (who, as it is known, are British subjects) in Egypt, and should divorce jurisdiction be conferred on this Court, I know from the many applications which have been made to this Court that a considerable number of petitions for divorce would be set down.

The law of Malta does not sanction divorce, and whether if divorce jurisdiction was given to this Court it would be in a position to grant decrees of divorce to Maltese subjects, I am not prepared to discuss in this despatch.

5. Hitherto the following Consular Courts have had divorce jurisdiction in Egypt: France, Belgium, Germany, Austria.

The following have had no divorce jurisdiction: Great Britain, Italy and Greece.

6. When the Special Courts for Germans and Austrians were established in April 1915, and the jurisdiction over German and Austrian subjects in Egypt was conferred on the British Consular Courts, it was decreed that "the substantive law to be applied by the said Special Courts shall be the law applied by the British Consular Courts," subject to matters of contract, personal status and testamentary documents in which cases the laws of the national (German or Austrian) were to apply.

7. I have had several cases in the Special Courts in which decrees of divorce have been petitioned for, but in all the cases which have come before me I have held that I had no power to grant the petition, notwithstanding the fact that the Consular Courts of Germany and Austria had divorce jurisdiction, on the ground that as a British Court I had no jurisdiction in divorce.

8. I mention these questions of the Malta law concerning divorce and divorce petitions in the Special Courts in order that the authorities may have them within their knowledge in the event of divorce jurisdiction being conferred on the British Consular Courts.

9. The matter of conferring jurisdiction in divorce on the Consular Courts was discussed when the 1910 Order in Council was drawn up, and correspondence took place between His Britannic Majesty's Judge at Constantinople and the Foreign Office on the subject in 1909, which, no doubt, can be referred to in the archives of the Foreign Office.

No. 23.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 16, 1919.

I HAVE had several interviews with Sultan and two Ministers in endeavour to arrive at solution of crisis on line laid down in your telegram No. 1596.*

It has already become clear that anti-protectorate sentiment was being fomented by Turkish party acting in the name of ex-Khedive. Sultan represented this fact to me very strongly, and I considered it necessary to publish proclamation vesting Khedivial estates in Government, and stating in recitals exclusion of Abbas and his sons from succession. I believe that this authoritative action has encouraged Sultan to adopt a firmer tone, and has helped to diminish influence of extremists.

I have had great difficulty with Ministers. They have held most tenaciously to the view that, even if they went to London, they would have to resign again later, unless they could obtain some measure of popular support. They insisted that Nationalist leaders would always be able to outbid them, unless they too were allowed to go to England and be discredited by their failure to gain a hearing from His Majesty's Government. I had already informed Ministers that I myself had been summoned by you to discuss Egyptian affairs, that you had made a large concession, and that it was their plain duty to accept invitation now extended to them. Sultan used similar language.

Finally, Ministers made following proposal:—

They said that they were most desirous to accept our suggestions and work for a liberal definition of protectorate, to which they were entirely loyal. They had no doubt that satisfactory agreement would be easy, but their position here would be hopeless unless Saad Zaghlul were shown to be incapable of redeeming his

* See No. 2.

promises. To attain this end it was, in their opinion, essential for him and his associates to leave Egypt and return empty-handed. They pleaded it was only necessary to grant passports to members of Nationalist deputation who applied for them individually. They quite understood no Nationalist could be officially received, and for their part they wished nothing better.

Rushdy and Adly Pashas begged me, therefore, as I was going home, to lay their case personally before you, and explain their difficulties, and I agreed to do so. I think two Ministers are sincere, and I hope that point of relaxation of military regulations in favour of extremists is one which you will be able to negotiate. No action is necessary until my arrival. Refusal to accept Ministers' resignations has no doubt had a good effect, and intervening period has shown Government will be carried on, if necessary, without an Egyptian Cabinet. But though ordinary administration continues without inconvenience, reconstructive work will be seriously interrupted if present situation is prolonged. Capitulations Commission is unable to sit, and absence of Adly has stopped progress of important sub-commission on local government.

Real co-operation with leading Egyptians has, in fact, become an essential part of our machinery, and I trust that you will consider very carefully method of conciliation, which I have now advanced after prolonged discussion, and in agreement with my principal advisers.

No. 24.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, January 16, 1919.

YOUR despatch No. 287, Commercial, 1917, paragraph 5.

In view of changed situation would you be prepared to reconsider resumption of sales of realised estates in Egypt.

The only property affected would be that of realised German and Austrian businesses, as there is no commercially owned property in Egypt declared as Turkish or Bulgarian.

No. 25.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, January 16, 1919.

VATICAN telegram No. 7* the 14th January regarding apostolic vicars in Egypt, repeated to me.

Cardinal Bourne and I have discussed matters at length. Cardinal has made an exhaustive inspection of ecclesiastical establishments in Egypt and I am convinced that political effect of a British cardinal's presence in this country has been excellent.

He continues journey to Palestine and Syria to-morrow. He has written fully and confidentially to Cardinal Gasparri, strongly advocating appointment of Father Couturier as Vice-Administrator in Egypt; fact that he is a Dominican should prevent objections on the part of both Franciscans and African Mission.

Cardinal hopes that it may be possible for you to exercise some pressure in direction indicated: he has written in the same sense to Count de Salis.

Once a sound ecclesiastical establishment is assured here Cardinal Bourne does not anticipate any difficulty in securing services of those army chaplains mentioned in my telegram 1980 the 30th December who would be prepared to remain in Egypt on demobilisation.

(Repeated to Vatican.)

* See No. 17.

No. 26.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Wingate.(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, January 18, 1919.*

MY telegram No. 66.*

I am forwarding by bag to-day copy of letter from Treasury relative to amendment of Sudan Loan Act.

Main points are as follows:—

Total loan to be limited to 5,000,000*l.* cash in view of pressure on United Kingdom for capital expenditure on urgent reconstruction matters. Treasury note that it is not prepared to start works other than Gezira scheme now and consider that above provision should meet requirements.

Treasury agree to revise rate of interest, but do not assent to sixty year sinking fund. They believe City would consider long period unwelcome and wish to discuss further with Sudan delegates.

They consider that owing to conditions now obtaining, costs submitted in previous estimates is certain to be exceeded and they desire revised estimates immediately.

Sir M. Macdonald informed.

No. 27.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 21.)(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) R.*Cairo, January 20, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 23.

Sir George Macauley's observations are being sent to you by bag.

Egyptian Government agree that they will have to take over this line on reasonable terms, but whether or not army wishes at present time to train staff whole question of terms on which line is to be taken over can I think best be settled later when we know more of future of Palestine.

No. 28.

Foreign Office to Army Council.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1919.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 121 Railways 423 D.P.W. of the 30th ultimo, regarding the transfer of the Kantara-Rafa railway line to the Egyptian Government, and to state, for the information of the Army Council, that a telegram was addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, on the subject.† A reply has now been received to the effect that the Egyptian Government are prepared to take over the line on reasonable terms and that their detailed observations are being forwarded by despatch. Lord Curzon will communicate them when received.

Sir R. Wingate suggests in his telegram that the question of the terms on which the line is to be taken over would best be settled when the future of Palestine has been determined.

Lord Curzon concurs in this view and would be glad to learn if the Army Council see any objection to the suggestion.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

* See No. 18.

* See No. 27.

17

No. 29.

Earl Curzon to Count de Salis.(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, January 25, 1919.*

CAIRO telegram No. 92.*

Apostolic vicar in Egypt.

You should do all that you can to obtain the desired nomination.

No. 30.

Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 29.)

My Lord,

Manchester, January 28, 1919.

I AM desired by the President of this Chamber, Mr. R. B. Stoker, M.P., to inform you that the Chamber are very desirous that an interview should take place with you as soon after Parliament has assembled as possible, when the Chamber would be represented by several of the Members of Parliament for Manchester and Salford, Mr. J. P. Foster of the Egyptian Bar, and Mr. T. E. Casdagli, a director of this Chamber.

It is regarded as most essential that the present time should be taken to impress upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of prompt and decisive action in furtherance of the best administration of Egypt. The following are the two principal points:—

1. The use of the English language in the Law Courts in Egypt, and
2. The application of the English principles of law in Egypt.

The president is very glad to find from the Foreign Office letter of the 3rd January† that Mr. Balfour sympathises with the views of the Chamber, and the Chamber counts upon the active exercise of this sympathy in the forthcoming struggle with those powerful interests whom nothing would please better than that matters-legal in Egypt, should be left exactly as they are for an indefinite period of time.

The president believes your Lordship's help will be enlisted when you have heard what the deputation has to say.

I am, &c.

WALTER SPECKMAN, *Secretary.*

No. 31.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 16, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of notes of conversations held on the 14th and 15th instant with His Highness the Sultan, and with Rushdy and Adly Pashas, with reference to the present Ministerial crisis in this country.

I have, &c.

REGINALD WINGATE.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Notes on Conversations on January 14 and 15, 1919.

BEFORE seeing Rushdy and Adly on the 14th instant, I had an interview with Sir William Brunyate, at which Sir Milne Cheetham was present. I read them the foregoing statement of what had occurred up to date, and then told them, in confidence, that I was proceeding to London on the 21st instant. We then discussed the impending interview, and decided that in the circumstances this information would perhaps affect the Ministers' decision, and that it would be well to take them into my confidence.

* See No. 25.

† Not printed.

I may here mention that I had a brief talk with Mr. Robert Rolo before seeing the Ministers. He told me, in confidence, that the Sultan had sent for him, had described in detail his conversations of the previous day with Rushdy and Adly, and had expressed to him great indignation at a remark from Adly that it was apparent from His Highness's desire that the Ministers should now accept His Majesty's Government's invitation, that he—the Sultan—had changed his views. His Highness had also pointed out to him that another obstacle to the acceptance of the invitation was the demand from His Majesty's Government for a preliminary programme of what they proposed to lay before the authorities in London. They altogether disliked this idea as it would weaken their position in the eyes of the Nationalists, who would say that in putting it forward they had been influenced by the Residency. His Highness hoped, therefore, that I would not press this point unduly at the impending conference.

At noon Rushdy and Adly arrived, and we had a conversation lasting over an hour, at which Sir Milne Cheetham was present. The whole situation was reviewed at some length, but it was clear that they had both made up their minds to refuse the invitation conveyed in my note; they repeated that its terms differed very little from those originally offered, that it was clear the Peace Conference would have formally ratified the British protectorate over Egypt before they had had time to say what they wished to the Government, and that, therefore, this renewed invitation had come too late.

Recognising, as we did, the importance of ending the present crisis by getting the Ministers to abandon their unreasonable attitude, Sir Milne Cheetham and I argued at some length that His Majesty's Government had shown a most conciliatory attitude when the whole of the circumstances had become known to them through my letters and reports, which had been much delayed in transit; that they had advanced the date of their arrival in London; that the deliberations of the Inter-Allied Conference had by chance been considerably delayed; that it was practically certain the Peace Conference could not begin for many weeks; and that, consequently, the possibility of explaining to His Majesty's Government all they had to say regarding the Egyptian question—before any mention of it was made at either Conference—was not so remote as they seemed to think. Finding them still recalcitrant, I then asked them if they thought my presence in London at the same time as themselves would be likely to help matters. This question puzzled them, and there was some hesitation. I then frankly announced that I had received sudden instructions to proceed forthwith to London, and that I was leaving in one of His Majesty's ships on the 21st instant. This announcement had a somewhat staggering effect, and Rushdy asked Adly a question in Turkish. I felt obliged to say that I understood Turkish, when Rushdy at once said, "I asked Adly whether, if we went with the High Commissioner, it might not be as well to accept the invitation." I at once replied that my instructions were quite clear, and that I must arrive in London ten days or so before the Ministers in order to discuss matters in advance, but that, as my own departure had been accelerated, I would at once make arrangements with the military authorities so that passages in some steamer could be reserved for them at an early date, and that I thought it would be possible for them to leave Egypt during the first week of February, which would probably bring them to London about the middle of next month.

They asked for time to consider the whole matter in this new aspect. I told them that as I had not yet informed the Sultan of my movements, I must ask them to make no mention of this until I had had time to see him; this I said I would do in the course of the day, and that they would probably be received by His Highness immediately after I had made my communication to him.

The Ministers then left, but I should add that, at one moment, our conversation became heated owing to Rushdy's reiterated complaints against the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I felt obliged to call him to order in a somewhat abrupt manner; his demeanour at once improved, and he insisted that he meant no offence.

In the evening I saw the Sultan who, to my surprise, announced he had already seen Rushdy and Adly, and had heard from them an account of our conversation in the morning. They had not been very communicative, had told him they were still thinking over the matter, and were to have another interview at the Residency the following morning.

I then explained to His Highness the reasons for their apparent reticence in that I had asked them to make no reference to my movements until I had had an opportunity of personally informing him. His Highness thanked me for this courtesy, and added that he most sincerely hoped the announcement would have the desired effect in inducing the Ministers to adopt a more reasonable attitude; he expressed great pleasure at the news, and hoped that personal explanations would go far towards bringing about

a better understanding of all the complicated facts of the situation. He seemed still to have misgivings that the Ministers would withdraw their resignations, but hoped for the best.

When I asked him what his own intentions were as to proceeding to London, he replied that he had no wish to become involved in the discussions there; that if His Majesty's Government could not grant the Egyptian demands, the failure would be attributed to him, and he would lose altogether his influence in the country. He still hoped that, after my arrival in London, the embargo against the Extremists being allowed to leave Egypt would be removed—the plea that they required to take a water cure at some place on the Continent might now surely be admitted? He fully understood that His Majesty's Government could not receive them officially, but no doubt they would have an opportunity of seeing people unofficially. He again pointed out that when all sorts and conditions of people were allowed to leave neighbouring countries to proceed abroad, now that the war was over, it was surely mistaken policy to maintain the embargo against certain Egyptians who, after all, were only voicing the policy indicated by President Wilson in innumerable speeches, a policy which it seemed, from the public press, His Majesty's Government had also endorsed. He urged again that this suppression of extremist Egyptian opinion, with which he in no sense associated himself, would only result in doing more harm than good; that they would only take their answer from His Majesty's Government direct, and nothing else would satisfy either extremists or the Ministers, though there was a wide difference between them. He and the Ministers accepted the Protectorate, but wanted to know what its "colour" would be; they knew Egypt must be "protected," and what better protection could they have than that of Great Britain?

At 9.30 A.M. on the 15th instant, I received a visit from Mr. Robert Rolo, who informed me that he had been twice summoned to the Palace yesterday by the Sultan—once in the afternoon, after His Highness had seen the Ministers, and again in the evening just after I left the Palace. The Sultan had given him a full account of both interviews, and had requested him to inform me, before I saw the Ministers this morning, of his impressions.

Mr. Rolo then proceeded to give me a full account of all that had passed, but, to avoid useless repetition, I need only mention the salient points. Rushdy's attitude had been generally more complaisant than that of Adly, but both had placed very forcibly before the Sultan the importance of conciliating the extremists; they pointed out that if they now withdrew their resignations and accepted His Majesty's Government's invitation, went to London, and failed to secure their demands, they would never be credited by the party of the people with having loyally done their duty as Egyptian patriots; their future value would be largely discounted, and they would merely be obliged again to resign. If, they said, the embargo against Saad Zaghlul and his adherents quitting Egypt could be removed, and they were permitted to go to Europe, not as a deputation, but individually, then the Ministers' faces would be saved and there would be sufficient witnesses in Europe to testify to the Egyptians that the Ministers had not betrayed their country.

They fully admitted that it might not be possible for His Majesty's Government to accede to all their demands, and it was quite evident they could not for a moment grant the absurd request of Zaghlul and his party; but if it were possible for me to give some assurances to the Ministers, in my forthcoming interview with them, that I would represent to the Home authorities, when I saw them, the desirability of removing this veto against the freedom of movement of the extremists, the Sultan had little doubt that both Rushdy and Adly would then consent to go to London.

At 11 A.M. to-day, I saw the two Ministers, Sir Milne Cheetham being present. Our conversation worked out almost exactly on the lines which Mr. Rolo had indicated, and I had no difficulty in assuring both Ministers that I would willingly represent their difficulties to the British Foreign Office authorities in London and Paris, and that, although I could give no positive assurance that the veto against the departure of individual extremists would be withdrawn, I had every hope that a full verbal explanation would help to clear up misunderstandings, and they might rely on me to do what I could to convince His Majesty's Government that what was now suggested would be likely to lead to a satisfactory result. My object, I said, was to arrive at harmony, not discord, and that I had every hope of success if all parties concerned would act in a reasonable manner. I said that I must strongly deprecate the action of the extremists, who had chosen a most inopportune moment, when His Majesty's Government was so fully preoccupied, to make demands which were injudicious and unjust, as they were incapable of fulfilment. In this the Ministers appeared fully to

agree, but argued that Egyptian or Oriental mentality was not fully understood and that they begged His Majesty's Government would make due allowance for the difficulty of their position—a position which had been rendered extremely acute by the war strain, the collapse of Turkey, and by the widespread dissemination of self-determination ideas which were imperfectly understood in the East, but greedily swallowed by all and sundry in this country.

After some further remarks, it was agreed that immediately I had seen the authorities in Paris or London, I should telegraph to Sir Milne Cheetham the decision of His Majesty's Government as to the removal of the veto, and, on the assumption that no further objection would be raised, arrangements could then be made for the journey of the Ministers to London; they thought that if they could leave Egypt about the 10th February this would be a suitable date. If, on the other hand, the removal of the veto was impossible, they would reluctantly be obliged to abandon their visit to London.

Meanwhile, their present attitude will be unchanged, and they will continue to absent themselves from their offices, but it was quite evident to both Sir Milne Cheetham and myself that their demeanour was entirely conciliatory, and they left in the confident hope that we would shortly meet in London. I informed them that, as my departure was entirely private, I would dispense with their attendance at the railway station, as they had expressed a wish to bid me good-bye there.

I also impressed upon them the undesirability of Zaghlul and party being informed of my movements. No doubt, on my departure, they would learn what had been arranged, and if the veto were removed, Sir Milne Cheetham would settle with the military authorities for the furnishing of the necessary permission to travel, after which they would be able to obtain their passports.

I saw Mr. Rolo, to whom I gave an account of our meeting, and asked him to explain it to the Sultan, whom I hoped to see before I left, but that I did not think any useful purpose would be served by too frequent visits to the Palace at the present juncture, as such would tend to increase popular excitement which it was desired to allay.

I omitted to mention that, in the course of my interview with the Sultan last night, he referred to the immense influence exercised by the Turkish harem ladies in all political questions. They were hopelessly ignorant, extremely prejudiced against England, and many of them still believed that the news of the Turco-German defeat was false propaganda instigated by the British. Their power over their husbands was hardly realised by us Westerns but it was none the less real, and our present difficulties were largely attributable to their hostility and malignity.

R. W.

January 15, 1919.

No. 32.

Sir M. Fitzmaurice to Mr. Balfour.—(Received February 1.)

Westminster Chambers, 9, Victoria Street, London,
January 31, 1919.

Sir,

NILE Projects Committee.

I beg to forward herewith the report of the above committee.*

I am, &c.

MAURICE FITZMAURICE.

No. 33.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, February 1, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 25.†

Decree prolonging powers of Mixed Court to 1st November was published yesterday.

* Printed separately.

† See No. 11.

No. 34.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 182.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, February 3, 1919.

ADMINISTRATION has continued without serious inconvenience during last fortnight, and in some cases the Council of Ministers has taken decisions by method of circulation of papers for signature to which resort is frequently made in normal circumstances. Otherwise Prime Minister and Adly Pasha are taking no part in public business, but are anxiously awaiting a decision which will permit them to leave Egypt.

There has been no question of disturbance of public order, and doings of extremists probably excite less interest now than was the case a few weeks ago. Saad Zaghlul recently issued invitations to 600 people, whom he proposed to address in tents adjoining his house in Cairo. As a gathering on this scale constituted a public meeting the military authorities, at my request, required him to countermand invitations. There is nothing else of interest to report except tendency to friction between Saad Zaghlul and old Nationalists.

No. 35.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, February 5, 1919.

MY telegram No. 1799 of 1918.

Taking into consideration removal of restrictions on cotton area, Egypt will probably require between 40,000-80,000 tons of imported wheat during the winter of 1919 to 1920 and spring of 1920. It is not yet possible to estimate more exactly, even these figures are not guaranteed.

There will be no maize available from Egypt or the Soudan this season (see your telegram No. 1449 of 1918), and exports of millet from Soudan, owing to poor crop, will be negligible.

No. 36.

Foreign Office to Sir W. Garstin.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 6, 1919.

WITH reference to your conversation with Lord Hardinge of Penshurst on the 15th November last, respecting the desire of the Suez Canal Company that under the scheme of judicial reorganisation in Egypt, a central tribunal should be established in the Canal zone, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that the views expressed by you on this subject, together with a copy of the extract from the minutes of the company's board meeting which was handed by you to Lord Hardinge on that occasion, were communicated to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt, who was requested to report the attitude of the Egyptian Government concerning the question.

A copy of Sir R. Wingate's reply, enclosing a report* by the rapporteur of the Capitulations Commission at Cairo are transmitted to you herewith, and I am to suggest that you should communicate these documents to the directors of the Canal Company in order that they may appreciate the reasons which have induced the authorities in Egypt to adopt the decisions which have been arrived at in regard to the distribution of the various tribunals.

As the directors will observe, there exist very considerable difficulties in following a procedure in accordance with the desires expressed by them as recorded in the minutes of their meeting, and, in the circumstances, Lord Curzon regrets that he does not feel able to press the Egyptian Government to reconsider their attitude in the matter. His Lordship hopes that the company will, in practice, find that the arrangements in respect to the location of the new Courts will not cause for them the inconvenience which they anticipate.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

* No. 12.

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No. 37.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 91.*

You are authorised to resume sales.

No. 38.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, February 6, 1919.

OUR telegram No. 89.

On 4th instant the Prime Minister came to ask an early decision as to consideration which he had laid before High Commissioner prior to his departure from Egypt. He begged me to telegraph saying his position was a very difficult one, and that he had shown proof of goodwill by again taking some part in public business.

I said I would forward his message, but it was perhaps too early to expect an immediate answer.

No. 39.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 177.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 8, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 40.†

It is recognised that civilians must be brought home, but you must remember almost insuperable difficulties confronting Ministry of Shipping. Burnett Stuart has explained situation to them. They will do everything possible to assist, but cannot yet lay down definite scheme. Temporary relief may be given by despatching small batches of passengers on homeward bound ships in near future, but it is most unlikely that any considerable numbers can be moved before end of March.

Shipping authorities desire formation of Priority Board similar to Indian one to review all applications for passages to Europe. You will no doubt consider advisability of having non-Government representation on Board.

This Board must assume control of embarkation for Europe of all British civilians, and passports for these should not be granted without Board's sanction.

Board must arrange applicants in order of priority and should be guided by following considerations:—

1. Prior claim of *bonâ fide* residents.
2. Period which has elapsed since applicant last left Egypt.
3. Any resident women and children who have had leave since war began and have returned to Egypt have done so at their own risk. This applies still more forcibly to non-residents who have come to Egypt since the war.

Those first on list may have to leave at very short notice, say, five days. Every passenger must sign paper that he or she will make no complaint as to accommodation, &c. It must further be understood that no indication can be given as to when return to Egypt can be arranged.

As regard opportunities for passage, the Priority Board should keep in touch with P.N.T.O., Cairo, who is being instructed to give the longest possible notice to the Board of any available space.

* See No. 24.

† See No. 14.

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No. 40.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 268.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, February 10, 1919.

FOLLOWING sent to Cairo, No. 7:—

"Judge Amos's private letter of 18th January to Mr. Hurst.

"I am not clear that work is being concentrated upon the legislation which is really essential. I consider it most important that this should be done, and that legislation which is only of secondary importance should be left on one side for the present in order that the new régime in Egypt may be brought into force as soon as possible. I understand that Judicial Organisation Decree provides that there shall be an interval after the promulgation of the principal codes (penal and two procedure) before they can be brought into force. During that interval laws of lesser importance might be dealt with.

Please give definite instructions on these lines, and emphasise that it is essential that work should be completed within the next few months as it is out of the question to postpone the introduction of the new system until the end of 1920.

No. 41.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 13, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 206*: Egyptian political situation.

Question is being considered in consultation with Sir R. Wingate, and decision will shortly be communicated to you.

No. 42.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 241.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, February 13, 1919.

YOUR despatch No. 5† of 3rd January.

Railways and frontier districts administration consider aircraft would be useful for patrolling line from Kantara to Rafa and other desert regions. It is considered that their employment for postal services here would be extravagant and unnecessary.

Egyptian Government has for long period paid fixed annual contribution to British forces without distinguishing one category of force from another. If establishment of Royal Air Force here entails increase in contribution it would appear that fresh basis of contribution would have to be settled by negotiations with Egyptian Government.

Sirdar's observations are as follows; I should welcome a unit of air force as an essential adjunct to normal British garrison here, and there are occasions when its services might well be used on patrols or in urgent cases for conveying officials. Question of utilisation of aircraft for civil purposes assumes a different aspect and is mainly one of finance. At present cost would be prohibitive for this country generally. The only possible exception would be postal service between Khartoum and Cairo, but it is very doubtful whether amount of traffic would make it a commercial success. This was discussed by General Herbert, R.A.F., during his recent visit here, and we came to conclusion that if a unit was established here as part of British garrison a six months' experiment for this purpose might be made.

* See No. 33.

† See No. 7.

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No. 43.

*Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.**

(No. 56.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 17, 1919.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy† of the draft convention with France regarding Egypt and Morocco (a copy of which has already been forwarded to Sir R. Wingate semi-officially), together with a copy of a provisional draft letter from Sir R. Graham to the Counsellor of the French Embassy, which it is proposed to send as a covering letter to the draft convention when returned in the form finally agreed upon.

The draft letter to M. de Fleuriau resumes, as you will observe, the various points connected with the convention, but not actually provided for therein, regarding which His Majesty's Government require assurances from the French Government.

As regards the draft convention itself, the only article on which the delegates of the two Governments have as yet failed to come to an agreement is article 17, and it is hoped that a settlement will soon be reached on this outstanding point as the result of conversations on the subject now proceeding at Paris.

I may add that the French text of the draft convention is that on the basis of which the previous negotiations have been carried on, the English translation attached thereto being merely a provisional one appended for the sake of convenience.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

*Draft of Letter from Sir R. Graham to M. de Fleuriau.**Foreign Office, February 19, 1919.*

I HAD hoped to have been able by now to return the final draft of the Egypt-Morocco Convention, but further telegraphic correspondence with Sir R. Wingate has drawn attention to the need of clearing up one or two uncertain points regarding article 17.

In the first place it seems very necessary that no ambiguity should exist as to the scope of the second part of the first paragraph which reads: "elles se soumettront aux lois de contrôle scolaire," &c. The Egyptian Government will no doubt wish to regulate the curriculum to be pursued in schools to which they accord recognition, and I presume that this is included in the phrase "lois de contrôle scolaire." We should be glad, however, to be sure that this is also the view of the French Government.

Secondly, as regards the words "sans distinction de nationalité," which have been inserted in the third paragraph of the same article, it is not quite clear to us what is the force of the addition. The intention of the paragraph proposed by Hurst at our last meeting was that persons who were entitled to practice at the Bar in France, as holders of diplomas conferring that right, should thereby be entitled to practise at the Bar in Egypt. This right would, of course, not belong to persons who for reasons of nationality were debarred from practising in France, and in these circumstances I do not quite understand with what object the words "sans distinction de nationalité" have been added in the revised draft. Perhaps you will be good enough to clear up this point also.

I take this opportunity of referring to a number of points connected with the convention, most of which have entered at some time or other into our discussions, but which have not actually been provided for in the draft. You will probably agree that the more important of these should be covered by an exchange of notes to take place at the time of the signature of the convention, but in the meantime I enclose a list of the matters regarding which His Majesty's Government would wish to receive assurances, and I shall be glad to know if there are any further questions which you consider should be settled at the same time. These assurances could be of a confidential character, if so desired.

* Also to Sir H. White (No. 16), *mutatis mutandis*.

† Not printed.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

*Memorandum.**Morocco.*

ARTICLE 3. The French Government undertake that, pending the conclusion of a new commercial treaty, the fishing rights at present enjoyed by British subjects in the waters and harbour of the French zone, and the right for British vessels to trade on an equal footing with French vessels between French and Moroccan ports, shall remain intact.

That if after the convention comes into force there should still remain outstanding any disputes between British subjects and the Protectorate authorities concerning the title to Habous, Mahzen, or freehold properties, benevolent treatment shall be given to the British claimants.

That as regards private properties at Agadir, the titles to which are disputed by the Mahzen, the same treatment should be extended to British subjects holding such properties as is accorded to the French owners' properties who are understood to have purchased their estates originally at the instigation of the French authorities, provided always that the titles of the British owners are not vitiated by fraud.

That benevolent treatment shall be extended also to the cases of any British subjects against whom the Protectorate authorities have preferred claims for the payment of increment tax under the terms of the Registration Dahir in respect of properties sold by them prior to the signature of the convention.

That the Protectorate authorities will consider favourably claims to British nationality made by persons who have hitherto been recognised generally as British subjects, and as such have enjoyed the privileges of British nationality, but who may be unable to produce documentary proof of their nationality.

Article 6. That the French Government will consider a proposal from His Majesty's Government for an agreement respecting the surrender by the authorities of the French zone of criminals who have taken refuge there from British justice from the Tangier or Spanish zones or from Gibraltar.

Article 9. That the present convention shall not prejudice the right to be regarded as British subjects of persons who acquired British nationality by naturalisation in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Madrid Convention of 1880.

Egypt.

Article 16. That "écoles de tout ordre" includes the French Law School.

Article 17. That the right to be claimed by the French Government under this article shall be limited to the personal appointment of the Director-General, and that in future the spirit of the 1904 Declaration shall not be invoked in support of a claim to French control over the internal administration of the Department or for the appointment of Frenchmen to subordinate posts therein.

General.

That the word "ressortissants" wherever used in the convention is to be interpreted with due regard to the distinction established by the Draft Judicature Law between the two categories of nationals.

Foreign Office, March 28, 1919.

No. 44.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 222.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 19, 1919.

TREASURY ask us to ascertain as quickly as possible the total of the military expenditure incurred by Egypt from the commencement of mobilisation to date, i.e., to 11th November or to 31st December last, whichever is the more convenient date.

The statement should exclude expenditure chargeable to army funds, but should include value of Egyptian contribution in cash towards the cost of the war.

Reply by telegraph.

Minute by Mr. C. Harmsworth on Law and Language in Egypt.

THIS morning Mr. R. B. Stoker, M.P., President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, introduced a deputation from the Egyptian section of that Chamber. The deputation desired to make representations in regard to the two points with which we are familiar. The deputation occupied a good deal of time in historical disquisition.

What they want in brief is:—

1. Adoption of the English Law in Egypt.
2. The abolition of French as the official language.

Complaint was made that the Capitulations Commission as at present constituted is not a body well suited for its purpose, and it was suggested that Sir J. P. Brunyate is not sufficiently conversant with the law and practice of Egypt. It was given as an instance of the absurdity of the retention of French as the official language in Egypt that the minutes of this Commission are reported in French.

The deputation seemed to know nothing of the legal enquiry now being conducted by the Lord Advocate. I understood them to hint that it had no actual existence! I invited the deputation to state their case in a brief memorandum which I promised to submit in the right quarter without delay.

C. H.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1919.

Minutes of an Interdepartmental Meeting held to discuss our Anglo-French Commercial Convention for Egypt and Morocco.

AN interdepartmental meeting was held on the 20th February, 1919, at the Foreign Office to discuss further the question of a new commercial treaty with France regarding Egypt and Morocco.

There were present:

Sir A. Steel-Maitland (*in the chair*).
Mr. Sperling.
Mr. Wills, Board of Trade.
Sir A. Webb.
Mr. Loyd.
Mr. Bruzard, Department of Overseas Trade.
Mr. Hubbard (*Secretary*).

1. Mr. Sperling mentioned the request put forward by the delegates of the Council of the Morocco Merchants' Association at the meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 15th January, and repeated in the Council's letter of the 6th February, that they should be relieved from the undertaking to treat the conversations with Sir A. Steel-Maitland and Mr. Sperling as confidential and should be allowed to inform their members of what had passed. Mr. Sperling asked Sir A. Steel-Maitland if he saw any objection to compliance with this request once the political convention shall have been concluded.

2. Sir Arthur wished to know what promise had been given to the French as regards secrecy and was informed by Mr. Hubbard that at the discussions with M. de Fleuriau the latter had asked, in a general way, that all the negotiations regarding Morocco should be kept confidential, as the French Government did not wish to be embarrassed by any agitation in the French press or Chamber. No particular time limit had been mentioned, but the objection to publicity would presumably cease to exist once the Political Convention was signed. Sir Arthur then added that he regretted to have learnt through the commercial mission now in Morocco that British merchants there were in possession of information which could only have reached them through the disclosure by the Association delegates of confidential information received from the Foreign Office. This being so, it was necessary to be particularly circumspect in any future dealings with the Association in the matter.

3. Sir Arthur passed on to the question whether or no there was any necessity

for a fresh commercial treaty, and his own and Mr. Hurst's minutes on this point, contained in Paper 5626, were read. He wished to know what view Egypt would take towards the matter of (1) imperial preference, (2) power to raise the present maximum rates of tariff.

4. Mr. Loyd said that the Egyptian Government's chief concern was the raising of revenue. The British element in Egypt would, of course, want to see Egypt included in any system of imperial tariffs and would, both for sentimental reasons and, to some extent, for their own interests, wish for preference to be given to British goods entering Egypt. From the nature of Egyptian exports there would be no great gain to that country from the granting of preferential tariff on entry into other parts of the Empire. Egypt therefore, apart from the British section of the community, would be rather indifferent to imperial preference.

5. As regards the second point, the Egyptian Government most certainly desired to be freed from the limitations set to their powers of raising customs dues. These limitations, however, depended on a number of treaties with other foreign countries, e.g., Italy and Greece, and to get rid of the Franco-Egyptian treaty would not in itself be of any use. Egypt would like to get rid of all the restrictive treaties together and attached no great importance to the abrogation of that with France alone, as it would not help materially towards disposing of the others.

6. Sir A. Webb concurred in Mr. Loyd's remarks, adding that there were so few real British agents dealing with British goods in Egypt that there would be little material profit in imperial preference even to the British population in Egypt.

7. Sir A. Steel-Maitland observed that from the point of view of Egypt, then, the case for applying a system of imperial preference would rest almost entirely upon the patriotic desire to assist British trade. It ought, therefore, to be considered whether British trade in general really would be helped by an arrangement enabling Egypt to give preference to British goods in exchange for similar liberty for France in Morocco. As a matter of fact Great Britain and Colonies already held 37 per cent. of Egyptian import trade and had a fairly free field in the export trade of those articles in which she was most interested. (Sir A. Webb pointed out that there would after the war be competition to capture the ex-enemy trade and, to some extent, the ex-Belgian trade which had been considerable.) On the other side, the loss to British trade which would follow upon the introduction of discriminating tariffs in Morocco was a certain one and of considerable magnitude. A balance between the gain and loss in the two markets should be worked out, and he thought that the Board of Trade and Department of Overseas Trade together might prepare a statement of the case.

8. In the meantime he would suggest that, since we did not seem to be committed by the negotiations with the French and the draft political convention to anything more than the principle of fiscal autonomy (or perhaps only the liberty of either party to raise the existing maximum tariffs to a higher figure), the best course for His Majesty's Government to pursue would be to let the matter lie until the French themselves should raise it, and then to restrict it, if possible, to the question of raising the maximum tariffs in Egypt and Morocco.

9. Mr. Sperling said that, speaking for the Moroccan side of the question, he quite concurred in Sir Arthur's suggestion. Sir H. White had, he pointed out, reported that the French in Morocco might be expected to be much more favourably disposed towards British trade with that country once they were free of the present irksome treaty obligations.

10. Mr. Loyd added that he felt sure that the Egyptian Government would be prepared to leave matters as they were till the French moved for a change or until they saw a chance of getting rid *en bloc* of all the treaties which at present bind their hands in the matter of tariffs.

11. Mr. Sperling mentioned the question of mining rights in Morocco and said that he thought it would be well, if no new commercial treaty were contemplated, to make sure that the provision of Article 3 of the draft political convention concerning "droits miniers" was a sufficient safeguard against any such discrimination against foreigners as would result from the application of a mining law on the lines of the bill now before the French Chamber.

12. Sir A. Steel-Maitland agreed that it was a matter which needed careful consideration and that it would be well for the Foreign Office to consult the Board of Trade officially on the matter.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 20, 1919.

QUESTION of successor to Lord E. Cecil as Financial Adviser to Egyptian Government has been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, and it has been decided to appoint Sir Richard Crawford, whose record of public service will be well known to you, to the post. Sir R. Crawford, who was strongly recommended by the Treasury, has accepted, and his appointment is approved by Sir R. Wingate. He will be unable to proceed to Egypt before May.

In coming to this decision His Majesty's Government have fully weighed the claims of Sir W. Brunyate, who has, with exceptional ability, acted as Financial Adviser during the past year, and they are highly appreciative of his excellent work throughout this period. They are, however, gravely concerned with the future situation in Egypt from a legal and judicial point of view. It is of vital importance that the work of the Capitulations Commission and the preparation of the new codes should be pushed on without delay or intermission in order that the new legal system may come into force as soon as possible after the negotiations with the French for the abolition of the Capitulations have been concluded. There is no doubt that progress in this work has been retarded owing to the heavy burden thrown upon Sir W. Brunyate in his dual capacity of Financial and Judicial Adviser. Moreover, when the new system has been established it is essential that it should be superintended, especially during its initial period, by an official in whose vigilance and capacity His Majesty's Government can feel the fullest confidence. In these circumstances Sir W. Brunyate's continued presence at the Ministry of Justice seems indispensable for some time to come.

You will, therefore, understand, and should explain to Sir W. Brunyate, that the appointment of Sir R. Crawford as Financial Adviser implies no lack of appreciation on the part of His Majesty's Government of the eminent services which he has rendered while acting in that capacity, and for which you should express their thanks to him. Sir R. Wingate has put forward a suggestion, of which I approve, that the Egyptian Government should be moved to grant a special allowance to Sir W. Brunyate from the date of Sir R. Crawford's appointment, which would raise his pay and allowances to the same figure as that of the Financial Adviser, it being clearly understood that this allowance is of a purely personal character. Moreover, Sir R. Wingate is considering a scheme, which will be discussed with the Egyptian Ministers on their arrival here, to place the Judicial Adviser on the Council of Ministers as well as the Financial Adviser, in order that there should be no diminution in Sir W. Brunyate's position and authority.

Please take the necessary action to carry into effect the decisions which I have indicated to you.

Memorandum, sent by Lord Curzon to Mr. Balfour on February 20, 1919, containing alternative suggestions for a telegram to be sent to Cairo, in reply to Sir R. Wingate's proposal that the Egyptian Ministers accompanied by the Nationalists should be allowed to come to England

The draft (B) was approved by Mr. Balfour, but with certain alterations and omissions, and was sent as Foreign Office telegram, No. 268, of the 26th February.*

The portions of the draft (B) which were altered or omitted are underlined and alterations inserted in the margin.

* See No. 56.

Proposed visit of Egyptian Ministers to England.

ON the 17th November last His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt reported that three Egyptian Nationalists, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, Abdel Aziz Bey Fahmy, and Ali Pasha Sharawi, had called at the residency in order to advocate a programme of complete autonomy for Egypt, which would leave to Great Britain only a right of supervision in regard to the Public Debt and facilities for shipping in the Suez Canal. They asked that they should at once be allowed to proceed to London in order to put forward their demands.

Directly afterwards Rushdy Pasha, the Prime Minister, suggested that he and Adly Pasha, Minister of Education, should visit London in the immediate future in order to discuss Egyptian affairs. He further urged that the Nationalist leaders should also be allowed a hearing in London. Both requests had the approval of the Sultan. The two Ministers disclaimed any desire of severing the British connection.

His Majesty's Government in reply stated that, while sympathising with the idea of giving the Egyptians an ever-increasing share in the Government of the country, they could not abandon their responsibilities for order and good government in Egypt, and for protecting the rights and interests of the native and foreign populations. No useful purpose would be served by allowing the Nationalist leaders to come to London and advance immoderate demands which could not possibly be entertained. A visit from the two Ministers would be welcome, but it would be more convenient if this could be deferred for the moment.

In the meantime the Nationalist leaders who had been received at the Residency had started a movement to collect adherents from the provinces. They traded upon and misrepresented the fact of the three leaders having been received as a deputation at the Residency to pretend that their movement was, if not approved, at least countenanced by the British authorities. They commenced collecting signatures on a petition, and also subscriptions which have realised a considerable amount, not less than 40,000L. They also formed a committee of fourteen leaders who were, with one or two exceptions, men of little standing and of doubtful antecedents and character.

Sir R. Wingate was instructed to make it perfectly clear that this agitation was viewed with extreme disfavour. Further, that importance was attached to the Sultan and Ministers showing that they shared our attitude in the matter. Action was taken by the Ministry of the Interior to prevent the circulation of petitions and to damp down the agitation.

On the 5th December Sir R. Wingate reported that Rushdy Pasha and Adly Pasha had resigned owing to the fact that they had not been encouraged to proceed to London at once. Further, that the Sultan, who was in an excitable frame of mind, was supporting their attitude. His Highness and the Ministers appeared to fear that some vital decision would be come to at the Peace Conference affecting the future of Egypt without the views of any Egyptian having been heard. In reply, it was pointed out that the postponement of their visit was only due to a regard for their own convenience and dignity, and that they would be received here at the earliest date which could be arranged. But the fact was emphasised that any discussions on Egyptian internal reforms must take place in London and not in Paris, and that no question vital to Egyptian interests would be raised at the Peace Conference except that of the establishment of the British protectorate, which the Allied Powers had already recognised and which the enemy Powers would be required to accept. This reply did not cause either the Sultan or Ministers to modify their attitude, and the Sultan felt unable to show clearly, as we had demanded of him, that he disapproved of the Nationalist agitation.

At the beginning of January Sir R. Wingate was summoned to London in order to explain the situation to His Majesty's Government, and at the same time the two Ministers were invited to come here immediately after his return, that is to say, about the middle of February. When, however, this invitation was conveyed to them they declared that, although they felt convinced that a satisfactory agreement with His Majesty's Government would be easy, their position would be hopeless unless Saad Zaghlul and the other Nationalist leaders were also permitted to come to England. They did not desire that the Nationalist leaders should be officially received when they arrived here. On the contrary they desired them to return to Egypt empty-handed.

Sir R. Wingate has now reached London. The situation as regards the visit of the two Ministers remains unchanged. Their resignations have in the meantime been

held in suspense, and have not been accepted by the Sultan. The Government of Egypt has continued without their active participation and without it being possible to call together a Council of Ministers.

It is strongly urged by Sir R. Wingate that instructions should now be sent to Cairo inviting the two Ministers to visit here at once, and at the same time removing the restrictions on the movements of the Nationalist leaders who would also be permitted to come to Europe. He considers that the Ministers will in no circumstances proceed here unless the Nationalist leaders are also allowed to come, as their position in Egypt would be made too difficult. It would be alleged that they had not been able to obtain sufficiently satisfactory terms from His Majesty's Government, and that the Nationalist leaders, had they come here, would have been more successful. If, on the other hand, it is shown that the Nationalists are not received here and have no chance of doing any service to Egypt, their position will be shaken, while that of the Sultan and his Ministers will be fortified. The alternative to this is to allow the two Ministers to resign, but Sir R. Wingate is of opinion that no suitable Egyptian Ministers would be found to take their places, and although dummy Ministers might be forthcoming, the Government would be extremely weak and the position of both the Sultan and Ministers would be almost impossible. He adds that this view is generally held in Cairo by both the British and native authorities. He proposes a draft telegram of instructions to Cairo (see Annex A).

The departmental view, on the other hand, is that the Nationalist leaders, who have placed themselves at the head of a disloyal movement to expel the British from Egypt, have no claim to be allowed to come here, and that to accede to the demand of the Ministers on this head would only be regarded throughout Egypt as a sign of weakness. The idea that the Nationalists should be brought here in order to be snubbed and turned down scarcely seems to savour of fair play, and would be likely to increase the bitterness of their feeling against us. It seems further undesirable that the native Ministers, when invited by His Majesty's Government to visit this country, should be able to dictate the terms on which they will come. The fact that the Nationalists would visit Paris and London for the express object of making trouble, and would have a large sum of money at their disposal for the purpose, is a subsidiary but not altogether negligible consideration. It should be added that indications have been received from Egypt that Sir R. Wingate's view of the matter is not shared in every quarter.

There would seem to be a reasonable chance that the Ministers, who have had time to think over their illogical position, and the Sultan, who is said to be disenchanted with the Nationalist movement, might now be amenable to reason. If they were not, it would be quite possible to carry on the Government of the country for the present with the existing machinery.

The Departmental view is expressed in the draft telegram to Sir M. Cheetham (see Annex (B)).

Draft.

Sir M. Cheetham,
Cairo.

(A.)

Telegram No.

Foreign Office, February , 1919.

I shall be glad to see Rushdy and Adly Pasha in London, and to hear their views on Egyptian questions as soon as it is convenient for them to come to England.

Sir R. Wingate has explained their anxiety that members of the extremist party should not now be prevented from leaving Egypt. The extravagant opinions apparently held by this party preclude any possibility of its members being received here officially or being regarded as an Egyptian delegation, but I have no objection to your exercising discretion in granting permits to leave Egypt to such Egyptian politicians as may apply as private individuals for same.

Draft.

Sir M. Cheetham,
Cairo.

(B.)

Telegram No.

Foreign Office, February , 1919.

My telegram No. .

I have carefully considered, in communication with Sir R. Wingate, the question of the visit to England of Rushdy Pasha and Adli Pasha and of Saad Pasha Zaghlul and the other Nationalist leaders.

I understand the two Ministers do not desire to proceed here unless the Nationalist leaders are also allowed to come, and that their attitude in the matter is approved by the Sultan.

It must, however, be remembered that these Nationalist leaders who, with the possible exception of Aziz Bey Fahmy, appear to be men of doubtful standing and antecedents, have openly placed themselves at the head of a disloyal movement to sever the connection between Egypt and the protecting Power and have, in furtherance of their aims, organised an agitation throughout the country with the signature of petitions and the raising of subscriptions. In

the circumstances, any relaxation of the existing restrictions on travelling in order to facilitate their journey to England and, still

more, their reception at the Foreign Office if they came, would imply a measure of countenance and recognition to which they are certainly not entitled, and of which, if conceded, they would be likely to make the same illegitimate use that they did of their original reception at the Residency. It has been suggested that they should be allowed to come here but should be coldly received and should not be granted an interview at the Foreign Office. Although I understand that this suggestion has the approval of the Sultan and Ministers I am not inclined to view it with favour. I should add that it is difficult to admit that Egyptian Ministers, invited by His Majesty's Government to visit this country, should be allowed to dictate the terms upon which they are prepared to come. His Majesty's Government, therefore, adhere to the attitude which they had previously adopted on this question.

You should now inform the Sultan and Ministers that his Majesty's Government renew their invitation to Rushdy Pasha and Adly Pasha or to any Minister or Ministers deputed by His Highness and the Council of Ministers to proceed to this country forthwith, and that all facilities for their journey will be given to them. They will receive a cordial welcome and full and sympathetic consideration will be granted to any representations or proposals they may desire to submit, both in regard to the future relations between Egypt and the protecting Power and to Egyptian internal reforms. [I cannot but regard it as unfortunate that they have felt unable

to formulate their proposals in writing for previous communication to me. Although no permission can as yet be given to the actual leaders who have organised the recent agitation to proceed to this country, where their presence could serve no useful purpose, we have no desire to restrict the movements of those Egyptians who, for considerations of health or other valid reasons, wish to visit Europe, and you have full discretion to concert with the military authorities in order to grant them facilities for leaving Egypt.]

I understand from Sir R. Wingate that the Sultan himself does not for the present desire to leave Egypt, but we hope to receive a visit from him at some later date. In the meantime, His Majesty's

* Following substituted:—

Causing petitions to be signed and subscriptions raised in support of it. In the circumstances, to facilitate their journey to England by relaxing the existing restrictions on travelling, or to go further by receiving them.

Omitted.

Government feel assured that His Highness will appreciate their attitude in the matter and the reasons which have prompted it, and that he will recommend the Ministers to accept the invitation now extended to them, but also further that the Ministers themselves will feel able to come.

No. 49.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 9, 1919.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the political crisis, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of three documents communicated to me privately by the Greek agent and consul-general, signed by Saad Pasha Zaghlul.

It is probable that similar documents have been forwarded to the other foreign agencies here, and they are characteristic of the propaganda which is being carried on by Zaghlul Pasha and the party he represents. The second of these appeals to the foreign representatives, though undated, is, I believe, of very recent origin.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

Appeal to the Representatives of the Accredited Nations in Egypt.

CONFIANTE dans les affirmations que, dès le début de la guerre, les hommes d'État de l'Entente n'ont cessé d'exprimer en faveur de la cause de la liberté et du droit ;

Comptant sur l'esprit nouveau qui pousse les peuples et les démocraties vers un idéal commun de justice et de paix sociales ;

Persuadée, surtout, que l'intervention décisive de la République des États-Unis dans le conflit mondial n'a pas eu d'autre but que de sauvegarder les droits des nations faibles et de préparer l'avènement d'une ère de justice impartiale d'où seraient à jamais bannis toute préoccupation d'intérêts particuliers et tout souci de prédominance puisant dans la force leur seule raison de se manifester ;

L'Égypte, consciente de ses devoirs et soucieuse de ses intérêts, a jugé, dès la conclusion du dernier armistice, que le moment était venu pour elle, après avoir, durant toute la guerre, observé l'attitude la plus calme et la plus loyale, de proclamer, d'une façon non moins calme et non moins loyale, son droit à une existence libre et sans entraves.

Le sentiment unanime de la nation n'attendait que cette occasion pour se manifester spontanément dans le sens de la revendication d'une indépendance qui a toujours constitué pour l'Égypte l'idéal suprême pour lequel elle a tantôt répandu le sang de ses enfants sur les champs de bataille et tantôt protesté avec véhémence chaque fois que des entreprises étaient tentées qui pouvaient l'en éloigner.

Aussi, la députation composée des soussignés, et qui s'est constituée en vue de soutenir, par delà les mers, les revendications légitimes du pays, a-t-elle rencontré, dès sa formation, l'adhésion et le concours unanime de la population.

Cette députation, qui compte dans son sein plusieurs membres de l'Assemblée législative, aurait pu se passer de tout mandat spécial pour accomplir une mission dont l'objet est consacré par le droit naturel des nations ; mais elle a pensé qu'une consultation du pays, sous la forme d'une procuration signée des habitants du territoire et surtout de ceux parmi eux qui occupent des fonctions représentatives, aurait permis d'attester la volonté du pays et d'édifier tous ceux qui jusqu'à présent ne sont pas au courant de son véritable état d'esprit.

A peine cette idée fût-elle connue, que le public en assumait lui-même la réalisation et que les mandats se couvrirent bientôt des milliers de signatures, parmi lesquelles

celles d'une grande partie de l'élite de la nation, comprenant les membres de l'Assemblée législative, des conseils provinciaux, des municipalités, &c. ; et il est certain que, si le mouvement avait pu se poursuivre, le pays tout entier aurait consacré de son vote la concordance de notre mission avec son désir unanimement exprimé.

Mais il semble que la nation avait trop compté sur l'expansion irrésistible des idées de droit et de justice que les échos qui nous en parviennent de l'Europe et d'Amérique et les déclarations de tous les personnages autorisés à refléter l'opinion révèlent à satiété.

Coup sur coup, nous étions informés, en effet, des mesures que prenaient les autorités pour empêcher la circulation des mandats et pour la confiscation de ceux qui étaient déjà couverts de signatures.

A une requête que notre délégation a adressée à son Excellence le Premier Ministre pour se plaindre de ces mesures, il a été répondu que les ordres y relatifs avaient été donnés par M. le Conseiller du Ministère de l'Intérieur et que les mandats en circulation avaient été considérés comme de nature à porter atteinte à l'ordre public.

Pourtant, jamais le pays n'a donné un plus bel exemple de sa pondération que lorsqu'il a été appelé à prendre part à cette grave et solennelle consultation. Aussi bien les jeunes que les vieux, les riches que les pauvres, les citadins que les villageois, montraient tous, sans distinction de caste, de croyance ou de parti, un sincère empressement et un élan patriotique qui n'excluaient nullement la modération du geste et de la parole.

Et alors que nous nous figurions que l'intervention des autorités ne pouvait dépasser, en l'espèce, la limite d'une mesure de police que, malgré tout l'arbitraire qu'elle comporte, nous ne voulions envisager que comme la manifestation d'un zèle inopportun, il était bien loin de notre pensée d'imaginer, un instant, que la défaveur qui semble être, auprès des autorités, le lot de notre mission, eût pu déterminer la nouvelle mesure qui vient d'être prise à l'égard de la délégation et qui aboutit virtuellement à l'empêcher de se rendre en Europe pour accomplir le mandat qu'elle a assumé.

Par une lettre du 1^{er} décembre courant du Secrétaire particulier de son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire britannique, il nous est fait part en effet, en réponse à une démarche écrite, tentée auprès de son Excellence, que celui-ci, après en avoir référé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, ne se trouvait pas en mesure d'employer son office auprès des autorités militaires pour la délivrance des permis de voyage que nous sollicitons.

En présence de ces mesures qu'il est difficile de concilier avec l'esprit qui anime et les peuples et le Gouvernement dont les hauts représentants vont bientôt s'asseoir à la table de la Conférence de la Paix ;

En présence du fait que lesdites mesures vont à l'encontre des assurances, plus d'une fois proclamées, que la voix des peuples et la libre expression de leurs aspirations agiront, dans un sens décisif, sur la direction qui sera donnée à leurs destinées ;

En présence du traitement exceptionnel que la nation égyptienne vient de subir et auquel les Ministres égyptiens eux-mêmes n'ont pas échappé par cette atteinte portée à la liberté individuelle et aux droits légitimes qui appartiennent à tout pays de faire entendre sa voix dans les questions qui le concernent, à titre primordial, et dont la portée ne peut être fixée qu'avec le concours de son opinion librement exprimée ;

Nous venons, par la présente, adresser aux représentants des nations amies, intéressées au sort de l'Égypte, notre protestation à l'égard d'une pareille ligne de conduite et à l'égard de toute décision concernant l'avenir de l'Égypte qui serait prise sans que le peuple égyptien ait été consulté.

Le Caire, le 9 décembre 1918.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Membres de la Délégation égyptienne.

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|--|
| 1. Saad Zaghlul Pacha | ... | ... | Vice-Président élu de l'Assemblée législative. |
| Aly Sharawy Pacha | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative. |
| 3. Ismaïl Sidky Pacha | ... | ... | Ancien Ministre. |
| 4. Mohamed Mahmoud Pacha | ... | ... | Ancien Moudir. |

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|-----|-----------------------------|-----|-----|---|
| 5. | Hamed el-Bassa Pacha | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative. |
| 6. | Abdel Aziz Fahmy Bey | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative.
Bâtonnier de l'Ordre des Avocats indigènes. |
| 7. | Ahmed Loutfi el-Sayed Bey | ... | ... | Ancien Directeur de la Bibliothèque nationale. |
| 8. | Mohamed Aly Bey | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative. |
| 9. | Mahmoud Aboul Nasr Bey | ... | ... | Ancien Bâtonnier de l'Ordre des Avocats indigènes. |
| 10. | Abdel Latif el-Mekabati Bey | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative |
| 11. | Sinnot Hanna Bey | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative et
Membre du Conseil Melli copte d'Assiout. |
| 12. | Dr. Hafez Affi Bey | ... | ... | Médecin au Caire. |
| 13. | Moustafa el-Nahas Bey | ... | ... | Juge. |
| 14. | Georges Khayat Bey | ... | ... | Notable à Assiout. |
| 15. | Husséin Wassef Pacha | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative. |
| 16. | Michel Lotfallah Bey | ... | ... | Membre de l'Assemblée législative. |

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

Appeal to Foreign Residents in Egypt.

La guerre mondiale vient de recevoir la seule conclusion digne d'elle en fondant le régime du droit et de la justice et en le substituant, pour la solution des conflits nationaux, au droit du plus fort. Sur une telle base, il est possible d'obtenir une paix durable, car nous verrons la fin des compétitions armées de jadis et, leur succédant, nous verrons s'établir des concurrences pacifiques et légales.

Cette paix du droit et de la justice fera, du même coup, disparaître les rancunes amassées au fond du cœur des petits peuples contre la domination, par la force brutale, des grandes Puissances. Et désormais, aussi, seront abolies les rivalités coloniales qui poussaient ces mêmes grandes Puissances à monopoliser, les unes au détriment des autres, avantages et bénéfices. Tout ainsi rentrera dans l'ordre, et la prospérité commerciale ne dépendra plus que de ses facteurs naturels, abstraction faite de toute considération politique ou contrainte armée.

L'Egypte a jugé que l'heure de l'immanente justice avait, dans l'ordre nouveau, sonné pour elle comme pour les autres pays et qu'elle pouvait espérer dans la fin d'une servitude uniquement imposée par la force et rentrer, elle aussi, dans la grande fraternité humaine. A cet effet, elle a donné à la délégation que j'ai l'honneur de présider mandat pour poursuivre et obtenir son indépendance complète par tous les moyens pacifiques et légaux.

Les obstacles que, dès la première heure, elle a rencontrés dans l'accomplissement de sa mission ne l'ont pas découragée, soit qu'une partie des mandats adressés par la population ait été confisquée, soit que les passeports pour l'Angleterre lui aient été refusés. Au contraire, poursuivant ses démarches elle a officiellement protesté, auprès des plus hautes autorités britanniques et des représentants des Puissances accréditées en Egypte, contre cette atteinte à la liberté individuelle.

La délégation égyptienne, après avoir fait parvenir à ces derniers un exposé de l'essentiel de notre programme, estime qu'elle a le devoir aujourd'hui de mettre au courant de notre mouvement pacifique et de nos aspirations nationales tous les résidents étrangers possédant des intérêts dans ce pays. Nous avons, en effet, l'ambition de pouvoir compter pour le succès de notre cause sur le concours des hommes libres de tous les pays que l'émancipation d'un peuple ne peut laisser indifférents et qui, naturellement, placent au-dessus de toutes considérations d'intérêt et de sentiment les principes de droit, de justice et de liberté.

C'est pourquoi, mandataires fidèles de la volonté égyptienne, nous affirmons nos aspirations vers une indépendance qui permettra à notre patrie d'atteindre son idéal de progrès et de reconstituer son ancien patrimoine de gloire.

Nous voulons une indépendance complète, exclusive de toute domination extérieure, afin que sous la forme d'un régime constitutionnel nous puissions réparer les torts que le Gouvernement de l'étranger a causés à notre état social, soit délibérément, soit par la nature même de cette ingérence.

Nous voulons conserver la confiance des résidents étrangers et leur faciliter la poursuite de leur activité commerciale, industrielle et intellectuelle dans le respect absolu de leurs privilèges.

Nous voulons, parce que nous sommes pénétrés des bienfaits de la civilisation et de la culture occidentales, faire appel, chaque fois que le besoin s'en fera sentir, aux plus hauts spécialistes étrangers pour nous prêter le concours de leurs lumières dans la direction de nos affaires publiques, faisant abstraction de leur nationalité et ne tenant compte que de leur mérite.

Nous voulons une indépendance totale, mais qui ne touche pas aux droits capitulaires des étrangers, soit qu'il s'agisse de l'inviolabilité du domicile et de la liberté individuelle.

Nous voulons enfin, en élargissant la loi de naturalisation dans le sens le plus libéral, faciliter à ceux qui le demanderaient l'entrée dans le giron de la grande famille égyptienne.

Telles sont nos vraies aspirations, telles sont nos intentions. Tout ce qui pourrait être dit ou écrit qui n'y soit pas conforme ne peut être que le fait des ennemis de la cause nationale.

Au nom de la délégation égyptienne, j'affirme à tous les résidents étrangers de ce pays que cette délégation associe, dans ses démarches en vue d'obtenir l'indépendance, le respect le plus entier des droits de l'étranger.

Je saisis cette occasion pour prendre à témoin tous ceux qui sont imbus des idées de liberté, des mesures contraires à cette liberté dont est victime notre délégation. Je déclare que toutes les décisions concernant l'avenir de notre patrie qui seraient prises sans que les Egyptiens fussent entendus iraient à l'encontre des règles de droit et des principes de justice, bases des délibérations du Congrès.

Le Vice-Président élu de l'Assemblée législative,
Président de la Délégation égyptienne,
SAAD ZAGHLUL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 49.

Abstract of Views of the Egyptian People respecting its Destiny.

1. L'EGYPTE réclame son indépendance :

- (a.) Parce que c'est un droit naturel des nations ;
- (b.) Parce que l'Egypte n'a jamais cessé de revendiquer cette indépendance, même au prix du sang de ses enfants. Ses victoires lui auraient permis de conquérir sa souveraineté, si le concert des grandes Puissances en 1840-41 ne lui avait pas imposé de réduire ses prétentions au minimum et de se contenter d'une large autonomie qui confine, du reste, à l'indépendance ;
- (c.) Parce qu'elle se considère maintenant dégagée du dernier lien de suzeraineté qui l'attachait à la Turquie, ce pays n'étant plus en mesure, par suite des conséquences de la guerre, de se prévaloir de cette suzeraineté ;
- (d.) Parce qu'elle estime le moment est venu pour elle de proclamer une souveraineté que justifient ses conditions ethniques et sa situation matérielle et morale.

2. L'Egypte entend que son Gouvernement soit constitutionnel : les modalités du régime s'inspireront de la situation particulière du pays au point de vue des intérêts étrangers. Des réformes économiques, administratives et sociales seront entreprises, pour le succès desquelles le pays ne manquera pas, comme par le passé, de faire appel aux lumières des peuples d'Occident.

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3. L'Égypte proclame que les privilèges des étrangers seront scrupuleusement respectés, et, si la pratique a pu montrer que certains d'entre eux sont susceptibles d'une meilleure adaptation, elle proposera, dans un esprit large et sincèrement sympathique, des modifications de nature à assurer le progrès du pays et à sauvegarder tous les intérêts en présence.

4. Elle s'engage à examiner l'établissement de mesures de contrôle financier dont l'efficacité, à l'égard des pays intéressés, ne saura être inférieure à celle des mesures ayant précédé l'accord de 1904 et dont l'organe essentiel continuera à être la Caisse de la Dette publique.

5. Elle est disposée à accueillir toute mesure que les Puissances jugeront utile pour la sauvegarde de la neutralité du Canal de Suez.

6. L'Égypte se considérerait, enfin, très honorée de placer son indépendance sous la garantie de la Société des Nations et de contribuer ainsi, dans la mesure de ses moyens, à la réalisation des idées nouvelles de justice et de droit.

S. ZAGHLUL.

No. 50.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 6, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following reply to your despatch No. 1* of the 1st January, regarding the use of the English language in the Mixed Courts.

I am informed that on the 2nd May, 1918, the President of the Mixed Court of Appeal requested the Bâtonnier of the Mixed Bar to inform the members of the Bar that the Court of Appeal had approved the report of a committee which had been appointed to consider improvements in the methods of preparing cases for trial. The recommendations of the committee are nine in number.

The seventh recommendation is worded as follows: "Présentation d'une traduction française de tous documents écrits ou tout au moins de la partie essentielle des documents écrits dans une autre langue, spécialement dans la langue arabe, les interprètes n'ayant pas le temps matériel de faire des traductions."

The recommendations of the report have no binding authority, and the President of the Court of Appeal in bringing them to the notice of the Bâtonnier confined himself to inviting him to use his influence and authority to induce members of the Bar to conform to them.

The authors of the report observe that the rules which they propose would, if followed, greatly facilitate the work of the judges and thereby conduce to the best interests of litigant.

The languages which are recognised as judicial languages before the Mixed Courts are four in number: Arabic, French, Italian and English. In practice, at the present time, as you are doubtless aware, the French language holds the field. At one time Italian was a serious rival of French, but at the present time its use has been almost completely eliminated.

The general agreement to adopt a single language has been productive of great convenience. There was no possibility of securing that all members of the judicial personnel should be well acquainted with all four of the judicial languages. There was in the past no possibility of English being adopted as the common medium. The European judges are recruited from all the principal countries of Europe, large and small. The Bar and the clerical staff are chiefly recruited from the local European or Syrian population, whose education is almost exclusively in the hands of the French and the Italians, who carry on their business almost exclusively through the medium of the French language.

The use of the English language among the population at large has undoubtedly made progress since the war as a consequence of the presence in Egypt of large military forces. A knowledge of English is also increasing among the educated native population, though not perhaps so fast as might be wished, as a result of the teaching in the Government schools. A foreign language is taught in the primary and partly used as a medium of instruction in the secondary schools. In the primary school it has for a very long time been the custom to allow the parent to choose whether the boy should learn English or French. Since the time of Fashoda the choice has almost always been in favour of English, with the result that the French classes have gradually disappeared from lack of pupils. The situation as far as

* See No. 1.

Egyptians are concerned is, therefore, on the whole a satisfactory one and the consequences of natural processes, but the more rapid propagation of English among the local European population, from which the personnel of the Mixed Bar is recruited, will chiefly depend in the future upon the degree of encouragement we are able to give to schools in which English will be the principal medium of instruction. On this point I beg to refer to Sir H. McMahon's despatch No. 361 of the 22nd December, 1916, and to the assurances given in Mr. Balfour's reply No. 16 of the 19th January, 1917.

The future of the English language in the Courts will naturally depend upon the progress it makes in common use. It is contemplated that the English element will be increased in the Courts to be set up after the Capitulations are abolished: and in the course of time it appears not unlikely that the English language will take the place at present occupied by French as the *lingua franca* of Egypt. But administrative or legal measures can with difficulty be devised to change in a short time the language which a population in fact speaks and understands.

I have, &c.

M. CHEETHAM.

No. 51.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 32. Commercial.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 7, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the War Trade and Licensing Officer covering a statement compiled in the Public Custodian's Office of all real property in Egypt belonging to enemy owners which has been brought to his notice either by the operation of liquidation orders or licences affecting commercial businesses or under the provisions of the proclamation of the 31st July, 1916.

With reference to the 2nd paragraph of section 1 of Mr. Ward Boys' note, I have the honour to refer to Sir Reginald Wingate's telegram No. 91* of the 16th January, in which he asked if you would be prepared to reconsider the resumption of sales of real estate in Egypt.

I should be very glad to receive your instructions on this point at an early date. I would add that the authorities here are completely in agreement with the opinion expressed in paragraph 2 of Mr. Ward Boys' note that there is no reason for any relaxation of control or alteration of policy so long as Egypt is under martial law.

I have, &c.

M. CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Note from the War Trade and Licensing Officer.

The Chancery,

Cairo, January 15, 1919.

YOUR 4083/52 of the 17th October, 1918.

I enclose a statement compiled in the Public Custodian's Office† of all the real property in Egypt belonging to enemies which has been brought to the notice of this office either by operation of liquidation orders or licences affecting commercial businesses, or under the provisions of the proclamation of the 31st July, 1916.

It is liable in every case to sale, either in the ordinary course of liquidation, or by express order of the licensing officer.

1. Commercially owned real property had, up to the date of the Foreign Office instructions (Foreign Office telegram No. 673 of the 3rd July, 1917), been sold as occasion offered in the course of the liquidation of the owning firm or company. Since that date sale has only been permitted where the circumstances came within certain exceptions to those instructions conceded by Foreign Office despatch No. 15, Commercial, of the 15th January, 1918.

Consideration of Foreign Office despatch No. 787 [? 287], paragraphs 5 and 6,

* See No. 24.

† Not printed

certainly leads to the belief that if consulted the Foreign Office would now allow the resumption of sales of this class of property, and I would suggest that a telegram be sent in the sense of your letter under reply.

It might be mentioned that the only property affected would be that of really German or Austrian businesses, since, as will be seen from the statement enclosed, there is no commercially owned real property declared as Turkish or Bulgarian.

2. Privately owned real property stands on a very different footing. This has in no case been sold, nor has its sale, so far as I am aware, ever been proposed as a general measure.

It has hitherto been either (a) vested in and administered by the Public Custodian, or (b) placed under an official receiver and manager, and (c) where a trustworthy representative of the owner existed left in that representative's hands under conditions as to accounts being rendered and payment being made to the Public Custodian of surplus revenues.

This, however, is no reason why the question should not be raised under the present altered circumstances.

It will be seen from the statement attached that a considerable amount of the property is declared as Turkish, and it may be assumed that except in particular cases such as those of the ex-Khedive, Prince Said Halim and possibly some others, it will be desired to continue the present treatment of administration in the interests of the owners. Even in the German and Austrian list there are a few important estates which are only technically enemy and would require specially favourable treatment. The chief examples are the Westbank Liegnitz (Princess Blücher), the Beyerle Estate (Allied beneficiaries) and the Khalil Estate (heirs really Syrian).

There remains, however, a large amount of property belonging to real enemies, German or Austrian.

The treatment of this property is directly connected with the question of the eventual disposal of all the property (whether in money, securities or real estate) held by the Public Custodian, or otherwise immobilised under the proclamation of the 31st July, 1916.

If it is decided to take over this property against the indemnity imposed on Germany and Austria, or otherwise, it is certainly advisable that we should be enabled to sell as occasion offers. The estate market is high, and if judiciously offered the estates should realise good prices.

The Public Custodian has frequent applications both for agricultural and urban property, and as he is at present situated, he is unable to sell or even to lease the property for more than short terms, and it seems to me undesirable that with a general demand such as undoubtedly exists, a considerable mass of property should continue to be immobilised.

H. WARD BOYS.

No. 52.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 67. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 9, 1919.

IN continuation of Sir R. Wingate's despatch No. 256, Confidential, of the 22nd October last, I have the honour to transmit herewith twelve copies of Sir William Brunyate's confidential memorandum, No. 12, relating to a memorial recently signed by certain members of the Mixed Bar.*

Twelve copies of this memorial are also enclosed.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

No. 53.

Sir A. Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Madrid, February 18, 1919.

SEÑOR PEREZ CABALLERO came to see me yesterday, and said that now that hostilities were over, and that the Allies were in control of Constantinople, the Spanish Government had no longer the reasons which had weighed with it in 1915 to hesitate about recognising, for fear of compromising the religious interests of France and Italy in Palestine and elsewhere in Turkey entrusted to its care, our protectorate over Egypt. Count Romanones was ready to arrange for such recognition, and for the simultaneous recognition by His Majesty's Government, which had been promised by Viscount Grey of Fallodon as its corollary, of the Spanish protectorate in the portion of Morocco assigned to Spain under the treaties immediately preceding the war, to which we and France had been parties.

I replied that I would lose no time in informing your Lordship of this communication, and requesting your instructions on the subject. The existing agreement on this question is recorded in my despatch to your Lordship's predecessor, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, No. 244 of the 29th September, 1915, and Lord Grey of Fallodon's despatch No. 146 of 13th October in the same year.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 54.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 2, 1919.

IN his despatch No. 352* of the 27th December, Sir Reginald Wingate alluded incidentally to the fears entertained by the French and American representatives as to the possible undesirable effect of a too liberal handling of Egyptian questions on foreign interests in this country. I now understand that Mr. Gary has actually addressed despatches to his Government in this sense, the opinion of the American element in Egypt being it appears, distinctly opposed to any relaxation of the British control, and indeed anxious to see that control strengthened. M. Lefèvre-Pontalis has also reported on the same lines, especially emphasising the need of an increased number of British officers in the police force. The Italian Minister, who, unless goaded on by his numerous and active colony, is inclined to take little part in local politics, has always avoided mentioning the ministerial crisis, though he informed Mr. Greg some days ago that at a recent interview he had had with the Sultan, His Highness had expressed himself as hopeful of a speedy settlement of the question, and had laid great stress on his own good intentions and desire for harmony and quiet.

However satisfactory the attitude of the French and Italian Ministers may have been, there is good reason to believe that the behaviour of their respective colonies has been far less conciliatory, and natives themselves have often hinted that a good deal of propaganda is being carried on among them by French and Italian local residents. This is perhaps not unnatural. Both colonies are undoubtedly actuated by jealousy and, above all, by fear that under the coming régime foreigners will be deprived to a great extent of their ancient influence and importance. There is also a widely held belief that the French language is about to be forcibly suppressed in the official and legal world and English substituted, to the detriment of the semi-European French-speaking class. However unreasonable these apprehensions may be, they are undoubtedly very common, in spite of a most eloquent address made not long ago by the French Minister to his colony, in which he pointed out that the largest number of Frenchmen outside France would be found in London, and that they were at the same time a most contented class.

As an instance of the strength and prevalence of this sentiment, I quote the following incident for what it is worth. Not long ago a group of Alexandrians were lunching together at a table in the principal club here. As Adly Pasha entered the dining-room, one of this group left his table, went up to the Pasha and said: "Je n'ai pas l'honneur de vous connaître, Excellence; je ne suis qu'un simple avocat d'Alexandrie, mais vous avez toutes mes sympathies," and then returned to his friends.

I have had practically no first hand information as to the sentiments of the Greek

colony, but the Greek Minister, M. Sactouris, has just told Mr. Greg that considerable propaganda has been carried on by the pasha and bey class among the Greeks, who, as you know, are scattered far more widely over the entire country than any other class. Eloquent, if somewhat incongruous, reference has been made to the Greek War of Independence against the Moslem oppressor, but, if M. Sactouris may be believed, these appeals fell on deaf ears, and the answer was invariably returned that Greece owed a great deal to England, and that in Egypt the Greek was merely a stranger and had no desire to interfere in local politics. Against this it may be said that there is still a strong Royalist minority in Egypt, and it is more than likely that these malcontents would take a line exactly opposed to that taken by or at any rate urged upon the Venezelist majority by the Greek agency. Certainly the Greek Minister seemed somewhat perturbed in regard to the agitation going on throughout the country, and both he and Mr. Knabenshue, who, in the absence of Mr. Gary in Upper Egypt, is temporarily in charge of the American agency, expressed especial surprise at the line adopted by the Sultan, which seem to them illogical, in view of the fact that he was to a peculiar degree the child of the protectorate, and would, therefore, presumably have been expected to give it his full support.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

No. 55.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 294.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, February 24, 1919.

SULTAN and Prime Minister are making continual appeals for a solution of political crisis.

A change in atmosphere has lately become increasingly obvious. Rushdy and Adly Pashas have lost popularity acquired by their resignations, and fact that they have had to wait so long for a decision from London has made their position an undignified one, and has considerably diminished prestige they previously enjoyed.

Saad Zaghlul is trusted by no one, and is being attacked as a spurious champion of independence by old Nationalists under leadership of Ahmed Lutfy and Sufany Bey. Saad Zaghlul is beginning to have difficulty in keeping himself before public eye. His latest exploit was to take advantage of discussion following a lecture on new penal code by Percival at Society of Political Economy to make a controversial speech in Arabic, denying right of any authority other than legislative assembly to modify existing codes. President prevented any debate by closing meeting, and it was unnecessary to take any further notice of incident.

Abdul Aziz Fahmy does not appear to be playing an active part at present, and Saad Zaghlul's party as a whole are extremely disappointed at failure of their efforts to attract attention of Peace Conference. They have not, however, entirely lost hope, and are, I understand, clinging to idea that Great Britain may be entrusted with a mandate for Egypt which will permit of appeal to League of Nations or some international authority.

The agitation which they have organised is dying out, or is at any rate quiescent, in country at large. A noteworthy feature is that this agitation has from beginning been entirely pacific in character. The leaders have in fact kept promise made to Adviser of Interior to restrain the students who constituted noisy element in political agitation of earlier years from creating disturbances. Older men with more to lose are less anxious to risk conflict with British authority. We still, no doubt, have to reckon with discontent amongst upper classes, the landed proprietors and professional element. Most of these people vaguely desire some form of autonomy which would make them individually more important, but situation does not seem to me to differ materially from that of 1914, when Prince Hussein and leading Ministers refused for a long time to accept protectorate without concessions which we were not able to make. The public opinion to which Ministers have succumbed has changed very little in interval, but it has been excited since last November by exaggerated notions of a general régime of liberty and self-government. Present movement, however, cannot be compared in importance with that of Mustapha Kamel, and there seems no reason why it should affect the decisions of His Majesty's Government on constitutional questions and proper form to be given to the protectorate.

No. 56.*

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 268.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 26, 1919.

MY telegram No. 200.

I have carefully considered, in communication with Sir R. Wingate, the question of the visit to England of Rushdy Pasha, and Adly Pasha, and of Saad Pasha Zaghlul, and the other Nationalist leaders.

I understand the two Ministers do not desire to proceed here unless the Nationalist leaders are also allowed to come, and that their attitude in the matter is approved by the Sultan.

It must, however, be remembered that these Nationalist leaders, who, with the possible exception of Abdul Aziz Bey Fahmy, appear to be men of doubtful standing and antecedents, have openly placed themselves at the head of a disloyal movement to sever the connection between Egypt and the protecting Power, and have in furtherance of their aims organised an agitation throughout the country causing petitions to be signed and subscriptions be raised in support of it. In the circumstances, to facilitate their journey to England by relaxing the existing restrictions on travelling, or to go further by receiving them at the Foreign Office if they came, would imply a measure of countenance and recognition to which they are certainly not entitled, and of which, if conceded, they would be likely to make the same illegitimate use that they did of their original reception at the Residency. It has been suggested that they should be allowed to come here, but should be coldly received, and should not be granted an interview at the Foreign Office. Although I understand that this suggestion has the approval of the Sultan and Ministers, I am not inclined to view it with favour. I should add that it is difficult to admit that Egyptian Ministers, invited by His Majesty's Government to visit this country, should be allowed to dictate the terms upon which they are prepared to come. His Majesty's Government therefore adhere to the attitude which they had previously adopted on this question.

You should now inform the Sultan and Ministers that His Majesty's Government renew their invitation to Rushdy Pasha and Adly Pasha, or to any Minister or Ministers deputed by His Highness and the Council of Ministers to proceed to this country forthwith, and that all facilities for their journey will be given them. They will receive a cordial welcome, and full and sympathetic consideration will be granted to any representations or proposals they may desire to submit, both in regard to the future relations between Egypt and the protecting Power and to Egyptian internal reforms.

I understand from Sir R. Wingate that the Sultan himself does not for the present desire to leave Egypt, but we hope to receive a visit from him at some later date. In the meantime His Majesty's Government feel assured, not only that His Highness will appreciate their attitude in the matter and the reasons which have prompted it, and that he will recommend the Ministers to accept the invitation now extended to them, but also that the Ministers themselves will feel able to come.

No. 57.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 313.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, February 28, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 231.†

I have communicated terms of your decisions to Brunyate, who has expressed to me in writing his grateful sense of appreciation of his work at Ministry of Finance and of your confidence in him regarding work required at Ministry of Justice.

I am not quite clear as to the date at which you desire his transfer to Ministry of Justice to take place and some interval for winding up of his financial work is indicated. The budget has been delayed this year by the end of the war coinciding with the date for submission of departmental budgets, which latter had to be revised in view of new peace conditions. Budget work will accordingly occupy two Under-Secretaries of State of Finance until far into March, at which time Lindsay, who has to make continual visits to Alexandria to preside over Cotton Commission, will be leaving Egypt. There is essential work which Brunyate should do before

* Cf. No. 48, where alternative drafts are discussed.

† See No. 47.

that date in order to clear the way for Dowson, now acting as additional Under-Secretary, who is official most qualified to fill the post of Under-Secretary vacated by Lindsay. He should in particular write and sign budget note, should deal with activities of various control boards instituted under martial law, all of which have been reported through him. The system involves intricate relations with the Egyptian Government and the military authorities, which have been entirely in Brunyate's hands, and I am not certain how the boards will work without this supervision. Brunyate should, in any case, be enabled to examine present situation exhaustively and make an authoritative statement in his note of valuable services which have been rendered to the public.

I should propose, therefore, that Brunyate should not at any rate be transferred before the 1st April, and I submit that it would be more practical for him to retain acting advisership until Lindsay leaves, when Dowson would succeed directly.

In whatever office he sits Brunyate will devote all possible time to doing the work.

With regard to your instructions to proceed to carry out the above changes, I should state that it is not certain that we can count on required action by Council of Ministers, since Prime Minister informed me some days ago that he does not feel able to take any further part in the administration until views of His Majesty's Government are made known to him.

As I gathered from your telegram under reply that a solution is not far distant, and as no official appointment seems to be immediately necessary, I can await your further instructions before taking any steps in this respect. But I shall see the Sultan and inform him of intended appointments (with the exception of Brunyate's retention on the Council, unless you wish me to mention that also at the present stage).

I have ascertained from Dowson that he would accept Under-Secretaryship, but, as I have explained privately to Sir R. Graham, his health is precarious and I know no one to replace him if it fails.

No. 58.

The Marquis Imperiali to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 4.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Italian Embassy, February 27, 1919.

THE Capitulations Commission in Egypt has prepared a draft law for the Organisation of Unified Tribunals, mentioned in your Excellency's note No. 203208.

The promulgation of such law before the Italian Government have had an opportunity of examining the draft in detail and formulating any observations thereon, might compromise Italian interests.

I am therefore instructed to inform your Excellency, that the assent given in general by my Government to the proposed abolition of the Capitulations does not imply that the change can take effect in consequence without the necessary preliminary understanding between the two Governments.

I have, &c.

• IMPERIALI.

No. 59.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 290.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 4, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 313.*

Sir R. Crawford's appointment, which will be announced in due course, by Sultan's Decree, should date from the day when he leaves this country to take up his duties in Egypt, and this will not be before May.

In the meantime it would be best that Sir W. Brunyate should continue to act as Financial Adviser, and should hand over to Sir R. Crawford when latter arrives in Cairo.

Nothing should be said at present regarding retention of Sir W. Brunyate on Council excepting to Sir W. Brunyate himself.

* See No. 57.

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No. 60.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 333.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 2, 1919.

I SAW Sultan immediately on receipt of your telegram No. 268,* but His Highness begged me to defer action till 1st March in view of engagements of his own on intervening day.

Yesterday accordingly I communicated your decision to Rushdy Pasha, and explained to him at some length responsibility which he and his colleagues would incur should they give way to Nationalist pressure. Rushdy was, however, quite firm in his intention to retire, and appeared relieved to be freed from an equivocal situation.

In the afternoon he was received by Sultan, who subsequently delivered to him a written acceptance of his resignation, accompanied by an intimation that Ministers should remain at their posts until formation of a new Cabinet.

This morning I sent for Sirry Pasha, as senior Minister, and subsequently saw Sarwat. These two Ministers with Wahba Pasha were received together by the Sultan this afternoon. His Highness tells me he impressed on them in most emphatic terms that it was their duty to the country to form nucleus of a new Government. I had already used similar language, and I hope that it may be possible to overcome disinclination of leading members of old Cabinet to take office again and preserve continuity of administration. Neither Sirry nor Sarwat have refused, but I am not yet able to say on what conditions they would accept.

No. 61.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 337.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 4, 1919.

M. VAYSSIÉ, Havas agent in Egypt, and editor of "Journal du Caire," left Egypt about four weeks ago for Paris. I now learn that he went as accredited agent of Egyptian Independent Party with money and documents to start a press campaign in France. Evidence of his activities has already appeared in French papers received here.

(Sent to Paris.)

No. 62.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 340.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 4, 1919.

MY telegram No. 337.

In absence of M. Vayssié, Naametullah Ghanem, of "Mustaqbel" of Paris, acts as director of "Journal du Caire." He recently wished to publish a translation of article entitled "The Egyptian Nationalist," which appeared in "Times" of 14th February. The translation was accompanied by short sarcastic editorial comments, which showed a most unfriendly feeling towards us, and whole article was accordingly suppressed by censor.

Incident indicates attitude of a paper which is regarded in Egypt as a semi-official French organ.

Another journalist of extreme Francophile leaning, M. Doumani, formerly of "Reforme" and "Nouvelles" of Alexandria, has openly joined Egyptian Independent Party.

No. 63.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 347.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 5, 1919.

SINCE despatch of my telegram No. 333 of 2nd March, I have had several interviews with Sultan and with Ministers already mentioned. It is now clear that

* See No. 56.

formation of a Government carrying sufficient prestige to be of real utility to us in present situation is conditional on acceptance of office by Sarwat Pasha; neither Sirry nor Wahba will serve without him. Sarwat has qualifications for leadership in shape of influence in legal world and grasp of problems which have to be faced, and he understands and agrees with our policy. Sultan, on my advice, has offered him Presidency of the Council, and composition of a Ministry to be submitted for your approval has been discussed, but united efforts of Sultan and myself to overcome Sarwat's reluctance to take responsibility in actual circumstances have been so far unavailing. Great pressure is no doubt being brought to bear upon him by Nationalists, and he is a young man who can afford to wait for a better opportunity. He has even urged me to recommend a direct British control of administration under martial law for a period long enough to prove that Nationalists are incapable of redeeming their promises. Effect of this would be to render task of a new Government easier.

I have considered a possibility of forming a Cabinet of entirely fresh elements. Choice of a new Minister is always a difficult matter, and I know at present of no person certain to command respect in the country and provide the co-operation we require. But this question cannot be fully examined until members of Ministry have taken up a definite position.

From all sides I hear it is useless to approach Adly, who is now too closely identified with extremists.

Nationalists have addressed a threatening letter to Sultan on the subject, of which I shall be able to telegraph in a few hours.

No. 64.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.— (Received March 6.)

(No. 348. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 6, 1919.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Acceptance of Rushdy Pasha's resignation was a severe rebuff to Saad Zaghlul, who was apparently under belief that he and his friends would certainly be allowed to proceed to Europe to advocate independence. He is now endeavouring to prevent formation of new Government, which would further discredit his party, and it is plain that politicians who would have accepted office are being dissuaded from doing so by threats against their lives.

Definite action has also been taken by Saad to intimidate Sultan, and discourage his present co-operation with us in re-establishing Council of Ministers.

On 3rd March Saad presented himself at Abdin with a body of adherents, identical (with two exceptions) with his original deputation, and on being refused admission left a signed petition addressed to Sultan. I have sent a translation of this document by bag yesterday.* While servilely worded in many respects, it repudiates the fact of the protectorate, warns the Sultan against counsels of Residency, and includes thinly-veiled threats against His Highness should he continue taking part in creation of a Ministry.

I am advised that language of petition would not justify prosecution for an offence against the Sultan in Egyptian courts, and there are technical difficulties in way in conviction for same offence by military courts under proclamations in force.

In my opinion, however, we cannot afford to pass over a campaign of intimidation, the object of which is to prevent Egyptian administration from being carried on under protectorate in its ordinary forms.

I have credible information that Saad is instigating the national Bar, the stronghold of his supporters, to address a further insolent petition to Sultan, and also to inconvenience native courts by a strike of the advocates.

If we allow such proceedings to continue we may expect intrigues directed against discipline of Government services, and difficulty in finding competent Ministry will increase.

In view of these considerations I have requested General Officer Commanding in Egypt to send for Saad and his acknowledged followers, and to represent to them seriously that present form of their agitation is in conflict with military interests. But this warning will not be enough to make Nationalist leaders desist from policy of threats and underground intrigue. Sultan is shaken by terms of petition, which is, in

* S. 30 No. 74.

fact, an impudent summons to him and to the nation, and His Highness has earnestly appealed to me for protection from further insults.

I have consulted principal Advisers, who agree with me that obvious course is internment of Saad Zaghlul outside Egypt, preferably in India or Ceylon. Saad has long ceased to listen to reason, and spends his time in gambling. His movement has reached a point at which it must resort to more violent methods in order to retain its hold on *intelligentsia* and moderate and more sensible Egyptians are wondering why we have permitted it to go so long unchecked. It may be unfortunate that I should ask for removal of a political agitator at present moment, but Saad, in view of insidious character of his propaganda, is more dangerous than those interned at Malta since beginning of war. I recommend his immediate arrest and deportation, and for the sake of the Sultan's prestige, which is a political interest to us, I would beg for an early decision.

No. 65.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 309.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 7, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 348.

Action should be taken at once to put a stop to proceedings of Saad Zaghlul and his partisans in endeavouring to intimidate Sultan and Ministers from the proper exercise of their functions and responsibilities. You are authorised therefore to concert with Commander-in-chief for the immediate arrest and deportation to Malta, without further warning, of Saad and those of his party most actively associated with him in this deliberate campaign of intimidation. It is desirable that not more persons than is necessary should be deported, and that Abdul Aziz Bey Fahmy should not be included among them.

Governor of Malta is being requested by Colonial Office to concert with Commander-in-chief in the matter, and to arrange for accommodation of persons deported.

No. 66.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.— (Received March 11.)

(No. 89.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, herewith, copy of a memorandum drawn up by the self-styled Egyptian delegation which has been forwarded to me by the Ministry of the Interior.

This memorandum sets forth in a more complete form than anything received up to now, the case of the Nationalist Party; but I understand that a fuller note is in course of preparation.

The present note has probably been communicated to some of the foreign diplomatic agencies in this country, and there is reason to believe that it has been conveyed privately to Europe by friends of the Nationalists.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM

Enclosure in No. 66.

Memorandum presented by the Egyptian Delegation.

LES REVENDICATIONS NATIONALES ÉGYPTIENNES.

Mémoire présenté par la Délégation égyptienne chargée de défendre la Cause de l'Indépendance de l'Égypte.

1.

Introduction.

L'INTERVENTION de la Turquie dans la grande guerre fut considérée par les Égyptiens comme l'occasion la plus favorable pour obtenir, enfin, cette indépendance que déjà les luttes soutenues par Mohammed Aly leur avaient assurée en partie, et que

justifient, non seulement une histoire glorieuse et des droits acquis depuis longtemps, mais encore leur situation morale et matérielle.

Aussi, dès que cette intervention eut lieu, des personnalités égyptiennes autorisées suggérèrent aux autorités anglaises de reconnaître l'indépendance de l'Égypte, contre l'engagement par celle-ci de participer à la guerre aux côtés de la Grande-Bretagne. Cette proposition ne fut pas écoutée, mais bien au contraire, le pays a subi un changement de régime qui compromet jusqu'au statut politique, obtenu en 1841, grâce aux plus durs sacrifices : en vertu d'un acte unilatéral—que nous n'avons voulu considérer que comme une mesure momentanée de guerre—elle érigeait en protectorat une occupation toujours qualifiée de provisoire par les Anglais eux-mêmes.

Les Égyptiens, blessés dans leur dignité nationale, et atteints dans leurs droits politiques, envisagèrent, néanmoins, leur avenir sans crainte, en présence des assurances données par la Grande-Bretagne et ses Alliés qu'ils ne combattaient que pour le triomphe du droit et la défense des nations opprimées. Et lorsque la République des États-Unis intervint à son tour dans le conflit, personne ne douta, en Égypte, que cette intervention avait pour seul but la libération du monde. Nous saluâmes en le Président Wilson "l'interprète inflexible" de la pensée d'un grand peuple qui allait combattre avec un complet désintéressement pour un régime universel de paix et de justice.

Le droit à l'existence et à la liberté n'est donc plus une question de continent ou de latitude ; et c'est pourquoi les Égyptiens se refusent à croire que, parce que leur pays se trouve en Afrique, il doit servir d'appât aux appétits des impérialistes. Continuer à étiqueter les nations pour faire des unes des nations libres, et des autres des nations vouées à la servitude, rien que parce que l'esprit occidental s'est plu, depuis de longs siècles, à tracer des limites ethniques ou géographiques à la liberté des peuples, serait en contradiction absolue avec l'esprit nouveau que le sort des batailles vient heureusement de consacrer.

Notre but est de présenter l'Égypte sous son véritable jour de pays de culture avancée, ayant droit, à tous égards, aux avantages qu'il n'est venu à l'esprit de personne de refuser à des nations pourtant moins importantes et moins civilisées.

L'Européen qui vit parmi nous est trop absorbé par les intérêts qui l'ont amené à s'expatrier pour prêter une attention suffisante à notre véritable état social. Enfermé dans un cercle étroit de congénères, il n'aperçoit de l'Égypte que la façade souvent trompeuse ; et l'on sait, par les calomnies dont furent victimes les Français avant la guerre, à quelles erreurs on s'expose en portant sur les peuples des jugements superficiels.

État économique.

L'Égypte est un des pays les plus favorisés du monde, tant par sa position géographique que par ses conditions climatiques et la richesse légendaire de son sol, fertilisé par les eaux du Nil. Sa production suffit à faire vivre une population qui, de deux millions qu'elle était au commencement du dix-neuvième siècle, compte aujourd'hui treize millions.*

La presque totalité de la prospérité foncière appartient aux Égyptiens, et ce sont eux qui exploitent exclusivement le sol, même lorsque la propriété en appartient à un étranger.

Les chiffres du commerce extérieur et intérieur illustrent éloquemment la situation économique et montrent la vitalité du pays.

Le commerce extérieur de l'Égypte ne s'élevait en 1800 qu'à £ E. 577,000 seulement (la livre égyptienne vaut 26 francs). Vers la fin du règne de Mohammed Aly, en 1836, ce commerce atteignait £ E. 4,700,000 et en 1880 £ E. 21,870,000 ; de 1895 à 1899, £ E. 29,191,000 ; de 1905 à 1909, £ E. 58,883,000 ; et en 1913, £ E. 80,456,000. C'est surtout à la demande de plus en plus forte de coton égyptien et à la hausse de ses prix qu'est dû ce grand développement.

Quant au commerce intérieur, c'est-à-dire celui des produits nationaux, il a atteint en 1914-1915 £ E. 44,450,000, constitués, presque en totalité, par des produits de l'Agriculture.†

* La densité de la population est telle, dans certaines régions particulièrement riches, qu'elle atteint 670 habitants par kilomètre carré.

† En 1917-18 ce commerce a dû atteindre au moins le double de la valeur indiquée ci-dessus, les prix des produits agricoles ayant considérablement augmenté.

L'accroissement de la richesse nationale est révélé, en outre, par les chiffres du budget de l'État et ceux de la population, chiffres qui se répartissent ainsi.

Année.	Population.	Recettes.	Dépenses.
1836	3,700,000	2,611,000	1,921,000
1884	7,500,000	10,140,000	10,100,000
1913	12,300,000	17,705,000	17,660,000

L'agriculture absorbant presque tous les capitaux et occupant la très grande majorité de la population, l'industrie ne peut être, à vrai dire, que peu développée. Mais on alléguerait en vain que les Égyptiens manquent d'aptitude industrielle ; malgré un outillage insuffisant, le pays s'est trouvé en mesure de produire lui-même, pendant la guerre, un grand nombre d'articles de première nécessité qui lui venaient de l'étranger.*

Ainsi l'Égypte n'a que faire des interventions politiques, souvent dictées—ce qui n'est pas notre cas—par la nécessité de sauvegarder des intérêts que de mauvaises finances peuvent compromettre. Toute tutelle que la force impose à un pays riche et prospère, risque d'exciter, au détriment de ce pays, les convoitises étrangères.

État moral.

Le patrimoine intellectuel d'une nation est constitué d'un ensemble de coutumes, de conceptions, de points de vue qui peuvent différer d'un peuple à l'autre, sans pour cela s'écarter de la morale générale. Chaque pays a sa civilisation propre, et telle coutume qui nous paraît bizarre représente, pour le peuple qui la pratique, l'aboutissement de tout un ensemble de faits.

Aussi, devrait-on, dans l'établissement des rapports politiques entre les divers peuples, et dans la graduation des avantages et des droits reconnus aux uns et aux autres, s'abstenir de toutes considérations particulières de croyance, de coutumes spéciales, de mentalité, etc.

Nous ne faisons pas aux peuples d'Occident l'injure de supposer, parce que la grande majorité des Égyptiens pratique une autre religion que la leur, parce que notre vie familiale et nos traditions s'inspirent d'idées différentes, qu'ils nous considéreraient, au point de vue de nos droits politiques, sous un jour défavorable.

Les étrangers qui entretiennent avec les Égyptiens des rapports de quelque nature que ce soit, s'accordent à louer leur douceur, leur aménité et leur tolérance. Et c'est un fait que, de tout temps, l'Égyptien s'est fait remarquer par son calme. Parmi les peuples d'Orient, les Égyptiens ont été et sont les plus empressés à rechercher le concours des Européens et à leur ouvrir, toutes grandes, les portes de leur pays. Mahommed Aly n'a-t-il pas fait appel à un grand nombre de spécialistes qui l'ont aidé dans la réalisation de son vaste programme de réformes ?

L'européanisation de l'Égypte avait même pris de telles proportions que le Khédive Ismaïl ne craignait pas de s'écrier, dans une phrase désormais célèbre : " Mon pays n'est plus en Afrique, il fait partie de l'Europe."

Les Égyptiens n'ont cessé de prodiguer aux étrangers des encouragements et privilèges. Les Capitulations en témoignent, et la création des tribunaux mixtes, dues à l'initiative du Gouvernement d'Ismaïl, avant même qu'on entreprit d'instituer de nouveaux tribunaux pour les affaires purement indigènes, indique dans quelle voie, toute favorable aux étrangers, était dirigée la politique égyptienne, alors qu'elle n'était encore soumise à aucune influence extérieure.

L'Égyptien n'est pas réfractaire au progrès. D'une vive intelligence et d'un don d'assimilation remarquable, sa formation intellectuelle ne le cède en rien à celle des peuples les plus avancés. Qui n'a vu l'artisan ou le paysan égyptien travaillant du matin au soir, sans être un seul instant détourné de son labeur par le vice dégradant de l'alcool ?

Peuple formant un bloc ethnique entier, il est difficile d'y démêler l'appoint des races étrangères, car sa force d'absorption est telle, que si elle n'élimine pas l'élément

* L'Angleterre n'a pas cessé de suivre, en ce qui concerne l'industrie, une politique d'obstruction. Son attitude bien arrêtée est de maintenir l'Égypte économiquement tributaire de l'industrie anglaise. Ainsi, lorsque la première société de filature se créa en Égypte, ses produits furent frappés d'un droit d'accise égal au tarif douanier imposé aux articles importés d'Angleterre, ce qui amena la chute de cette intéressante entreprise.

étranger, elle se l'assimile jusqu'à lui faire perdre ses caractéristiques propres. Aussi, peut-on constater que la population ne forme qu'une seule et unique race parfaitement homogène au physique, comme dans sa mentalité et ses mœurs.

Organisation administrative et sociale.

Instruction publique, justice, administration régionale et centrale, institutions communales, culte, assistance publique, hôpitaux, etc.—en un mot, tout ce qui permet de grouper les efforts de la collectivité existe en Égypte et s'adapte parfaitement à la mentalité de ses habitants. Du reste, les Égyptiens sont familiarisés depuis des siècles avec les conditions d'une société organisée, et l'état actuel n'est que la conséquence d'une évolution normale.

En ce qui concerne l'instruction publique, nous regrettons de dire qu'elle ne répond pas suffisamment au désir d'apprendre manifesté par la population. La faute en est au Gouvernement ou, pour mieux dire, à ses conseillers anglais qui n'ont pas tenu compte des vœux formulés à maintes reprises par le pays. Cependant, l'élite et la classe moyenne trouvent des institutions scolaires de tout rang. Nos écoles supérieures ont produit dans les diverses branches des lettres, des sciences et des arts, une remarquable phalange d'hommes sur lesquels repose l'avenir du pays.* A côté de cet enseignement supérieur et secondaire, l'initiative privée et celle des conseils provinciaux, élus par le suffrage des habitants, s'emploient dans la mesure de leurs ressources à répandre l'enseignement élémentaire. Même, les conseils provinciaux, auxquels la loi organique permet d'établir des contributions à concurrence de 5 pour cent de l'impôt foncier, pour entreprendre des travaux d'utilité publique, n'ont pas hésité à consacrer la totalité de ces revenus à la diffusion de l'instruction dans les villages.

Une justice prompte, éclairée et égale pour tous, n'est-elle pas l'indice d'un état social avancé ? A cet égard, et sans vouloir relever ici les vicissitudes subies par notre système judiciaire sous l'occupation anglaise, nous pouvons affirmer que les institutions judiciaires, indigènes et mixtes, qui fonctionnent depuis près d'un siècle, font honneur au pays. Les magistrats tant indigènes qu'étrangers offrent toutes les garanties, et dans la phalange des hommes de loi, les magistrats égyptiens sont souvent parmi les plus éclairés.†

Il est inutile de nous étendre sur l'organisation administrative. On sait que le Khédive Ismaïl créa un Ministère responsable avec des Départements ministériels copiés sur le système européen. Ces institutions se sont développées, perfectionnées et pourraient rendre de grands services si la contrôle de la nation sur les actes du Gouvernement s'exerçait d'une façon effective ; mais nous aborderons ce sujet quand nous parlerons des effets de la domination étrangère sur l'Égypte.

En ce qui concerne le progrès économique, nous devons aussi rappeler que, grâce au concours des Européens et des étrangers en général, les banques, les bourses, les associations commerciales, les grandes maisons de négoce sont en nombre suffisant pour assurer les transactions et régulariser le marché. Les opérations commerciales profitent de la plus large liberté et les capitaux étrangers ne rencontrent point d'entraves dans leur productivité.

Des œuvres philanthropiques de toutes sortes et de toutes nationalités ont été fondées qui rencontrent une sympathie générale. Du reste, le paupérisme trouverait difficile à s'introduire dans ce pays si largement accueillant.

Par ce qu'on a lu plus haut, on voit que l'Égypte peut revendiquer la plénitude de ses droits à une existence libre, à une indépendance totale. Ces droits ne sauraient être méconnus que si, contrairement au programme de paix que le Président Wilson, parlant au nom des Alliés, a tracé dans son discours du 27 septembre 1918, les Puissances venaient "à établir une distinction entre ceux envers qui elles tiennent à être justes et ceux envers qui elles tiennent à ne pas être injustes."

Deux objections peuvent être soulevées au sujet de nos revendications. Il s'agit :—

1. Des droits que l'Angleterre prétendrait avoir sur l'Égypte ;
2. De l'intérêt qu'aurait l'Égypte au maintien de la tutelle étrangère.

* Le nombre des jeunes Égyptiens fréquentant les écoles d'Europe s'élevait avant la guerre à près de 700.

† Les magistrats égyptiens remplissent, avec conscience et dignité, leur fonction, malgré l'attitude de l'administration anglaise, qui fait de l'exercice de la justice aux tribunaux indigènes une source de revenus pour le Trésor, refusant les fonds indispensables à l'amélioration de la magistrature et de ses services auxiliaires.

DES DROITS QUE L'ANGLETERRE PRÉTENDRAIT AVOIR SUR L'ÉGYPTÉ.

Situation politique de l'Égypte avant 1882.

Avant que les événements de 1882 n'amènent l'occupation anglaise, l'Égypte était un pays de suzeraineté ottomane, mais possédant, sous le Gouvernement de Khédives accédant au trône d'après un ordre de succession dynastique, son entière autonomie intérieure. La suzeraineté turque se traduisait uniquement par le paiement d'un tribut annuel, par quelques limitations concernant les effectifs militaires et par le respect dû aux traités signés par la Sublime Porte.

Cette autonomie intérieure si complète, les Égyptiens l'ont obtenue sur les champs de bataille et au prix de leur sang. Il n'a rien moins fallu que l'intervention de l'Europe pour arrêter la marche victorieuse de Mohammed Aly et l'obliger à accepter l'autonomie au lieu de l'indépendance qui était le but poursuivi.

La convention de Londres du 15 juillet 1840, suivie du "hatti-chérif" du 13 février 1841, constitue la charte de l'Égypte ; et la reconnaissance des droits de celle-ci ne le fut pas par la Turquie seulement, mais aussi par les grandes Puissances, dont l'intervention garantissait ce pacte de délivrance.

Est-ce qu'il est concevable que des droits ainsi acquis puissent être perdus parce que des troubles intérieurs, exagérés à plaisir, avaient un instant inquiété quelques résidents européens ?

Insurrection d'Arabi.

L'insurrection d'Arabi due, à l'origine, à des privilèges injustement accordés à des officiers circassiens au détriment des officiers égyptiens, et dont l'histoire impartiale saura démêler les responsabilités, n'en a pas moins démontré que l'esprit national se révoltait contre toutes les injustices. Le programme des réformes législatives élaboré par les nationalistes indique, d'ailleurs, que le peuple aspirait à une plus grande liberté—sentiment louable entre tous, mais qui n'empêcha pas l'Europe de perpétuer contre l'Égypte une violence de toute façon imméritée.*

Néanmoins, les Puissances étaient d'accord pour maintenir à l'Égypte l'intégralité de ses droits politiques. L'Angleterre, de son côté, déclarait qu'elle n'entendait pas profiter d'une situation où, de concert avec la Turquie, elle ne devait agir que comme mandataire de l'Europe, pour une simple mesure de police tout à fait momentanée. Le fameux protocole de désintéressement signé à Constantinople le 25 juin 1882 en fait foi.

C'est dans le même esprit que, le 11 août 1882, Mr. Gladstone déclara à la Chambre des Communes que l'Angleterre n'entend occuper l'Égypte que pour y rétablir l'ordre et soumettre ensuite la question égyptienne aux délibérations des Puissances. Mêmes déclarations de la part des chefs de l'expédition militaire et navale. Et les hommes d'États de confirmer, par la suite, en maintes circonstances le caractère tout à fait provisoire de l'occupation.†

Caractère de l'Occupation.

Par le sens juridique attaché au terme "occupation" et par le fait que le droit public a même omis de la mentionner comme un mode de règlement des relations qui peuvent exister entre deux pays, il était facile de se rendre compte de ce caractère provisoire, du reste admis et proclamé par les intéressés eux-mêmes.

La prolongation de l'occupation ne pouvait, non plus, conférer à la mainmise de la Grande-Bretagne une légitimité quelconque. N'a-t-elle pas, elle-même, en 1887,

* Il n'est pas sans intérêt de reproduire ici le texte de la réponse que l'ultimatum de l'Amiral Seymour suggéra au Conseil des Ministres égyptiens, présidé par le Khédive Tawfik : "L'Égypte n'a rien fait qui ait pu justifier l'envoi des flottes combinées. L'autorité civile et militaire n'a à se reprocher aucun acte autorisant les réclamations de l'Amiral. Sauf quelques réparations urgentes aux anciennes constructions, les ports sont, à cette heure, dans l'état où ils se trouvaient à l'arrivée des flottes. Nous sommes ici chez nous, et nous avons le droit et le devoir de nous y prémunir contre tout ennemi qui prétendrait l'initiative d'une rupture de l'état de paix, lequel, selon le Gouvernement anglais, n'a pas cessé d'exister. L'Égypte, gardienne de ses droits et de son honneur, ne peut rendre aucun fort ni aucun canon, sans y être contrainte par le sort des armes. Elle proteste contre votre déclaration de ce jour et tiendra responsable de toutes les conséquences directes ou indirectes qui pourront résulter d'une attaque des flottes ou d'un bombardement, la nation qui, en pleine paix, aura lancé le premier boulet sur la paisible ville d'Alexandrie, au mépris du droit des gens et des lois de la guerre."

† Dans son livre intitulé : "Situation internationale de l'Égypte et du Soudan," M. Cocheris ne cite pas moins de soixante affirmations d'Ambassadeurs et de Ministres anglais, proclamant, tous, le désintéressement absolu de l'Angleterre dans la question égyptienne, affirmations qui s'échelonnent de 1881 à 1899.

c'est-à-dire cinq ans après l'entrée de ses troupes en Égypte, délégué Sir Henry Drummond Wolf pour fixer une date à l'évacuation?

Aussi bien, la Grande-Bretagne a-t-elle toujours éprouvé le besoin, chaque fois que revenait sur le tapis la question de l'échéance de son mandat, de donner à ce mandat des objets successifs et divers, lui permettant d'expliquer, sinon de justifier, la prolongation de son séjour. C'était, au début, la restauration de l'autorité du Khédive, ensuite, la menace des derviches; plus tard, la reprise du Soudan et enfin lorsque tous ces prétextes déterminés furent épuisés, ce fut l'antienne fameuse de la mission civilisatrice à exercer auprès d'un peuple insuffisamment formé.

La Grande-Bretagne pourrait-elle se prévaloir des accords, qu'au terme de sa longue rivalité, elle conclut avec la France, en 1904, accords en vertu desquels, contre la reconnaissance de son action dans d'autres contrées, la France laissait les mains libres à sa rivale en Égypte? Pour les Égyptiens, cette entente n'avait d'autre valeur que celle de sa portée spéciale en ce qui regarde les relations nouvelles qui allaient être inaugurées entre les deux grands pays; mais il est inadmissible qu'elle puisse toucher aux droits imprescriptibles des Égyptiens et à leur autonomie solennellement, et à maintes reprises, reconnue.

Il lui est donc impossible, pour la justification de sa mainmise sur l'Égypte d'avancer d'autres arguments que ceux de ses désirs ou d'intérêts appuyés uniquement sur la force.

Le Protectorat.

Personne, nous l'espérons, ne pensera à invoquer l'acte accompli dans les conditions spéciales que l'on sait comme un titre à une mainmise définitive sur l'Égypte.

Mesure de guerre, la proclamation du protectorat ne peut que prendre fin avec elle. Et, du reste, la Grande-Bretagne semble ne pas attribuer au protectorat une portée qu'il ne peut avoir, puisqu'elle n'a pas cherché à obtenir l'approbation du pays et la reconnaissance formelle des Puissances. C'est une simple déclaration unilatérale qui a établi le nouveau régime, et celui-ci est si peu assis que ni le statut politique ni l'ordre d'accession au trône n'ont pu être arrêtés.*

DE L'INTÉRÊT QU'AURAIT L'ÉGYPTE AU MAINTIEN DE TUTELLE ÉTRANGÈRE.

Origine du Progrès de l'Égypte.

Un fort courant d'opinion représente l'Égypte moderne comme étant l'œuvre de l'occupation anglaise. Sans doute quelques-unes des initiatives matérielles des Anglais ont été utiles, mais il est absolument contraire à la vérité de dire que le progrès de l'Égypte ne date que de 1882. L'Égypte actuelle est, avant tout, l'œuvre du régime d'autonomie instauré par Mahommed Aly.

En effet, lorsque Mahommed Aly prit en mains le gouvernement de l'Égypte le pays se trouvait dans des conditions désastreuses, tant au point de vue économique que social. L'essor imprimé par lui fut tel que vers la fin de son règne le chiffre de la population avait plus que doublé et celui du commerce sextuplé. L'instruction publique fut organisée sur des bases solides; il établit un vaste plan de travaux d'irrigation, canaux et barrages et en fit commencer l'exécution.† Il améliora les voies de communications terrestres et fluviales, créa le canal Mahmoudieh, qui est encore aujourd'hui une des artères principales du commerce intérieur, et commença l'aménagement du port d'Alexandrie. C'est encore à lui que l'on doit que la culture du coton ait été intensifiée. Enfin, il s'efforça d'introduire la grande industrie.

Plus tard, sous le règne de ses successeurs, et principalement sous le Khédive Ismaïl, un programme important de réformes fut dressé et réalisé, qui devait faire de l'Égypte l'égal des pays européens.

C'est ainsi que l'enseignement public, non seulement pour les garçons mais aussi, pour les filles, reçut les plus hauts encouragements, et que les institutions religieuses étrangères furent généralement aidées pour la fondation de nombreux collèges et écoles. C'est de cette époque que date aussi la création du Musée d'Égyptologie, de

* Ceux qui connaissent l'attachement des Égyptiens à la famille régnante comprendront aisément que cette remarque, qui concerne uniquement le caractère du protectorat, laisse hors de cause la personnalité des membres de la dynastie.

† Clot Bey estime que jusqu'en 1836 Mahommed Aly avait creusé 104,000,000 de mètres cubes, fait 40,000,000 de mètres cubes de terrassement et construit 2,814,000 mètres cubes de travaux de maçonnerie en faveur des irrigations et des communications intérieures.

l'Observatoire et de la Bibliothèque nationale, l'institution des sociétés savantes, la construction de l'Opéra, &c.

Le Caire, Alexandrie et Port-Saïd devinrent des cités tout à fait modernes par le percement de grandes voies et de belles avenues, par la distribution de l'eau et l'installation de l'éclairage, et par la construction de beaux édifices.

D'autre part, dans le domaine des travaux publics, l'effort accompli avant 1882 a été énorme. Citons le Canal de Suez, dont le monde entier a tiré de si précieux avantages, la création du Canal Ibrahimieh, qui a régénéré la Haute-Égypte, et le Canal Ismaïlieh, qui lie le Caire à Suez, l'achèvement du port d'Alexandrie, les docks de Suez, les phares sur les deux mers, la création d'un chemin de fer à voie large et le service des Postes et Télégraphes.

Dans l'ordre administratif, comme nous l'avons rappelé plus haut, c'est de cette époque que le Ministère égyptien et ses départements furent copiés sur le modèle occidental et que l'administration provinciale fut divisée en quatorze régions.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne l'œuvre judiciaire, l'Égypte qui souffrait de la diversité des juridictions consulaires put convaincre les Puissances de l'utilité de leur unification et leur fit accepter la création des tribunaux mixtes. Les juridictions du statut personnel musulman furent organisées et le travail de codification fut mené à bonne fin.

L'Œuvre britannique.

Il est certain, après cette énumération rapide et nécessairement incomplète, qu'on est mal venu de dire que l'Égypte n'a commencé de vivre sa vie moderne que depuis 1882. En réalité, tout l'essentiel avait été déjà fait. Et l'on serait également dans l'erreur la plus profonde si l'on soutenait que l'action de l'Angleterre, depuis 1882, fut telle que si elle venait à évacuer aujourd'hui l'Égypte, son départ serait suivi de conséquences désastreuses.

Nous sommes trop équitables, cependant, pour ne pas reconnaître les initiatives de l'Angleterre en Égypte. Son œuvre, presque exclusivement matérielle, se caractérise, d'une part, par le relèvement des finances du pays et la mise en valeur de ses ressources naturelles, et, d'autre part, par l'introduction, dans l'administration générale, des principes d'ordre et de discipline.

Mais ce concours limité, peut-il avoir pour prix la perte de notre indépendance? Qui pourra le soutenir? L'enjeu n'est-il pas hors de toute proportion avec les avantages obtenus?

Du reste, si cette collaboration étrangère avait, au début, quelque utilité, il n'en est plus de même aujourd'hui que les générations nouvelles, pénétrées des principes d'ordre, de progrès et de libéralisme, sont aptes à gouverner leur pays avec toute la justice et toute l'efficacité désirables.

On est amené, d'ailleurs, à se demander si le bien résultant de la domination étrangère n'est pas annulé par le mal inhérent à la nature même de cette domination.

Effets d'une Domination étrangère.

L'intérêt d'une Puissance dominante s'oppose ordinairement à tout ce qui peut élever, au-dessus d'un certain niveau, le moral du peuple dominé, et il est difficile d'exiger d'elle qu'elle sacrifie cet intérêt, aussi bien dans l'ordre politique que dans l'ordre matériel.

Mais ce n'est là qu'un des inconvénients de la domination. En effet, une métropole, même bien intentionnée, ne peut surveiller de près les rouages qu'elle a créés. Leur fonctionnement est soumis au gré des agents qui exercent directement le pouvoir et qui, jouissant d'une suprématie absolue, échappent malheureusement au contrôle régulateur de l'opinion des gouvernés, d'autant plus que les subalternes indigènes sont portés à la servilité qui est même appréciée comme une preuve de loyalisme, alors que la dignité devient la marque d'un esprit subversif.

En Égypte, plus particulièrement, cette puissance sans limite, conférée à tous les fonctionnaires anglais, finit par leur donner un sentiment exagéré de leur mission et les pousse à empiéter sur les pouvoirs de leurs collègues et même de leurs chefs égyptiens. Ainsi le fonctionnaire égyptien ne peut que perdre le sentiment de sa personnalité, se dérober aux responsabilités et se dépouiller de tout esprit d'initiative.

D'autre part, il est naturel que l'Angleterre, qui doit à la force seule sa domination sur nous, ne se résigne pas facilement à octroyer le droit de contrôle sur ses actes et sur sa gestion. Elle cherche à l'éviter, au contraire, par la fameuse antienne de la non-maturité et s'oppose au développement normal des institutions représentatives.

Pourtant, la force de l'opinion dans ce pays et la sûreté de jugement des Égyptiens sont telles, que le contrôle par la nation aurait pu être utilisé dans le sens le plus favorable à nos intérêts; mais les Anglais ont entouré ce droit de tant d'atténuations et d'entraves qu'il est devenu illusoire. C'est ainsi que l'Assemblée législative, qui devait marquer un progrès sur l'institution qui l'avait précédée, ne possède toujours qu'une voix consultative et ne peut exercer aucune influence sur les décisions du Gouvernement.

III.

L'Égypte estime que les titres qu'elle vient d'exposer seront, aux yeux du Congrès de la Paix, plus que suffisants pour établir ses droits à une existence conforme à nos aspirations.

Mais si l'on considère que la liberté n'est pas seulement un droit naturel des peuples, et qu'elle doit être le prix d'un constant effort pour le triomphe de la cause de la civilisation, nous pouvons affirmer que l'Égypte s'est révélée, par la collaboration précieuse qu'elle a prêtée à la cause des Alliés, digne de participer aux bienfaits du nouveau régime de justice. Nous pouvons ajouter qu'elle a d'autant plus de titre à la bienveillance des Alliés que, pour agir dans cette guerre, elle a dû faire taire le juste ressentiment que l'établissement du protectorat a fait naître en elle.

La Coopération égyptienne.

L'utilisation de l'Égypte comme base d'opérations militaires de premier ordre a permis de conduire à bonne fin la campagne de Palestine et de Syrie, a aidé à la réussite des opérations de Mésopotamie et a servi au mouvement des troupes requises pour les Dardanelles.

C'est là le côté passif de notre coopération; il est pourtant impossible de le négliger si l'on se rappelle que les Alliés avaient besoin, pour la sécurité de leurs opérations, d'un calme parfait, qui, de notre part, n'a jamais fait défaut. L'état d'esprit qui a régné, pendant un certain temps en Grèce, n'a-t-il pas été pour beaucoup dans la stagnation du front de Salonique?

Quant à notre concours actif, le Général Allenby en a reconnu officiellement toute l'étendue et toute l'importance. Certainement, l'envoi ostensible, sur un point quelconque du front, d'un contingent égyptien, au lieu de paquets de troupes dont la coopération a passé inaperçue, aurait eu plus de retentissement et il nous aurait attiré une reconnaissance qui s'attache, malheureusement, aux manifestations bruyantes beaucoup plus qu'aux concours vraiment utiles.

Pour se faire une idée exacte de l'importance du concours égyptien, il faut se représenter un pays dont toutes les ressources en hommes, en matériel, en argent, en produits agricoles et industriels étaient à la disposition des autorités militaires.

Dès les premiers jours des hostilités, notre machine gouvernementale n'a cessé de fonctionner en vue de procurer aux armées l'assistance nécessaire. Certaines administrations du pays se sont même consacrées à ce travail, au détriment de leurs services propres.

Des centaines de milliers d'Égyptiens ont été réquisitionnés pour servir comme auxiliaires dans les armées, et un grand nombre a même été appelé, loin d'Égypte, en France ou en Mésopotamie.

Dans les services de l'arrière, un grand nombre d'Égyptiens se sont enrôlés, ce qui a permis de disposer de beaucoup de militaires pour le service effectif sur les lignes de feu.

Au point de vue du matériel, peut-on oublier l'aide énorme apportée par les chemins de fer égyptiens dans les transports militaires? Le matériel roulant du pays a été soumis à une usure telle que, pour le remettre en état après la guerre, il faudra assumer des dépenses considérables.

Au budget de l'Égypte, a figuré, l'an passé, une contribution de £ E. 3,500,000, comme assistance à l'œuvre de guerre. Les contributions des particuliers aux œuvres d'hospitalisation et d'assistance aux blessés ont été constantes, et la générosité du public s'est exercée avec beaucoup de munificence.

L'Égypte a dû réduire aussi son acréage cotonnier en vue d'augmenter les superficies plantées en céréales et subvenir, ainsi, aux besoins de ravitaillement des troupes en campagne et en garnison sur le territoire. Des quantités énormes de blé, d'orge, de maïs, de paille, de viandes de boucherie, un nombre considérable de bêtes de charge et de trait, etc., ont été réquisitionnées à de bas prix.

Le coton, qui est la source principale de la richesse du pays, a été non seulement réduit en acréage, mais il a dû subir, par la tarification, une restriction sans exemple dans aucun autre pays cotonnier, même les Indes. A un moment où la demande

mondiale justifiait les plus légitimes bénéfices, l'Égypte a été soumise à une énorme réduction dans ses ressources, pouvant se chiffrer par plus d'un demi-milliard de francs.

IV.

Au moment de soumettre nos revendications au Congrès de la Paix, nous aurions redouté que la voix si faible de notre pays ne soit couverte par celle de plus puissants intérêts, si nous n'avions pas la conviction que la volonté unanime des peuples est, en ce moment, uniquement tendue vers les solutions que dictent les principes de justice.

L'entière "satisfaction" dont parlait le Dr. Wilson, dans son discours du 27 septembre 1918, consisterait pour les Égyptiens :

- 1° Dans la reconnaissance et le libre exercice de l'indépendance de leur pays;
- 2° Dans la rétrocession du Soudan égyptien.

INDÉPENDANCE.

Nous demandons qu'elle nous soit reconnue : (a) parce que c'est un droit naturel et imprescriptible des nations; (b) parce que l'Égypte n'a jamais cessé de la revendiquer au prix même du sang de ses enfants; (c) parce qu'elle se considère maintenant dégagée du dernier lien de suzeraineté qui l'attachait à la Turquie; (d) parce qu'elle estime que le moment est venu de proclamer une souveraineté que justifie sa situation morale et matérielle.

Il nous semble que lorsque l'Europe juge que le Hedjaz, hier encore province turque, a droit à l'indépendance, elle ne peut que traiter l'Égypte, infiniment plus évoluée et possédant son autonomie, sur un même pied d'égalité.

DROITS DES ÉTRANGERS.

Tout au plus pourrait on demander : (a) la sauvegarde des intérêts des étrangers porteurs des titres de la Dette égyptienne; (b) la garantie des droits des européens résidant en Égypte.

Dette publique.

Cette dette ne constitue qu'une charge bien légère, comparée à la fortune nationale. Néanmoins, l'Égypte accepte volontiers que, comme par le passé, le service des coupons soit assuré par des affectations spéciales de certains revenus de l'État; et que la Caisse de la Dette publique, que l'occupation anglaise n'a pas abolie, continue à exercer son contrôle financier dans une mesure assurant le crédit de l'Égypte, sans porter atteinte aux prérogatives du Gouvernement et de la représentation nationale.

Garantie des Droits des Européens.

L'Égypte considère que c'est son devoir d'assurer scrupuleusement aux Européens leurs privilèges, et elle s'en remet à la justice de la Société des Nations pour que les garanties soient conçues de telle manière qu'elles sauvegardent et respectent autant que possible ses droits de souveraineté.

Nous verrions avec plaisir l'élargissement de la compétence des tribunaux mixtes, pour leur permettre de juger toutes les affaires pénales concernant les étrangers. Il en est de même pour l'extension des institutions comme les municipalités, où l'élément étranger a été appelé à participer à l'administration locale.

En ce qui concerne le pouvoir législatif et de taxation, les étrangers trouveront toutes garanties dans l'existence d'une organisation internationale siégeant dans le pays et dont l'adhésion serait nécessaire pour toutes les lois et tous les impôts qui leur seraient appliqués. Le régime des chambres réunies de la Cour d'Appel mixte fonctionnant déjà par application de la loi du 11 novembre 1911, et mieux adapté à son rôle nouveau par l'adjonction d'autres éléments choisis en dehors de lui, répondrait parfaitement à ce but.

Concours des Étrangers.

L'Égypte ne manquera pas de faire appel, demain comme hier, aux lumières des spécialistes du monde entier; mais ce qu'elle attend c'est qu'on lui fournisse des collaborateurs et non des maîtres. Nous avons, en effet, tout un programme de réformes essentielles qu'une politique particulariste ne permettrait pas de réaliser et pour l'exécution duquel nous comptons sur le concours désintéressé de l'étranger.

Réformes intérieures.

La première des réformes consistera dans l'établissement d'une constitution où la responsabilité ministérielle sera nettement définie.

L'instruction publique fera l'objet des premières préoccupations de l'Égypte indépendante qui en poursuivra la diffusion dans toutes les classes sociales.

Un plus grand esprit d'économie présidera aux dépenses publiques, celles-ci ayant été trop engagées, surtout depuis l'abolition du contrôle de la Dette publique, soit dans des crédits somptuaires et souvent inutiles, ou dans des émoluments très élevés de fonctionnaires dont le nombre est sans rapport avec les nécessités du service.

A un système fiscal suranné grevant uniquement la propriété foncière serait substitué un système plus élastique et mieux réparti.

Le régime douanier serait modifié pour faciliter l'importation des articles de première nécessité et protéger raisonnablement la production nationale. Une taxation spécifique tiendra compte de la nature des articles à frapper.

Des lois protégeront l'évolution des organisations coopératives, base fondamentale d'une saine économie sociale.

Une plus grande extension et une organisation plus libérale des institutions provinciales et municipales permettront d'assurer aux intérêts locaux un développement rapide et efficace.

Enfin, l'agriculture, le commerce, l'industrie, l'hygiène, la question ouvrière feront l'objet de lois qui aideront au bien-être général.

Canal de Suez.

Il est certain que l'intérêt des Puissances commande de confier la garde du Canal de Suez à l'Égypte, qui n'a aucune visée politique ni ambition coloniale. Mais comme il s'agit d'une question bien moins égyptienne qu'internationale, et dont le règlement figurera au premier plan des préoccupations du Congrès de la Paix, l'Égypte est disposée à accueillir toutes mesures que le Congrès de la Paix jugera utiles pour la sauvegarde de la neutralité du Canal.

L'Égypte et la Société des Nations.

L'Égypte s'honorerait de placer son indépendance sous la garantie de la Société des Nations et de contribuer, dans la mesure de ses moyens, au triomphe des idées nouvelles.

RETROCESSION DU SOUDAN.

En demandant la rétrocession du Soudan, les Égyptiens n'agissent pas sous l'influence des idées d'accroissement de territoire et d'expansion coloniale, mais se placent tout simplement autant sur le terrain du droit que sur celui de la conservation nationale.

De temps immémorial, le Soudan a fait partie intégrante de l'Égypte, et si, par moments, il en a été détaché, la première préoccupation de l'Égypte autonome fut de réintégrer le Soudan dans le giron de la patrie.

Mais il ne s'agit pas que d'un point de droit ou d'une question historique. Les intérêts de l'Égypte et du Soudan sont, par la nature même des choses, si intimement liés que les deux pays se complètent et ont besoin l'un de l'autre pour vivre et prospérer. Laisser s'établir au Soudan une Puissance étrangère serait exposer l'Égypte, qui vit du Nil, aux risques les plus graves.

Le Conseiller financier anglais auprès du Gouvernement égyptien s'est ainsi exprimé dans son rapport du 14 décembre 1901 : " Quel que soit le nom qu'on lui donne, la terre arrosée par le Nil, depuis les montagnes d'Abyssinie et les grands lacs jusqu'aux bords de la Méditerranée, forme un ensemble intégral et indivisible. Maintenant que la science de l'ingénieur est parvenue à un si haut degré, c'est à la Puissance dont la domination est établie sur le Haut-Nil qu'appartient le contrôle des eaux de l'Égypte. La possession du Soudan est nécessaire à l'Égypte, plus nécessaire même que la possession d'Alexandrie."

De leur côté, les habitants du Soudan ont tout à gagner au contact de la civilisation égyptienne, la seule qui puisse leur convenir. Pour eux, l'Égypte est une grande sœur dont ils parlent la langue, et dont ils adoptent facilement les institutions et les mœurs.

Cette mutuelle sympathie et cette affinité de mœurs et de mentalité trouvent leur explication naturelle dans ce fait historique que les Arabes venus en Égypte et ceux qui se répandirent au Soudan avaient la même origine. Les descendants de ces derniers forment aujourd'hui la fraction la plus importante et la plus éclairée de la population soudanaise.

En demandant que le Soudan fasse retour à l'Égypte, nous entendons l'associer à nous et lui reconnaître tous ses droits.

Abandon et Reprise du Soudan.

Il est superflu de parler ici des circonstances qui amenèrent en 1884 l'abandon du Soudan. Qu'il suffise seulement de rappeler que le Ministère Chérif s'opposa à cet abandon et que, lorsqu'il lui fut imposé, il démissionna en déclarant :

" L'Égypte n'avait pas le droit de consentir à l'abandon du Soudan et que, devant suivre les conseils de la Grande-Bretagne sans les discuter, le Ministère trouvait que cela était contraire à la Constitution du 28 août 1878, suivant laquelle le Khédive règne avec ses Ministres."

Plus tard, à la reprise du Soudan, on imposa également à l'Égypte la convention du 19 janvier 1899, par laquelle le Soudan, de province égyptienne, devenait une possession anglo-égyptienne. Cette convention qui attribue à l'Égypte un rôle passif et un titre purement nominal a eu pour véritable effet l'incorporation du Soudan à l'Empire britannique.

Quelle est, en droit, la valeur de la convention du 19 janvier 1899 ?

Aucun doute n'est permis ; cette convention est nulle. Elle a été obtenue par une contrainte qui en a vicié la nature. Il est évident, en outre, que l'Égypte, en l'état des traités internationaux et des firmans qui lui interdisaient d'aliéner une parcelle quelconque de son territoire n'avait pas qualité pour conclure une telle convention.

Nous nous élevons avec autant plus de force contre cette convention, qu'il a été fait table rase des intérêts et des sentiments des Égyptiens. Il est inconcevable qu'un pacte d'association réserve, autant que celui-ci, tous les droits à l'une des parties et toutes les obligations à l'autre.

Si l'Angleterre domine et gouverne exclusivement cet immense territoire, l'Égypte, elle, paie de ses deniers les déficits importants du budget et les dépenses des grands travaux pour la mise en valeur de ce territoire. Elle a, ainsi, avancé £ E. 3,500,000 pour le réseau de chemin de fer et £ E. 1,000,000 pour la construction de Port-Soudan.* Et il s'est trouvé—ironie des choses—qu'en construisant Port-Soudan, de ses propres deniers, l'Égypte a créé pour le commerce soudanais un débouché nouveau qui ne peut que diminuer le profit qu'elle retirait de son trafic avec le Soudan.

Et c'est encore l'armée égyptienne, casernée presque toute au Soudan, qui est employée à pacifier les régions insoumises ou à conquérir, pour le compte du régime commun, des nouveaux territoires. Les dépenses considérables sont, bien entendu, à la charge exclusive de l'Égypte.

Quels avantages retirons-nous en échange de nos sacrifices ? Nous sommes encore à nous le demander. Les fonctionnaires égyptiens disparaissent peu à peu pour faire place, dans les hauts postes surtout, aux fonctionnaires britanniques. Le jour n'est pas éloigné où, en dehors de la garnison payée par nous, il n'y aura pas un seul agent égyptien au Soudan.

C'est pour toutes ces raisons que nous ne cessons de réclamer, conformément au droit et à l'équité, le retour du Soudan à la mère-patrie.

V.

Avant de terminer ce rapport, qu'il nous soit permis de nous défendre contre un reproche de nature à nous aliéner la sympathie de ceux en la justice de qui nous comptons pour une appréciation bienveillante de notre cause.

L'Égypte, s'est-on écrié, qui, grâce à la Grande-Bretagne possède une organisation et une prospérité remarquables, qui lui doit d'avoir été à l'abri d'une invasion turco-germanique, et d'avoir joui de la tranquillité et de la richesse pendant qu'à ses côtés ce n'était que ruines, souffrances et misères, l'Égypte, contrairement à l'attente de l'Angleterre, a choisi ce moment précis pour faire montre de dispositions peu amicales.

Au contraire, tout témoigne de la constante correction avec laquelle l'Égypte a agi vis-à-vis de la Puissance occupante.

* Les avances de l'Égypte à ce jour dépassent 11,000,000 £.

En dépit des traités méconnus, des promesses oubliées, d'une immixtion dans nos affaires de jour en jour plus obsédante; en dépit des entraves apportées à la propagation de l'instruction publique et au développement des institutions représentatives; en dépit de cette blessure d'amour-propre qui fut infligée à l'Égypte au début de la guerre, lorsque, par une simple lettre du représentant intérimaire de la Grande-Bretagne, on installa sans plus de forme le protectorat, nous ne nous sommes départis, à aucun moment, d'un calme et d'une sagesse dont nous aurions voulu que la Grande-Bretagne appréciait, à cette heure, toute la valeur.

L'Égypte, nation faible et écrasée sous le poids des préjugés que les intérêts contraires ont amoncelés contre elle, ne demande qu'à être favorisée par l'Angleterre et si, dans la profession de foi qui a été développée plus haut, nous avons donné toutes assurances en ce qui regarde les intérêts étrangers, nos rapports avec la Grande-Bretagne nous mettent à l'aise pour dire que le jour où notre indépendance sera obtenue avec son appui, elle aura droit à notre entière gratitude.

Quant à la sécurité dont nous avons joui pendant la guerre, nous ferons observer que notre pays n'aurait pas été probablement menacé, si la Grande-Bretagne n'y avait une situation à défendre et si elle ne devait en faire une base d'opérations pour ses campagnes militaires.

La Délégation égyptienne, composée des membres soussignés, et qui a reçu par procuration, signée des habitants du territoire, mandat de plaider la cause de l'indépendance de l'Égypte, ne voulait pas se contenter de cette défense écrite. Elle comptait se rendre en Europe pour intéresser de vive voix, à la question égyptienne, les hauts représentants de l'opinion britannique et mondiale.

Malheureusement, la même politique dont nous souffrons, a eu une nouvelle occasion de se manifester sous une forme encore plus arbitraire.

L'autorité britannique, sous le prétexte que les mandats mis en circulation dans le but de consulter l'opinion du pays étaient de nature à troubler l'ordre public, s'est avisé d'interdire leur circulation et de confisquer ceux qui étaient déjà couverts de signatures.

Le prétexte invoqué était difficilement soutenable, puisque le pays opposait aux agissements des autorités le calme le plus parfait.

Cette mesure d'étouffement n'a pas empêché que des milliers de signatures ont été données par l'élite du pays, comprenant la plupart des membres des institutions représentatives en tête desquelles figure l'Assemblée législative.

Le geste des autorités ne pouvait que révéler une chose, c'est qu'elles redoutaient qu'à bref délai la consultation du pays ne démontrât une unanimité de sentiment qu'elles s'étaient toujours efforcées de présenter sous un autre jour.

Et de fait, à aucun moment de son histoire, on n'a pu enregistrer en Égypte une telle unanimité dans les opinions. La cause sacrée de l'indépendance a réuni tous les suffrages et a même supprimé toutes les dissidences. Aussi bien les jeunes que les vieux, les riches que les pauvres, les citadins que les villageois, tous, sans distinction de caste ou de croyance, ont montré qu'ils sont animés du même idéal et qu'ils communiquent dans les mêmes sentiments.

Mais une mesure, bien plus grave et bien plus inattendue encore, venait attester qu'une politique dont la base est avant tout l'intérêt ne regarde même pas aux droits sacrés de la liberté individuelle.

L'autorité britannique refusait aux membres de la Délégation les autorisations nécessaires pour se rendre en Europe, et ainsi se trouve étouffée depuis deux mois la voix que le pays comptait faire entendre pour la défense de sa cause.

L'esprit de justice et les principes de liberté qui animent tous ceux qui ont la charge d'organiser le monde nouveau, ne sauraient s'accommoder d'agissements qui ont pour effet de priver la Conférence de la Paix d'une documentation exacte et désintéressée sur la situation véritable d'un pays qui aspire à la liberté, et qui pour y parvenir s'engage à fournir les garanties les plus complètes.

Une décision qui serait prise dans des conditions où tout ce qui se rapporte à nos aspirations, à notre état social, à nos intérêts est présenté sous un aspect non conforme à la réalité des choses, ne saurait avoir de légitimité et ne saurait engager le peuple qui doit la subir.

Pour ces raisons, la Délégation a la conviction profonde que les membres de la Conférence de la Paix ne laisseront pas la cause de l'Égypte à la merci d'appréciations inexactement ou insuffisamment documentées et qu'ils voudront bien permettre aux mandataires autorisés du peuple égyptien de présenter sa défense avec toute la liberté nécessaire.

Il s'agit de la cause même pour laquelle tant de sang vient d'être répandu et tant de sacrifices consentis; et nous comptons que les principes élevés dont s'honorent les nations civilisées, et qui vont être la base des accords concernant l'avenir des peuples, ne resteront pas lettre morte quand viendra sur le tapis la question de nos revendications nationales.

Le Caire, le 25 janvier 1919

Signatures des membres de la Délégation :

SAAD ZAGHLUL PACHA,
Président de la Délégation égyptienne,
Vice-Président élu de l'Assemblée législative.

ALY SHARAWI PACHA,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative.

ABDEL AZIZ FAHMY BEY,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative, Bâtonnier
de l'Ordre des Avocats.

MOHAMMED ALY BEY,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative.

ABDEL LATIF EL-MEKABBATY BEY,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative.

MOHAMMED MAHMOUD PASHA,
Ancien Moudir (Préfet).

AHMED LUTFI EL-SAYED BEY,
Ex-Directeur de la Bibliothèque nationale.

ISMAIL SIDKY PASHA,
Ancien Ministre.

SINNOT BEY HANNA,
Notable copte, Membre de l'Assemblée
législative.

HAMED EL-BASSAL PACHA,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative.

MAHMOUD ABOUL NASR BEY,
Ancien Bâtonnier de l'Ordre des Avocats.

GEORGES KHAYATT BEY,
Notable copte.

DR. HAFEZ AFIFI BEY,
Médecin au Caire.

HUSSEIN WASSEF PASHA,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative.

MICHEL LUTFALLA BEY,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative.

ABDEL KHALEK MADKOUR PASHA,
Membre de l'Assemblée législative, Prévôt
des Marchands du Caire.

No. 67.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)

(No 37. Commercial. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Cairo, February 19, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the military authorities have recently submitted to me certain correspondence, in course of transmission, which bears upon measures which are being taken for the extension of Swiss trade with Egypt and

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a controversy which has arisen between the Swiss commercial community in Egypt and the Swiss Government concerning, in particular, Mr. Alfred Kaiser, the late commercial agent, and, perhaps, the prospective consul-general for Switzerland in Egypt.

This correspondence consists of (1) a letter, dated the 30th December, 1918, from Mr. F. Siegfried, president of the Swiss Commercial Commission in Cairo, to Mr. E. Naef, a member of the Commission, care of Messrs. Sülzer Frères, Winterthur, and (2) copies of letters from the Alexandria branch of the Swiss Commercial Commission to the Swiss Minister in London, with which is enclosed a letter for transmission to the Federal Government written by the president of the Société de Secours suisse at Alexandria on behalf of the Swiss colony in that town.

I transmit copies of a summary of the matter contained in this correspondence.* Information concerning Mr. Alfred Kaiser is to be found in secret list E. 1, under the heading "Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Handels-Agentur der Alexandria."

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

No. 68.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 360.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 8, 1919.

MY telegram No. 1547 of 20th October last and Rome telegram No. 772 of 22nd October to you.

The Italian Minister informs me Sayyed Idris has now applied to go to Palestine at end of April. The Italian Government has refused the request on ground that it is inexpedient for him to leave his country while peace negotiations are proceeding in Paris, &c., and Minister states that his Government are anxious we should reply in same sense if approached by Sayyed Idris.

(Repeated to Rome.)

No. 69.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 364.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 9, 1919.

AS authorised by your telegram No. 309, I asked military authorities to deport Saad Zaghlul, Ismail Sidky, Mohammed Mahmoud, and Hamed-el-Basal. They were arrested yesterday and left for Malta this morning. Sidky has been a Minister under protectorate as Saad desired to be one. Mahmoud was a provincial governor. These three are the best-known names of the party, to which Sidky largely contributed brains and organising power. Hamed-el-Basal is an unruly element best out of the way.

I think this action, for which Sultan has expressed his warm thanks, will be sufficient for the moment, but I am not at all sanguine that independence movement will be really checked by it. The first impression, on the contrary, is likely to be one of irritation and sympathy with deported ringleaders.

I have not pressed the question of Ministry in the last few days, as the fact that British policy has taken a decided line may ease the situation. Sirry and Wahba are, however, more inclined to come in without Sarwat, on whom we cannot count.

Administration of country is at the present in no way affected by crisis.

No. 70.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 368.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 10, 1919.

MY telegram No. 364.

Deportation of Saad Zaghlul and his colleagues led yesterday to an outbreak of feeling amongst students of higher colleges, majority of whom left schools and made a

* Not printed.

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noisy demonstration. They were dispersed with some difficulty by Egyptian Police and 310 arrests were made.

Arrangements were made to deal with a larger demonstration in Cairo this morning, and City Police being driven in by bodies of students coming into centre General Watson took over command, and after a few hours' rioting situation is well in hand. The students were only joined by riff-raff of the town. I understand that a good deal of damage has been done and one or more persons have been killed.

Saad was at one time Minister of Education and popular amongst students, and some manifestation on their part was to be expected.

There is some evidence that Nationalist leaders were opposed to this outbreak, but, headed by Aly Shaarawy Pasha, vice-president of deputation, they have addressed another petition to Sultan, complaining of abuse of martial law in case of their colleague, and using much the same arguments as before, though expressed in less threatening language. Similar petitions of protest against protectorate and of assertion of right of Egyptians to appeal to Peace Congress have been received by His Highness from a number of lawyers and doctors of Cairo and from notabilities of Gharbia, chiefly belonging to Tanta. I hear also that deputations from Upper Egypt have been sent to United States Agency in Cairo, where they were not admitted. A possibly more serious feature is that one of the courts here was unable to sit this morning, as advocates refused to attend.

Disciplinary measures are being considered in this case. I will telegraph further when I have been able to consult military and Egyptian authorities.

No. 71.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 13, 1919.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Board of Trade, a copy of a record of the inter-departmental meeting* held at the Foreign Office on the 20th ultimo to discuss the question of a commercial treaty between the British and French Governments concerning Egypt and Morocco.

With regard to Sir A. Steel-Maitland's suggestion that a statement should be drawn up to show the probable effect, both in the favourable and averse sense, of the application of preferential tariffs in the two Protectorates (see paragraph 7 of the enclosure), Lord Curzon presumes that the necessary steps will be taken by the Board of Trade in conjunction with the Department of Overseas Trade, and he would be glad if the statement when prepared might be communicated to this Department.

A separate letter relating to the question referred to in the last paragraph of the minutes was addressed to the Board of Trade on the 10th instant.

A copy of the present letter is being sent to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I am, &c.

G. S. SPICER.

No. 72.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)

Sir,

Board of Trade, March 12, 1919.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Chairman of the Empire Cotton Growing Committee, urging the necessity for the completion of the drainage of the Delta and the barrage of the White Nile in order to increase the production of cotton.

I am to state that the Board concur generally in the views expressed by the committee, and to suggest for Earl Curzon of Kedleston's consideration that a copy of the committee's letter may be forwarded to the Government of Egypt.

I have, &c.

PERCY ASHLEY.

* No. 46.

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Enclosure in No. 72.

Empire Cotton Growing Committee to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Board of Trade, February 17, 1919.*
AS you are no doubt aware, the irrigation and reclamation schemes which had been contemplated in Egypt and the Soudan before the war are now being again considered with a view to immediate work. It is understood that the money required for the works in the Gezira district of the Soudan is to be provided at an early date, but this committee is most anxious that the drainage and irrigation schemes in the Delta, and the barrage on the White Nile, should also be pushed forward as early and as energetically as possible.

In my letter to you of the 29th December, 1917, I pointed out that a considerable part of the drainage work in the Delta had even then been completed, and that, although it was impossible at that time to complete the two sections of the full scheme which had already been commenced owing to the impossibility of getting the heavy pumping machinery made in England, a considerable amount of work remained which involved little but manual labour, and which, if completed, would go far to secure immediate benefit from the work already done. This would not only have brought a considerable area of new cotton land into cultivation, but it would also add materially to the fertility of the land already under cultivation, and so increase the average yield of cotton per acre.

In reply to the representations which you then addressed through the Foreign Office to the Egyptian Government, the latter stated that it was then impossible to proceed further with these works, owing to the insistent demands of the army in Egypt for labour in connection with the military operations then proceeding in Egypt and Palestine, but they also stated that as soon as these operations were completed the work would be proceeded with at once.

Now that this condition has been fulfilled, my committee is most anxious that this essential work should be gone on with at the earliest possible moment. The Egyptian crop has suffered very severe curtailment during the war, owing in part to the exigencies of the food supply. The restrictions on the acreage under cotton which the Egyptian Government found it necessary to impose in 1918 have now, however, been withdrawn, and it is extremely desirable that everything possible should be done to develop the Egyptian crop beyond its former dimensions. The completion of the drainage works is part of the necessary work to be done towards that end, and my committee believes that no difficulty is now apprehended in obtaining the necessary labour. We should therefore be greatly obliged if you would now take the opportunity of pressing upon the Egyptian Government our great anxiety that this part of the work should now be pressed forward with the minimum of delay. It is, in our view, most desirable that material progress should be made with the work during the coming spring and summer, so that the benefit of the improved drainage may be felt during the next flood season.

With regard to the completion of the two sections already undertaken by the installation of the large pumping plants at the sea coast, my committee believes nothing stands in the way of the immediate placing of the necessary contracts, and that such contracts would now be welcomed by the engineering firms concerned in this country. It is, in our view, very desirable that this should be done at once, so that these two sections may be completed at the earliest possible moment, and the full benefit of the work already done be realised as soon as possible.

Before that can be done, however, it is necessary that large reclamation works in the newly-drained areas should be undertaken, and the execution of these works must await the provision of further water supplies for the Delta. For this purpose the proposed dam on the White Nile south of Khartoum was planned, and it is now essential that this scheme also should be taken up and pushed through to completion as soon as possible. Upon this will also depend the commencement of the remaining sections of the full scheme for the drainage and reclamation of the Delta, which, when finished, will add well over a million acres to the area available for cotton in the Delta. Such an addition is an essential matter to Britain, and my committee trusts that no delay will take place in pushing the whole scheme through to completion. The supply of fine cotton is extremely critical, especially in view of the steady advance of boll weevil into the Sea Island districts of Florida and Georgia, and it is absolutely essential as a very minimum that the increase of the Egyptian crop should at least keep pace with the reduction of the Sea Island subsidy.

The committee has recently had the advantage of hearing further evidence on the whole subject from Sir Murdoch Macdonald, K.C.M.G., Under-Secretary of State for the Public Works Department of the Government of Egypt. Sir Murdoch Macdonald made it clear that the Gezira scheme and the Blue Nile barrage, the Delta drainage scheme and the White Nile dam form one comprehensive whole, and the committee is convinced that they would make possible a great increase in the production of cotton, the desirability of which we need not press on you. The committee understands that the Gezira scheme is being pursued, and does not therefore feel it necessary again to emphasise its importance at the moment; it does, however, wish to insist on the equal importance of the expansion of area in lower Egypt.

The committee therefore wishes me to beg you to impress upon the Government of Egypt the necessity for proceeding at once with the drainage of the Delta and the barrage on the White Nile, both of which, it feels, are vital to the increased production of cotton in Egypt.

I am, &c.
HENRY BIRCHENOUGH, *Chairman.*

No. 73.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 95. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 1, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76 of the 12th February,* I have the honour to enclose herewith fifteen copies of Sir William Brunyate's confidential memorandum No. 13, containing his comments on the revised draft Penal Code transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch above mentioned.†

I have sent a copy of this memorandum to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, to whom I have also forwarded copies of the draft Penal Code and the commentary thereon.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

No. 74.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 5, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit by the first opportunity, for your Lordship's information, copies of a petition to the Sultan, signed by Saad Pasha Zaghlul and his adherents, and presented by them personally at Abdine Palace on the 3rd instant.

The original petition is in Arabic, but the French translation herewith enclosed was forwarded to His Highness by Saad Zaghlul himself.

The Sultan refused to receive the petitioners, and immediately communicated to me the contents of their address. This document not only denies the existence of the British protectorate and, consequently, of the authority of the Sultan, but also utters hardly-veiled threats against His Highness should he assist in the formation of a Ministry to replace that of Rushdy Pasha. I have referred the petition for opinion to my legal advisers, who state that, although such language would presumably render its authors liable to prosecution in England, the defects of Egyptian codes in the matter of offences against the Sultan make it impossible to take proceedings under Egyptian law, and that it is doubtful whether a military court could convict under the proclamations of martial law.

The petition is, nevertheless, a deliberate attempt to intimidate Sultan Fuad, and to deter him from using his influence—as he is doing—to reconstitute the Cabinet and promote the continuance of government in a constitutional manner.

The presentation of the petition is the reply of the Nationalist leaders to the blow to their prestige represented by the acceptance of Rushdy's resignation. It is an overt act, intended to paralyse the administration, and to show that we cannot govern the country under present conditions, and appears to me to differ in character from their

* Not printed.

† Printed separately.

previous proceedings. It is quite certain that the lives of Egyptians who would be willing to co-operate with us are being equally and even more directly threatened.

I shall report by telegram the main facts of the situation and the action which appears indicated.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 74.

Petition presented to the Sultan on March 3, 1919.

(Traduction.)

Hautesse,

Le Caire, le 2 mars 1919.

LES soussignés, membres de la Délégation égyptienne et mandataires de la nation, ont l'honneur d'exposer à votre Hautesse ce qui suit :

Lorsque les belligérants s'entendirent pour que les principes de liberté et de justice fussent la base de la paix, et qu'ils proclamèrent que les pays dont la guerre avait modifié la situation politique devaient être consultés sur la manière de se gouverner, nous prîmes sur nous d'entreprendre les démarches nécessaires pour l'indépendance de notre patrie et pour la défense de notre cause au Congrès de la Paix. En effet, le droit du plus fort a disparu de l'arène politique et l'Égypte, affranchie de la suzeraineté turque, se trouve dégagée de tous liens. Le protectorat proclamé par les Anglais sans accord préalable entre les Égyptiens est nul, car il n'a constitué en réalité qu'une mesure militaire devant disparaître avec la guerre.

Pour ces considérations, et parce que l'Égypte, au cours de cette guerre, a assumé, aux côtés des défenseurs des droits des petits peuples, tous les sacrifices qu'elle pouvait supporter, il n'existe plus aucune raison qui s'oppose à ce que le Congrès de la Paix consacre, en application de ces propres principes, notre liberté politique.

Ayant informé son Excellence Husséin Pacha Ruchdi que nous désirions nous rendre en Europe, le Président du Conseil, convaincu que nous étions les porte-parole du peuple tout entier, nous promit son appui. Mais lorsque les passeports nous furent refusés et que, séquestrés chez nous, par la force du despotisme et non par la force de la loi, nous fûmes mis dans l'impossibilité de défendre la cause de notre malheureux pays, le Premier Ministre estima qu'il ne pouvait plus assumer les responsabilités du pouvoir, alors que la nation était contrecarrée dans sa volonté; et d'accord avec son collègue son Excellence Adly Pacha Yeghen, ils présentèrent leur démission définitive, démission que le pays accueillit en honorant leurs personnes et en exaltant la sincérité de leur patriotisme.

L'opinion avait toujours cru que leur noble attitude dans la défense de la liberté recevait le puissant appui de votre Hautesse. Aussi était-on loin de s'attendre à ce que l'acceptation de la démission des deux Ministres fût la solution finale donnée à la question du départ de la délégation égyptienne. Cette solution indique, en effet, que l'on entend suivre la tactique de ceux qui voudraient nous humilier et renforcer les obstacles créés pour empêcher le peuple de communiquer avec le Congrès de la Paix et lui soumettre ses revendications; elle laisse croire, en même temps, à un acquiescement à la domination définitive de l'étranger.

Le peuple était convaincu que si votre Hautesse s'est trouvée obligée, peut-être pour des considérations dynastiques, d'accepter le trône de votre auguste père, devenu vacant par la mort de votre frère le Sultan Husséin, cette acceptation, sous le régime d'un protectorat provisoire et nul en droit, ne pouvait avoir pour effet de vous détourner de travailler pour l'indépendance de votre pays. Mais résoudre la question par l'acceptation de la démission des deux Ministres qui se sont inclinés devant la volonté nationale, ne peut s'accorder avec votre amour à vouloir le bien de votre peuple et à tenir compte de ses vœux. Aussi a-t-on été étonné que vos conseillers aient perdu de vue que le peuple, en ces graves circonstances, vous demande, à vous qui êtes le plus qualifié des descendants de Mohammad Ali, le grand libérateur de l'Égypte, d'être, quoiqu'il puisse vous en coûter, le premier à soutenir le pays dans la poursuite de son indépendance.

L'ardeur de votre âme est trop noble pour être à la merci des circonstances. Comment vos conseillers ont-ils pu perdre de vue que les termes de la démission de Ruchdi Pacha ne permettent pas à un seul patriote égyptien, ayant le sentiment de sa dignité, d'accepter sa succession. Comment ont-ils pu perdre de vue qu'un Ministre qui se formerait sur un programme manifestement opposé à la volonté nationale, serait fatalement voué à l'insuccès.

Que votre Hautesse nous pardonne cette intervention, qui, dans d'autres circonstances, aurait pu être déplacée, mais les choses en sont arrivées à un tel point de gravité que toutes les considérations doivent s'effacer devant l'intérêt de la patrie, de cette patrie dont vous êtes le fidèle serviteur. Votre Hautesse occupe le plus haut rang dans le pays, elle en a donc les plus hautes responsabilités, et c'est en elle que reposent les plus vastes espérances.

C'est dans un sentiment de profonde sincérité que nous supplions votre Hautesse de s'informer de l'opinion du pays avant de prendre une décision définitive dans la crise actuelle. Nous assurons à votre Hautesse qu'il n'y a plus, dans toute l'étendue du territoire, un seul de vos sujets qui ne réclame l'indépendance. Empêcher le peuple de réaliser son vœu unanime, c'est une responsabilité dont vos conseillers n'ont pas minutieusement pesé toute la portée.

Poussés par le devoir de servir notre patrie et par notre loyauté envers votre Hautesse, nous nous sommes permis de vous exprimer les sentiments de votre peuple qui jamais plus qu'aujourd'hui n'a été confiant dans l'obtention de l'indépendance, et qui, aussi, jamais plus qu'aujourd'hui ne redoute que cette indépendance ne soit compromise par le parti impérialiste, et qui demande à votre Hautesse, à juste titre, d'épouser ses ressentiments et de vous ranger à ses côtés, afin de pouvoir s'assurer ainsi la réalisation du but poursuivi. Votre Hautesse est toute puissante à le faire.

Nous nous honorons de soumettre à votre auguste trône l'expression de notre sincère dévouement.

ALI SHAARAWI.
ABD-EL-LATIF-EL-MAKABBATI.
MOHAMMAD MAHMUD.
HAFIZ AFIFI.
AHMED LUTFI-ES-SAYED.
SULIMAN.
HUSSEIN WASIF.
ABD-EL-KHALIK MADKUR.
HAMAD EL-BASSAL.
MAHMUD ABU AN-NASR.
ABD-EL-AZIZ FAHMY.
SINNÂT HANNÂ.
MOHAMMAD ALI.
ISMÂIL SIDKÎ.
SAAD ZAGHLUL.

No. 75.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 378.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 11, 1919.

THERE was a recurrence of rioting in several quarters of Cairo this morning, but troops easily quelled disturbances and prevented an organised attempt to induce workmen in railway shops to come out. As in the case of higher colleges on first day, when students of law school visited and influenced the rest, efforts of demonstrators are directed towards withdrawing employees from Government offices and preventing scholars from returning to their schools.

These efforts have only been partially successful, and a number of arrests have been made, but I regret to report that clerks in Ministry of Public Works and Education, with the exception of most senior staff, yielded to outside pressure to-day and left their offices. It is hoped, however, that with better protection and removal of disturbing elements many will return.

The most disquieting feature is a strike of advocates, a concerted movement which has now prevented all the native courts of first instance in provinces from sitting. Egyptian President of Native Court of Appeal has acted firmly, insisting upon his colleagues striking off the list with forfeiture of fees all cases in which neither advocates nor parties appeared.

Instructions have been sent also to judges by Ministry of Justice to continue trial of criminal cases without counsel.

Provinces are otherwise perfectly quiet, except that there is news from Shebin-el-Kom that a train has been prevented from leaving.

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Without wishing to exaggerate results of present disturbance, I am forced to recognise that there is a perceptible movement towards disorganisation of Government machinery, results of which, if it continued, would be serious.

In the capital immediate problem is to restore order and check terrorism. As regards districts I have recommended Commander-in-chief to send detachments to provincial centres, where troops were posted in the first period of the war in order to forestall disturbance and reassure British and foreign inhabitants.

I have discussed situation with Commander-in-chief and Chief of General Staff, who leave for Paris to-morrow.

All facilities will be given in the event of renewed disorder. I do not recommend further deportations for the moment, but severe measures will be taken at once if they appear advisable.

No. 76.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 1427.)

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON presents his compliments to Mr. Balfour, and transmits herewith a copy of a despatch* from His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid relative to the recognition of the British and Spanish protectorates in Egypt and Morocco respectively.

It appears obvious that the action of the Spanish Government in making the proposal at the present moment is a purely political move designed to strengthen their position in Morocco in any negotiations which may take place with the French Government, and although the position of Spain in regard to the Moroccan situation may be said to command the sympathy of His Majesty's Government, it is questionable whether His Majesty's Government would be well advised to give a probable cause of offence to the French Government by accepting at this moment the Spanish suggestion of mutual recognition. A refusal to do so could, if necessary, be based upon the ground that the Spanish Government failed to co-operate in the matter of the negotiations for internationalising Tangier, their assistance in this direction having been made virtually a condition of His Majesty's Government's adherence to the Franco-Spanish agreement of the 27th November, 1912, when His Majesty's Government offered to recognise the Spanish zone by adhering to that instrument in December 1914.

Lord Curzon would be glad to receive Mr. Balfour's views on the reply to be returned to Sir A. Hardinge's despatch.

Foreign Office, March 15, 1919.

No. 77.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 57. Commercial.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 15, 1919.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 32, Commercial,† of the 7th ultimo, transmitting a copy of a note from the War Trade and Licensing Officer, relative to real property in Egypt belonging to enemy owners.

2. With regard to the concluding portion of Mr. H. Ward Boys' note, I think it as well to inform you immediately that His Majesty's Government have no intention of permitting the sale of privately-owned real property.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* No. 53.

† No. 51.

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No. 78.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 387.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 12, 1919.

MY telegram No. 378.

State of Cairo is normal to-day, except that tramways are not running, and Government employees who left their departments yesterday have now, with assurance of protection, returned to their duties. Strike of advocates, if not over, is continuing in a much modified form. I should say it is not destined to last long and movement of Bar in provinces appears to have been unsuccessful. There are signs that elder men are exerting a moderating influence, and, as at present informed, I am no longer anxious on this score.

There has been disorder in Tanta, a town which has always had a reputation for turbulence. British troops arrived there this morning just in time to assist the police in protecting property. They were apparently forced to fire on crowd, and some loss of life occurred. Reinforcements have been sent and everything is quiet.

No disturbances are reported elsewhere and general outlook is more favourable.

No. 79.

Statement on the Situation in Egypt made by Earl Curzon of Kedleston in the House of Lords on March 18, 1919

MY Lords, I am glad to respond to the question which has been put to me with private notice by the noble Marquess, since the matter is one which naturally attracts a good deal of public interest. The situation is as follows. In November last a deputation of Egyptian Nationalists, under the leadership of Saad Pasha Zaghlul, called at the British Residency to advocate a programme of complete autonomy of Egypt which would leave to Great Britain only a right of supervision in regard to the Public Debt and facilities for shipping in the Suez Canal. They demanded that they should be allowed to proceed to London at once in order to put forward their demands. At the same time the Nationalists elected a Committee of fourteen leaders and commenced an agitation throughout the country, collecting signatures to petitions and also subscriptions in support of their programme. Shortly afterwards the Prime Minister, Rushdy Pasha, suggested that he and Adly Pasha, Minister of Education, should visit London in the immediate future in order to discuss Egyptian affairs. He further urged that the Nationalist leaders should also be allowed an hearing in London.

His Majesty's Government, in reply, stated that while sympathising with the idea of giving the Egyptians an ever-increasing share in the government of the country, they could not abandon their responsibilities for order and good government in Egypt, over which a British Protectorate had been formally declared in 1915, and for safeguarding the rights and interests of the native and foreign populations. No useful purpose would be served by allowing the Nationalist leaders to come to London and advance immoderate demands which could not possibly be entertained. As regards the two Ministers, their visit would be very welcome, but it would be better in the interests of their own convenience and dignity that it should not be timed to coincide with the first weeks of the Peace Conference when Mr. Balfour would be absent in Paris and fully engaged. It was proposed that the visit should be postponed for a short time. The two Ministers tendered their resignations to the Sultan.

At the beginning of January the British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, was summoned to London to report upon the situation, and an invitation was addressed to the two Ministers to come here in the middle of February; but they replied that they declined to come unless the Nationalist leaders were also permitted to proceed to London. His Majesty's Government felt unable to accept such a condition, and the resignations of the two Ministers, which had remained in suspense, have been accepted by the Sultan. Steps were then taken for the formation of a new Ministry, but the Nationalists, on hearing of the refusal of their demand, have endeavoured to prevent a Ministry from being formed by intimidating the Sultan and those Ministers or others who were ready to remain in or accept office. His Highness has appealed to the Acting High Commissioner for protection from further insults and intimidations,

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and authority was given for the arrest and deportation to Malta of Saad Pasha Zaghlul and three other Nationalist leaders who have played the most conspicuous part in the present agitation.

There have since been some demonstrations and rioting in Cairo and in one or two provincial centres, chiefly organised by students who have enlisted the help of the town rabble. Collisions have occurred with the Egyptian police and with the British troops engaged in maintaining order, and there have been some casualties, while a few looters have been shot. These manifestations are not approved by the more sober elements of the population. There is every reason to believe, from the latest information, that the situation is well in hand.

No. 80.

Question asked in the House of Commons, March 18, 1919.

Mr. Inskip asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to a letter written by Sir W. E. Brunyate, Judicial Adviser to the Sultan of Egypt, on the 10th January, 1919, and published in the "Bourse Égyptienne" on the 6th February, 1919, and also in the "Gazette des Tribunaux," in which he refers to the objections of the mixed Bar to the proposed use of the English language in the courts of the British Protectorate of Egypt, and seeks to reassure the mixed Bar on this point, and expresses a hope that no preference will be granted to the English language; whether the letter of Sir W. E. Brunyate has the approval of His Majesty's Government; and what action it is proposed to take.

Answer.

Mr. Ward.—The answer to the first part of the hon. member's question is in the affirmative, but the language used by Sir W. Brunyate does not appear to bear the construction placed upon it, as he only expresses a purely personal opinion that so long as any widespread demand continues to exist for facilities for hearing cases in French, those facilities ought to be provided. Sir W. Brunyate repeats in the last paragraph of his letter that he is writing in his own name. As regards the last part of the question, His Majesty's Government do not contemplate taking any action in the matter.

No. 81.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 389.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 13, 1919.

THERE has been some more rioting and pillage to-day in Cairo, but confined to parts of the city in vicinity of El Azhar quarter. The leaders are El Azhar students, whom it is difficult to follow up since it is not desirable for British troops to go too near El Azhar Mosque. Use of Egyptian troops have been suggested, but is doubtful whether they can be depended on, and it is of highest importance to prevent fanaticism, happily absent hitherto, from playing any part in present movement.

Situation with regard to Bar is, I am afraid, uncertain. Reports are not so good as yesterday, but it is still possible that Bar Council will not be dominated by younger members. British detachments have been sent to some provincial centres, and others are following.

I am considering advisability of a military proclamation, which would include assurances given by His Majesty's Government to Sultan of Egypt and his Ministers, and communicated to me in penultimate paragraph of your telegram No. 268 of 26th February. Text would, of course, be telegraphed for your sanction.

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No. 82.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 393. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 15, 1919.

DISTURBANCE has continued in Cairo yesterday, though on a small scale. An armoured car on patrol was compelled to use machine gun, and some looters were summarily shot. Reports from provinces show trouble at Damietta, and demonstrations at Mansura. Attempts are being made to interrupt communications, telegraph lines have been cut in several places apparently with the view to isolating Cairo, and railway lines from Tanta to Menouf.

It is not likely that repression will be immediately effective, and we should be prepared for necessity of its continuance. British officials generally are impressed by persistence of agitation officially being carried on by remainder of deputation, with headquarters at Saad Zaghlul's house.

Reason most frequently expressed by natives for bitter feeling which has arisen is fact that British policy will not allow Egyptians to be heard and to ventilate their grievances—in other words, that their representatives are not permitted to leave Egypt. As you are aware, two Ministers, whatever their real intentions may be, have resigned on this account. Every other member of late Cabinet with whom I have discussed reconstruction of Ministry has put forward in one form or another condition that delegates of advanced party should be free to accompany such Ministers as might proceed to London. I hear Ahmed Lutfy, a prominent Nationalist of old school, and not hitherto identified with Saad Zaghlul, has approached Director of Public Security with a proposal in the same sense, which Lutfy asserts would do more than anything else to allay existing excitement. I have also received visit from Mustapha Pasha Maher, who will be known as a man of strong character and friendly to English, who has not mixed in politics. He stated a number of persons of moderate views, including three leading religious dignitaries of Egypt—Sheikh Abu Fadl, rector of El Azhar; Sayed Omar Makram, Neguib-el-Ashraf; Abdel Hamid-el-Bakri, sheikh of Sufi religious sect—had informed him that they were ready, if given any encouragement, to visit Residency with suggestion that remaining members of Saad Zaghlul deputation be permitted to leave Egypt and that His Majesty's Government, having shown that it is intended to restore order with a firm hand, could afford without loss of prestige to pay attention to a request put forward by intermediary entirely unconnected with present agitation. I have avoided responding to these overtures in any way, but they are worthy of your notice as symptomatic of their trend of opinion. In present circumstances we are not able to recommend any steps likely to lead to an immediate reconciliation with strong political opposition aroused in few months by Saad Zaghlul propaganda.

For the moment military authorities must continue to suppress disorder energetically, but in order to provide for event of political situation not improving in spite of these measures, I should be glad if I may be informed whether at some not distant date it would be possible for His Majesty's Government to relax restrictions on departure of Egyptians.

Existing regulations do not allow many to travel, but it is presumed that they will become less severe in future.

In this case would it represent any inconvenience from wider political point of view if so-called Egyptian patriots were to visit France and England, whether or no any of them were granted official recognition in London? I make this suggestion very tentatively, because I am not aware whether settlement of Near East, which seems to be approaching, will in any way concern Egypt. I feel, however, that we are encountering a stronger resistance than might have been expected, and there are now signs that religious sentiment may add to our difficulties. Leaders of El Azhar are opposed to movement of their own students, which has become a most conspicuous feature in agitation, but Sheikh of El Azhar is finding it most difficult to assert his authority.

Religious excitement, if once aroused, will probably spread to districts and will mean trouble in villages amongst fellahs, who have hitherto been quite outside the movement.

I learn at the moment of telegraphing that sheikhs and ulamas of El Azhar intend to address memorial either to military authorities or myself. This would probably contain recommendation that extremist leaders should be allowed to leave Egypt, and I should be grateful to know for my guidance if you can in any case contemplate such a possibility.

No. 83.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)(No. 394. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 15, 1919.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Mischievous attempts on communications are proceeding. Large crowds have assembled at Kaliub and Wasta, holding up trains, destroying permanent way, and cutting telegraph wires.

All communications with Upper Egypt are interrupted for present. Troops have left for Kaliub and are being sent to Wasta. Up to date there are no reports of attacks on foreigners beyond rumour that English railway employé was killed at Wasta.

Men in railway repair shops in Cairo struck work this morning, a minority yielding to threats. This strike is not of great importance if temporary, but if continued will be serious.

The refusal of the native Bar to appear before native courts appears now to have become general. A military proclamation is to be issued suspending legal provisions requiring prisoners to be assisted by counsel in criminal cases, and empowering courts to appoint members of Parquet to defend. Proclamation will also provisionally suspend exclusive right of Bar to appear for parties in civil suits. Proclamation will only apply to native courts.

Above facts point to a grave situation. I have seen General Officer Commanding in Egypt, who agrees that a large number of troops will be necessary to re-establish and maintain communications and to guarantee food supplies in Cairo. We have to face possibility that native staff on Egyptian State Railways will refuse to work. I am informed that military authorities would then have to take our lines with such trained staff as can be collected from Palestine, and it is probable that only transport trains could then be run.

General Watson agrees with me that the great danger is an outbreak of fanaticism. I must reserve my opinion on probability of such a development until further information is available. Latest reports are that preaching in favour of cessation of work has taken place in some mosques in Cairo. Were it not for this feature it would probably be our best policy to deport or intern here the rest of Saad's deputation, and to treat similarly others who might openly replace them. Alternative is to discover some ground for reconciliation, and I may wish to recommend a concession to native feeling.

I beg accordingly for an urgent answer to the point raised in my immediately preceding telegram as to whether departure of Egyptians to Europe, if they can find passages, would be any embarrassment to our policy.

Probably few would go, but they would represent themselves as delegates of Egyptian people.

No. 84.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.(No. 349.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 17, 1919.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 378, 393, and 394: Situation in Egypt.

Question of Nationalist leaders being allowed to come to Europe is not so much one of inconvenience here as of present and future effect in Egypt. It must be remembered that these leaders have committed themselves to sever the British connection with Egypt; there is therefore no common ground on which we can meet them for discussion. Moreover, to allow them to proceed here after the recent events you have reported would make it appear that we were yielding to force when persuasion had failed of its effect. Further, the prestige and popularity of the Nationalist leaders would be greatly enhanced, and it would probably be difficult, if not impossible, for the Sultan and moderate ministerial elements to hold their own against them either in the Legislative Assembly or in the country for some time to come.

In view of serious situation which your telegrams disclose, you should, for the moment, concentrate your efforts on the restoration of law and order, and you will receive the full support of His Majesty's Government in taking such steps as you and

the General Officer Commanding consider necessary for this purpose. You should endeavour to act as far as possible in concert with the Sultan and sober native elements. All rioting should be sternly suppressed, the Sultan should be called upon to deal severely with incitements in mosques, insubordination of Government officials should be punished, and you should do your utmost to rally those reasonable elements, especially among the provincial notables, which have always been friendly disposed towards us, and upon whose support we should be able to rely.

As regards future policy, I can make no pronouncement until law and order have been restored, but the matter is receiving the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government.

No. 85.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 518.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, March 18, 1919.

YOUR telegram and Nos. 393 and 394 from Cairo.

The restoration of order and formation of a competent Government must be immediately and unconditionally carried through. But in the meantime there need be no concealment of our readiness, after this has been satisfactorily accomplished, to discuss in London alleged grievances with Egyptian Ministers. If they think their task would be better performed if they were accompanied or immediately followed by persons qualified to represent the Nationalist case even in its extreme form, I can see no objection.

No. 86.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 400. Urgent)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 16, 1919.

TANTA and Cairo were perfectly quiet yesterday, 15th March, and to-day, but in addition to events reported in my telegram No. 394 there were disturbances yesterday in Zagazig and Mansura and Beni Suef. In two first towns no serious riots took place and no loss of life. There was some slight damage to property. Destruction of railway stations was continued and permanent way damaged, and telegraph cut in many parts of the Delta and Giza Mudirieh. Railway and telegraph communication is now interrupted in the Delta and Upper Egypt. Military effort is confined for the moment to restoring line Alexandria-Cairo, which has again been cut.

Rest-house buildings in Domains at Saka in Gharbia were burnt down by mob which came from Kafr-el-Sheikh. Disorders in Damietta were suppressed by Egyptian police with some loss of life, roughs from neighbouring village having joined students. There is evidence that fellaheen have been instigated to interrupt communications, but they are also threatening to attack private property. Fear of this is driving decent Egyptians to try and arrive at some understanding with extremists so as to modify their attitude and force them to approve of formation of a Ministry. British and Egyptian observers alike state that present phase of agitation, taking the form in districts of sabotage and destruction, is unlike any previous outbreak, and Gaafar Pasha,* who has seen extremist leaders to-day, informs me that they are themselves frightened at spirit which has been aroused. On point of fanaticism I am informed that no immediate danger exists. There is up till now no news of attacks on Christians except one fatal case already reported. A rumoured movement among Ulemas is apparently of the nature of that described in third paragraph of my telegram No. 393 of yesterday.

General Bulfin, who takes command in General Allenby's absence, arrived this afternoon. I will report after hearing his views. My present impression is that there is a tendency to approach us in search of solution, which is all to the good, but military situation is unsatisfactory, and we do not appear to have enough troops to ensure necessary communications.

* Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior.

No. 87.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)(No. 403. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 17, 1919.

MY telegrams Nos. 393, 394, and 400.

I conferred this afternoon with General Bullfin, who has arrived from Palestine, and who has been informed of the situation here.

The following points were made clear :—

1. He proposes, with forces at his command, to safeguard railway communications with Alexandria, and if possible to keep up line to Port Said. It is impossible at the same time to restore communications with Upper Egypt.

2. This policy is rendered necessary by state of food supplies in Cairo, which are only sufficient for a given number of days, and dependent on Alexandria line.

3. If destruction of communications, public works, &c., continue, and attacks are made on Europeans, in my opinion the repression must take the form of severe punishment of Egyptians, which means great sacrifice to human life.

4. Yesterday General Watson sent for extremist leaders, and stated he must hold them responsible for organised violence and sabotage resulting from their propaganda. Some discussion took place, in which they asserted their inability to restrain the movement or to make promises to do so.

5. General Bullfin said it was, in his opinion, necessary to form an Egyptian Ministry to co-operate with the army in pacifying the country. I explained the difficulties we had had in getting Egyptians to take office in the face of public opinion, which demanded concession to extremists.

It will be noted from the above that we have no means of regaining control in Upper Egypt, from whence there is practically no news, and that provisioning of Cairo may be difficult.

I should make it clear that present movement in Egypt is national in the full sense of the word.

It has now apparently the sympathy of all classes and creeds, including the Copts.

Forcible measures should eventually succeed, as the population is practically unarmed, but only at the expense of considerable bloodshed and the creation of great bitterness.

I agreed yesterday that extremist leaders should receive another warning, but, as has been stated above, proceedings ended in discussion. Result of this was that the extremists approached Rushdy Pasha and Adly Pasha, and that the latter asked to see me. Presenting the matter as a private suggestion, he put forward the proposal that the Peace Conference should grant to Great Britain a mandate for Egypt. A mandate, he thought, would leave things much as they were, while providing some solution of present deplorable *impasse*. I said I could not even report this proposal to you unless it was put forward by a group of responsible Egyptians capable of forming a Government. Adly proposed that he should see me again.

It is clear that many moderate Egyptians regret the events of the last few days, and also that firm measures are having some effect. Muzloun Pasha and others have already approached me in a spirit of conciliation, but always with an expression of belief that permission for deputation to leave Egypt will alone satisfy agitation.

Adly Pasha, I think, sincerely desires to find some means of escape from present position.

I submit that there are several courses open :—

1. Publication of a statement that the Peace Conference has recognised British Protectorate over Egypt.

2. A similar statement that Great Britain has accepted a mandate.

3. That all restrictions on the departure to Europe of Egyptians, including members of existing deputation, should be removed. There may be grave objections to such a decision, but we cannot neglect the strength and universality of sentiment which supports deputation.

4. Immediate despatch of a Commission to Egypt, with full power to examine situation here and submit recommendations. General Bullfin has made this suggestion, but I doubt its efficacy in actual excited state of public feeling.

I am impressed by military review of situation now imparted to me, and the fact that we have had to abandon Upper Egypt and foreigners living there.

Our weakness in this respect is not yet known, but effect must ultimately be very bad. Necessities of demobilisation are apparently reason for inability to employ larger forces.

Cairo is quiet outwardly, but feeling has not changed. If we are to make concessions we should act as quickly as possible.

I think some concession is necessary, but its nature appears to me to depend on general position in Paris.

We should be able to count on support from Moderates if a new and definite situation could be announced.

No. 88.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.(No. 328. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 19, 1919.

SIR M. CHEETHAM'S telegram No. 403 of 17th March discloses a more serious situation in Egypt than any previous reports had led us to expect.

I understand that General Allenby arrives in Paris to-day. I am sure that you will agree that his early return to Egypt is advisable, and I trust therefore that you can arrange that his business in Paris should be expedited, and that he should be able to leave for Egypt by the end of the week.

We are consulting Sir R. Wingate in regard to the situation, and are also concerting with the military authorities as to any further military action that may become necessary.

No. 89.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 19.)(No. 406. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 18, 1919.

FOLLOWING is summary of events reported during the twenty-four hours ending noon, 18th March, 1919 :—

Between Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said various stations burnt signal-boxes destroyed, and rails and sleepers removed along the main and subsidiary lines.

One train arrived at Cairo from Port Said after journey of twenty-six hours, preceded by military train repairing the line. No communications with Upper Egypt beyond Wasta, where trouble serious. Many other stations destroyed. Similar damage further south reported by telegram via Port Sudan; natives constantly engaged in destroying lines in numerous districts until dispersed by fire.

Telegraph wires and poles being destroyed in all directions.

There is no communication other than by wireless telegraph and aeroplane between Cairo and the provinces.

At Cairo a peaceful demonstration, in which some thousands took part, headed by university intellectuals, took place yesterday without incident, except where once interfered with by party of soldiers, one native casualty resulting.

Demonstration this morning at Boulac was dispersed with several casualties.

Further demonstration in Cairo was ordered to disperse by military authorities and did so.

At Alexandria the Khedivial mail line employees joined the students. Trouble ensued; several casualties caused by troops; dock gates closed.

Various grain, sugar, and oil stores threatened, but precautions taken. Attacks were made on sugar factories at Cairo, but assailants beaten off.

No. 90.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, March 20, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 389 of 13th March, last paragraph.

It is of course most desirable that attitude of His Majesty's Government towards visit of Ministers should be generally known, and you may include our assurances in any proclamation issued without further reference to us.

No. 91.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.(No. 357.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, March 20, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 406.

What is attitude of Egyptian army and police as regards present disturbances?
(Also a similar telegram to Sir L. Stack, Khartoum, of the same date.)

No. 92.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 20.)(No. 408. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, March 19, 1919.*

GENERAL BULFIN came to see me yesterday after paying an official visit to Sultan. He has explained to His Highness that he had necessary forces to repress agitation, and intended to do so, but that from what he saw of tenacity and extension of outbreak no repression could be effective which was not of severest kind. The Sultan asked whether military authorities or Residency could not obtain from London some action which would save Egypt from this calamity.

My previous telegrams have alluded to possibility of allowing extremists to leave Egypt and present their case where they wish, and I have reported that this is only solution which, in general estimate, would be successful.

Meanwhile agitation in provinces has resulted in state of things with which army must in any case deal, and which political influences exerted from Cairo are probably powerless to control.

Latest news is of Bedouin incursions into Behera.

It should be realised that we are now in a totally different situation from that of moment when your original instructions were given not to relax restrictions in case of Nationalist leaders.

No one in Egypt at that time could have believed that actual insurrectionary outburst was possible.

Its sudden appearance and rapid growth is astonishing to the oldest observers.

Movement is anti-British, anti-Sultanian, and anti-foreign. It has Bolshevik tendency, aims at destruction of property as well as communications, is organised and must be paid. Extraneous influence is strongly suspected. British officials incline to the belief that, whatever Nationalist instigation there may have been in last few months, the feeling now exhibited must have been growing during several years, and that an explosion at some time was inevitable.

If an announcement were now possible which would settle doubt as to future of Egypt, it might be accompanied without loss of prestige by free permission to Egyptians to leave here for the purpose of advocating their views.

Action to be taken by our military forces will be a clear sign of determination of His Majesty's Government to vindicate their authority. But if an Egyptian element, which is still wanting, can be induced to act with us, repression may be easier and bloodshed reduced. Leading Egyptians, from fear or from sympathy, will not openly declare themselves against general sentiment.

What is now happening must put back progress on old lines for many years, and make extremely difficult a return to intimate relations.

The desire of Commander-in-Chief is to secure immediate co-operation of Egyptians in work of pacification.

A concession, if it can be devised, which would facilitate such an understanding and equally lighten the task of governing Egypt in the future is, in my opinion, urgently needed.

No. 93.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 20.)(No. 410. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, March 19, 1919.*

FOLLOWING is summary of events reported during twenty-four hours ending 19th March:—

North of Cairo situation is very grave. Provinces of Behera and Gharbia and Menufia and Dakahlia are in a state of open revolt. At Benha Greek shops looted. At Damanhour Governor of Behera Province attacked and reported beaten to death and provincial headquarters sacked; at other places senior police officers have been killed. Railway stations have been sacked and burnt, and telegraph and telephone communication destroyed.

Repair work to line being constantly done and main line mostly picketed by troops, but, generally speaking, civil government in the country districts of the Delta Province is non-existent, except where precariously maintained by military. Bedouins in large forces are raiding and plundering, and crops in various places have been destroyed. Turkish flag is flown in some villages.

Disorder is rife and police are powerless against mob.

South of Cairo Egyptian troops are assisting repair of line towards Wasta district, but aeroplane reports further damage being constantly done by Bedouins and villagers, station buildings being sacked and destroyed. Information received from Assiut by wire, via Suakin, that disturbance there is severe. At Hawamdieh Europeans from sugar factory have taken refuge in river launch, at Tukh stacks of fodder burnt. Peaceful demonstrations reported from Minia and elsewhere.

At Cairo certain demonstrations have, after due warning to disperse, been broken up by fire. Efforts to prevent lighting of the city by attack on lamplighters stopped by troops. Native press ostensibly urges peaceful methods, but is assuming stronger Nationalist tone.

El Azhar leaders attempting to induce Coptic Patriarch and community to join movement actively.

News has just been received from Beni Suef, where a small detachment of Indian troops is besieged by Bedouins, that a train has come in from south in which were found naked bodies of six murdered British officers. No further details of this available.

No. 94.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.(No. 340.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, March 21, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 511.*

Following is text of letter which has been addressed to General Allenby under date of to-day, and communicated to him by wireless:—

“Sir,

“I have to inform you that, in view of the grave situation which has arisen in Egypt and the absence from that country of His Majesty's High Commissioner, General Sir Reginald Wingate, His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to grant to you a commission, under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, constituting and appointing you His Majesty's Special High Commissioner for Egypt and the Soudan.

* Not printed.

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"You are directed to exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil, to take all such measures as you consider necessary and expedient to restore law and order in those countries, and to order and administer in all matters as may be required by the necessity of maintaining the King's protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis.

"The commission which His Majesty has been pleased to grant you will be transmitted to you, and I have informed His Highness the Sultan of Egypt by telegram of your appointment.

"I have further instructed His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Egypt by telegram that a proclamation announcing this appointment should be issued forthwith.

"I am, &c.

"CURZON OF KEDLESTON."

No. 95.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.

(No. 365.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1919.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 408 and 410.

General Allenby is now on his way to Egypt.

You should inform the Sultan at once that, in view of the grave situation in Egypt and the absence of His Majesty's High Commissioner from that country, the King has been graciously pleased to appoint General Allenby to be His Majesty's Special High Commissioner for Egypt and the Soudan. He is directed to exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil, to take all such measures as he considers necessary and expedient to restore law and order in those countries, and to order and administer in all matters as may be required by the necessity of maintaining the King's protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis.

You should also arrange for the publication of the appointment in these terms.

(Personal.)

You will understand the circumstances under which this appointment is made, and that it implies no lack of appreciation on the part of His Majesty's Government of the good services you are rendering in a very trying situation.

No. 96.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 411. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 20, 1919

YOUR telegram No. 349.

You will now have received my telegrams Nos. 403 and 408, as well as detailed information from here and through military authorities of revolt in Delta.

I have in no way acted contrary to spirit of instructions contained in your telegram No. 349, but I have allowed Egyptians to approach me, and have kept in touch with their views without encouraging unacceptable proposals for compromise.

Commander-in-chief has, on my suggestion, received Wahba and Sirry and sent a message to Prince Omar Toussoun. He has repeated warning addressed to Sultan and asked for assistance of Egyptian public men in restoring tranquillity, but hitherto without response. Commander-in-chief has also summoned Ali Sharawy and Abdul Aziz Fahmy, and stated plainly his intention to stamp out terrorism and brigandage at all costs, while inviting their co-operation in mitigating sternness of measures involved. Leaders of deputation made no sign of abating their demands, though they are, as I hear from confidential sources, nervous and anxious. They subsequently asked me, and I replied that they should first put on paper any propositions they wished to make.

Egyptian officials in Cairo are behaving satisfactorily, but those in provinces, if not terrorised, have no influence, and we are not for moment in contact with them. Sultan

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is isolated in his palace, and has no authority. Provincial notables are largely identified with Nationalists, and previous values have little application.

Situation has developed considerably since my message of 15th March. Drastic military action is now justified and unavoidable, and must have effect of preserving British authority and prestige in this country. Only question remaining is whether His Majesty's Government would think it desirable, in order either to confirm general appreciation of our position in Egypt or to facilitate our future administration, to give some sign that we are not entirely insensible of aspirations, however misguided, which have produced present upheaval. We can presumably suppress disorder and re-establish an administration in provinces which, in opinion of officials of Interior, must for some time be largely British as regards higher personnel, but it will be much harder to deal with national feeling.

I will report at once any proof such as is not yet apparent of a real desire to meet us on the part of Nationalist leaders. A rapprochement of this kind might conceivably lead to formation of a Ministry of moderates, but I doubt if a Government can be obtained before restoration of order.

I should be glad to be informed what attitude I should take if asked whether a number of Egyptians representative of various shades of opinion might be allowed to go to London.

No. 97.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 414. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 20, 1919.

FOLLOWING is summary of incidents reported during twenty-four hours ending noon to-day:—

At Hawamdieh workmen at sugar factory struck demanding withdrawal of British troops. Halfa, till last night in telegraphic communication with Beni Suef, reports inability to get north of Allagi (south of Assouan).

British refugees from Beni Suef reached Cairo last night, and report very serious situation 14th to 16th. Bedouin there using firearms, including Mausers.

It is probable that besides seven British officers murdered in the express from Luxor, others were killed and thrown from the train near Mellawi.

Three other southern stations have been burnt. Large force of Bedouin attacking Medinet Fayoum were repulsed with 400 casualties.

Day quiet in Cairo, but suburban railways and telegraphs interrupted. Some railway stock burnt at Saida Zeinab.

A large procession of women was prevented and dispersed.

A small demonstration of students took place outside American Agency.

Trains for Port Said and Alexandria yesterday stopped as planned at Zagazig and Tanta respectively.

Telegraphic communication between Kantara and Cairo restored.

Fresh damage to the line and stations reported from many places.

In Menufia and Gharbia and Behera and Dakhalia anarchy is still rife. North Gharbia is cut off both by rail and telephone.

Aeroplane with mails Alexandria to Cairo on the 18th forced to land at Tanta was burnt by crowd. No news of mails. Alexandria was quiet on 19th.

No. 98.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 415. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 21, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 357 of 20th March.

There are three Egyptian battalions at Abbasia. It was decided a week ago that it would be better not to use them to suppress rioting in Cairo, especially where Azhar students were engaged. Policy adopted was to distribute them in small parties for less

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active service; 125 have been sent to Upper Egypt, 500 are employed in taking guards of Cairo police, guarding pumping-stations, &c. On these lines behaviour satisfactory. Egyptian officers are nervous as to effect on their men of British troops firing on the mob.

Cairo police have done very well, backed by our troops. We know little as yet of what has happened in provinces, but one general report says even when police were willing they were powerless.

Attitude both of troops and police is what might be expected in face of prevailing sentiment. The troops have not had to be disarmed.

No. 99.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 416. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 22, 1919.

SUMMARY of incidents reported up to noon to-day:—

Cairo city was quiet, though strike of railway employees and carriage drivers continues. Wives and children of State telegraph employees at Heliopolis have been molested while their husbands are at work.

Armed Bedouin from Fayoum and Beni Suof are reported as moving towards Cairo.

Serious rioting took place 18th March in practically all towns and villages between Minia and Diraw.

Large bands of Bedouin are reported to be gathering in Fayoum. Europeans have been brought into Medinet-el-Fayoum as far as possible.

Line between Cairo and Wasta is again broken in several places.

Train leaving Port Said at 8 A.M. arrived Cairo at 4.20 P.M. Fourteen trucks reported smashed at Kassassine and an engine on its side at Abu Hammad on Zagazig line.

Both lines between Zagazig and Ismailia were damaged during night in one place.

Damage done during rioting in Zagazig is reported to be exclusively to Greek shops. Europeans from surrounding villages have been brought in. State of Zagazig town is becoming normal.

In certain parts of Menoufia, notably at Menouf, civil administration is being restored. Better-class natives in that province are reported as being opposed to disorders.

Telegraphic communication with Tanta is restored.

The Tanta-Mansourah and Tanta-Zifta lines are reported damaged. Very little other news from Delta.

It is now an established fact that some Coptic priests preached to crowd from a pulpit in El Azhar last Friday.

No. 100.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 97.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, March 22, 1919.

I TRANSMIT herewith copy of a letter dated the 12th March* from the Board of Trade enclosing copy of a letter from the Empire Cotton Growing Committee on the subject of the increase of cotton production in Egypt.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* See No. 72.

No. 101.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 419. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 22, 1919.

MY telegram No. 411, paragraph 2.

No prominent Egyptians have called on me the last few days. So far as I can gather, they did so previously in belief that recent events in provinces would have called attention of peace conference to independence movement, and that a readiness to compromise on the part of His Majesty's Government was to be expected. However, number of Egyptian notables of good standing have approached Residency indirectly with requests for an expression of policy from His Majesty's Government, and with proposals to be allowed to petition for permission to be given to any and all Egyptians to proceed to England if they wished to do so. They desire a solution of the crisis on these lines. Some think that it would be necessary to include in permission members of Saadist party, others that this would be unnecessary. Petitions have not yet taken definite form, and I gather that no one is willing to come forward with proposals as above described without assurance that they will be accepted.

If they returned empty handed to their followers, they would be treated with contempt as traitors in eyes of all Egyptians. Same idea is current amongst senior Egyptian officials of certain departments of Government and among Egyptian officers. In three cases at least applications have been made to British heads of Department to represent to Residency that bloodshed is ruining a friendship built up in last thirty years, and will close all ranks against us and make task of future Government of Egypt extremely difficult.

Persons making these proposals have been treated with consideration, but no encouragement has been given.

Petitioners include number of wealthy landowners (generally from Upper Egypt), of whom some have had Government posts in past, and have kept aloof from politics. Joined with these are three religious leaders, mentioned in my telegram No. 393, and Grand Mufti. Many senior Government officials, ex-officers of army, and ex-officials hold similar views.

Following names are representative of bulk of petitioners, who are horrified at result of Nationalist agitation, but dare not openly oppose extremists: Mustafa Pasha Maher, ex-Director-General of Wakfs; Ahmed Pasha Afifi, Director-General Khassa in time of Sultan Hussein; Kamil Pasha Gelal, a rich landowner of Upper Egypt; Lamlum Khanikin Saadi, a Bedouin chief of Fayoum; Ismail Pasha Abaza, member of Legislative Assembly; Amin Pasha Ghali, Coptic landowner.

I report above merely as evidence of growth of more moderate opinion. Sirry Pasha and Dr. Nimr, of Mokattam, have reported to me to-day that extremist leaders show signs of weakening and irresolution, but I do not see way to forming a Ministry.

No. 102.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 420. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 22, 1919.

INCIDENTS reported to-day:—

Fayoum situation calmer, and some stolen Government property recovered as well as some arrests made. In Wasta and Beni Suef districts on the 20th agricultural population reported as carrying on their usual occupation and showing no signs of excitement.

At Assouan on 19th railway telegraph and telephone wires were cut. Mob locked Mudir in his house and closed the court. Five kilometres of rail broken near Komombo. Seventy-one passengers arrived at Halfa from Shellal, of whom thirty-seven from Assouan and remainder presumably from Luxor.

Cairo fairly quiet. Some of carriage drivers have returned to work. Natives attached to Cairo goods marshalling yard during the night of 21st exchanged shots with military guards. Soda factory at Wady Natroun reported insurrection on 19th. Sixty natives attacked Australians in Sharkia and were driven off with loss of five killed. Some telephone lines from Cairo to Suez Canal are now working. In Behera

an abnormal fall of level in irrigation canals is reported. It is feared that Khatatha Canal has been tampered with. Fresh cases of damage to railway and trains reported from North Gharbia. Greek shops were looted on 20th at Tanta. Telegraph line from Matruh to Alexandria was cut during the night of the 19th. On the 17th no unusual movement of Bedouin in Matruh district had been reported. Alexandria is quiet. Mudir of Behera, previously reported killed, is safe and recovering from his injury.

No. 103.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham.(No. 371.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, March 22, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 411: (last paragraph).

The first and essential consideration is to restore law and order, and all the necessary military measures for this purpose will be taken. If any proposals are made to you from responsible quarters you should report them to me and say that you are doing so, but add that you cannot expect that they will receive consideration until after law and order have been entirely re-established.

No. 104.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 24.)(No. 425.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, March 23, 1919.*

INCIDENTS reported to-day:—

Wasta town and district perfectly quiet and villages concerned seem cowed. Police have behaved excellently. Everything quiet in Red Sea district except at Hurghada, where workmen at the oilfields threatened to strike. A settlement is, however, expected.

Appearance of Medinet-Fayoum reported by aeroplanes as normal.

Day has been quiet in Cairo. Railway is cut between Embaba and Boulac. More men are working in railway workshops.

At Zagazig a republic is reported to have been declared by Nationalist Committee. Outlying districts in Sharkia in a state of great disorder. In Behera agricultural work is proceeding normally, except between Damahour and Kafr-el-Zayat.

Bedouin reported gathering in western districts for raids on principal towns. Further disturbances in this province are considered probable, and a light is reported in progress near Assiut. Main line between Quesna and Benha cut last night: five rails removed. Passenger train from Alexandria reached Cairo in four and a half hours this morning.

Alexandria reports no incident. Matarieh, on Lake Menzaleh, in a turbulent state, and attempts may be made on daily steamer from Damietta to Port Said.

At Mansoura on 18th ten natives were killed and thirty-four wounded in disturbances. The Mamur was accidentally wounded.

Behera Company's estate at Bessendila has been plundered.

Demonstrations reported Zifta and Sherbin and Santa, but not disturbances. Sillum, Mariut and Siwa reported quiet, but unrest at Wadi Natroun.

No. 105.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 24.)(No. 426. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, March 24, 1919.*

MY telegram No. 419.

Situation is developing.

Vigorous language and action of Commander-in-chief has had sobering or reassuring effect on various urban elements.

Amongst extremists discouragement is visible resulting from realisation of violence, compromising of their cause, and fear of reprisals whether as penalty or at

hands of insurgents. They are still seeking for intermediaries, and show a tendency to ask only for such a compromise as may save their faces.

In certain districts movement has character of a peasant rising against landlords, which is perhaps an indication that organised motive has spent its force.

Mazlum, Rushdy, Adly, and Sirry Pashas are now forming a group with object of offering assistance to Commander-in-chief to pacify country, but language which I hear they propose to employ does not imply disapproval of independence movement.

No. 106.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 24.)(No. 427. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, March 24, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 365, sent by wireless through Admiralty, only reached me on evening of 23rd March.

I visited Sultan at once, and informed him confidentially of General Allenby's appointment. Notice in the official journal is being delayed till 25th March, and matter kept secret at the request of General Bulfin, who desires publication of appointment to be followed at short interval by General Allenby's arrival.

No. 107.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 24.)(No. 428. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, March 24, 1919.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Central officials of the Minister of the Interior have for some time been working in closest touch with General Headquarters, where Intelligence is centred. I have put all other British officials unreservedly at disposal of Commander-in-chief for following objects:—

1. To strengthen military staff.
2. To provide a civil adviser at each town occupied by our forces.
3. To attach, as far as possible, to each body of troops moving in Delta an Englishman speaking Arabic, and, if available, possessing knowledge of districts involved.

No. 108.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 25.)(No. 433. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, March 25, 1919.*

SITUATION to-day.

South of Cairo: Assuan dam has not been touched. Occasional disturbances have occurred, but on the whole, conditions apparently quieter. Evacuation of Europeans is proceeding satisfactorily. In some cases Egyptian troops are being used for this purpose in view of bitter feeling of population against British troops.

Cairo quiet. Original Extremist leaders are not yet able to face loss of prestige implied by unconditional surrender, while subordinate instigators in Cairo and elsewhere who have little at stake, even when order is restored, pass to more insidious means of terrorism, such as distributing pamphlets, sending threatening letters, tampering with Egyptian troops, and inciting Berberine servants of British officers and officials.

North of Cairo: Sabotage and plundering continue, but apparently on a reduced scale. Some damage has however been done to Irrigation Regulators. Slight strike and disturbance occurred at Port Said on 21st March, some casualties were inflicted by troops. Town has been quiet since 22nd March. Incursions of Bedouins into Western Behera continue. Alexandria and western desert are quiet.

No. 109.

*Sir R. Wingate to Sir R. Graham.—(Received March 25.)*31, Great Cumberland Place, London,
February 17, 1919.

My dear Graham,

BRUNYATE, in his letter to me of the 15th January (of which I sent you a copy), dealing with the Financial Advisership, referred to a long note he had written to me on the 4th January. I have now had this note copied, and enclose a copy herewith.

Yours very sincerely,
R. WINGATE.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Sir W. Brunyate to Sir R. Wingate.

Dear Sir Reginald,

January 4, 1919.

POOR Cecil's death definitely raises the question one had seen coming for some time past of the arrangements you will make as to the Financial and Judicial Adviserships. It is now a year since, at your request, I undertook the duties of the former office during Cecil's absence. I was aware that my Capitulations work would necessarily suffer therefrom, but it appeared in all the circumstances the best arrangement that could be made under war conditions.

While I in no way regret the decision then taken, I realise that our Capitulations work has suffered to a greater degree than I had hoped might be the case, and, except as a makeshift, the combination of the Financial Advisership with the post of "rapporteur" of the Capitulations Commission is, I recognise, an impossible one.

One obvious course is that I should now return to the Ministry of Justice, and that other arrangements of a permanent character should be made for the Financial Advisership. Were there anyone obviously available on the spot, or did I think that it was likely that at the present juncture anyone coming from outside would find the Financial Advisership easy to take up, there would, of course, be much to be said for that course. I think it right to say, however, that in my deliberate opinion anyone coming from outside would find the Financial Advisership a very difficult post to fill. It is one in which a great many threads of Government business centre, more especially so until our war work is cleared off; it involves very intimate and rather special relations with Ministers, which is likely to be a matter of special importance during the reconstruction period; and its occupant is the recognised head of the Anglo-Egyptian service, a service which at the present time is in a somewhat exceptional condition, owing to the diversion of a large portion of its personnel to special war work and to the considerable number of acting appointments. Provided, therefore, that adequate arrangements can be made for the continuance of the Capitulations work, I am inclined to regard the Financial Advisership as the more important office of the two to have adequately filled.

In making these observations, I have attempted to look at the whole matter from as impersonal a point of view as possible, but it would be idle to attempt to conceal from you that, did you consider me to have shown the necessary qualities for the Financial Advisership, it is so recognisedly the senior post in the service that it would be a matter of personal satisfaction to me were I to be permanently appointed to it.

Should such an appointment commend itself to you, I should, however, desire to satisfy myself in advance that we were in general agreement on matters of policy. You have, during the period of my acting appointment, given me such uniform support that such a question may appear a singularly unnecessary one. At the same time, I am, on the one hand, aware that the position occupied by the Financial Adviser has been at times a source of anxiety to you, and on the other hand, while occupying an acting appointment, I have been more concerned to carry on from day to day or to deal with the special problems presented by war conditions than to attempt to formulate any general policy.

The question of policy, whether financial or otherwise, is, moreover, of particular importance at the present time, as we have now to contemplate re-transferring the administration from a war basis to the basis natural to normal conditions, or, more

accurately, to look at it from the point of view of its suitability for the period of reorganisation which is involved in the disappearance of the Capitulations. As you are aware, I have been throughout inclined to look upon judicial reform as one feature only, and perhaps not the most important one of such reorganisation, and the extent to which the attention of the Foreign Office has been exclusively centred on that one feature leads me to think that some review of our general situation might be of interest to them.

Capitulations Work.

Should you desire me to remain at the Ministry of Finance, I should venture to recommend Mr. Amos, who is now acting in the appointment, as Judicial Adviser. There is no one senior to him in the judicial service whom I could recommend with equal confidence, and the only other local candidate whose claims I feel to require serious consideration, is Mr. Hayter. I am bound to say that I have been most favourably impressed by Mr. Hayter's work as a legal adviser, which I have found to be most reliable, and to be further characterised by a sane appreciation of administrative problems. At the same time, Mr. Hayter has been so long and so completely separated from the special work of the Ministry of Justice that I feel that better use can be made of his services elsewhere.

Should Mr. Amos be appointed Judicial Adviser, the question would then arise whether he should replace me as "rapporteur" of the Capitulations Commission—a commission of which I should naturally remain a member.

On the whole, I should advise against an attempt to join the two duties. You may remember that I myself found it so difficult to combine them that I applied for Mr. Amos' recall from special duty in England in order to help me at the Ministry of Justice, and having obtained his services, I found myself leaving the routine work of the Judicial Advisership to him in increasing measure, even before my transfer to the Ministry of Finance. I was the better able to do so owing to the fact that the Judicial Advisership was an office of which I had had long experience, at any rate in an acting capacity. But I see distinct advantages in the two functions being separated. A recent telegram promises us the help of Sir Alexander Wood Renton as from an early date, and should the Home authorities be satisfied with his suitability for the post of "rapporteur," I should suggest its being offered to him.

Were this combination to be adopted, I should feel no great anxiety as to the future of Capitulations work, notwithstanding certain difficulties with which we have been recently confronted. I gather from the latest telegrams that the Anglo-French agreement as to Egypt and Morocco will be finally negotiated at an early date, and its publication should, I think, do much to put an end to those difficulties. I am, of course, aware that London has shown a not unreasonable dissatisfaction with the progress of our work, but on the whole I think it probable that it is progressing more rapidly than is realised. Mr. Amos, acting under my general instructions, has been forming committees which have put an immense amount of work into matters supplemental to the codes on the part of officials who could have rendered no very great help on the codes themselves, and has now begun to present a series of drafts. Everything is tied up for the moment by the abstention of Ministers, owing to the recent crisis, but one would hope that that crisis may soon be over. I should doubt whether either Mr. Amos or anyone available from home could have carried the work of the commission to its present stage, but I should hope that it could now be carried on to completion without myself as "rapporteur."

(An alternative suggestion made to me while this note was being copied is that Mr. Amos should have the title of "rapporteur" but be assisted by Sir A. Wood Renton and M. Piola Casselli as members of a technical committee. In some ways I think this a better solution.)

Constitutional Reforms.

Any general survey of the situation necessarily includes some reference to constitutional reform, and there I have already submitted proposals to you. Those proposals were, of course, met by a very scornful negative from Sir Hussein Rushdi Pasha, but you will remember that a conversation recently reported to you with Sarwat Pasha showed that he and Sir Adly Yeghen Pasha took a very different view of them. As they have gone home, it is perhaps not much use attempting to deal further with the matter until we hear what London has to say.

Ministry of Finance.

Financial Policy.—Amongst the Ministers I deal first with the Ministry of Finance, owing to the anxieties which I know you feel as to the undue power of the finance authorities in Egypt.

Leaving for the moment the non-financial duties of the Financial Adviser, my own view is that there is no great difference between financial policy and policy in respect of any other branch of administration.

The general financial policy is, of course, a question for the Government, and in this country the Government, for many purposes, means the High Commissioner. Our only right, as I understand it, is to be fully heard before any general financial policy is adopted and put into force. Assuming that right to be recognised, it is immaterial whether we are asked to frame a policy for submission to the Government or are merely permitted to criticise a policy framed by the Government or the High Commissioner. Once a general policy is decided on, it becomes our business to apply it.

A question intermediate between that of general policy and that of routine financial administration is that of the allocation as between the different credits asked for of the money actually available. That, again, is in the last resort a Government question, and it is clear that it is not for the Ministry of Finance to say whether at any given moment public health or irrigation is, for instance, the more important, nor, again, to say in which of two provincial towns a hospital is more urgently required. Our special rôle in such matters is, as I understand it, to insist that all demands for credits are properly put forward with as accurate an estimate as possible of the financial liability ultimately involved, and with full technical justification. As a matter of fact, demands for credits have, in the past, been put forward in so inchoate a form as to render any considered judgment impossible, and we are doing our best at present to have this remedied.

There remains what I have called routine financial administration, which largely consists in (1) seeing that Government rules are observed and in authorising exceptions thereto, and (2) securing uniformity of conditions as between different departments, more especially in the grading of the personnel.

Such routine financial administration appears to me to be more particularly the concern of the Ministry of Finance, as routine irrigation administration is, for instance, the concern of the Public Works Ministry—a fact which is apt to be lost sight of owing to the acute personal interests frequently involved. To my mind, the granting of a special pension, or the creation of a special personal salary, is identical administratively with the granting of special irrigation facilities to a landowner. Either Ministry may make mistakes and may have to be over-ruled by a decision from outside; but if the Ministry's business is properly conducted, the reversals of its decisions or recommendations, if in any way frequent, are bound to lead to confusion. From this point of view the Ministry of Finance is of particular service to everybody else concerned, owing to its being part of its routine duty to take the unpleasant responsibility of saying "no."

Headquarters Staff.—Coming to the organisation of the headquarters staff, I think it probable that the staff will require to be strengthened before any large use is made of our future power to impose new taxation. Something has, however, been already done. The most promising change of recent years was that by which the Department of State Accounts—which is the real financial Department at headquarters—was taken out of Syrian hands and entrusted to an Englishman. We are still much understaffed in that Department so far as regards officials who can be trusted to exercise a reasonable discretion, but there again a beginning was made last year by the appointment of an Englishman to supervise Budgetary proposals and to discuss them with the Departments concerned. The best proof of our success is that, so far as I am aware, no appeals to you were lodged by discontented Departments.

I have further strengthened the headquarters staff during the past year by retaining Mr. Dawson's services as an Assistant Under-Secretary, even since Mr. Lindsay's return from leave, and by bringing Mr. Trelawny to headquarters. Something of the kind was necessitated by the heavy external calls on the time both of Mr. Lindsay and of myself, but the policy has been thus far justified by events that I believe it to be generally recognised that financial business is at present reasonably up-to-date. The conclusion I draw is that the staff was formerly inadequate.

So soon as questions arise as to the policy to be followed in new taxation, some additional expert staff will be required for that purpose. A nucleus exists in the Financial Secretary to the Ministry, but is, probably, insufficient. It may be that in this connection the head of the Customs Department might conveniently be reduced in status, serving as a mere collector of revenue under a higher official who was responsible for advising on our taxation policy.

Subordinate Departments.—There was formerly a tendency to attach to the Ministry of Finance Departments for which it was difficult to find a place elsewhere, or which, being elsewhere, desired a change. As I think you are aware, my own policy would be to free the Ministry from as much general administrative work as possible. In this sense I outlined a scheme in the last Budget Note (after obtaining your approval thereto) for transferring to a newly-created Ministry of Communications the Departments of Posts and of Ports and Lights, and I should hope that it may be possible to give effect to these proposals in our next Budget. It would also appear to me that the State Domains might be usefully combined with the Ministry of Agriculture—a matter I discuss later in connection with the Ministry—and Mr. Dowson has impressed upon me that the Survey of Egypt might be transferred in the same way. For reasons to be mentioned later, I propose no immediate action under this head, but I am none the less in favour of such action on grounds of policy. Were that done, the Ministry of Finance would still be left with the Coast Guard, which is difficult to place unless it were to be given to the Interior; but, with that exception, I feel that we should be left with nothing not properly belonging to us, and that the conduct of our own business would be much facilitated thereby.

Proposed Department of Commerce.—I understand that the creation of a Department of Commerce in connection with the Ministry of Finance to be approved in principle, and, should I remain at the Ministry of Finance, I should propose to undertake its formation as soon as the disappearance of War Committees gives a chance of obtaining the necessary staff. I should hope that later on a special Under-Secretaryship for that Department would be justified, but I am by no means sure that it would be wise to attempt to force the pace.

The Financial Advisership.—Apart from the Financial Adviser's duty of sitting on the Council of Ministers, there is a considerable amount of miscellaneous business centred in his office, of a financial or semi-financial kind, for which no convenient place could be found elsewhere in our existing organisation. Included therein are dealings with concessionaire companies and would-be concessionaires. It would be difficult, in my opinion, to transfer the business in question, and there is a special justification in its being centralised in a British official, owing to the fact that Residency opinion has in all cases to be taken.

As regards the Financial Adviser's position on the Council of Ministers, it is, of course, true that it very much strengthens his position for non-financial purposes, and I have always myself regarded it as an historical accident that the British official who sits on council should be a financial official and not, for instance, the adviser to the Ministry of Interior. The explanation is, of course, that interference with the control of the Egyptian administration on the financial side began long before the other advisers were instituted, and it may not be without interest to observe that in 1893 provision was made for the Judicial Adviser, the Sirdar, and the Under-Secretary of Public Works attending meetings of council at their own request when matters of importance affecting their respective Departments were coming up for discussion. I believe that when I first came to Egypt the officials in question, to whom the Adviser Interior had then been added, did occasionally attend council meetings, but apparently the privilege was so little valued that the practice has now fallen into complete desuetude. I should suppose that in 1893 discussions in council had more reality than they have since retained, or than is at all possible so long as at present the Sultan presides at council meetings. What are practically formal decisions can as easily be registered with one Englishman present as with two, and if there is need for serious discussion it takes place informally in advance, any necessary advisers being present.

Various suggestions have from time to time been made as alternatives to the Residency being represented on council by the Financial Adviser. One such alternative has been the creation of an adviser to the presidency of the council, another has been that two or three advisers should sit, or that the whole of them should.

I exclude for the moment the suggestion that all the advisers should sit, as that

would involve the replacement of the Council of Ministers by an Executive Council which would no longer be predominantly Egyptian in character and would raise questions of policy too wide to be here discussed.

One, or even two, additional advisers could no doubt be added without affecting the professed character of the council as an Egyptian body, and, provided that Ministers were agreeable and that the obviously right adviser or advisers were available, I should see no objection thereto. At the same time, my experience has led me to feel that the presence of one or more colleagues on council might complicate rather than simplify one's task. At the actual meetings of the council one has to supply explanations, sometimes of a political character, and to exercise a kind of control which, I suppose, amounts in substance to a right of veto, and either part of the task is one that in some respects can be better exercised by one individual than by two. The more important part of one's duty is, however, one's relations with Ministers outside the official meetings of the council as, for instance, at the informal talk which takes place at the Palace, both before and after the actual council meeting. Such talk is wholly informal, generally friendly, and often instructive for both sides, but its utility largely depends on the terms on which one is with the Ministers as a whole. It is a little difficult to judge how its character would be affected if others of one's colleagues were present, but it is at least safe to say that, should they happen to be men who did not enjoy the friendly confidence of Ministers, the free interchange of views might be seriously hampered.

An advisership to the presidency of the council would logically be preferable to the employment for the purpose of a Departmental adviser, such as the Financial Adviser nominally is. On the whole, I incline to think that such an adviser would have a very strong position indeed, and might even tend to dwarf the President of the council. He would naturally tend to become the acknowledged chief of his colleagues, and would be entitled to be heard on their own purely Departmental proposals. Something of the kind was proposed a dozen years ago, and I rather believe that the then consul-general, Lord Cromer, considered that such an official would, somewhat encroach on his own duties. From the Egyptian point of view such an official would, of course, directly represent the English control, and his presence might, therefore, come to be felt more irksome than that of an official whose control is nominally exercised on purely financial grounds. From a political point of view, therefore, a control which is in form financial might possibly be tolerated for a longer period than would be the alternative now under discussion. That alternative does, however, present possibilities which may be worth examination.

Ministry of Agriculture.

Turning to the other Ministries and taking first the Ministry of Agriculture, I think there is a very widespread feeling that for a variety of reasons, some of them of a personal character, the Ministry of Agriculture has failed to gain for itself an adequate place in the country. It was, of course, first created as a Department attached to the Ministry of Public Works, and I myself regretted at the time its transformation into an independent Ministry. What I think was overlooked was that the village population is accustomed to be approached through certain definite channels, such access being enjoyed in the largest measure by the Ministry of the Interior, and in a smaller measure by the Ministry of Public Works, and that a Department which cuts itself off from one of the recognised Ministries will require to be administered with singular ability if equivalent points of contact with the village population are to be successfully established. With no wish to minimise the high qualifications of the technical officials employed by the Ministry of Agriculture, I have a very strong feeling that they have entirely failed to establish the necessary contact with the population, and I express the opinion with the greater confidence as I was for some years the legal adviser to that Ministry. While it is no doubt true that the work of a long-established Department of Agriculture tends in any country to include a larger and larger technical element, the purely technical side is one which the people are likely last to understand, and appreciate.

For these reasons I should be glad at no distant date to see the Ministry brought into closer contact with practical farming by the transfer to it of the State Domains, and, as already mentioned, I should be quite content that the Survey should be taken over at the same time. If I make no immediate proposal in that sense, it is largely on personal grounds. I happen to know that it would be most distasteful to the present D.G. State Domains to serve under the present Under-Secretary of

Agriculture, and, although I recognise that personal questions ought not to be allowed to interfere with necessary schemes of organisation, I am bound to add that, in my opinion, the qualifications of the present Under-Secretary of Agriculture for the larger task are so doubtful as to make me hesitate to recommend a scheme which in practice might well break down for personal reasons.

I believe, in any case, that Mr. Langley contemplates an early retirement, and it occurs to me that, should such be the case, and should the Survey be ultimately included in the enlarged Ministry, Mr. Dowson, the present D.G. Survey, might well be the most suitable adviser to the Ministry. He is, it is true, without practical agricultural experiences, but, on the other hand, his administration of the Survey has been markedly successful, his experience at the Ministry of Finance has given him a wider outlook on general administrative problems, and nothing which is scientific in its nature fails to interest him.

It has been suggested to me that to a Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, the Department of Mines might also be usefully attached. While I see certain advantages in such a transfer, I am not entirely convinced that our mining policy is yet sufficiently determined to justify the detachment of the Department from the Ministry of Finance.

Ministry of Communications.

Should the proposed Ministry of Communications be created in the new Budget, it would include railways, posts, telegraphs, telephones and ports and lights. To this list I have proposed the addition of inland water transport, while Sir George Macauley, the present Under-Secretary and General Manager of the Railways, would also propose to add main roads and aviation.

Sir George Macauley is obviously marked out as adviser to such a Ministry as is proposed, and I concur in his proposals as to its scope, although I am aware that the Ministry of Public Works may be reluctant to give up some of its present duties, and although I fully realise that both inland water transport and roads are closely connected with the canals of the country. So far as I remember, Sir Murdoch Macdonald insists strongly on the desirability of a single cadre of engineers and would go so far as to re-transfer railways to the Ministry of Public Works, to which they were once attached. My own strong feeling is that Sir Murdoch's policy involves too excessive a centralisation and would prevent the adequate study of a number of problems from the point of view of communications, and I should hope that he may be ultimately satisfied that irrigation, including new works, together with State buildings, should provide ample employment for a Ministry and its head. What happens in practice is that some of the problems I have alluded to have not been adequately studied at the Ministry of Public Works and that the tendency is for them to be thrown on the office of the Financial Adviser, which has no adequate staff for the purpose. I have recently heard from Sir George Macauley that there is a chance of his being freed in the near future by the military authorities, and in that case I should be inclined to recommend that he be seconded for special duty pending the setting up of the proposed Ministry.

Ministry of Education.

The Ministry of Education is already engaged on working out schemes for the creation of a university and for the generalisation of elementary education. The setting up of a university has my entire sympathy, while it is clear that the generalisation of elementary education must proceed as rapidly as the necessary funds can be found either from central or local sources. It is, I believe, proposed that the money should come primarily from local sources, and that raises the whole question of local government, which is at present in a somewhat embryonic condition. It also raises the question of the control of local bodies by different Ministries in respect of the various activities with which such local bodies are entrusted, and this latter problem is one of considerable difficulty. The closest approach to a solution I have to suggest is that control should take the form of grants-in-aid, which may be withheld whenever prescribed conditions are not complied with.

Another educational problem which appears to me of the utmost urgency, and which has not yet been seriously taken in hand, is that of the provision by the State of education of a type suitable for the Levantine community. To this it has already been my duty to draw your attention in connection with the work of the Capitulations Commission, and in substance the British Chamber of Commerce has been saying the same thing in insisting on the extension of the English language. Notwithstanding

the extent to which the Ministry of Education is fully occupied with the problems they are already examining, I should hope that you may see your way to give the necessary instructions for the early examination of the problem now under discussion.

Ministry of Justice.

For practical purposes the problem of the Ministry of Justice is that of the judicial reforms now being examined by the Capitulations Commission, and I need not further deal with it here. The headquarters staff of the Ministry of Justice was overhauled some twelve years ago in accordance with suggestions made by myself, and, save so far as concerns the machinery for dealing with mixed tribunal problems—a matter coming outside my then suggestions—has since proved reasonably adequate for its purpose. A considerable strengthening of the headquarters staff will be necessary under the new judicial organisation, but that has already been realised and is being provided for.

Ministry of the Interior.

Headquarters Staff.—So far as I can judge, the headquarters organisation of the Ministry of the Interior has never been subjected to systematic examination and reorganisation since 1894, and, looking at it either from a budgetary point of view (which often throws light on organisation), or from outside information as to the way it actually works, I am unable to trace even the beginnings of an intelligible organisation. It is true that of recent years a municipalities department has been set up, but provincial councils, which are equally concerned with municipalities in local government, still remain under the so-called administrative section which is in charge of an Egyptian director. A difficulty which has been put to me is that the English Director of Personnel and Equipment has been, from force of circumstances, taking over informally a good many of the duties of the Under-Secretary, so that neither his status nor his remuneration any longer corresponds with his actual duties. To meet this Mr. Haines suggested to me the other day that the Director of Personnel and Equipment be made Secretary-General to the Ministry, a proposal which is open to the obvious objection that a secretary-general is an official whose duties, whatever they may be, extend to all departments of the Ministry, and that therefore the proposed term would be a misnomer and would carry us no further in the matter of organisation. It would appear to me, looking at the matter from outside, that the principal defect is that the administrative department is a survival which is to-day out of harmony with the remaining organisation of the Ministry. It was to remedy something of much the same kind that my proposals were made in the Ministry of Justice as above described. I ought, however, to add that Mr. Haines expresses himself as much more satisfied with the organisation he has taken over than I am able to do.

Local Government and Public Health. I deal with these two questions together because it appears to me that any progressive public health policy must be largely interconnected with the extension of local government. As regards local government, there is, as I have said, a section of the Interior dealing with municipalities and local commissions. I should obviously be extended so as to cover provincial councils, and it would then be necessary to decide on the proper methods of control to be exercised by such a department over local bodies entrusted with real powers. According to my information, the tendency of the present head of the department is towards rather undue centralisation, although I have to admit that the progress of the municipalities and local commissions has of late years been full of promise. The whole matter is in any case being studied by a very strong Sub-Commission of the Capitulations Commission, presided over by Sir Adly Yeghen Pasha.

As regards public health, the Balfour Commission has, of course, recently reported in favour of the creation of a Ministry of Public Health. I have in a separate minute, which I asked Sir Milne Cheetham to show to you, mentioned reasons for believing that the Commission in question had been seriously hampered by ignorance of local conditions on the part of its members, and I specially insisted that by transformation into a Ministry, the Department of Public Health would run many of the risks which have been so fatal to the Ministry of Agriculture. I understand that Lieutenant-Colonel Garner is now to be definitely regarded as head of the department and that he is personally against the transformation of the department into a

Ministry. I am, of course, in favour of a progressive policy in public health matters as rapidly as the necessary money can be found, provided that care is taken to avoid progress so rapid as to predispose our uneducated population against the activities of the department.

Police and Public Security.—Questions of police and public security in the provinces appear to be questions I can properly leave to my colleague at the Ministry of the Interior, save so far as it may be necessary to satisfy ourselves that adequate steps are being taken to meet the new conditions which will be created by the disappearance of the capitulations. The same remark applies, of course, to the prisons service. Taken in its widest sense, the police question no doubt raises that of the future status of the inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior, a question which I should be inclined to regard as a Government one rather than a purely Interior one, in view of the important political considerations involved. I should however, prefer to await proposals from Mr. Haines under this head.

Ministry of Public Works.

Irrigation.—When one speaks of the Ministry of Public Works it is the irrigation service that one most frequently has in mind. In that connection we are already committed to a considerable extension of the Delta improvement scheme, and presumably to the White Nile Dam. My only hesitation as to the latter is that I understand that Sir Murdoch Macdonald has recently submitted a revised estimate for the cost of the proposed Blue Nile Dam—a dam the cost of which concerns the Soudan and not Egypt—involving an increase of expenditure so heavy as would make me hesitate to approve of proceeding with the White Nile Dam, should the same considerations apply, until prices shall have reached a more normal level.

While it is these works which loom largest in the public eye, my own close association for a number of years with the Ministry of Public Works has led me to feel that our entire system of controlling the distribution of water in detail has fallen behind the standard which might reasonably be expected, and I should be glad to see considerable effort devoted to its improvement. In making this observation I believe that I am doing no more than express the opinion of a considerable section of the Irrigation Service, and I have indeed to recognise that Mr. Tottenham and others are already devoting attention to the matter. You may remember that the whole question was examined in some detail from a legal point of view by the Capitulations Commission at the beginning of the year, and I should hope that the publication of a more satisfactory law will prove a decided stimulus to reform.

I ought not to leave the question of irrigation without anew placing on record my growing conviction that the service is suffering very seriously by the prolonged absence of Sir Murdoch Macdonald in England. I should conceive that it must be difficult for him to keep in touch with the service, and it must be clear that very heavy responsibility is thereby being thrown on Mr. Tottenham while he is deprived of the free hand which is the natural accompaniment of such responsibility.

Buildings.—Our Building Department causes me some anxiety. It will perhaps be within your knowledge that some eight to twelve years ago it broke down rather badly, and while steps have been taken to remedy its more obvious defects, I cannot feel sure that it has been sufficiently strengthened to enable it to face the very extended building programme which no doubt awaits us. As I have already reported in my confidential memoranda in connection with the Capitulations Commission, I feel that in order to obtain a contented and really efficient staff in the provinces, very much more attention must be given to the housing of our staff in provincial towns than has hitherto been the case, and that means a very large programme indeed, even apart from requirements for Court Houses, Schools, &c. The whole question demands the very serious attention of the Public Works Ministry. I may also mention in this connection that provision of housing accommodation will probably mean something in the nature of town planning in the provincial towns, although that happens to come under the Municipalities Section of the Ministry of the Interior and not under the Ministry of Public Works.

Miscellaneous Services.—The other principal services under the Ministry of Public Works are the Mechanical Department, the Physical Service, the Main Drainage Department and the so-called Tanzim Department. The Physical Service is a small scientific service which was, I believe, at one time under the Survey, and I should wish to reserve my opinion as to the best place for it until the general question of our scientific services comes up for review.

The Tanzim Department, which originally exercised jurisdiction throughout the country has now shrunk to little more than one of the Cairo municipal services, owing to the transfer of Tanzim work in the provinces to the Municipalities Department of the Interior. This may well be materially increased whenever we are in a position to promulgate adequate building laws, and I should hope that it may be possible to take steps to create an adequate municipal service for Cairo at no distant date, if possible with some element at least of popular representation. The same is very much the case with the Main Drainage Department, which is really a Cairo municipal service, although the heads of the service are to some extent regarded as technical advisers for other sewerage schemes. With the decentralisation of municipal engineering, the question of central control is becoming a rather difficult one—a question I have already alluded to in connection with education. The Ministry of Public Works seems, of course, the natural home for engineers, yet control by a Department of that Ministry is very difficult when general control of local bodies is vested in the Interior. It may well be that the ultimate solution will be to enlarge the Municipalities Department into something like a Local Government Board, though for reasons already alluded to I should be rather reluctant to see it entirely dissociated from the Ministry of the Interior. The Mechanical Department has of late years been accumulating a number of very miscellaneous functions. The irrigation steamers have long been in their hands; it has become the responsible authority for the issue of pumping licences, and all Government pumping stations have recently been transferred to it. More recently still it has become responsible for a considerable number of motor cars. Whether its personnel and organisation are quite equal to its present duties I have some reason to doubt. Notwithstanding the difficulties incident to dual control, I am rather in favour of extending its responsibilities in order to avoid the duplication of small staffs. I think it probable that it ought to be responsible for the repair and upkeep of all motor cars, and possibly all motor cycles, and even that it might be a convenience that Government cars should be to a considerable extent pooled. Possibly also it should be made the natural home for most of our mechanical engineers, even though they might be seconded for special duties with other departments. A short time ago, for instance, the best mechanical engineers available in the service were attached to the Main Drainage Department, and their services were in fact drawn on in connection with the specifications for the large pumping plants for drainage purposes, the execution of which was suspended by the war. It would be difficult enough to obtain the services of engineers of a sufficiently high calibre even for a centralised service, while it becomes almost impossible so soon as the work is split up between irrigation works, sewerage works, &c

Ministry of Wakfs.

The Ministry of Wakfs is, of course, largely outside the ordinary Government cadre, and we have hitherto been reluctant to deal with it for fear of arousing religious prejudice.

Any such suggestion is, of course, without rational foundation; the charitable destination of the revenues of given lands is no reason for contenting ourselves with a lower standard either of administration or of accounting, and I am convinced that if the matter were approached judiciously, reliance being placed in enlightened Egyptian opinion, a good deal might be done. Every Minister with whom one talks is keenly alive to the defects of the present system, and so long as it continues it is almost certain that we shall continue to have Palace interference. At the same time the matter is one in which any hasty action would be most unwise.

Ministry of War.

You will remember that some eight or nine years ago a draft law as to military discipline was prepared, which would, to a certain extent, have regularised the whole question, but which Lord Kitchener, on his arrival in 1911, preferred not to promulgate. I would venture to suggest that the time is ripe for re-examining the utility of such a law. The position is of course that army discipline depends entirely on an obscure decree, published in Arabic, only in, I think, 1884, by which action theretofore taken by the Sirdar was approved, and a code of offences was promulgated. It has ever since been assumed that the Sirdar had a fairly free hand as to army discipline, and such discipline, as now enforced, is in several respects contrary to the provisions of the Decree just alluded to. Lord Kitchener had been

so closely associated with the old system that his unwillingness to have the matter regularised was perhaps intelligible, and I have to admit that no serious difficulty has since occurred. At the same time I have to observe that your own Sirdarship carried us on into the war period, and that with the disappearance of the officers who were familiar with the old traditions, the situation becomes much more delicate, while the legal principles likely to be applied by our new courts will almost certainly necessitate closer conformity between theory and practice.

The Soudan.

While the Soudan is, of course, distinct from the Ministry of War, the combination in the same hands of the two offices of Sirdar and Governor-General, and the extent to which the Soudan Government relies on army officers for administrative purposes, makes it not improper to deal with two in close connection.

I would venture to raise the point whether the continued combination of the two offices in the same hands is desirable, more particularly now that a stage has been reached at which no British officers are serving in the army who have had any close connection with Egypt. As you are aware, my duties in past years have been of a very miscellaneous character, and I hope it will not be improper to observe that even during your own Sirdarship I came to have a feeling that there was no adequate machinery in Cairo for dealing with army matters, more particularly after the transfer of the Adjutant-General to Khartoum. I should also imagine that the Governor-Generalship will, with the continued development of the Soudan, come increasingly to occupy the full time of any one man.

I am at the same time aware of the difficulties resulting from the fact that the army serves, and must apparently continue to serve, in what are in reality two distinct countries, and for that reason I content myself with the observations above recorded.

Politically it would, of course, be an immense advantage to us if the Soudan could be separated from us for all purposes, both military and financial, in the sense that it would look to Great Britain rather than to Egypt both for any garrison not locally raised, and for any necessary funds. Here again, I am fully alive to the difficulties in the way. But it is certain that our relations with the Soudan have caused constant political irritation during the last twenty years, and if in the future our political institutions are to be developed in a direction which will necessitate greater frankness of statement, I should conceive that the existing relations will be increasingly difficult to defend.

As an alternative I should suggest the clearer definition of the situation. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899, was even at the time somewhat of the nature of an expedient, and after twenty years might well be subjected to revision. Now that Ministers are asking for the definition of the status of the Protectorate, it might be a convenient opportunity to define more accurately the status of the Soudan and Egypt's obligations with reference thereto. The offer to do so might even be an inducement to certain of our friends to consent to postpone for a short time their desired visit to London.

Whatever is done under this head, it would, of course, be impossible for Egypt to be dissociated from the Upper Nile on which her irrigation depends. At the same time I would venture to raise the question whether routine irrigation in the Soudan can now be most conveniently controlled from Cairo. I seldom meet a Soudan official nowadays without hearing suggestions in favour of local control. Even assuming a separate service to be created, it would probably be desirable to secure free interchangeability of personnel between the two, which would be the less difficult as the climate of Egypt is obviously preferable, while the irrigation problems of the Soudan may well for the next few years be the more interesting.

Staff.

Egyptian Staff.—Turning to the question of staff, I deal first with the Egyptian side of the question.

As I recently observed in my note on constitutional reform, the existing Egyptian staff appears to me very markedly superior to what was available twenty years ago, but, as I believe I also pointed out, I doubt whether we have sufficiently tackled the question of training the Egyptian personnel for the responsibilities incident to higher posts—a point on which I further insisted in noting on the recommendations

of the Balfour Public Health Commission. It is of course natural that English heads of Departments should have concentrated on securing the maximum possible efficiency at any given moment, but the policy is none the less in certain respects a shortsighted one. The story is very much the same as regards all departments, with the exception of the Ministry of Justice, which as regards Native Tribunals has so largely relied—and as I think with excellent results—on Egyptian personnel. I was talking the other day with an Inspector-General of Irrigation, and he very frankly commented on the greater difficulty of looking after the training of Egyptian engineers, due to the fact that the best training is largely interconnected with social relations. I feel in any case that we are bound seriously to take the matter up, and to consider as regards each department how soon, and to what extent, we can rely on Egyptian agencies, even at some cost of efficiency.

The question of the salaries of our Egyptian technical cadres is one which is causing me increasing anxiety. In connection with the Public Health Report I had occasion to comment on the peculiar difficulties as regards doctors resulting from the competing claims of private practice. The difficulty is, however, general throughout the service. Our judges are complaining of their low salaries, and as compared, for instance, with the engineers, they have certainly been indifferently treated, a matter which I hope may be to some extent remedied in connection with judicial reorganisation. Quite apart from the temporary decrease in the purchasing power of money, I incline to think that new social conditions require a changed manner of life on the part of our responsible Egyptian officials, and that in order to obtain a body of self-respecting men of the highest efficiency we should probably do well to improve their pecuniary position and general status. At the same time the financial liability involved would be considerable. The Army stands, of course, rather outside the ordinary Civil Service, but I incline to think that the above observations are equally applicable. The point is, however, one on which your opinion would be of much greater value than my own.

As regards the purely clerical staff, I am impressed by the continued existence of redundant masses of personnel, and I should like as time permits to have enquiries made into the possibilities of reduction throughout the service. I fully realise, of course, that wholesale dismissals would be impossible, but extensions of Government activities would probably permit of the absorption elsewhere of the personnel economised.

Senior British Personnel.—I am increasingly led to the conclusion that some considerable re-adjustment is desirable in the salaries of the senior British personnel, by which is ordinarily understood men whose salaries are not less than 800*l.* a year.

The tendencies at work in the last twenty years have been of several kinds. Twenty years ago the only English Under-Secretaryships were those of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Public Works, the former of which carried a salary of 2,000*l.* a year, while the latter, which was more of the nature of an advisership, carried the same salary with a personal allowance of 500*l.* a year. A second Under-Secretaryship was created at the Ministry of Finance in, or about, the year 1906, the salary being fixed at 1,500*l.*, which was then the salary of all the Egyptian Under-Secretaries, and when Mr. Mitchell Innes retired from the senior Under-Secretaryship, the salaries for all Under-Secretaries, British and Egyptian alike, was fixed at 1,500*l.* to 1,750*l.* a year. Since that date a British Under-Secretaryship has been created at the Ministry of Agriculture, the official salary of which is shown in the Budget at the normal figure, although the present occupant of the post receives 2,000*l.* a year for special reasons. The General Manager, Railways, whose salary as General Manager is also 2,000*l.*, has been given the personal rank of Under-Secretary.

As regards Directors General, their posts were twenty years ago at fixed salaries varying, I believe, from 1,200*l.* to 1,500*l.* a year, according to their standing in the service and the supposed importance of their posts. They have since been uniformly cut down to a graded salary of 1,200*l.* to 1,500*l.* a year, with the exception of the Inspector-Generals of Irrigation which, in a general revision of the irrigation cadre, were fixed at 1,400*l.* to 1,750*l.* a year, those salaries being enjoyed by Englishmen and Egyptians alike.

In my opinion, by fixing the Under-Secretaryship of Finance at 1,500*l.* to 1,750*l.* a year, the whole series of subordinate posts, the salaries of which have been kept below this figure, have been unduly depressed, and there is an especial congestion in the part of the cadre between 800*l.* and 1,200*l.* In making this observation, I am not unaware that in the contrary sense staff has been largely increased in certain

directions and numerous posts in the neighbourhood of 1,000*l.* a year have been created for the performance of work which was formerly done by Egyptian directors on somewhat lower salaries, but this has, of course, further increased the congestion in question.

I should myself recommend that the whole question be systematically re-examined, and I think it very important that in doing so a distinction should be made between Englishmen and Egyptians doing identical work. The principle just mentioned is, of course, recognised in the Ministry of Justice, although it has occasionally been rather hotly contested even in that Ministry. In the Ministry of Public Works, on the other hand, no such differentiation is made, with the result, as I believe, that certain Egyptian officials are being quite needlessly overpaid. My own feeling is that we are entitled to expect from senior British officials a certain style of living which is quite unnecessary in the case of Egyptians, and which is fully justified by the importance of prestige as an element in the administration of a country governed on such lines as Egypt. To meet the obvious political difficulty I would suggest that posts, or categories of posts, which are liable to be occupied either by Englishmen or by Egyptians, should be given a fixed salary, but that Englishmen should receive an expatriation allowance, counting towards pension, in addition to the budgetary salary. This should effect the desired purpose and could, I think, be justified on the ground of the additional expense due to travelling between Egypt and England, and to the family separations which are a normal incident of the service abroad of an Englishman of a certain age. Such an arrangement would further facilitate the gradual replacement of British by Egyptian staff whenever Egyptian progress justified such a measure, without the risk of Egyptians so promoted being overpaid.

In speaking of the importance of prestige, I desire, of course, to restrict my observations to the classes to which alone they are properly applicable. There are at present, and I imagine there are bound to be, considerable classes of Englishmen engaged in very useful work which in no way brings them before the public eye, and the proper performance of which is entirely compatible with the modest style of living habitual to the same classes, in England. A good deal of scientific work comes under this head and probably a good deal of educational work, although I think it very possible that the remuneration of educationalists will have to be increased in order to meet increased competition at home.

British Inspectorate.—The whole question of the British inspectorate is a very difficult one. While I recognise that an Englishman, as such, normally possesses qualities which enable him without undue friction to tender advice to relatively senior Egyptians, the difficulty of doing so is bound to increase as our Egyptian personnel improves, and I think it probable that we shall have increasingly to rely on the natural form of inspection by senior officials rather than on a system so often followed in the past of inspection by relatively junior men.

A further difficulty is that while on the face of it supervision requires qualities quite as rare as direct administration, so that we are justified in obtaining the best available material for our inspectorate, the excessive sub-division of the inspecting services leads to our inspectors being very inadequately trained for general administrative posts at a later stage. I am particularly impressed by this difficulty in the case of the Finance inspectorate, with which it would at present be quite impossible to dispense, but which now that the machinery of land tax collection has been regularised, is of a distressingly routine character. It has occurred to me that it might be possible to overcome a part of this difficulty by combining the inspectorates of the Ministries of Finance and of the Interior, and I am glad to say that my colleague, Mr. Haines, would be prepared to see an experiment tried in that direction. I am in part led to take this view by the fact that on the whole our best inspectors seem to me to be the men who have had experience in the two branches. The obvious objection is that of divided responsibility, but I would observe that, after all, the inspectors are in a sense advising Mudirs, whose responsibility is already divided. It occurs to me, indeed, that by effecting the combination we should be able to count on Mudirs having relatively senior men to deal with direct, the junior men working under their seniors as sub-inspectors. Another advantage would, I think, be that we should be enabled, without undue prejudice to the prospects of our British personnel, the more easily to accommodate the measure of inspection to the circumstances of the moment. Whether any other inspectorial duties could be similarly combined I should hesitate to say.

The present note has become considerably longer than was intended when it was

begun, but I imagine that it is very desirable from time to time to take stock of our general situation. It is perhaps especially important so to do at the present moment when our Egyptian friends are clamouring for a clearer definition of that situation, and, should you find yourself in at all general agreement with any such programme as I have sketched out, I feel that it would be very desirable that some public pronouncement should be made on the question. The natural place for doing so would be in the Annual Report of the High Commissioner, and, while I recognise that war conditions have rendered the temporary disappearance of that Report both natural and probably necessary, I should venture to hope that its re-appearance will be one of the first consequences of the return to normal conditions.

Very sincerely yours,
W. E. BRUNYATE.

No. 110.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 26.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 24, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No 1427* of the 15th instant, relative to the recognition of the British and Spanish Protectorates in Egypt and Morocco respectively, I agree in your Lordship's view that an acceptance, at this moment, of the Spanish suggestion of mutual recognition would probably give offence to the French Government. Moreover, until the present policy of France in regard to Morocco is clear and until His Majesty's Government have decided what should be their attitude towards such proposals as the French Government may put forward, it is hardly possible to consider the question of the recognition of the Spanish protectorate over the Spanish zone.

2. At the same time it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to base a refusal on the ground of the non-acceptance by Spain of the draft statute for Tangier of 1914. It is quite possible that the Spanish Government may now be ready to agree to that statute of internationalisation in the hope of forestalling any French proposals for some other régime. In this connection I would refer to my despatch No. 304 to your Lordship of the 22nd instant. It seems best, in the circumstances, that the question of recognition should be postponed, and no answer for the present returned to the suggestion of the Spanish Government.

I am, &c.
(For Mr. Balfour),
ERIC DRUMMOND.

No. 111.

Sir L. Stack to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 79A. Military.)
(Telegraphic.)

Khartoum, March 21, 1919

IN Soudan, black and Arab troops are not affected by events in Egypt, and can in consequence be relied on. Egyptians are much interested, and their attitude will depend mainly on that of their officers.

Amongst latter, senior Egyptian officers deplore disturbances as militating against any future measure of self-government.

The junior Egyptian officers are much excited, and I fear many of them would be ready to create a situation embarrassing to Government if they dared to.

This risk would be increased by a prolongation of present situation in Egypt, or a report that Egyptian army troops there had got out of hand. Senior British officer representing me in Egypt reported, on 15th March, attitude of troops perfectly quiet, and officers, though possibly sympathising with deported leaders, quite ready to help in any way. I have since heard Egyptian army troops are assisting in repairing railway south of Cairo.

* No. 76.

No. 112.

Memorandum by the Department of Overseas Trade on the Relative Prospects of British and French Trade in Egypt and Morocco with reference to the Proposed Commercial Convention affecting these Countries.

THE following memorandum has been drawn up with a view to estimating, as far as possible, what trade Great Britain would stand to lose in Morocco and gain in Egypt in the event of a commercial convention being concluded on the basis of reciprocal preferential tariffs in favour of Great Britain in Egypt, and in favour of France in the French zone of Morocco. An analogous case has arisen already in Tunisia, which in default of any more definite data, may be taken as an example.

Before 1898 the Tunisian import duty amounted to 8 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods from all countries with a few exceptions. By the treaty of the 18th September, 1897, a copy of which is attached,* British cottons were, and continue to be, taxed at the rate of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, French cottons entering free of duty. Other British goods bear tariffs somewhat similar to the minimum tariffs applied to British imports into France. Nearly all French goods enter Tunisia duty free.

1. *Cotton Goods.*—The average value of British cottons entering Tunisia in the period 1895–1897 was 191,600*l.* per annum; during the same period French cottons entering Tunisia averaged 27,000*l.* annually, *i.e.*, before the imposition of the 5 per cent. discrimination the proportion was: British cottons, 87·6 per cent.; French cottons, 12·4 per cent.

During the three years previous to the war the import of British cottons averaged 263,000*l.* per annum, but French cottons rose to 262,000*l.* (British, 50·1 per cent.; French, 49·9 per cent.).

It may thus be taken that Great Britain lost, through the imposition of a 5 per cent. discrimination, 37½ per cent. of the cotton import trade, *i.e.*, about 197,875*l.*

In the case of Morocco, the import of British cottons prior to the war amounted to 627,000*l.*, French cottons 89,000*l.* (British, 87·5 per cent.; French, 12·5 per cent.). If we now assume that the Moroccan market, after the imposition of a 5 per cent. discrimination against us, would take the same development as the Tunisian market, in respect of cottons only, it can easily be seen that in sixteen years' time Great Britain would stand to lose 37½ per cent. of the value of cottons exported to Morocco, this sum would gradually increase up to 644,000*l.* per annum.

2. *Other Goods.*—As regards goods other than cottons, we must exclude stationary imports, such as coal and coke, and green tea, which is a foreign re-export. The total British and French exports of such goods into Tunisia before the institution of the preferential tariff, *i.e.*, before 1898, averaged about 904,000*l.* per annum, of which France held 869,000 or 96·12 per cent. and Great Britain 35,000*l.* or 3·88 per cent. During the three years previous to the war the import of French goods into Tunisia enumerated averaged 3,702,000*l.* per annum or 97·34 per cent., and Britain's share amounted to 101,000*l.* per annum or 2·66 per cent. It may thus be taken that Great Britain lost, through the imposition of a tariff higher than the 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, and somewhat similar to the minimum French import tariff, 1·22 per cent. of the total French and British trade other than cottons, coal, coke or green tea. The trade lost may therefore be calculated at slightly less than a third of Britain's share, about 46,500*l.* per annum.

As regards Morocco, British and French exports of goods now under consideration amounted to 4,726,000*l.* per annum in pre-war days (Great Britain 439,000*l.* or 9·2 per cent. and France 4,287,000*l.* or 90·8 per cent.). The Tunisian trade in such goods increased over four times during the sixteen years between 1897 and 1913. There is no reason to doubt that Moroccan trade in such goods will increase at least four times in the same length of time, and British trade will stand to lose in that period slightly less than a third of her share in an anticipated total trade of about 19,500,000*l.* This loss may be assessed at 3 per cent. of the total trade, *i.e.*, 585,000*l.* The total loss to be anticipated in Morocco in a period similar to that which has been taken for observation in Tunisia, therefore amounts to a figure increasing up to 1,229,000*l.* per annum worth of trade within sixteen years' time of which 644,000*l.* is in reference to cotton goods and 585,000*l.* in other articles.

As regards Egypt we have to consider an entirely different state of conditions. There is no country presenting an analogous case which can be taken as a basis for prognostication in the same way as Tunisia served as a guide to the probable course of events in Morocco (French zone).

* Not printed.

To begin with Egypt has for many years been a settled country and the increase in its trade during the last twenty years has followed more or less the curve taken by the general increase in the world's commerce, whereas Morocco is in an entirely different position, having only recently been "pacified," i.e., relieved from the burden of a corrupt and semi-barbarous Government. It is therefore more than probable that a rapid increase of trade is not to be expected in Egypt such as may reasonably be looked for in Morocco.

Turning now to the specific question of French trade with Egypt and the proportion of it which England might expect to gain in, say, sixteen years time, we have first of all to consider that Egypt is the home of a numerous settled French colony numbering about 14,500, whereas the British element in Morocco (French zone) numbers only about 1,050, of whom about 350 are merchants of English nationality and the balance are native-born British subjects consisting of Gibraltarians and Maltese protected persons, &c. This consideration alone makes it clear that French commerce in Egypt is in a stronger position and less likely to be seriously affected by a 5 per cent. discriminatory tariff. There is further an important consideration that French is a language very widely known in Egypt, whereas English is not much understood in Morocco.

The analysis of French trade with Egypt shows that in the year 1913 French and French colonial exports into Egypt totalled £E. 2,575,000, of which 770,000% was flour, maize and semolina. 687,000% in respect of flour sent to France for milling and not to be regarded mainly as a product of French origin. The next most important French exports into Egypt were:—

	£
Underclothing and Hosiery ...	170,000
Haberdashery and fancy goods and toys ...	102,000
Apparel ...	62,000
Cotton yarns and manufactures ...	38,000
Woollen manufactures ...	63,000
Silk tissues ...	79,000
Mixed tissues ...	66,000
Machinery ...	126,000
Iron steel manufactures ...	97,000
Electrical instruments ...	36,000
Wines, spirits and liqueurs ...	79,000
Mineral waters ...	17,000
Medicines ...	54,000
Dyes and colours ...	40,000
Perfumery ...	25,000
Olive, cocoanut and other oils ...	77,000
Lime ...	37,000
Tanned, ox, sheep and goat skins ...	31,000

In view of the considerations previously outlined showing that French trade, owing to general conditions, is in a stronger position in Egypt than British trade in Morocco, it seems unlikely that a 5 per cent. discriminatory tariff would gain for us as much trade in the above categories as the 37½ per cent. forecasted as the probable French gains of our cotton trade in Morocco.

Taking these articles separately, the following table may be taken as a rough estimate of the probable increase:—

	Per cent.	£
Underclothing and hosiery ...	25	42,500
Haberdashery, fancy goods and toys ...	20	20,400
Apparel ...	20	12,400
Cottons ...	15	5,700
(It being understood that the French specialise in lines we do not compete very much in.)		
Woollens ...	25	15,750
Silk tissues ...	—	—
Mixed tissues ...	10	6,600
Machinery ...	25	31,500
Iron and steel manufactures ...	25	24,250
Electrical instruments ...	20	7,200
Wines, spirits and liqueurs ...	—	—
Mineral waters ...	—	—
Medicines ...	25	13,500
Dyes and colours ...	25	10,000
Perfumery ...	—	—
Olive, cocoanut and other oils ...	10	7,700
Lime ...	10	3,700
Tanned skins ...	10	3,100
Total ...		204,300

This figure is on the present scale of trade. As in Morocco, the probable loss to British trade was estimated for a period of 16 years, it is necessary to forecast the anticipated increase in the bulk of Egyptian trade during the same period.

An examination of Egyptian statistics shows that hitherto the bulk of trade has little more than doubled during a period of the same length, and in view of the greater stability which now prevails in that market, it is not thought probable that in the next 16 years imports will more than double; this indicates that we might expect to gain a proportion of French trade in the next 16 years which would total something over 400,000% or 500,000 at an outside estimate, against a probable loss in Moroccan trade of 1,229,000.

March 27, 1919.

No. 113

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 442. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

SIR M. CHEETHAM'S telegram No. 433.

Situation up to this morning:—

Cairo, March 26, 1919.

South of Cairo: Deirut was stated to be in the hands of the mob on 22nd, with 1,000 armed Bedouins holding up river traffic.

At Assiut grave disorder occurred on 23rd and 24th, with burning and looting, notably of Coptic shops. Fighting between Bedouin and natives and British troops went on during those days, and on afternoon of 24th the Mudir telegraphed that ammunition was short and position dangerous. General Huddleston's force has now been relieved. Railway and telegraphic communication with Halfa has been restored. Kena reported in a critical position and in need of troops on 24th.

Strike is said to have occurred in Gemsa and Hurghada oil-fields, but another account denies this.

Minor incidents elsewhere, but order is spreading southward, and in Fayoum evacuated police outposts are being reoccupied.

Cairo: Quiet, though certain nervousness still perceptible. Lawyers' strike is thought to be wavering, and their action would probably influence that of the students.

North of Cairo, West Behera, North Gharbia, and parts of Dakahlieh are still much disturbed, but numerous arrests being made in west of Behera. Troops inflicted 100 casualties in defending a construction train from attack between Zagazig and Mit Ghamr; Alexandria and Port Said quiet.

Bedouin of western desert quiet and apparently unaffected by the movement.

No. 114.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 443. Urgent)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 26, 1919.

SIR M. CHEETHAM'S telegram No. 426.

President of Legislative Assembly, Adly and Sarwat Pashas, and two leaders of Independent party called on General Bulfin on 24th March. They produced document which they had signed and proposed to send out broadcast to country in order to pacify people. Document was unsatisfactory, being written in obscure terms and expressing no disapproval of Independent movement. They were informed language used by them was not suitable, and after discussion left to prepare a new notice on lines which would meet General Bulfin's views.

They drafted a new notice yesterday and obtained last night and this morning signatures of leading and influential persons to document, which it is their intention to print and circulate throughout the country. Notice is described as an appeal to Egyptian nation, and is in following sense:—

Military authorities have issued a warning. Outrages are forbidden by laws of God, and cutting communications does irreparable harm to people of country.

Such outrages render possibly innocent persons liable to punishment, and would prejudice Egyptian claims to consideration.

Signatories therefore appeal to Egyptian nation to keep within bounds of the law and put no obstacle in the way of those serving their country by lawful means. They invite notables and men of influence to do their duty in preventing anything which might injure country.

Signatories comprise President of Legislative Assembly, all the ex-Ministers, leading religious dignitaries, some of Nationalist deputation, many leading Copts, a few moderates. I invited to Residency a number of principal signatories and delivered an address to them this afternoon, text of which has been given to Reuter's agent for immediate despatch.

I hope touch with Egyptians has now been regained and will have good effect, but I do not regard myself as committed to act with any section of opinion. It is too early to know results of declaration of maintenance of protectorate implied by terms of my appointment.

No. 115.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 444.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 27, 1919.

MY telegram No. 442.

Situation up to this morning:—

South of Cairo general improvement continues; 152 refugees have been evacuated from Fayoum to Cairo. Some fighting continued at Assiout up to night of 25th. Position at Dena and Luxor has improved.

Assouan is quiet. Arabs of the eastern desert are offering help. Western oasis is quiet.

Iluqhadah quiet, with oil-fields under guard.

In Cairo: Quiet. Resistance to pacification now appears to centre in Al Azhar. Native press becomes more sensible.

North of Cairo: Slight damage to irrigation works, but position is rapidly returning to normal, and this is true of the Delta generally.

Kafr-el-Sheikh, a centre of disturbance, has been surrounded by troops, and arrests are being made.

No. 116.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 447.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 28, 1919.

SITUATION to-day:—

South of Cairo: Force from Soudan arrived at Luxor on 26th, and reports all well. One hundred and forty-six European civilians are safe at Assiout. Area north of Assiout as far as Mallawi remains somewhat turbulent.

Fayoum is reported clear of Bedouin hands.

Cairo quiet.

North of Cairo: Practically quiet.

No. 117.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 449. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 28, 1919.

MY telegram No. 443 of 26th March.

Last paragraph.

I consider it of primary importance that Egyptians should know our protectorate has been accepted by Powers.

I understand that Italy and United States have not recognised protectorate. Can you obtain this recognition or make some declaration which cannot be disputed?

No. 118.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 16, 1919.

I HAD the honour to inform you in the final paragraph of my telegram No. 378 of the 11th March, that a movement had been set on foot by the members of the Bar practising before the Egyptian Native Courts, having for its purpose to impede the administration of justice by refusing to plead in cases in which they were retained as counsel.

However the movement originated, it was concentrated in and encouraged by the majority of the members of the Bar Council, who appear at the outset to have succeeded in carrying their colleagues with them.

My information is to the effect that many members of the Bar dislike being dragged in the train of men of the stamp of those leading the movement, but have hitherto been unable to resist the current. The attitude of Aziz Bey Fahmy (who is the Chairman of the Bar Council) is somewhat uncertain, and he has himself probably hesitated as to the course he should take. On the one hand, he is regarded as the leader of Saad Pasha Zaghlul's party in the latter's absence; on the other hand he may have felt uncertain as to the extent of his influence, and have been unwilling to put it to the test in the interests of moderation. In a recent private interview with the President of the Appeal Court (Yehia Pasha Ibrahim) he appears to have undertaken to do his best to arrest the movement.

The *modus operandi* agreed upon by the strikers has been of a twofold character. Firstly, to ask for adjournments of all cases in which they were engaged, both civil and criminal, frequently quoting the authority and approval of their clients for this course, or stating that they were making arrangements with their clients to give up their briefs; and secondly, to apply to the Court for the transfer of their names from the list of advocates in active practice to the non-active list.

The attitude of the Courts towards applications for adjournments has been influenced by the fact that owing to defective local rules of practice the Court lists are commonly encumbered with large numbers of cases which are either not ready for trial, or which the Court could not reasonably be expected to hear on the day for which they are set down. For this reason the grant of adjournments when asked for is in many cases regarded almost as a matter of course. The result has

been that since the beginning of the movement on the 9th March very few civil cases in which advocates were instructed have been heard in the Native Courts in Cairo. The movement has also spread to the provincial towns. In a certain number of cases the parties themselves have expressed willingness to intervene in place of their defaulting counsel, and in these circumstances the Courts have heard the case. On the first indications of the movement, the Ministry of Justice circularised the Presidents of the First Instance Courts by telegram advising the Judges (1) to strike out of the list all cases in first instance in which advocates were retained but refused to plead on any ground not of a personal character or connected with the case; (2) to proceed with all criminal cases unless the accused personally applied for an adjournment on adequate grounds. Judges were advised to exercise their discretion as to the course to be taken in cases on appeal, as there was some doubt whether a case so struck out could be restored to the list. The effect of striking out in first instance will be to compel parties to pay over again a quarter of the Court fee, which is proportional to the amount at stake in the suit.

This circular only applied to the subordinate Courts. At the Court of Appeal the situation was at its inception taken in hand with some vigour by the President of the Court and by the leading Presidents of Chambers, particularly by Ahmed Pasha Zulfikar and Aziz Pasha Kahil, acting continually in concert with and under the advice of Judge Percival, acting in the place of the Vice-President, Mr. Halton, now absent on sick leave. In addition to endeavouring, in personal interviews with leading members of the Bar, to induce them to throw their influence on the side of moderation, by representing to them the breach of professional duty of which they were rendering themselves guilty, and the gravity of their action from a public point of view, these Judges took a firm line in Court, and insisted either on proceeding with the hearing of cases or on striking them out of the list. This example was not, however, followed by all members of the Court, some of whom may have felt hesitation in making the parties pay for the improper attitude of their counsel. The most important issue was as to the course to be taken in the Assize Courts before which are tried all cases punishable with more than three years' imprisonment. The Assize Courts hold monthly sessions in each of the eight principal towns in Egypt: each Bench is composed of three Judges of the Court of Appeal. Under the law governing the procedure in these Courts every prisoner must be defended by counsel. If the prisoner does not himself instruct an advocate, the Court assigns him counsel, and any advocate so designated and failing without proper excuse to appear is liable to a fine of £E. 50. The following Assize Courts have been sitting during the past week: those at Alexandria, Tantah, Cairo, Beni Souef, and Assiout. At Alexandria the Bar appears for some days to have fulfilled its duty in a normal manner; at Tantah the last day of the session coincided with the disturbance already reported to you, and the Court adjourned the remaining cases to the April list. At Cairo, the advocates applied for adjournments which the President, Ahmed Pasha Zulfikar, in some cases granted only from day to day. At Beni Souef on the 12th the effort made by one of the advocates retained before the Assize Court to perform his duty provoked a hostile popular demonstration.

Until the 15th instant hopes that the moderate party might finally prevail, at any rate to the extent of securing that arrangements were made for the representation of prisoners in assize cases, could still be reasonably entertained. On the morning of the 13th, Ibrahim Bey El Hilbawy, who appears to have played a considerable part in promoting the movement, gave a private undertaking to the President of the Cairo Assize Court that the Bar would assure the defence of prisoners of the next Court day (namely, Saturday, the 15th, Friday being a holiday). This engagement was kept on Saturday morning by an advocate appearing in the only case that was ready for trial. It seems, however, that at a meeting of the Bar held on Friday, Hilbawy Bey was strongly attacked by other members of the Bar for having shown so much moderation as to give the engagement in question.

The situation at the end of the morning of the 15th was that, in the opinion of the Ministry of Justice, there were no signs discernible of any adequate forces being in existence within the Bar itself capable of checking the strike movement, and I am informed that there is little doubt that on the 16th few or no cases will be argued in the Native Courts throughout Egypt, save where the parties themselves are present in person.

At the end of the morning of the 15th the Acting Judicial Adviser, after consultation with me, addressed a letter of remonstrance and warning to the

Bâtonnier of the Council of the Native Bar, pointing out that it was his duty to use his authority to check the strike movement, and that Government could not long postpone taking appropriate measures to ensure the regular administration of justice.

As I fear that there is little hope that this remonstrance will have any immediate effect, I have arranged to obtain the signature of the Commander-in-Chief to a Proclamation under martial law designed to provide a provisional remedy for the legal embarrassments created by the attitude of the Native Bar. It is intended to publish this Proclamation, unless the situation changes, in the course of the 16th. I enclose a copy of the draft, in the form in which it will be submitted for signature.

Your Lordship will observe that this Proclamation provides for the assistance of advocates being dispensed with in cases where the law at present requires their co-operation; that it authorises the Courts to appoint members of the parquet and other qualified persons—not necessarily advocates—to defend parties; and that it suspends for the time being the exclusive right of members of the Bar to represent litigants before the Courts.

Your Lordship will also observe that the proposed Proclamation applies only to the Native Courts. I am informed that native advocates practising before the Mixed Courts are following the same line of conduct as the Native Bar; and that the European members of the Mixed Bar, while not joining in the movement, have decided not to seek to take advantage of the withdrawal of their native colleagues to press for immediate judgment.

In view of the special status of the Mixed Courts, the fact that they deal with little criminal business of importance, and the considerable number of Europeans at the Mixed Court Bar, I have however thought it advisable in the circumstances to postpone taking action in reference to these Courts until representations are made to me by the Mixed Judges that the conduct of their business is being seriously hampered.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

No. 119.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 114.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 16, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 368 of the 10th March, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of translations, which I have received from the Palace, of Arabic petitions from various quarters addressed to the Sultan after the arrest and deportation of Saad Zaghlul and three of his colleagues.*

I have thought it unnecessary to forward to your Lordship the lists of signatures.

The language of these petitions is, on the whole, moderate, but the intention of all of them is undoubtedly to press the Sultan to declare himself for the Nationalists against the Protectorate and insist on the departure of the delegation for Europe. They demand whether the acceptance of the resignations of Rushdy and Adly Pashas is the only solution that His Highness can find of the present crisis? They complain that British Imperialism is preventing the departure of the delegation, and thus preventing the Egyptians from being heard at the Peace Conference. Why, they ask, should a hearing be refused to the Egyptian nation when deputations from all the small nations of the world are being allowed to proceed to Paris to make their aspirations heard?

The similarity of the language used in these petitions, as in the more important ones from the Egyptian delegation itself to the Sultan, tends to show that they have been compiled at the Nationalist headquarters in Cairo. The collection of signatures appears to have been a well-organised affair, but some doubt exists as to the genuineness of some of them.

The petitions from the provinces of Dakalia, Gharbia, and Minia may be dismissed without serious comment. Many prominent names are absent, and there is no reason to believe that they represent in any way the views of the notables in general.

Of the fifty-eight signatories of the petition from the merchants of Cairo only twelve can be considered as more or less well-to-do and to any extent representative. Abd el-Khalek Madkour, who heads the list, is a well-known native merchant, and it

* Not printed. The petitions make use of the usual arguments employed by the Nationalists.

will be remembered that his name appeared in the last petition from the delegation to the Sultan, which I enclosed in my despatch No. 111 of the 12th March. There is reason to believe that much of the printed matter, &c., connected with Nationalist propaganda issued from his premises.

A more interesting petition is that from the doctors of Cairo. Many are employés of the Public Health Department, and the majority are of undoubted respectability. It is in this petition that one most doubts the genuineness of the signatures. If they are genuine, it would be interesting to know whether the signatories were aware of what they were subscribing to. Many may only have signed as the result of outside pressure, but the list is evidence of widespread sympathy with the Nationalist agitation.

The petitions from the members of the native Bar and the employés of the Ministry of Justice are of considerably more importance. As in the other petitions we have no information as to the manner in which signatures were obtained. The British judicial authorities think it unlikely that many advocates would have the independence to refuse to sign a petition of a Nationalist tendency if pressed to do so. On the other hand, of the total of approximately 600 advocates who figure on the list of active practitioners at the native Bar only 110 have signed the petition. The signatories are not confined to advocates practising in Cairo. There are prominent names from Alexandria, Tanta, Beni Suef, and Assiut. There are several Copts, some of considerable position. Also some Syrians. Though a large number of the signatories are young and obscure men, there are a few well-known ones. The names are also noticed of seven present and five past members of the Council of the Bar; and the fact that nine of these names appear in the first thirty-one names in the petition points to the petition having been got up in the circles of the Bar Council. Comparing the names of the members of the council who have not signed with those who have, it would seem that the latter represent the rather less actively political element.

The petition from the employés of the Ministry of Justice contains ninety-eight signatures. In fact those of all the native employés in the Ministry below the Under-Secretary. The director of Meglis Hasby, the director of Mehkemeh Sharaias, the director of the native Courts, all men of exceptional ability, have signed. William Makram Ebed, a Copt, an Oxford graduate and private secretary to the adviser, has also signed. It is felt that some, if not the majority, of the signatories of this petition would prefer not to involve themselves in any way in politics, but have been carried away by the current of popular feeling.

I have, &c

MILNE CHEETHAM.

No. 120.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 397.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 29, 1919.

THE following is an extract from reply to Colonel Wedgwood in the House of Commons, on the 18th March:—

"His Highness has appealed to the Acting High Commissioner for protection from further insults and intimidations, and authority was given for the arrest and deportation to Malta of Saad Pasha Zaghlul and three other Nationalist leaders who have played the most conspicuous part in the present agitation."

No. 121.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon — (Received March 29.)

(No. 423.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 23, 1919

FOLLOWING is a report on situation in Soudan sent by Acting Governor-General at my request:—

"There does not seem any reason for apprehension at the present moment, but if the seriousness of the situation in Egypt continues, and communication is interrupted for any length of time, an atmosphere of unrest is bound to be created. This, coming at season of year when the people have little to occupy them, might, coupled with high

price of dura, due to shortage of crop this year, and now almost all certainty of lack of commodities, especially sugar, be exploited by disaffected Egyptian elements, and lead to outbreaks of violence in shape of looting by lower orders in towns, which would afford above-mentioned elements opportunity for embarrassing Government by failing to provide the assistance which would normally be expected from them.

"In the circumstances, consider following precautions should be taken at once:—

"1. Regular direct steamer communication should be instituted between Suez and Port Soudan, in order to carry mails and evacuate those awaiting passages to Europe, particularly women and children.

"2. Despatch of one British battalion, not less than 600 strong, to reinforce British garrison, which is now at a minimum, and has been further depleted by despatch of 100 men to Assouan, whom it may be necessary to [?reinforce] and to occupy vulnerable points on Soudanese Railway, which, with present garrison, have not sufficient men to do." (End of R.)

Admiral has offered for General Allenby guardship for Port Soudan, which he has accepted.

No. 122.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 31.)

(No. 462. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 30, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 397 of 29th March.

Statement in House of Commons regarding action of Sultan conveys a false impression. Sultan showed Sir M. Cheetham the petition of extremists, which was obviously intended to intimidate His Highness, and Sir M. Cheetham recommended immediate steps to prevent further insults of same kind.

It is desirable it should be made clear that His Majesty's Government, on advice of their representatives, was solely responsible for action taken, which was necessary in view of fact that attitude had become one of deliberate intimidation.

No. 123.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 31.)

(No. 465. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 31, 1919.

MY telegram No. 443 of 26th March.

In reply to my address to notables, stating my readiness to accept co-operation from Egyptians, I received yesterday long memorandum,* signed by extremist deputation, describing agitation as due to general feeling that Egyptian views have not been allowed expression. Tone of this document is on the whole moderate. I have not been approached by any other body or individual.

To-day I sent for ex-Ministers, and said that, in view of the fact that deputation had written to me, I proposed to see them. I asked Ministers for their views. Led by Rushdy and Adly Pashas, they asked me to remove restrictions on departure of would-be travellers from Egypt without exception.

This concession, without conferring any official recognition generally from me, would automatically restore tranquillity, and guarantee formation of a Ministry.

Fruitful discussion with His Majesty's Government would then be possible.

Rushdy reiterated his acceptance of protectorate.

Order has now been outwardly re-established in provinces, although a general strike in Cairo is threatened, but will be probably of short duration.

I propose with your concurrence to issue passports to any respectable Egyptians who may wish to visit Europe, without reference to colour of their requirements, as is

* See No.

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done in Palestine and Syria. This will put Egyptians on an equality with other nations as regards liberty of movement.

I have shown I can repress agitation, and action which I propose to take will have good effect.

Please express approval.

(Sent to Mr. Balfour, Paris, No. 465.)

No. 124.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 400. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 31, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 462.

Statement in question was based on passage in Sir M. Cheetham's telegram No. 348, "Sultan is shaken by terms of petition . . . and His Highness has earnestly appealed to me for protection from further insults." Sir M. Cheetham, after consulting his principal advisers, recommended immediate arrest and deportation of Saad Pasha Zaghlul for the sake of the Sultan's prestige, and was authorised to act accordingly.

I do not think that any false impression was created here, but you may take such local action as you consider desirable to make it clear that His Majesty's Government accept sole responsibility for measures adopted.

No. 125.

Earl Curzon to British Delegation, Paris.

(No. 403. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 30, 1919.

GENERAL ALLENBY'S telegram No. 449 of 20th March, repeated to you.

It would undoubtedly have valuable political effect in Egypt if our protectorate could obtain general recognition, and especially that of United States Government, and if a declaration to this effect could be issued.

I understand that provision for recognition is being included in preliminary terms of peace. Would it be possible to issue some pronouncement on the subject immediately, or at as early a date as possible?

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 398.)

No. 126.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 1.)

31, Great Cumberland Place,

London, March 26, 1919.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my private letter to Lord Hardinge, dated Cairo, 27th December, 1918 (which I understand has now been made an official document), forwarding a private letter and note from Major-General Sir Lee Stack, Acting Sirdar and Governor-General of the Soudan, dealing with the effect on the Soudan of the Egyptian Nationalist agitation in Egypt, I have now the honour to enclose a further note, dated Khartoum, 23rd February, 1919, on the growth of national aspirations in the Soudan, which is specially interesting at the present juncture.

There is to my mind no doubt that we are face to face with the early beginnings of a Soudanese nation, and it is our business to decide in good time what we are to do with it. I do not speak in any alarmist sense, nor threaten the creation in the next few years of a "Soudan for the Soudanese" party of Europeanised natives. I mean rather that we have got to recognise that decent government is producing what it ought to produce—a sense of national self-respect—and it is our duty to decide how to turn it to the best account.

That it should display itself primarily in a desire to have done with Egyptian control is, I think, inevitable, and what Sir Lee Stack suggests in his note is that we ought to prepare for this now by taking steps in the direction of identifying the Soudan more closely with Great Britain than with Egypt. He does not suggest the practical measures at present—there are certain definite difficulties, finance, irrigation, military

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policy, the overcoming of which will have to be thought out—but he is anxious to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government as to the policy they would recommend.

In my private letter to Lord Hardinge of the 27th December, 1918, I gave a general indication of my views based on a prolonged residence in the Soudan, when I was responsible for the government of that country for upwards of seventeen years. I entirely concur in the further conclusions drawn by Sir Lee Stack in his note of the 23rd February, 1919, and consider that both Egypt and the Soudan—as well as the British Empire—will gain by a loosening of the tie which now binds the two countries together.

I have, &c.

REGINALD WINGATE.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Note on the Growth of National Aspirations in the Soudan.

TWO months ago a note was submitted dealing with the effect of the Nationalist movement in Egypt on the natives of the Soudan. The note pointed out that the attitude of Egyptian exponents of Nationalism towards the British occupation had suggested to the people of the Soudan the possibility that the British might withdraw from the Soudan and leave Egypt in sole control. It was shown that this possibility was viewed by the Soudanese with concern, and that some of the more enlightened were contemplating circulating an appeal to obtain signatures to a request for the removal of the Egyptian element from the administration of the Soudan.

Latterly there has been a rather interesting development of this feeling among those who speak for the more intelligent section of the native population.

Three of the principal religious leaders, Sayed Sir Ali Morghani, K.C.M.G., El Sherif Yusef el Hindi, M.B.E., and Sayed Abderrahman Mohammed Ahmed (El Mahdi), have expressed in the course of informal conversations a keen desire that the Government should take a stronger line than is taken at present to emphasise the fact that the Sudan is under the British Empire and that its future is identified with British control. Sayed Sir Ali Morghani in particular spoke of his ambition to see the people of the Soudan grow up under the guidance of great Britain a united people with their own laws, customs, and administration, capable of both governing and fighting for themselves. They all three admit that the bulk of the people are not yet conscious of any national ambition of this kind, but they are convinced that the idea is latent, and that it only requires education to bring it out. For this purpose they have asked to be allowed to institute among their followers a kind of propaganda which will endeavour to foster loyalty and co-operation with the British Imperial idea, with the ultimate object of cultivating a spirit of national unity among the Soudanese. The natural accompaniment of their aspirations is a desire which has been frankly expressed and evidently is strongly felt to eliminate as soon as possible from the Government the Egyptian element, both administrative and clerical. It is urged that the people dislike and mistrust the Egyptians who are given authority over them, and cannot see any advantage in being governed by them. At the same time, those who are putting forward this argument feel that the Government is itself hampered by Egyptian Departmental control, which naturally tends to consider Egyptian before Soudanese interests.

It would perhaps be unwise to take the opinions of these religious leaders as a complete and exhaustive representation of native opinion. They are naturally anxious to increase their own influence in the country, they fully appreciate the power of Great Britain as exhibited in the victorious conclusion of the war, and see that their best hope lies in identifying themselves with British domination. On the other hand, they are genuinely attached to our rule, and their ambition for the welfare of their people is to a large extent sincere. It may be concluded without much doubt that their arguments are based on facts, and that their coming forward at this time is evidence of an honest desire to contribute something from the side of the governed which will assist us in setting the right course for the development of their country.

It seems important to note that there is apparently no trace of Pan-Islamic sympathy in the line of argument adopted. This is the more interesting because the outstanding result of the war in the near neighbourhood of the Soudan has been the establishment of an Arab kingdom just across the Red Sea. This kingdom, though not

at present claiming the Khaliphate, actually holds the Holy Places of Islam, and would seem to be the one of all possible institutions likely to become a focus for Moslem enthusiasm, and to afford a rallying point for those who believe in an independent political future for the Arab peoples. Yet the movement has aroused in the Soudan nothing but a friendly interest, in spite of distinct efforts on the part of King Hussein himself to court the sympathy of Arabs over here.

At the same time, the independent kingdom of the Hedjaz is as yet only in its infancy, and should it appeal to Moslem political intriguers as a likely foundation for a Pan-Islamic movement, a conviction among the Soudanese that their aspirations were being best realised through our help, would be the strongest safeguard against any propaganda hostile to British interests.

As a policy for the future these proposals have two main aspects—separation from Egyptian control and the education of a national idea among Soudanese.

As regards the first of these there are several practical objections to making too much haste. In the first place, there is not yet a large enough number of educated persons in the country to take the place of the Egyptians now holding posts in the Administration. The Egyptians are too useful to be dispensed with hastily, even though they are not altogether liked by the people they have to govern. In the second place, the military needs of the country will have to be supplied without the use of Egyptian troops. The leaders mentioned above are reassuring as to the willingness of the people to undertake military service, but the experiment on a sufficient scale has yet to be tried. In the third place, there is the question of finance, which is the most difficult of all. The revenues of the Soudan are adequate to the present civil needs of the country, but we could not yet pay for a sufficient military force without help from outside. It would be unwise, even if it were possible, to put on the Soudan the burden of taxation that the maintenance of an adequate military force would involve.

Further, the question of the relations between Egypt and the Soudan is not a simple one. In any settlement of Soudan affairs there are large Egyptian interests to be considered. The question of the use of the Nile cannot be decided without reference to the needs of Egypt, which depends for its existence on its irrigation. The reconquest of the Soudan was originally undertaken to safeguard the frontier of Egypt. Its ultimate development cannot be determined in a way that would involve a breach of our promise to protect Egypt.

Nevertheless, the suggestion is put forward that it is time to face the problem of readjusting the relations between the Soudan and Egypt on lines whereby Great Britain will gradually take over the part in the Government of the Soudan now played by the Egyptian Government. The movement that has been described appears to afford an opportunity as well as a sound reason for attempting to get rid of much that is unsatisfactory in the present administration.

With regard to direct steps towards a national policy for the Soudan, it is hardly desirable to permit active propaganda to this end. In the first place, it would be out of keeping with the spirit of our administration and unfair to the Egyptians, who would be sure to attribute our action to a desire to intrigue against them and undermine their influence. If the sense of nationality is to grow, it will do so naturally, and to cultivate it by means of propaganda would be a false move. In the second place, it has always been our policy to gradually associate the Soudanese in the Government, and to train them to govern themselves. This policy has been marked at various stages of the administration. The establishment of the Gordon College at Khartoum by Lord Kitchener was the initial step, of which the first practical outcome is that nearly all the administration of Mohammedan law in the country is in the hands of native Soudanese "kadis" trained in the college. The college has turned out also a considerable number of recruits to the junior clerical and technical staff of the Government, while the workshops of the railways, steamers, and public works departments, both civil and military, provide an effective training ground for many Soudanese who have not had the opportunity of working in the college. The second most important step was the institution of the military school, in which sons of natives of the Soudan are trained to become officers in the black and Arab battalions of the Egyptian army. A school has lately been formed in which natives will be trained to administrative work in the posts now held for the most part by Egyptian officers. It is also proposed to make use of the sheikhs and chiefs of tribes as an element in the civil and criminal judiciary. A scheme has been formulated to that effect, and will shortly be in operation. It is intended further to establish as a memorial to Lord Kitchener, a school of medicine, which will enable the country to provide its own subordinate medical service, and not rely as at present (apart from British doctors) mainly on Syrian and Egyptian officers.

It has been pointed out to Sayed Sir Ali Morghani and his associates that steps such as these are practical evidence of the Government's sympathy, and are the soundest methods of attaining the objects at which they aim. They have been told that we intend to develop on these lines as rapidly as circumstances allow. At the same time, the establishment of a definitely British ascendancy in the country would undoubtedly give the people a sense of confidence and security. The danger is no doubt small that disappointment with their present somewhat vague political status may drive them into the arms of a pan-Arab or pan-Islamic movement. Yet it exists, and, in a country where religious fanaticism is always just below the surface, cannot be neglected.

LEE STACK, Major-General,
Acting Sirdar and Governor-General of the Soudan.

Khartoum, February 23, 1919.

No. 127.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 457.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 29, 1919.

SITUATION to day.

All quiet in Egypt, with the exception of sporadic disturbances in Dakahlia Province.

No. 128.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 478. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 1, 1919.

CAIRO and Alexandria quiet. Construction train attacked near Mazghouna on 30th March, with some casualties on both sides, but all now quiet. Calm in other districts. Twelve columns operating in Upper and Lower Egypt. Threat of general strike to-morrow, but situation well in hand.

No. 129.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 120.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 2, 1919.

ON receipt of Sir R. Wingate's despatch No. 331* of the 16th December, a copy was communicated to Sir W. Garstin with a covering letter in which I expressed my regret that in view of the difficulties which there appeared to be in the way of the establishment of a Central Tribunal in the Canal zone, I did not feel able to press the Egyptian Government to reconsider their attitude in the matter.

Since then the Board of the Suez Canal Company, and especially the British official Directors thereon, have expressed unofficially their great disappointment with this decision, and have enquired whether it would not be possible to meet their wishes.

I am well aware that the Egyptian Government are anxious to avoid the creation of tribunals in localities which can be served by tribunals existing at other centres, but I think that in the case of Port Said there are other considerations which must be taken into account.

I can understand that the Suez Canal Company may feel, and with some reason, that in view of the rather exceptional position which they occupy a special treatment should be accorded to them. It must, from their point of view, involve some loss of prestige if they are affiliated to neighbouring Mudirias.

I am influenced too by the fact that we are under considerable obligations to the Company, and we owe to their initiative much of the improvement that has been

* No. 12.

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effected in the towns in the Canal zone; further they have, during the war, waived dues amounting to 25,000,000 fr. for military transports.

For these reasons I am of opinion that it would be desirable to make the concession for which the Company have asked, and I should be glad if you would explain the situation to the Capitulations Commission.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 130.

Earl Curzon to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 91.)
Sir;

Foreign Office, April 2, 1919.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 78* of the 18th February relative to the proposal of the Spanish Government that the reciprocal recognition of the Protectorates in Egypt and in the Spanish zone of Morocco should now be effected by the two Governments concerned, I have to inform your Excellency that, after consultation with Mr. Balfour, I am of the opinion that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government at the present moment to consider the question of recognising the Spanish Protectorate.

It appears to me patent that the Spanish Government have raised the question now with the hope of strengthening their position *vis-à-vis* the French in Morocco, and to comply with their suggestion would probably cause offence to the French Government. Until, therefore, the present policy of France in regard to Morocco is made more clear, and until His Majesty's Government have definitely decided upon the attitude to be adopted by them towards such proposals as the French Government may put forward, the question of recognition must remain in abeyance.

In these circumstances your Excellency should refrain from returning any answer to the proposal put forward by Señor Perez Caballero.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 131.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 621. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 2, 1919.

GENERAL ALLENBY'S telegram No. 465.

Prime Minister and I are of opinion that as Allenby was appointed Special High Commissioner of Egypt to deal with situation there, his advice cannot be disregarded. We feel therefore bound to support proposals he makes for re-establishment of tranquillity, and consider recommendations contained in his telegram should be approved.

While we agree with you that it is desirable he should be aware of your suggestion for a Commission, we think that it would be better that this should be put forward tentatively in a separate telegram and as a measure of help towards a final settlement of political difficulty. We consider that it should be treated as entirely distinct from passport question.

It is important to avoid any appearance of mistrusting his present policy. Ultimately it may prove desirable to adopt both plans.

I do not consider Allenby's policy is in essence inconsistent with suggestions contained in my telegram No. 518, and we must remember that, while he has full knowledge of our views, we are not fully seized of present local conditions.

* See No. 53.

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No. 132.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 414.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 3, 1919.

MESSRS. VICKERS propose to institute a flying-boat service on the River Nile between Cairo and Kisumu.

Please report by telegraph to what extent Egyptian Government desire to control civil aviation, and whether they are prepared to grant a concession to Messrs. Vickers.

No. 133.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 487. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 3, 1919

MY telegram No. 474.*

Following received from Acting Governor-General, Soudan:—

"I have delayed reporting until I could gauge result of publication of your statement to Egyptian Notables and their appeal to Egyptian nation. Effect has been excellent. Some wild and hasty talk, which had been previously rife amongst younger Egyptian elements, has subsided, and the few attempts made to stir up native feeling against us have been complete failures. Situation may be regarded as normal."

No. 134.

Note from Sir R. Wingate to Foreign Office.

WITH reference to Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 621, Very Urgent, to the Foreign Office, received at 9 A.M. this morning, I beg, most respectfully, but at the same time most strongly, to differ from the advice tendered by General Allenby in his telegram No. 465,† Very Urgent, dated Cairo, the 31st March.

It is quite possible that General Allenby may be under the impression that the course he recommends, after only a week's association with the tangled political situation in Egypt, may be consonant with that recommended by myself from the beginning of the crisis in November up till the date I left Egypt (21st January, 1919), but in point of fact this is not so.

My final recommendations are contained in my telegram No. 89 to Lord Curzon, dated the 16th January, and they were reiterated in the draft telegram which I submitted to the Foreign Office, and which the latter referred to Paris about the 20th February, and in which I pointed out the anxiety of the Egyptian Ministers that the extremist party should not be prevented from leaving Egypt; that the extravagant opinions held by this party precludes any possibility of its members being received officially at the Foreign Office, or being regarded as an Egyptian delegation, but I suggested the Acting High Commissioner should be allowed to exercise his discretion in granting permits to leave Egypt to such Egyptian politicians as may apply as private individuals for them.

His Majesty's Government, however, adhered to the view they had formerly expressed, with the result that the resignations of the Ministers were accepted, and the embargo against the departure from Egypt of the Nationalists was maintained.

This led to the intimidation of the Sultan by the Nationalists, and he appealed to the Acting High Commissioner for protection.

Prospective Ministers were also intimidated from accepting office. In consequence, the Acting High Commissioner asked for the deportation of four Nationalist leaders to Malta, which His Majesty's Government approved.

Thereupon disorders broke out in various parts of the country, and it was necessary to take strong military measures.

* Not printed. States that situation is much better.

† No. 123.

General Allenby, who had just arrived in Paris, was sent back at once to Egypt as Special High Commissioner with full military and civil powers. He arrived in Cairo about a week ago, and at once announced his intention of taking strong repressive measures, adding, he would do his duty, and he called on the Egyptians to see they did theirs.

On the 31st March he saw the Ministers who had resigned, and who urged him to remove restrictions on would-be travellers from Egypt *without exception*. General Allenby then recommended that, with Foreign Office concurrence, he should issue passports to every respectable Egyptian who may wish to visit Europe without reference to the colour of their requirements, as is done in Palestine and Syria. I may here, incidentally, point out that the political situation in Palestine and Syria is entirely different from that of a British-protected Egypt.

On receipt of General Allenby's recommendations, they were referred by Lord Curzon to Paris, with a note pointing out the danger of accepting these suggestions, and recommending the despatch of a commission to Egypt, under the presidency of Lord Milner.

I strongly dissented from General Allenby's proposals for the reasons which I had already given at some length in my notes to the Foreign Office, dated the 21st March.

In these notes I pointed out that the psychological moment, when permission to the Nationalists to leave Egypt might have been efficacious, had passed, and I urged the issue of a proclamation that the only methods by which the agitators could gain a hearing was by at once returning to law and order, that they had been guilty of the grossest breaches of the law, for which they must take the consequences. But I suggested that the severity of such a proclamation might be tempered by a promise that when the authorities had been fully convinced that law and order had been restored, that the agitators were repentant and had given an assurance (in writing) that they would never again transgress the law by such methods, His Majesty's Government would favourably consider the despatch of a Commission to consider on the spot the question of the nature of the Protectorate and kindred questions respecting the future government of Egypt.

In any circumstances, I pointed out that a strong garrison would be required, but that under no circumstances should there be any idea of giving way to the agitators after they had been guilty of such gross breaches of the law.

To this view I entirely adhere, and I must offer it as my very carefully-considered opinion, and after a long experience of administration in Egypt and the Sudan, that to give way *immediately*, as is now suggested, would be fraught with the gravest dangers, not only to the maintenance of our position in Egypt, but to the whole of our North African possessions.

The Nationalists will say, and with justice, that by agitation and intimidation they have forced the hands of His Majesty's Government, and I do not think it is going too far to say that we shall have practically abandoned the position in Egypt which we have acquired after years of patient toil and labour.

For the moment peace and order can doubtless be restored by the suggested methods, and the agitators will not fail to give instructions in this sense to their partisans, but our real power and authority will have practically gone and we shall be at the mercy of agitators at any time they care to repeat the methods by which they will say they have obtained their ends in the present crisis.

I am confident that anyone who has had prolonged experience of ruling Orientals, and especially Egyptians, will concur in my views, and I feel it incumbent on me to express, in the strongest terms, my dissent from the proposed acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in these proposals.

Apart from their deleterious effect in Egypt, where we have innumerable well-wishers who are in complete disagreement with the extremists' aspirations, and whom we shall now alienate, the effect on the Sudan may be most serious, but I shall refer to this important aspect of the question in another note.

R. W.

April 3, 1919.

No. 135.

Sir R. Wingate to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

My Lord,

London, April 3, 1919.

REFERRING to my note of to-day's date dealing with Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 621, very urgent, received at the Foreign Office this morning from Paris, I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's consideration, my views on the effect on the peoples of the Sudan, of the adoption of the recommendations contained in telegram No. 465, very urgent, dated Cairo, the 31st March.

In this connection I have the honour respectfully to call the attention of your Lordship to a private letter I wrote to Lord Hardinge, dated Cairo, the 27th December, 1918, covering a personal letter to me from Sir Lee Stack (acting Sirdar and Governor-General of the Soudan) and a note dated Khartoum, the 22nd December, 1918.

I have also to call attention to an official letter from myself to your Lordship, dated London, the 26th March, covering a further note from Sir Lee Stack, dated Khartoum, the 23rd February, dealing with the growth of national aspirations in the Soudan.

All these letters have an important bearing on the present political situation in Egypt, and I venture to submit that its development, in the sense foreshadowed in my note to the Foreign Office of to-day's date will have an immediate repercussion in the Soudan, where, in spite of the recent disturbances in Egypt, a spirit of loyalty to Great Britain at present prevails, and it has been found possible to send troops from the Soudan as far as Luxor, whilst residents and others from Upper Egypt have found a safe refuge at Wadi Halfa.

It has, however, been pointed out by Sir Lee Stack in recent telegrams (see Sirdar's telegram No. 79A, military, of 21st March, and Egypt political telegram No. 423 of the 23rd March) that the continuance of this satisfactory state of affairs cannot be entirely depended upon unless order in Egypt is quickly restored.

From my own experience of seventeen years as Sirdar and Governor-General of the Soudan, and my intimate knowledge of the political conditions obtaining in that country, I would supplement Sir Lee Stack's remarks by my own view, that, unless the present Egyptian situation is treated in such a way as to demonstrate the paramount authority of Great Britain in Egypt, and unless the Nationalist agitation (which is responsible for the present disturbances) is dealt with in the manner indicated in my notes of to-day and of the 21st March, a situation of great gravity may also arise in the Soudan.

I will now endeavour to describe, in the briefest possible manner, the main points of the situation in the Soudan.

This country (inclusive of Darfur) comprises a territory of considerably over 1,000,000 square miles. Previous to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the Soudan was ruled, with the most oppressive tyranny, by a host of venal Egyptian and Turkish officials, supported by an army of between 40,000 and 50,000 Bashi Bazuks.

Led by the Mahdi the peoples of the Soudan revolted against their tyrannical masters, overthrew the Government, and finally took possession of the whole country.

After the capture of Khartoum by the Mahdists, and the death of Gordon, the revolution, begun in 1883, rapidly degenerated into a form of fanatical tyranny, which destroyed almost every vestige of civilisation, and was only terminated by the reconquest of the country by British and Egyptian troops in 1898, and the final defeat and death of the Khalifa a year later.

The Anglo-Egyptian Soudan Agreement of January 1899 laid down the constitution of the reconquered country, which henceforth became an Anglo-Egyptian possession over which the British and Egyptian flags are flown side by side. An administration was established whereby the obnoxious capitulations were abolished, the principal military and civil posts were held by British officers and officials, and the subordinate positions by Egyptians.

Supreme authority was vested in the British Governor-General, who was at the same time the Sirdar or Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, which was mainly responsible for the maintenance of law and order. A police force, largely recruited from the natives of the country, was gradually organised and forms a very valuable adjunct to the army.

It was, however, soon apparent that the racial antagonism between the Soudanese and the Egyptians (generally called "Turks" by the local inhabitants) was far too

deep-seated to be easily eradicated, and it became clear that the gradual introduction of a policy of the "Soudan for the Soudanese" was that best suited to the condition of the country. This policy was facilitated by the growth of the Gordon College and the Military School in Khartoum, in which institutions Soudanese and Arabs were trained for subordinate positions in the Government and as officers of the army. Almost imperceptibly the personnel of the army was changed—Soudanese and Arabs gradually taking the place of the purely Egyptian elements. The transformation requires very delicate handling in order to avoid raising fears amongst the Egyptians, for these hold tenaciously to the idea that the Soudan is theirs, whilst the Soudanese consider that wherever Egyptians are in control there is misgovernment, and that their mainstay is the British rule, the benefits of which they have learnt to appreciate.

I have thus briefly summarised the recent history and present situation of the Soudan as it affords the true reason for the loyalty of its inhabitants to the British cause during the war, and although from time to time, during the last eventful four and a half years, attempts by means of Turco-German propaganda and by Egyptian Nationalists have been made to suborn the loyalty of the Soudanese in the army, in the administration, and amongst the inhabitants generally, the antipathy of the Soudanese to the return in any form of Egyptian domination has caused all such efforts so far to be abortive.

From the date of the Anglo-Egyptian reoccupation of the Soudan the highest British authorities—from Lord Cromer downwards—have never failed to impress upon the Soudanese that they will never again be governed from Cairo—in other words, that whatever political changes might take place in Egypt whereby Nationalism or any other form of Government might become predominant, the Soudanese could safely trust to the British partners in the condominium to prevent any return to the state of affairs which brought about the original Mahdi revolt.

The Soudanese peoples have implicitly trusted the British pledge, which has been the keystone of our position in this great country.

The Soudan has an undoubted future in many aspects, of which not the least important is its value as a great cotton growing district, and already the British Government has guaranteed a loan of several millions of pounds for the early development of this cultivation.

One of the main planks of the platform of the Egyptian Nationalist programme is the re-establishment of Egyptian rule over the Soudan, now—in their point of view—usurped by their British partners. It is the possibility of such contingencies arising—leading on the one hand to unrest in the country and on the other to the growth of national aspirations amongst the Soudanese—to which Sir Lee Stack refers in his second note.

It is for this reason that I have thought it necessary—in view of the developments in the Egyptian situation during the last few days—to urge upon His Majesty's Government the vital importance of maintaining the *status quo* in the Soudan which (together with the adjacent counties of Abyssinia, Eritrea, Uganda, East Africa, and the French and Belgian Congos) may be seriously affected if the Egyptian extremists gain their ends.

I would also venture to express an earnest hope that—in this eventuality—the Governor-General may be authorised to re-affirm the intention of His Majesty's Government to take over an ever-increasing share in the government of the country. I would even go as far as to suggest that, in adopting such a policy, His Majesty's Government may find the present a suitable moment to definitely take over the Soudan, thus eliminating the intensely unpopular Egyptian element and inflicting on the Egyptian Nationalists who have sought to gain their ends by lawlessness, pillage and murder, the well-deserved punishment of losing a country which their misgovernment had forfeited many years ago and which could never have been regained without British aid, which has made the Soudan what it is to-day—a land with a great future and strategically and materially a most valuable asset to the British Empire.

I have, &c.

REGINALD WINGATE.

No. 136.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 417.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 4, 1919.

SIR M. CHEETHAM'S despatches Nos. 60 and 67* of 6th and 9th February: English language in Courts.

I concur in views expressed in your first-mentioned despatch, and agree that French should continue as an official judicial language as long as there is a genuine demand for its use. I, therefore, do not propose to press for anything in the nature of a time-limit for the admissibility of French in the Courts.

On the other hand, any attempt to exclude English from use in the Mixed Courts must be guarded against. The incident referred to in your despatch No. 60 appears to indicate that tendencies of this sort exist.

It must be clearly understood that as English is an official language in the Courts, such facilities for hearing cases in that language must be provided as will ensure that a practitioner or litigant who prefers to use English will not be prejudiced.

No. 137.

Parliamentary Commercial Committee to Foreign Office.—(Received April 5.)

Sir,

House of Commons, April 3, 1919.

AT a largely attended meeting of the Parliamentary Committee held in the House of Commons on the 2nd April the following recommendations were passed, and I was desired to submit them to you:—

- " 1. That the meetings of the Capitulations Commission in Egypt be conducted in the English language, that all minutes be kept in this language, and that all minutes of meetings hitherto held be translated into English.
- " 2. That all minutes of meetings, whether past, present or future, be accessible to the British Chamber of Commerce in Egypt and to Chambers of Commerce in England.
- " 3. That Mr. Justice Grain be made a member of the Commission.
- " 4. That an appeal lie from the new Courts in Egypt to the Privy Council, and that English be the language of the new Courts.
- " 5. That English law and procedure with necessary modifications should be adopted as the model in framing the procedure of the new Court it is intended to establish."

I have, &c.

A. POWNALL, *Hon. Sec.*

No. 138.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 473.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 1, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 400.

I have issued communiqué stating that His Majesty's Government accept full responsibility for action of military authorities in deporting Zaghlul and his colleagues. I have done this in agreement with Sultan.

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No. 139.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 484.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 2, 1919.

A LETTER from Ismail Sidky Pasha to his brother in Cairo shows that Zaghlul and three other Egyptians, deported to Malta, are interned in prisoners of war camp at Polverista.

This is having bad effect here.

Please arrange with Colonial Office that agitators should be treated as political prisoners, and not as prisoners of war.

No. 140.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 486. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 2, 1919.

SITUATION to-day.

Cadets of the Military School marched out early this morning leaving their rifles and equipment behind them. They were joined later by a throng of cadets from Police School.

They demonstrated this afternoon in front of Sultan's palace.

Partial strike of Government officials began to-day, and is expected to be more general to-morrow.

Sixty men from a detachment of Egyptian army troops, under orders for Wasta, broke barracks and went into the town, taking with them their arms and ammunition.

All have now returned except ten. It is hoped that whole detachment will leave for Wasta to-morrow. I think senior Egyptian officers addressed them with good effect. Provinces are generally quiet. Casualties in incidents at Mazghoun, reported yesterday, are believed seven soldiers killed, seventeen natives killed and twelve wounded.

No. 141.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 490.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 3, 1919.

SITUATION to-day.

A demonstration and riot took place to-day in Abdin Square and was dispersed by troops. One British civilian official was killed. There were some casualties among demonstrators. Strike continues and native feeling in Cairo to-day is still unsettled.

Cadets of the Military School demonstrated this morning in front of American Agency, cheering for America. Some were arrested, but have since been released on guarantee.

Egyptian army detachment, mentioned in my telegram of yesterday, left for Wasta this morning complete, all absentees having returned. In provinces all is quiet.

No. 142.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 411. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 3, 1919.

SIR M. CHEETHAM'S telegram No. 410* of 19th March.

Please telegraph at once full details of murder of British officers. Only information here is report by "Times" Cairo correspondent, dated 23rd March, which states nine officers murdered. Has their identity been established?

* See No. 93.

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No. 143.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 496. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 4, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 411.

Seven or probably eight British were murdered in the Assiut to Minia train 18th March, of whom following have been identified: Major Cecil Jarvis, M.C., 20th Deccan Horse, Indian Army, and Kaimakam Alexander Pope Beu, Inspector of Prisons Upper Egypt. One officer and four or five n.c.o.'s not yet positively identified.

Further telegram follows.

No. 144.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 497. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 4, 1919.

I HAVE had a meeting with Sultan this morning. I think that Egyptian army and police are at present to be trusted, but that daily they are being more influenced by press of Extremist opinion, which is becoming stronger and more violent.

Nationalist movement, which was at first purely political, is now taking a religious turn. Centre of religious disturbance is El-Azhar Mosque, where seditious and inflammatory speeches are made all day and night. Owing to sacred character of El-Azhar Mosque, which is revered throughout the Moslem world, its frequenters cannot be entirely restrained by force.

There is evidence that movement is influencing Palestine and Syria, besides Egypt, and danger is a very real one.

Sultan desires to do all he can to help me, and has promised to use his influence with Grand Mufti and Ulema to calm religious hotheads, but I fear without much result.

I have by force of arms suppressed most outward disorder in Egypt, but causes of unrest and ill-feeling are as strong as ever, and I can see no prospect of improvement under present conditions.

It is essential that a favourable reply be sent at once to recommendation in my telegram No. 465* of the 31st March.

That is the least concession that will suffice.

Sultan proposes to issue a manifesto, which action would, I think, improve situation temporarily, but unless some concessions are made by His Majesty's Government situation will again become bad, and this position will be compromised.

If I announce a favourable reply to suggestion for removal of embargo on travel in my telegram No. 465, it will be possible to form a Ministry. Immediately Ministry is formed His Majesty's Government should renew their invitation for a Delegation to visit London.

In addition to suggestion I have referred to, and which I consider essential, I would reiterate great importance of obtaining an early announcement that our Protectorate is recognised by Powers.

Every day's delay augments my difficulties and increases gravity of situation.

(Sent to Mr. Balfour, Paris, No. 497.)

* See No. 123.

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No. 145.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 499. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 4, 1919.

MY telegram No. 496.

Train left Luxor at 6 P.M. on 7th March. On board two officers and eight other ranks. At Nag Hamadi natives boarded train and insulted soldiers. Officers then took them into their first-class carriage. At Assiut three other ranks left train and Kaimakam Pope Bey, Inspector of Egyptian Prisons Department, joined it.

Train left at 4 A.M., 18th March. At every station on line large crowds had collected awaiting arrival of train, who called for "Ingleez," threw stones, and attempted to board train. Some stations were safely passed. At Deirout a very large crowd attacked train, drove driver from engine, and succeeded in entering first-class carriage, now solely occupied by British.

One or two were probably killed here. On train re-starting many Deirout natives stayed on board as far as the next station, Der Moes. Here they were reinforced by another large crowd, who, with stones, sticks and knives, killed all the remaining British, none of whom were armed. Bodies were replaced in train, except one, which has not yet been traced, and train proceeded. At succeeding stations large crowds were collected, evidently with same object, who raised shouts of triumph on hearing English had all been killed. On arrival at Minia, bodies were taken from train, enquiry made, and bodies buried.

Steps are now being taken to exhume them. It appears that attack on train must have been prearranged, and that Egyptian and railway authorities at various stations made no effort to prevent this massacre.

No. 146.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 504. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 4, 1919.

SITUATION in Cairo as regards actual disturbances.

Intimidation continues with a tendency to fanatical excitement, particularly against Armenians. El Azhar remains the centre of sedition. Telegraph employees have struck, but service is being maintained by military, as is also railway service. Sultan was well received by crowd on his way to prayers this morning. Casualties in yesterday's disturbances are now stated to be 10 rioters killed and 56 wounded.

Provinces are outwardly quiet.

No. 147.

Earl Curzon to General Allenby.

(No. 423.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1919.

CENSOR has passed telegram from Geneva correspondent to "Daily Express," London, saying that he learns from Egyptian nationalist source that Nationalist Committee, who worked at Berlin during war under Farid Bey, are now at Berne and Geneva. They are sending agents to spread disturbances in Egypt. German Bolsheviks have supplied them with gold, and intend to distribute pamphlets by aeroplane in Egypt from nearest Turkish territory.

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No. 148.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 427)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1919.

PRIME MINISTER sends following message to you:—

"We are fully prepared to accept your policy as outlined in your telegram No. 465,* and to give you every support in carrying it through. You are acquainted with all the circumstances of a very difficult situation, and you have our completest confidence.

"An alternative suggestion has been made here which, in case it has not occurred to you, I think it worth while to mention. Idea is to send Commission of highest importance, with Lord Milner at its head, to investigate existing conditions in Egypt, hear every force, and report on future form of our protectorate. Your rigorous policy of bringing order throughout the country under control, coupled with announcement of Commission, would (it is supposed) remove all ground for present restrictions. These might presently be relaxed without misgiving, for cause of order and good government would have been vindicated and nationalist sentiment would have received every legitimate satisfaction. Whether such policy as this be wise in existing circumstances we cannot fully judge. We must leave this matter to your discretion, but in any event and whatever your decision we shall give you our fullest support."

No. 149.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 510. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 5, 1919.

SITUATION in Cairo is quiet, but there is an undercurrent of hostility. There was a large meeting at Tulun Mosque this morning, consisting mainly of Government employees, who resolved to continue strike. There was some looting, which was quickly dealt with. Attitude of Egyptian army and police is still good, but the strain on their loyalty is increasing.

Reports received, dated yesterday, show signs of renewed uneasiness in provinces.

Soudan is quiet, but the Governor-General is apprehensive lest present uneasiness in Cairo, if it continues, may be reflected there.

(Repeated to Khartoum.)

No. 150.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 511. Very Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 6, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 427.

Outwardly quiet prevails, but extremist feeling is increasingly violent and dangerous.

have to-day seen Sultan, who is making proclamation, counselling quiet and obedience to law.

I shall issue to-morrow proclamation to following effect:—

"Now that order has been in great measure restored I declare, in agreement with His Highness the Sultan, that there are no restrictions on travel, and that Egyptians who wish to leave the country will be free to do so."

* See No. 123.

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Further, I have decided that Saad Pasha Zaghlul, Ismail Pasha Sidky, Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud, and Hamed Pasha El Bassal shall be released from internment and be given similar freedom of movement.

I have carefully considered alternative proposal of Commission under Lord Milner. Such a Commission will be desirable later, but would be useless now.

Sultan hopes then soon to form and to send deputation of Ministers to London in response to invitation in Lord Curzon's speech of the 24th March, probable despatch of Commission proposed by you would then be desirable.

I appreciate highly expression of Prime Minister's confidence and assurance of your support.

(Sent to Mr. Balfour, Paris, No. 511.)

No. 151.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 125.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 22, 1919.

I RECEIVED your telegram No. 309 of 7th March during the night, and on 8th March I requested Major-General Watson, General Officer Commanding Force in Egypt, to arrest with as little delay as possible for deportation and internment in Malta the following leaders of the Nationalist agitation :—

Saad Zaghlul Pasha.
Ismail Sidky Pasha.
Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha.
Hamad-el-Bassal Pasha.

These arrests were carried out without incident during the afternoon, and the prisoners passed the night in Kasr-el-Nil Barracks. They were taken in closed motor cars to the 11 o'clock train for Port Said next morning, the 9th March, and embarked on the "Caledonia," which sailed that evening.

The political crisis had now lasted for nearly four months. It had inevitably had an unsettling effect on the mind of the educated Cairo population, and created a general feeling of uneasiness. When definite action was at last taken, it was only to be expected that some form of unfriendly manifestations would take place. These, as was natural, took the form of demonstrations by the students, with whom Saad Zaghlul was popular. On Sunday morning the students of the higher colleges, law, agriculture, engineering, and commerce, made noisy demonstrations, entered the medical school, and forced the students to join them. I should report that during this incident Dr. Keatinge, Director of the School of Medicine and of Kasr-el-Aini Hospital, was knocked down, but received no injury. The police dispersed this demonstration with difficulty and made 310 arrests.

The nature of events of the 9th March showed that it might be necessary to call in military assistance for the police. The General Officer Commanding, therefore, made arrangements for troops to be available early in the morning of the 10th, who could be moved in motor lorries to the seat of disorder in case the city police required reinforcement. Trouble began early, and the mounted troop of the Cairo police were roughly handled in trying to stop the El Azhar students, who had now joined the other students, coming to the centre of the city. The commandant of police was obliged to call for help, and at 9 A.M. General Watson took over the town. Prompt measures were taken for the protection of the Residency, bridges over the Nile, and other important points. Pickets with machine guns and Lewis guns were posted at convenient corners. The students were joined by the town roughs, and a considerable amount of rioting, chiefly confined to breaking glass and uprooting trees in public gardens took place. The trams were smashed by the mob in the centre of the town and entirely ceased running in the course of the afternoon. The military were compelled to fire, and slight loss of life occurred. Rowdiness died down in the evening and the night was quiet.

Next morning, the 11th March, rioting commenced in several parts of Cairo. At an early hour the rioters—mostly El Azhar students and riff-raff—gathered in the central parts of the town and marched down towards the railway works with the intention of bringing out the railwaymen. They were met by troops in the station square, and after a few shots had been fired the mob dispersed with casualties. Twenty-one of the ring-leaders were arrested. While this was going on, disturbances took place in other parts of the town. Shops were pillaged, and much damage was done in the Mousky Street.

A more serious feature than the rioting was the way in which Government offices began to show signs of being affected by the general movement. The clerks of the Ministry of Public Works and Education yielded to pressure both by partisans of the movement outside, and by elements in the Ministries themselves, and left their offices.

I need not here report in detail the movement set on foot by the members of the Bar with a view to the suspension of the Administration of Justice. This matter has been fully reported in my despatch No. 113 of the 16th March.

So far the provinces had remained quiet; and it was only from Shebin-el-Kom, the chief town of Menoufia, that disquieting reports were received. Here students were reported to have left their schools and prevented a train from leaving. Later in the day the train was allowed to proceed.

It was, however, by now obvious that the unrest might spread to the provinces, and General Watson made arrangements for the despatch as soon as possible of detachments of British troops to the various important provincial centres and the Fayoum, to reassure the population and protect foreigners, should occasion arise.

On the 12th March I felt myself in a position to inform your Lordship by telegram that the general situation appeared more favourable. Cairo was outwardly quiet, and life was normal, except that the trams were not running. The employees of the Ministries who had left their posts on the 11th had returned to their offices, and there were indications that the strike of the advocates would be speedily settled. Shebin-el-Kom was reported quiet, and the only disturbance was in Tanta—always a Nationalist hotbed. Here some 3,000 demonstrators tried to rush the railway station, but British troops who had arrived by armoured train assisted the police in restoring order. They were obliged to use their machine gun, killing eleven and wounding fifty-one.

Though no events of importance occurred on the 13th March, the general atmosphere appeared less satisfactory than on the previous day. The movement showed signs of being better organised and more widely spread than had been expected. Some rioting and pillage took place in Cairo, chiefly in the Azhar quarter. Disturbance in this part is always difficult to handle, as it is desirable to prevent British troops approaching too near the Azhar Mosque. I had a long discussion with General Herbert, Officer Commanding Egyptian army in Cairo, as to whether it would be advisable to employ Egyptian troops in this area. We finally decided that it would be best not to use them. Though General Herbert was of opinion that discipline would prevent Egyptian troops actually going against us, he could not but admit that the sympathies, both of the Egyptian officers and of the men, inclined towards the Nationalists.

On the 14th March the general situation was more serious. An armoured car on patrol in the Saida Zenab quarter of Cairo was attacked by a large crowd, and in the end was obliged to fire. Thirteen natives were killed and twenty-seven wounded. Later on in the morning five looters were caught and summarily shot. There were other disturbances throughout the city, but on a small scale.

Reports now began to come in that there was considerable unrest in the provinces. Riots occurred in Damietta, where the Manur reported the situation serious, and asked for the immediate despatch of military assistance. The police station at Manouf was attacked, one man was killed and some wounded. Disquiet was reported at Beni-Suef, and some disorder at Mansura, following a procession of students demanding "Independence." Reports of isolated attacks on telegraphic and railway communications in different parts of the Delta gave indications of how widespread the agitation was, and that a most serious situation would arise if it continued. Upper Egypt and the Fayoum were reported quiet.

The situation grew rapidly more serious during the 15th March. Organised attacks on communications were made in all directions. By mid-day all telegraph and telephone lines north of Cairo, except a military line to Alexandria, had been cut. Crowds attacked the station at Bulaq Dacrou, just south of Cairo, broke up the signal

box and cut all telegraph wires; at Qaliub, just north of Cairo, they pulled up the lines, thus severing the main railway communication between Cairo and Alexandria and Port Said. At Qaliub, a crowd stormed the station and attacked a passenger train. They were beaten off by British officers with revolvers and finally dispersed. Many casualties were suffered by the mob, and one British soldier was killed.

Grave news was received from the south. A horde of natives and Bedouins from the Fayoum, estimated at nearly 7,000 attacked Markaz Wasta, disbanded the police, seized their arms, marched on the railway, and began to pull up the lines between Wasta and Recca stations, a distance of about 10 kilom. The morning express from Cairo was attacked at Recca, where the mob smashed the windows of the train and sacked the mail van. Europeans in the train were robbed and roughly handled. The train eventually returned to Cairo.

Meanwhile, the morning train from the Fayoum was attacked at Wasta Station, and Europeans in it—including an inspector of the Ministry of Interior—narrowly escaped with their lives. They had to hand over all their money and anything of value to the mob. A British railway official on arrival at Wasta in his railway car was set on by the crowd as he got out of the train and killed.

Fighting also occurred in Beni-Suef, south of Wasta, between Bedouins and a small detachment of Indian troops who had been sent from Cairo to preserve order. The British officer in command was badly wounded, and the troops were left with no one knowing their language to command them. An awkward situation was only saved by the arrival by train of British officers returning from leave at Luxor.

Much pillage and looting were reported from the Delta during the day. A crowd from Kafr-el-Sheikh attacked the State Domains headquarters at Sakha, burned the rest house, the post office, and the station, and did considerable damage to crops. Attacks on trains were frequent, and many small stations were burned.

Demonstrations took place at Mansura during the day, and the British Consular Agent telegraphed that the mob had removed the consular coat of arms from his house, destroyed it, and thrown it into the river.

The attacks on Europeans and wholesale damage to communications which occurred on the 15th, showed that the Nationalist movement, which had so far been confined more or less to demonstrations, was now assuming a most serious aspect; and that the lives and property of Europeans in the provinces, especially in Upper Egypt, were in considerable danger.

Destruction of communications continued throughout the 16th March. The line was damaged at Bashtil, thus cutting the alternative route via Teh-el-Barud to Alexandria; and the alternative route from Cairo to the Canal zone via Bilbeis was cut at Shebin-el-Kanatar. By 9.30 A.M. there was no telegraph, telephone, or rail communication whatsoever between Cairo and the provinces. Many stations on the suburban lines were burned and the track damaged.

Some natives of Minet-el-Gambh, between Benha and Zagazig, attacked the station, which was guarded by British troops, who were compelled to fire, and an aeroplane assisted. Thirty were killed and nineteen wounded. There were no incidents in Cairo on the 16th, but the feeling of uneasiness seemed to increase as the various reports from the provinces began to be known.

Reports received from Alexandria showed that the city was normal. A peaceful demonstration was held on the morning of the 16th, and a procession through the town cheered in front of the French, Italian, and American Consulates, and abused the British.

On the 17th a demonstration of quite 10,000 people paraded the streets of Cairo, and cheered the French, Italian, and American Agencies. The procession was led by Azhar students, who were followed by other students and apparently all the riff-raff that could be collected in the town. The proceedings were well organised, and no incident occurred until at the very end, when a party of soldiers had to interfere with the demonstrators, and a Greek shot dead a student carrying a banner. The procession then dispersed. The Greek was arrested, and is to be tried by court-martial. In Alexandria there was trouble in the dock quarter of the town, where the employees of the Khedivial Mail Company endeavoured to join the students. The military had to fire on the mob. Fourteen were killed and twenty wounded.

Cairo being now entirely isolated except by air, the situation in the provinces became rapidly worse during the 17th and 18th March. Sharkia province alone remained quiet. Gharbia, Menufia, Dakalia and Behera were all in a state of open revolt. Riots occurred in practically every Markaz town. Most railway stations were burned, and

agricultural roads destroyed. Rosetta Markaz was burned on the 17th. Zifta was practically in the hands of the mob. Teh-el-Barud was in a state of siege and the Markaz captured. The Turkish flag was hoisted on the Shibrakhit Markaz. Ibrahim Halim Pasha, Mudir of Behera, was knocked down while trying to quell the riots at Damanhour on the 17th and received severe injuries, but I am glad to learn he is recovering. A British detachment was despatched from Alexandria to Rosetta, and a strong force to Damanhour to deal with the serious position which had arisen there from the rising of the Bedouins in Western Behera.

Since the 20th March the situation in the Delta, though still unsatisfactory, may be said to have improved. Pillaging, looting and cattle stealing have continued, but to a reduced extent. Communication on a limited scale has now been restored with Alexandria and Port Said, both by rail and telegraph. British troops have arrived in all parts of the Delta, and it is hoped that they will be able to restore order very shortly.

No definite news has been received regarding the attitude of the Bedouins in Western Behera and elsewhere. At Medinet-el-Fayoum, on the 19th March, they attacked the town, but were driven off by a British force with 400 casualties. The Commander-in-chief has issued a severe warning to them to remain in their encampments, and it is hoped that this will have the desired effect; but if they recommence raiding on a large scale, they will have to be repressed with severity. Since the above incident at Medinet el-Fayoum, the Fayoum has remained quiet.

During the last four days Cairo has remained outwardly normal. The trams are running again under strong military guards, and, except for an attempt to destroy material at the Bulac railway crossing in Cairo, nothing of note has occurred. This latter disturbance was soon quelled, but the troops had to fire and there were many casualties. On the 19th March, the women of Cairo endeavoured to make a large demonstration in the streets but they were dispersed. The leading ladies eventually called at the American Agency in closed carriages and received an ovation from crowds of students who had collected outside. A general cab strike was declared on the 20th March, but the men began to return to work on the 22nd March.

Very little news can be obtained of the situation south of Beni-Suef since the 16th March, and such reports as have been received give reason for anxiety. On that day, Minia was reported to be quiet. In my telegram No. 410 I reported the news of the train having arrived at Beni-Suef from the south, in the guard's van of which were discovered the naked and mutilated bodies of six murdered British officers. No details have yet been received of this shocking incident, and it is feared that the loss of life in this train may have been greater than was at first thought. A British column is already on the way to Assiut, and it is hoped that it will be able to throw further light on this affair.

It appears that outbreaks of disorder have occurred at various places in Southern Egypt, but have generally been of a less violent character than those north of Minia. Reliable information shows that the railway, telegraph and telephones in Assouan Mudiria have all been cut, but otherwise little damage done. The sugar factories in Upper Egypt are said to be safe.

Seventy-one passengers from Luxor have arrived at Wady-Halfa by river.

The above brief description compiled from reports received from official sources will I trust, give your Lordship a rough picture of events in Egypt during the past fortnight. Much of the information received day by day proves to be inaccurate and exaggerated later, but in the present despatch I have been careful to include only such details as are almost certainly true.

I have, &c.,
MILNE CHEETHAM.

No. 152.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 514.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 6, 1919.

MY telegram No. 510.

Majority of Government officials returned to work to-day. No fresh incidents.

No. 153.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 520.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 7, 1919.

MY telegram No. 511.*

Proclamation was issued here this morning. I shall be grateful if you will send necessary instructions to Malta for Saad Zaghlul, Ismail Sidky, Mohammed Mahmoud, and Hamed-el-Bassal Pashas to be released and allowed to proceed wherever they may wish to go.

Please inform me of their movements.

No. 154.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 521. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 7, 1919.

IT is too early to report on the result of this morning's declaration beyond that removal of restrictions has been received with enthusiasm.

No incidents are reported from the provinces.

No. 155.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 534. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 9, 1919.

EIGHTEEN Egyptians are leaving for London about 11th April via Malta. Four berths have been reserved for Saad Zaghlul and three other Pashas on same ship. They should be allowed to proceed.

I will telegraph name of ship later.

(Addressed to Malta.)

No. 156.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 535. Very Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 9, 1919.

MY telegram No. 534.

Name of ship is His Majesty's transport "Caledonia." My immediately following telegram gives *en clair* list of Egyptian passengers. Please inform Saad Zaghlul Pasha.

(Addressed to Malta.)

* See No. 150.

No. 152.*

Memorandum by Sir R. Graham on the Unrest in Egypt.

I.—Summary of Events.

THE first intimation received by His Majesty's Government of any political movement in Egypt was on the 17th November last, when the High Commissioner reported that three well-known Egyptian Nationalists, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, Abdel Aziz Bey Fahmy and Ali Pasha Sharawi, had called in a deputation at the Residency. They had advocated a programme of complete autonomy for Egypt which would leave to Great Britain only a right of supervision in regard to the Public Debt and facilities for shipping in the Suez Canal. They asked that they should at once be allowed to proceed to London, in order to put forward their demands. In reporting this visit, Sir R. Wingate stated that "in condemning in the strongest terms the former Nationalist movement I offered frank criticism on various points of their present argument, and warned them repeatedly that they must exercise patience, having regard to the many important pre-occupations of His Majesty's Government." This reception accorded to the Nationalist leaders, and the fact that their demand for the immediate independence of Egypt did not meet with a firmer negative reply, were felt to be unfortunate. We were placed, at the outset, in a position from which it was difficult to recover.

Directly afterwards Ruchdi Pasha, the Prime Minister, suggested that he and Adly Pasha, the Minister of Education, should visit London in the immediate future in order to discuss Egyptian affairs. He further urged that the Nationalist leaders should also be allowed a hearing in London, as "in the event of their request being refused a charge of inadequate representation of Egyptian questions could not then be brought against responsible Egyptian Ministers, as might be the case if only the latter went to London." He stated that both requests had the approval of the Sultan. The two Ministers disclaimed any desire of severing the British connection.

These requests came at a moment when the Peace Conference was about to assemble. All the energies of the Secretary of State and of the Foreign Office were concentrated on the preparation of the British case. Moreover, Mr. Balfour, with Lord R. Cecil and Lord Hardinge, was about to leave for Paris, and no decision had been taken with regard to an acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during his absence. It was evident that if the Egyptian Ministers arrived in London at such a moment there was no prospect of sufficient time and attention being afforded to discuss with them the important questions of our future relations with Egypt under the Protectorate and Egyptian Constitutional reforms.

Sir R. Wingate was informed that His Majesty's Government desired to act on the principle which they had always followed of giving the Egyptians an ever-increasing share in the Government of the country, but that the rate of Egyptian progress towards self-government must depend on the Egyptians themselves. The stage had not been reached at which self-government was possible, and His Majesty's Government had no intention of abandoning their responsibilities for order and good government in Egypt and for protecting the rights and interests both of the native and of the foreign populations of the country. No useful purpose could be served by allowing the Nationalist leaders to come to London and advance immoderate demands which could not possibly be entertained. His Majesty's Government would always be ready to listen with sympathy to any reasonable proposals on the part of the Ministers or other Egyptians, and would welcome a visit from Ruchdi Pasha and Adly Pasha. But it would be more convenient, in view of the pending Peace negotiations in Paris, if their visit could be deferred for the moment.

In the meantime the Nationalist leaders, taking, or pretending to take, their reception at the Residency and the language held to them as an encouragement of their programme, started an intensive agitation throughout the country. They represented that their movement was, if not approved, at least countenanced by the Egyptian Government and by the British authorities. They circulated petitions for signature and subscription lists, and were able, in a comparatively short time, to raise a sum of 50,000. They also formed a committee of fourteen leaders, who were, with one or two possible exceptions, men of little standing and of doubtful antecedents and character. As an instance of the false conception which prevailed with regard to the

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movement, it may be cited that one of the most influential and loyal notables in the province of Menoufia, Abu Hussein Pasha by name, told a British inspector that he had subscribed 10,000L. to the movement, as he understood that it had the support of the British Government, and gladly cancelled his subscription when informed to the contrary.

Sir R. Wingate was instructed to make it perfectly clear that this agitation, which he described as an organised campaign against the Protectorate, was viewed by His Majesty's Government with extreme disfavour. Further, that importance was attached to the Sultan and Ministers showing that they shared this attitude. Instructions were issued in Cairo to prevent public meetings and demonstrations and to suppress the distribution of seditious circulars and subscription lists.

On the 5th December Sir R. Wingate reported that Rushdi Pasha and Adly Pasha had resigned, owing to the fact that they had not been encouraged to proceed to London at once. Further, that the Sultan, who was in an excitable frame of mind, was supporting their attitude. His Highness and his Ministers appeared to fear that some vital decision would be come to at the Peace Conference affecting the future of Egypt without the views of any Egyptian having been heard. In reply, it was pointed out that the request to defer their visit was solely inspired by a regard for their own convenience and dignity, and that they would be received here at the earliest date which could be arranged. But the fact was emphasised that any discussions on Egyptian internal reforms must take place in London and not in Paris, and that no question vital to Egyptian interests would be raised at the Peace Conference except that of the establishment of the British Protectorate over Egypt, which the Allied Powers had already recognised and which the enemy Powers would be required to accept. This reply did not cause either the Sultan or Ministers to modify their attitude, and the Sultan felt unable to show clearly, as we had demanded of him, that he disapproved of the Nationalist agitation. They must not be judged too hardly for this. Once the ball of independence had been set rolling, their position became one of great difficulty, and Egyptian statesmen are not conspicuous for moral courage.

At the beginning of January Sir R. Wingate was summoned to London in order to explain the situation to His Majesty's Government, leaving Sir M. Cheetham in charge, and at the same time the two Ministers were invited to come here immediately after his arrival, that is to say, about the middle of February. They were also requested to submit at once, in writing, any proposals which they wished to be considered for discussion. When, however, this invitation was conveyed to them, they declared that although they felt convinced that a satisfactory agreement with His Majesty's Government would be easy, their position in Egypt would be hopeless unless Saad Zaglul and the other Nationalist leaders were also permitted to come to England. They did not ask that the Nationalist leaders should be officially received here. On the contrary, they desired them to return to Egypt empty-handed and proved incapable of redeeming their promises.

Sir R. Wingate had now reached London, and the whole question was discussed with him. Sir R. Wingate urged that the restrictions on the movements of the Nationalist leaders should be removed, and that they should be permitted to come to Europe with the Ministers. He considered that the Ministers would never have and would not now come without the Nationalist leaders. It would be alleged in Egypt that the Ministers had not been able to obtain sufficiently satisfactory terms from His Majesty's Government, and that the Nationalist leaders, had they been here, would have been more successful. If, on the other hand, it was shown that the Nationalists were not received here and had no chance of doing any service to Egypt, their position would be shaken while that of the Sultan and his Ministers would be fortified. The alternative to this was to accept the resignations of the two Ministers, which had been held in suspense, but Sir R. Wingate was of opinion that it would be difficult to replace them.

The following were the objections to the course proposed. It was sincerely desired that the Egyptian Ministers and other responsible Egyptians should come here, that the important questions of the exact form which the British Protectorate in Egypt is to assume and of the necessary constitutional changes should be discussed with them, and that a settlement equally satisfactory to both sides should be reached. On the other hand it was considered essential to draw a sharp distinction between the movement for complete independence and one for concessions and reforms under the British Protectorate. The first could receive no countenance, the second could be met with sympathy and encouragement. If once the idea of independence received

recognition and was fairly started, it must inevitably be so far more popular than any more moderate programme, that no native, statesman or politician could hope to resist it. Further, we must lose all our friends who would not dare stand by us for fear of the future consequences if independence came about. Thus, while the Ministers were welcome, there was no common ground for discussion with Saad Zaglul and his friends, the self-appointed and irresponsible leaders of an agitation for the avowed purpose of expelling the British from Egypt. These men were nearly all irreconcilables who could not expect place or preferment so long as the British dominion in Egypt continued. Saad Pasha Zaglul had signalled his tenure of office as Minister of Education by a constant and uncompromising hostility to British influence. After his fall from office he had become more violent in his anti-British sentiments, and had, as leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly in 1914, acted as the Khedive's agent, had made violent personal attacks upon Lord Kitchener, and had done everything he possibly could to embarrass the administration. Of the other leaders, to mention the three who have since been deported to Malta, Ismail Pasha Sidki has been deprived of office after being involved in two disgraceful scandals. Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud had to resign his post of Provincial Governor owing to the torturing of a witness in a police case, and Hamed Pasha El Basal was under suspicion, and for a long time under supervision during the war, owing to his sympathies and intrigues with the Senoussi. With such men no arrangement was possible. If they were allowed to leave Egypt with the Ministers, their agitation and programme would receive sanction, and they would be regarded in Egypt as the truly National deputation. Moreover, it was evident that a semi-understanding already existed between them and the Ministers, and if they came to London with the latter they would, by their influence and incitements, certainly prevent any satisfactory arrangement from being reached. The fact that the Nationalists would visit Paris and London for the express object of making trouble, and would have a large sum of money at their disposal for the purpose, was a subsidiary, but not altogether negligible consideration. It was, further, undesirable that native Ministers, when invited by His Majesty's Government to visit this country, should be allowed to dictate the terms on which they would come. The idea that the Nationalist leaders should be brought here in order to be snubbed and disregarded scarcely seemed to savour of fair play. It could only increase the bitterness of their feeling, and was indeed a temporising measure only likely to secure immediate peace at the cost of increased trouble later.

The two views of the case were referred to Paris, and were considered by Mr. Balfour, in consultation with Lord Milner and Lord Hardinge.

Under instructions sent on the 26th February, the Sultan and Ministers were informed that His Majesty's Government renewed their invitation to Rushdi Pasha and Adly Pasha, and to any Minister or Ministers deputed by His Highness and the Council of Ministers to proceed to this country forthwith, and that all facilities for their journey would be given to them. They would receive a cordial welcome, and full and sympathetic consideration would be granted to any representations or proposals they might desire to submit, both as to the future relations between Egypt and the protecting Power and to Egyptian internal reforms. But His Majesty's Government could not alter their attitude with regard to the visit of the Nationalist leaders.

On the 2nd March this decision was conveyed to the Sultan. Rushdi Pasha and Adly Pasha maintained their resignations which were accepted by the Sultan. His Highness, who from this time on seems to have definitely ranged himself on our side, summoned Sirry Pasha, the next senior Minister, and Sarwat and Wahba Pashas, also Ministers, and impressed upon them in emphatic terms that it was their duty to their country to form the nucleus of a new Government. On the next day the Presidency of the Council was definitely offered to Sarwat Pasha.

In the meantime, on the 25th February, Sir M. Cheetham had announced a distinct improvement in the atmosphere. Rushdi Pasha, Adly Pasha, and Saad Zaglul had all lost popularity, and there were divisions in the Nationalist camp. The agitation was dying down. The situation did not differ materially from that in 1914, and public opinion had changed very little in the interval, but had been excited since last November by exaggerated notions of a general régime of liberty and self-government. The present movement could not compare in importance with that of Mustapha Kamel (the Nationalist leader in Lord Cromer's time) and there seemed no reason why it should affect the decisions of His Majesty's Government on constitutional questions, and the proper form to be given to the Protectorate.

This account of the situation was soon destined to be falsified. On the 6th March Sir M. Cheetham reported that Saad Pasha Zaglul, who had felt the refusal to allow

him to proceed to Europe as a severe rebuff, was doing all he could to prevent the formation of a new Government, and those politicians who would have been ready to accept office were being persuaded from doing so by threats against their lives. Further, definite action had been taken by Zaglul to intimidate the Sultan, and to discourage His Highness from co-operating with the British Authorities in re-establishing the Council of Ministers. On the 3rd March Zaglul had presented himself at Abdin Palace with most of the members of his original deputation, and, on being refused admission, had left a signed petition to the Sultan repudiating the Protectorate, warning His Highness against accepting the advice of the Residency, and containing thinly veiled threats against him should he continue to assist in creating a Ministry. The Sultan was shaken by the terms of the petition, which was, in fact, an impudent summons to him, and His Highness had earnestly appealed to Sir M. Cheetham for protection from further insults. Sir M. Cheetham had consulted his principal advisers, and they agreed with him in recommending the immediate arrest and deportation of Saad Pasha Zaglul, whose insidious propaganda made him more dangerous than any of the agitators interned at Malta since the beginning of the war. On the 7th March Sir M. Cheetham was authorised to concert with the Commander-in-Chief for the arrest and deportation to Malta of Zaglul and those of his party most actively associated with him in this deliberate campaign of intimidation. Zaglul Pasha, with Ismail Pasha Sidki, Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud, and Hamed Pasha El Basal, were arrested on the 8th March and left for Malta on the following morning. Sir M. Cheetham reported that the administration of the country was in no way affected by the crisis. But on the following day there was an outbreak of feeling in Cairo amongst the students of the higher colleges. They were dispersed by the Egyptian police and 310 arrests were made.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the series of events which, in the short space of a week, transformed Egypt from a scene of peace to a welter of anarchy and rapine. Evidence was soon forthcoming that the plan of campaign had been carefully premeditated and organised. It was directed by the remainder of the Nationalist deputation who had taken up their headquarters at Zaglul's house. In the towns there was rioting, looting, and attacks on Government buildings. An eye-witness of the Cairo disturbances was impressed by the complete control a few students possessed over the mob. In the provinces there was a concerted attack on communications, telephone and telegraph wires were cut everywhere, and the railways and stations were damaged at Tantah, Wasta, and other important junctions. It is worth noting that the plan carried out corresponds to the programme drawn up by the Germans and Young Turks for an outbreak in the autumn of 1914, which was revealed to the Egyptian authorities by the German spy Mors, captured at Alexandria. As was to be expected, the disturbances soon assumed a predatory, rather than a political, character. In the towns mobs of roughs and criminals looted Christian shops, and in certain provincial districts the peasants rose against the landlords and sacked the big farms. The settled Bedouin, a lawless and truculent lot, who live on the edge of the cultivation, were not slow to seize the opportunity for looting and to join in the fray. There is also evidence that they had been organised and paid. The fellaheen are unarmed. During 1915-16 the Ministry of Interior collected from them no less than 100,000 firearms of sorts, few of them of any military value. But no systematic attempt was made to disarm the Bedouin as the military consequences might have been serious. The Bedouin are armed, some of them with rifles. They entered the Behera, Fayoum, and Minia provinces, looting as they came, and attacked isolated British detachments, but were easily repulsed. They probably had a hand in the brutal murder of nine British officers and men who were returning from Luxor in the Upper Egypt express. The desert Bedouin have taken no part in the outbreak. Satisfactory features of these deplorable occurrences are that the Egyptian army has remained steady, and the Administrative officials and police, who have been freely used, have behaved remarkably well, in spite of the severe strain laid upon their loyalty. The behaviour of the clerks in Government offices has not been equally good.

The extent and violence of the movement, which appeared to have assumed a national character, even the Copts (with great wisdom from the point of view of self-preservation) declaring sympathy with it, took the British local authorities, both civil and military, completely by surprise, and the troops immediately available were scarcely sufficient to cope with the disorders. But reinforcements were quickly brought up, and order and communications were gradually restored. At the most critical moment aeroplanes performed very useful service.

On the 20th March General Allenby was appointed Special High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, with supreme military and civil authority, and arrived in Cairo on the 25th March. The situation seemed to have already begun to mend. Disorders had died down, and the action of the military authorities had commenced to have its effect. On the 26th March General Allenby reported that a number of leading natives, including the President of the Legislative Assembly, all the ex-Ministers, the leading religious dignitaries, and some of the Nationalist deputation had issued an appeal to the Egyptian nation to keep within the bounds of the law. General Allenby had invited the signatories to the Residency, and had addressed them. He had pointed out to them that it was his duty to restore order, and that he must employ measures of active repression from which both innocent and guilty might suffer. It was the duty of every patriotic Egyptian to devise means whereby these measures would achieve the desired results as speedily as possible with the minimum of suffering for Egypt.

On the 28th March General Allenby telegraphed that he considered it of primary importance that the Egyptians should know that the British Protectorate had been accepted by the Powers. He urged that this recognition should be obtained, or some declaration made which could not be disputed. The peace delegation in Paris were asked whether it would be possible to issue some pronouncement immediately or at as early a date as possible.

On the 31st March General Allenby reported that he had not been approached by any body of Egyptians excepting by the Extremist deputation. He had, however, asked the ex-Ministers for their views. Led by Ruchdi Pasha and Adly Pasha they had urged him to remove the restrictions on would-be travellers from Egypt without exception. This concession would restore tranquillity and guarantee the formation of a Ministry. General Allenby said that order had now been outwardly re-established in the provinces, and as he had shown that he could repress the agitation he proposed to issue passports to any respectable Egyptians who might wish to visit Europe without regard to their political views.

General Allenby's succeeding telegrams showed increasing apprehensions as to the gravity of the situation. Although order had been outwardly restored, and was only marred by a few riots and demonstrations, the underlying current of Nationalist feeling was increasing in depth and bitterness. Moreover, the movement, which was at first purely political, threatened to take a religious turn. This is singular in view of the Coptic participation in the movement, and of the fact that the new revolutionary flag bore a cross as well as a crescent. The Azhar Mosque, where seditious and inflammatory speeches were made by day and night, had become the centre of the agitation. He considered it essential that a favourable reply should be sent at once to his previous recommendation.

The Foreign Office viewed the contemplated surrender with grave misgiving, which was fully shared by Sir R. Wingate, and the question was referred to Mr. Balfour in Paris. There it was felt that General Allenby's advice could not be disregarded. On the 5th April he was informed that his policy was accepted, and that he would receive every support in carrying it through. An alternative suggestion, supported by the Foreign Office, was, however, made to him, viz., that a Commission of the highest importance, with Lord Milner at its head, should be sent out to Egypt at once to investigate existing conditions, hear every party, and report on the future form of the Protectorate. This alternative proposal would have transferred the scene of political interest from Europe to Cairo, and might have made it easier to satisfy Egyptian demands without appearing to yield to violence what had been refused to persuasion. But the decision was left to General Allenby's discretion.

On the 6th April General Allenby telegraphed that the Sultan was issuing a proclamation counselling quiet and obedience to law. Further, he himself would issue a proclamation on the following day to the effect that now that order had been in great measure restored, he declared, in agreement with the Sultan, that there were no longer restrictions on travelling, and that Egyptians who wished to leave the country would be free to do so. He had further decided that Saad Pasha Zaglul and the three other ringleaders detained at Malta should be released from internment, and should be given similar freedom of movement. The proposed Commission might be desirable later, but would be useless now. It might be sent when the deputation of Ministers left Egypt for London.

General Allenby has since reported that this decision has been received with enthusiasm in Egypt. A body of eighteen Nationalist leaders, including Zaglul Pasha and his three comrades at Malta will shortly arrive in this country.

The immediate result of this concession will no doubt be a relaxation of tension and the formation of a Ministry.

II.—Causes of Unrest.

The immediate cause of the agitation affecting every class in Egypt is the general wave of unrest, dissatisfaction, and vague political aspirations which is passing all over the world as the after effect of four years' crisis. This Egypt, so fortunate in avoiding the losses, privations, and sacrifices of the belligerent countries, has not been able to escape. Full use has been taken by unscrupulous agitators of this state of mind and of grievances, some imaginary and others undoubtedly real, to fan the flame of revolt. We do not know, and shall probably never learn, what wild tales as to our misdeeds and nefarious intentions have been circulated in the bazaars and villages. The result has been a systematically organised outbreak of extreme violence, and on an extended scale, which appears to have taken the local authorities completely by surprise.

It would be well to analyse the state of mind and the sense of grievance which have predisposed Egypt to this upheaval. In the large towns we have always been exposed to hostile outbreaks of this kind. The rich pashas are pro-Turkish and anti-British, and the harems have been hotbeds of Young Turk intrigue and propaganda. Public opinion as a whole is as yet by no means convinced of the Turks having been defeated, and has no idea at all of the extent of that defeat. When it is realised the effect will be salutary. The students and professional classes, doctors, lawyers, and a good number of the younger Government officials, are Nationalist in sympathies and followers of Saad Pasha Zaghlul. Troubles in Cairo originate with the students of the law school, and of the Azhar University, where the motley and unruly crew, comprising Egyptians, Turks, Indians, Arabs, Afghans, Javanese, Moroccans, &c., are usually engaged in fights and squabbles with each other, but are always ready to combine against the authorities.

The ideals of the intellectual classes, even of their more moderate members, have, during the past few years, hardened considerably. Many of those, who formerly only hoped for a greater freedom of political expression, now aspire to complete independence. This is but the natural outcome of the Wilsonian idea, of the cry for "self-determination," "freedom of small peoples," &c. Thinking Egyptians had realised that Egypt was defenceless, and must rely on the protection of some strong Power, and, on the whole, they preferred British tutelage as being less onerous than that of any other great Power. But now they see in the League of Nations a fairy god-mother, remote and unobtrusive in their internal affairs, but always ready to step in and save them the trouble and anxiety of defending themselves from aggrieved or aggressive neighbours. There is no doubt that Egyptian *amour-propre* has been wounded by the absence of Egyptian representation at the Peace Conference, when India and, still worse, the disliked and despised Bedouin of the Hedjaz, have been represented. A cutting from "The Graphic," depicting the Emir Faisal at the Peace Conference, was circulated as a piece of anti-British propaganda. Capital has also been made out of the Lebanese deputation having been allowed to proceed to Europe. Even the Ministers share this feeling, but the fact that their underlying ideal is that Egypt should be governed by Great Britain under a mandate, with the inevitable consequence that the Egyptian question would be reopened at frequent intervals, made the idea of satisfying any aspiration on their part to attend the Peace Conference impossible. Moreover, the new status of Egypt has not yet been recognised by the United States Government. The Anglo-French declaration to the Arabs roused hopes and jealousies. The impending abolition of the capitulations has excited apprehensions as to the more exclusive British judicial control that it foreshadows. The native Bar fears that an attempt may be made to Anglicise the law and practice of the Egyptian Courts, and to impose the English language for general judicial use. The indiscreet enthusiasm of certain British lawyers in Egypt has done much to increase these fears. Opinion was also greatly disturbed by Sir William Brunyate's draft of Constitutional Reform which aims at bestowing on an Upper Chamber, with an European majority, superior powers to those possessed by the native Lower Chamber.

While it is natural that there should be dissatisfaction among the educated and professional classes, whose political ideas have been excited and who have suffered by the rise of prices during the war without any corresponding gain, it is less easy to account for the violent upheaval among the agricultural classes, who take little

interest in politics and to whom the war has brought a prosperity beyond their wildest dreams. Cotton, which realised from 18 to 25 dollars a cantar (100 lb.) before the war and fell to 9½ in 1914, is now at a fixed price of 43. The British army has been a wonderful customer. All kinds of produce—corn, vegetables, fodder, &c.—fetch excellent prices. Certainly the large notables have no ground for complaint, and it is not believed that they are really hostile to British rule. But they are a simple and ignorant lot, excepting in so far as agriculture is concerned, and are easily swayed by political influences which they do not understand. With firmness and sympathy it should not be difficult to bring them back to a saner frame of mind. The same may be said of the fellaheen, who have, for value received, always been our best friends in the past. They have shared in a notable degree in the wave of agricultural prosperity and they have paid off their debts to money-lenders and mortgage banks. This prosperity has given them a new feeling of independence, and they have "waxed fat and kicked." But it must be owned that these fellaheen have certain very real grievances resulting from the war. They have bitterly resented the requisitioning of their fodder for the army, not perhaps so much on account of the fair but fixed price, somewhat below the market rate, as because, owing to our heavy army requirements, they have been left short of feeding stuff for their own cattle. But still greater resentment has been caused by the more or less forced requisitioning of their services for the Labour and Camel Transport Corps in the Egypt Expeditionary Force. When the military authorities demanded the assistance of an Egyptian Labour Corps it was foreseen that trouble and ill-feeling must be created. It was not possible to secure labour by conscription, partly because we were precluded by the terms of the Declaration of the British Protectorate from any such action and partly because the native Ministers and officials all gave warning that conscription would inevitably mean widespread revolution throughout Egypt. It was absolutely necessary from a military point of view to obtain the men, and the decision was therefore reached to recruit them as volunteers. At first from 10,000 to 20,000 real volunteers were forthcoming. But the military demands increased, it was urged as imperative that the Labour and Transport Corps should be maintained at a figure not far short of 100,000 men, and apart from the congenital disinclination of the fellah to leave his Nile mud, conditions both of agriculture and of agricultural labour were too good to allow of genuine voluntary enlistment on this large scale. It was, therefore, left to the native authorities, under the supervision of a very small body of British inspectors to procure the men, each district having to produce its quota. The men were enlisted for short terms of service, usually three months; they were well paid and, it is believed, well fed and well treated. But although a few liked the conditions of service and re-enlisted several times, the vast majority hated being taken from their homes. Forms of compulsion had to be used, and opportunities for corruption and favouritism were afforded to the *omdehs* and minor local officials, of which they were not slow to take advantage. No less than 500,000 men have been recruited, and although they have rendered invaluable services to our armies, to which General Maxwell, General Murray, and General Allenby have all paid the highest tribute, a rankling sense of injustice and resentment has been left among them which has, no doubt, found expression and relief in a violent campaign of destruction. It should be added that while the behaviour of most of the British troops quartered in the Egyptian towns and villages has been admirable, there have been serious exceptions to this rule and very bitter feeling has been aroused.

But when every allowance has been made for the state of mind and sense of grievance depicted above, they are not sufficient to account for the present serious and organised outbreak, in which the hand of the Young Turk, and even German agent, is clearly discernible. There is a significant reference in a telegram from General Allenby of the 4th April to the "fanatical resentment against the Armenians." There has never been any such resentment felt by Egyptians except under Young Turk instigation. As has already been indicated, the plan of campaign followed was that laid down for 1914. Very little illuminating information has been received from official sources in Cairo, but a number of British officers and residents have arrived here during the last few days who throw fresh light on the inside working of the revolt. Reference has already been made to the organisation in the towns and to the attacks on communications. In the outlying districts small bands of agitators appeared at the provincial headquarters and summoned the "Mamur," or head administrative official, to hoist the new Egyptian flag and join in the movement for "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." When, as happened in nearly every case, the Mamur refused, the Nationalists threatened that they would bring in the Bedouin to

loot the district and set fire to the Government buildings, and they frequently carried out their threat. Bands of Bedouin had been organised and were in the pay of the Central Nationalist Committee. It is to be noted that Prince Omar Toussoun, cousin of the Sultan, but notorious for his pro-Turk and anti-British sympathies, was in Shephard's Hotel in Cairo for some weeks past, and that the Bedouin Sheiks were constantly visiting him. It is generally considered that His Highness took an important part in the organisation of the movement.

Sir M. Cheetham has reported that, in the light of what has happened, he and his competent advisers have come to the conclusion that some upheaval in the nature of the present revolt was sooner or later inevitable. An Egyptian official recently arrived here declares that it had been fixed for July, but that the deportation of Zaglul and his friends precipitated matters. However this may be, the Anglo-Egyptian authorities appear to have been so greatly out of touch with native sentiment that such statements must be accepted with reserve. They have indeed shown a complete lack of foreknowledge for which it is almost impossible to account, and an explanation has been requested. From a political point of view the outbreak could scarcely have occurred at a more unfortunate moment. From a military point of view the same cannot be said, as a year ago, when we were still fighting the Turk, or six months from now when the occupying forces might have been greatly reduced, the danger would have been more formidable.

The course of events may be summarised as follows:—

For some time past a subterranean, but carefully prepared and organised, movement, with a Young Turk undercurrent, has been in progress in Egypt with a view to complete independence. In November last this movement came out into the open, and, being left unchecked, in the course of a fortnight swept the whole country, including the Sultan, Ministers, Moderates, and such friends as we had, off their feet. His Majesty's Government did what they could to stem the tide, firstly, by ordering the agitation to be suppressed, and, secondly, by attempting to separate the Moderates from the Extremists, by allowing the Ministers to come and present their views in London, while refusing the Nationalists permission to do so. The moment this policy showed some signs of success the Nationalist leaders assumed a threatening attitude, four of them were deported, and the explosion took place. To have allowed the Nationalist leaders to have come here and be officially received would have been to give official sanction to the movement for independence, and to have recognised their mandate as the true representatives of the Egyptian nation. There was a great deal more to be said for the proposal that they should be permitted to arrive in London, but that then no further notice should be taken of them. This course was carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, and was twice deliberately rejected. Had it been accepted, the present outbreak might possibly have been avoided, but would more likely only have been postponed. It is hard to believe that the Nationalist leaders, fully conscious of the power and organisation of the forces behind them, would have submitted to humiliation without sooner or later bringing matters to a trial of strength. Be this as it may, the trial of strength has now taken place, and the British authorities in Egypt invested with full discretionary powers have shown themselves unable, or unwilling, to stand up to the forces arrayed against them. The principle at issue has been surrendered, and the Nationalist leaders, including those deported to Malta, will shortly arrive here. Thus a fortnight of violence has achieved what four months of persuasion failed to accomplish. The object lesson will not be lost in Egypt and throughout the East.

R. G.

April 9, 1919.

No. 157.

Memorandum on the Use of English Legal Principles and the English Language in Schemes for Judicial Reform.

IN Foreign Office despatch to Sir R. Wingate, No. 37 of the 14th February, 1917, approving the creation of the Capitulations Commission, Mr. Balfour gave instructions on the following lines:—

1. Although nothing in the nature of a drastic substitution for the existing codes of others based on English law is desirable, the system should be brought, so far as possible, into accord with that which prevails in the United Kingdom.

2. It is essential that, in regard to criminal procedure, the revised codes and legislation should embody a system, and provide for the administration of justice in accordance with a standard approximating as closely as possible to that prevailing in this country.

3. Attention should be paid to the improvement of the existing Egyptian laws, having special regard to the principles and practice adopted in other portions of the British Empire, and particularly in the United Kingdom; preference being given, whenever possible, to the British system provided that the interests of Egypt are equally well served.

4. In commercial law, it is desirable that English law should be especially adopted, particularly in regard to the sale of goods, bills of exchange, negotiable instruments, shipping and bankruptcy.

Sir W. Brunyate, in a memorandum on this despatch, observed that he believed that the principles laid down therein would be accepted generally by the Commission. He says: "If public opinion in England is prepared to accept the view that anything in the nature of a drastic substitution for the existing codes by others based on English law would be impracticable and undesirable, I am inclined to think that our foreign friends here are preparing to acquiesce in almost any changes consistent with that principle." He remarked that the system of working by means of sub-committees and "questionnaires" would to some extent balance the preponderance of foreign members on the Commission, in regard to which he considered that the inclusion of himself as the sole Englishman would in practice lead to the best results. He also expressed the view that the introduction of English principles and ideas could most effectively be forwarded by educational reforms.

A résumé of Mr. Balfour's instructions was communicated by Sir W. Brunyate to the Commission at their first meeting.

In July 1917 the British Bar in Egypt addressed a memorial (supported by the Cairo and Alexandria Chambers of Commerce) to the Commission, urging that "the legal reforms should have as basis the introduction of English ideas and methods, and should aim at the adoption of procedure and law which will owe their interpretation to English jurisprudence and precedents," protesting against codes being drafted in French, and asking that English should be made compulsory in the higher Courts after five years, or perhaps somewhat longer.

(N.B.—The draft Judicature Law provides for the use of both French and English as the official languages, in addition to Arabic, and sets no limit to the use of the first.)

Sir W. Brunyate's confidential memorandum No. 5 deals with this memorial (see paragraphs 9 to 14, regarding the language question; and paragraphs 15 to 24, regarding the introduction of English principles in law and procedure). He draws attention to the fact that French is the "lingua franca" of Egypt, and suggests that to try to exclude French too soon would tend to supplant it rather by Arabic than English; the reform should proceed *pari passu* with educational reforms. He also defends the use of French for drafting purposes. In regard to civil law and procedure, and to criminal law, he observes that the differences between the memorialists and the Commission rest on details or differences of point of view rather than fundamental principles, but he gives careful reasons why their proposals in regard to criminal procedure (especially the use of the jury system) are impracticable.

The Commission discussed the memorial, which was rather severely criticised by one of the native members, and passed a resolution that laws should be drafted indifferently in French or English "suivant les nécessités" (see *procès-verbal* No. 30, p. 314 to end). Mr. Hurst approved of this decision. Two meetings were then held at Cairo between representatives of the British Bar and of the Commission,

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some English judges of the Court of Appeal also being present. Sir W. Brunyate considered that "the meeting left nothing to be desired" and that the English lawyers were brought into line more or less with the Commission's own views (see confidential memorandum No. 7, paragraphs 30-33).

In his confidential memorandum No. 8, Sir W. Brunyate discusses the question of an appeal to the Privy Council which the Advisory Committee had recommended should be considered. The Commission was, on the whole, unfavourable to its adoption except in a few exceptional cases, in which view Sir W. Brunyate concurred, giving his reasons (see paragraphs 6-8, also *procès-verbal* No. 69, p. 299). The Advisory Committee had also recommended a greater use of English in drafting, and that the use of French in the Courts should be limited to ten or fifteen years. The Commission, as regards the first of these recommendations, expressed dissent from the view of the Advisory Committee and its earlier resolution on the subject (see above). As regards the second, Sir W. Brunyate told the Commission that he himself had suggested a limit of ten years during his discussions in Paris, and the matter was not debated.

As the Advisory Committee have held no meetings since the first drafts were received from the Capitulations Commission, we have no technical opinion to refer to as regards the question of the extent to which English principles and precedents have, in point of fact, been employed in the preparation of such laws as have hitherto been drafted.

Foreign Office, April 8, 1919.

No. 158.

Pro-memoriâ by Italian Embassy.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 10.)

(Translation.)

IN July 1917, the British High Commissioner in Egypt informed the Italian Diplomatic Agency at Cairo that he had made arrangements that the Anglo-Egyptian authorities, while continuing to correspond direct with Said Idris-el-Senussi, should always show the correspondence to the Italian agency.

While appreciating the good intentions shown by Sir Reginald Wingate, the Italian Ministry of the Colonies and that for Foreign Affairs took further steps through the British Embassy in Rome to secure that all correspondence between the Anglo-Egyptian authorities and Said Idris-el-Senussi should invariably and solely take place through the channel of the Italian authorities in Cyrenaica.

However, the matter having remained at this stage, the Italian Government are of opinion that the time has now come when the *modus procedendi* of direct communication hitherto followed by the Anglo-Egyptian authorities in their relations with Said Idris should be quickly changed, in the sense that the British Government should leave it to the Italian Government to treat on any matter with Said Idris. This measure is necessary owing to the great need for not strengthening further in Said Idris—by treatment on a footing of equality on the part of the Anglo-Egyptian authorities—the aspirations of becoming a political power, and for making him understand that he must address himself solely and directly to the Italian authorities.

Only by the adoption of this procedure will Said Idris realise his practical dependence on Italy, and only then will he, as head of the Senussi confraternity, become a useful common instrument through the channel of the Italian Government. The *modus procedendi* hitherto followed by the Anglo-Egyptian authorities puts the Italian Government, the Anglo-Egyptian Government, Said Idris and the Government of Cyrenaica in a difficult position, which does not assist either negotiations or the relations of the Italian authorities and British authorities with Said Idris, who will thus escape Italian control and will not come under British control, a state of affairs which moreover would be contrary to the agreement in force.

Recalling the declaration made by the British Embassy in Rome in the memorandum of the 16th September, 1917, and the fact that the British Government were thoroughly disposed to accept the principle that communications between foreign Governments and Said Idris should take place solely through the channel of the Italian authorities, the Italian Embassy are confident that this principle will now be

definitely accepted, and that the British Government will issue the necessary instructions to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities in order that all their correspondence with Said Idris should pass through the channel of the Italian authorities at Cyrenaica.

Italian Embassy, London, April 2, 1919.

No. 159.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 536.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 9, 1919.

ALY SHARAWY PASHA, Abdel Aziz Fahmy Bey, Ahmed Lutfy El Sayed Bey, Mohammed Aly Bey, Abdel Latif El Makabatti Bey, Mahmoud Abu El Nasr Bey, Hafez Afifi Bey, Sinot Hanna Bey, Mustafa El Nahas Bey, Georges Khayat Bey, Hussein Wasif Pasha, Mohammed Badr Bey, Georges Romani, Maitre Aziz Mancy [*sic*], Maitre Wissa Wasif.

(Addressed to Malta.)

No. 160.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 538. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 9, 1919.

THERE have been disturbances in various parts of Cairo to-day resulting in a number of casualties. Armenians in particular have been attacked by parties of roughs.

New Ministry was well received, but will probably find it difficult to make their measures effective immediately.

Provinces are quiet. There have been large peaceful demonstrations in some places.

No. 161.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 539. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 9, 1919.

I HAVE to-day formed a new Ministry, which situation urgently demanded.

Its composition is as follows:—

Hussein Rushdy Pasha, President of Council and Provisional Minister.

Yusef Wahba Pasha, Finance.

Adly Yeghen Pasha, Interior.

Abdel Khalik Sarwat Pasha, Justice.

Gaafar Waly Pasha, Works.

Ahmed Midhat Yeghen Pasha, Agriculture.

Hassan Hassib Pasha, Public Works and War.

I believe above Government is in circumstances strongest that could be formed.

Rushdy Pasha takes Department of Education until a suitable Minister can be selected, and will then retain only Presidency of the Council. Another Minister will also have to be found for new Department of Communications shortly to be established.

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No. 162.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).(No. 450. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, April 11, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 539.

Composition of new Ministry is approved, but I should be glad of information as to non-inclusion of Sirry Pasha.

No. 163.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 532.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 8, 1919.

THERE were large peaceful demonstrations this morning in Cairo held by consent of authorities.

Unfortunately a fracas took place this afternoon between a few of British troops and native Egyptians, resulting in several casualties. Quiet is now restored, but I fear some bitterness may ensue.

No. 164.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 541. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 10, 1919.

MY telegram No. 539.

New Ministers called on me in a body this morning, and I subsequently visited them all separately. Ministers have conferred with representatives of Government employees in various Departments, who continue to absent themselves from their duties. They have not succeeded in persuading employees to return, but will meet them again this evening. I shall telegraph to-morrow morning the situation in this respect, with any recommendations which the attitude of Government officials may render necessary.

Cairo is outwardly quieter to-day, but spirit of sullen resistance is no less strong; there is still hooliganism in poorer quarter of town, directed mainly against Armenians, and to some extent against Greeks.

State railways employees all returned to work this morning with the exception of workshop hands.

Provinces are quiet.

No. 165.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 547. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 11, 1919.

GENERAL state of public feeling in Cairo is somewhat calmer. Armenian and Moslem religious authorities have met, and it is expected that the latter will exhort their audiences not to persecute Armenians. Jews now join with Moslems and Copts in meeting at El Azhar. Meeting between Ministers and representatives of Government employees held with object of settling the strike question has been, so far, without result. There was an affray in Alexandria yesterday afternoon resulting in some casualties amongst natives. To-day, all is quiet there, and a deputation of lawyers has waited on General Officer Commanding, Alexandria, expressing regret at yesterday's incident, and appreciation of the attitude of the troops. Religious authorities are exhorting the people to be quiet. Provinces are quiet except for slight unrest at Benha, Mit Ghamr, and outlying villages near Tanta. In these places telephone lines have been cut and railway obstructed, but military precautions have been taken, and no serious incident has occurred.

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No. 166.

*Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.**

(No. 132.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 11, 1919.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of the minutes of an interdepartmental meeting held to consider the question of a new commercial treaty with France regarding Egypt and Morocco,† and of a memorandum‡ which has been prepared in order to throw light upon certain questions of policy arising out of the proceedings at the meeting.

The conclusion to which the memorandum points is, as you will observe, that the effect of the introduction of reciprocal preferential tariffs in Egypt and the French zone of Morocco would be, on the whole, detrimental to British commercial interests.

The question as it concerns Morocco has, in the meantime, been materially affected by the declaration made by the French Government at the Peace Conference that they intend, provided that Morocco is liberated from the "international servitudes" imposed by the German treaties, to maintain there the "open door," that is to say, economic, commercial and industrial equality for all the Allied nations.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 167.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 553.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 11, 1919.

MY telegram No. 536.

The following also left on the "Caledonia":—

Ali Hafez Ramadan, and Mohammed Effendi Abdel Fattah, correspondent of "Wadi El Nil" newspaper.

(Repeated to Malta.)

No. 168.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 554. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 12, 1919.

FRENCH Minister called on me this morning and asked what was status of Egyptians who sailed yesterday for Europe on steamship "Caledonia."

I told him that they travelled as private individuals, and that neither those starting from here nor those joining ship at Malta had any political recognition from His Majesty's Government.

No. 169.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 555. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 12, 1919.

CAIRO calm, but fresh activity is to be expected.

Armenians and Greeks are less apprehensive.

No settlement has yet been reached with officials on strike, but the Ministers are still negotiating with them. I interviewed Rushdy Pasha this evening, and he expressed himself as more hopeful of termination of strike.

Extremist demands are becoming more sweeping, and a Bolshevik spirit is developing.

There are no special incidents to report from Cairo or the districts.

* Also to Sir H. White, No. 45.

† Nos. 46 and 112.

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No. 170.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 136.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 12, 1919.

I HAVE been impressed with the apparently quite unexpected character of the recent outbreak in Egypt, which seems to have taken the local authorities, both civil and military, completely by surprise.

2. In his telegram No. 294, of the 24th February last, Sir M. Cheetham reported that the Nationalist movement could not be compared in importance with that of Mustapha Kamal, and he evidently considered that the agitation was dying out in the country at large. But in his telegram No. 408, of the 19th March, he informed me that the sudden appearance and rapid growth of the insurrection was astonishing to the oldest observers, that foreign influence was strongly suspected, and that British officials in Egypt believed that the feeling exhibited had been steadily growing during several years, and that an explosion was sooner or later inevitable.

3. It is evident that His Majesty's Residency had been supplied with totally insufficient and misleading information as to the true nature and character of the Nationalist political movement, as to the strength of the support which it enjoyed, and as to the organisation which it had prepared for outbreaks in every part of the country. It was certainly the duty of some branch or member of the British Service in Egypt to be better aware of native feeling and sentiment, to have foreseen the danger that was evidently impending, and to have warned the higher authorities accordingly. The failure in all these respects is a matter that calls for serious notice.

4. I shall be glad of any observations and explanations which you may have to offer on the subject, and also to learn whether you have taken or propose to take any action with regard to it.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 171.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 556.)

(Télégraphique.)

Caire, le 12 avril, 1919.

LE Gouvernement invite la population au calme et à la tranquillité comme il invite aussi les fonctionnaires et autres personnes qui se sont mis en grève pour appuyer les aspirations nationales à reprendre leur travail, maintenant que les Egyptiens ont été autorisés à partir et qu'il a été constitué un Ministère résolu à se dévouer entièrement au service du pays, pénétré des sentiments de la nation et appréciant à toute leur valeur les inspirations nationales.

Dans l'état actuel, la continuation des grèves est de nature à provoquer des désordres et à conduire à l'anarchie. Que les grévistes réfléchissent à la formidable responsabilité qu'ils encourent envers leur pays en persistant dans une attitude que l'expose à de tels dangers.

Le Gouvernement est convaincu que tout le monde comprendra que la première préoccupation de Sa Hautesse le Sultan en formant le Ministère était de faire le premier pas pour confier la sauvegarde de l'ordre et de la tranquillité à l'autorité égyptienne et pour revenir à l'état normal.

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres, HUSSÉIN ROUCHDY.

No. 172.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 558. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 12, 1919.

MY telegram No. 555.

I have seen Rushdy Pasha to-night, and he has shown me the notice in my immediately preceding telegram which I have approved, and which he will publish to-morrow.

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No. 173.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 543.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, April 11, 1919.

I SHOULD be grateful for any facilities which the Government of India could give merchants desiring to export flour or wheat to Egypt from next month onwards.

No. 174.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 558 A. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

IT is of great importance that I should be kept [? regularly] and fully informed of activities of Egyptians, mentioned in my telegrams Nos. 536 and 553 while in Europe, and I suggest special arrangements be made which will ensure my receiving a daily telegraphic report in full detail.

I should also receive ample notice of the results of their visit in order that I may be able to deal with any situation which may arise. There is a possibility that a lull may take place while they are in Europe, which will be utilised by Extremist leaders to perfect their organisation with a view to still more violent action, should they fail to attain their object.

I shall probably wish to publish from time to time information as to doings of these persons, in order to forestall inaccurate accounts which they themselves may send. There is little doubt that they have arranged secret means of communication which we may not be able to discover.

Plan of campaign of more extreme party, consisting chiefly of young students and violent Nationalists of the old School, is rapidly becoming Bolshevik in character. It is probable that Bolshevik agents will endeavour to gain touch with Egyptians while in Europe, and thus establish a footing in Egypt (see your telegram No. 423).

No. 175.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 559. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

AN insurrection took place at Tura gaol yesterday evening. Convicts numbering about 500 broke out and were fired on by guards of black warders. Returns so far received show 12 convicts killed, 70 wounded, and 100 still at large, of whom some are supposed to have been drowned in the Nile.

(Repeated to Khartoum.)

No. 176.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 569. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 403 to Peace Delegation repeated here.

I would again call attention to importance of recognition of Protectorate by Powers.

(Sent to peace delegation, No. 569 of 1st March.)

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No. 177.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 460.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 13, 1919.

I SHOULD be glad to have some idea of the material damage to public works caused during recent disturbances, and what cost of restoration will be roughly.

No. 178.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 570. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

ANTI-ARMENIAN movement proves to have been on a considerable scale. It was worst on 9th April, when large number of outrages on persons or property were apparently committed. Total deaths up to present number twenty-nine, but fuller information will probably increase this figure.

Movement is said to have been initiated by obscure and disreputable body of "Young Turk" sympathisers, possibly in collusion with students. Armenian leaders appealed to El Azhar authorities to use their influence, but no cessation of outrages followed. Armenians then concentrated in churches and schools under British protection and to-morrow move into properly organised concentration camp at Heliopolis. El Azhar and Egyptian lawyers are using threats and persuasion to prevent this. They demand that Armenians shall ask British to remove guards, to return to their houses, and that Armenian lawyers shall defend Egyptian political prisoners, but, so far, without success.

No. 179.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 571. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

NO incidents have been reported in the last twenty-four hours.

I have seen Rushdy Pasha this evening. He tells me he has failed to bring about cessation of strike, but that he and his colleagues are still working hard to that end. I am under the impression that Ministry is genuinely endeavouring to arrive at a solution, and they are frightened by growing Bolshevism of national movement.

No. 180.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 575. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 14, 1919.

STRIKE of Government officials continues in full force, and though there is an undercurrent of resistance to strike on part of Moderates, the Extremists are practically supreme. A new feature of the campaign of intimidation is the throwing of vitriol and other acids. A railway official and several tramway conductors have been injured in this way.

Further efforts made by El-Azhar and students to win over Armenians have failed.

Three more of the missing convicts from Tura have been captured and one killed.

Provinces are quiet, but strike of Government employees is reported from Zagazig.

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No. 181.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 578. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 15, 1919.

NATIONALIST movement in Egypt is based on idea that continued agitation will result in intervention by Peace Conference.

Egyptian notables who have now been permitted to leave for Europe as private individuals are regarded by many Egyptians as a delegation, and result of their visit is awaited with universal interest. Nature of their reception in Europe therefore will have considerable effect on situation here. If some of these gentlemen can gain access to responsible Allied statesmen, and are told that Allied Powers are agreeable to leave control and guidance of Egypt in hands of Great Britain, effect here can only be good, especially if Allied representatives in Egypt were instructed by their Governments to repeat statements made in Paris.

On the other hand, failure to obtain any hearing will be ascribed to British influence, and will probably lead to further endeavours to attract attention by continued agitation in Egypt, and campaign in European and American press.

(Repeated to Mr Balfour, Paris.)

No. 182.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 130.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 25, 1919.

THE following is a brief review of the attitude of the press in Egypt since the arrest of Saad Pasha Zaghlul and others:—

Practically the whole of the native press is Nationalist in varying degree. The two most important papers of the country are practically at opposite extremes; both are Syrian owned; but, while the "Mokattam" is strongly pro-British and anti-Nationalist, the proprietor of the "Akram," Takla Bey, has done his utmost to pose as the hero of the Nationalist Movement and to cement all classes, Christian, Syrian, and Moslem in the rising. Of the Moslem papers, the "Wad-el-Nil" has been on the whole moderate; among Coptic papers, the "Watan" has had several very sensible articles, while the "Misr" has gone all out for the union of Moslem and Copt. Practically all the native press, "Mokattam" of course excepted, has harped on the innocence of Egypt of the crimes, which, they state, are solely the work of the rabble.

Among foreign papers, the French "Journal du Caire" is deeply involved with the movement. Its editor, Georges Vayssié, has gone to France, it is believed specially commissioned by the Nationalists, to open a campaign in their favour in the French press. His deputy, Naametullah Ghanem, chooses the very morning on which General Allenby's appointment to maintain the King's Protectorate in Egypt is announced, to quote from the "Manchester Guardian" to the effect that Great Britain should be the mandatory nation in Egypt, the protectorate established during the war being abolished. This was of course suppressed. This attitude of the official French paper in Cairo is particularly unfortunate. The other French papers are quite sound.

Of English papers, the "Egyptian Mail" is absolutely sound, while the "Egyptian Gazette" does all in its power to insert inopportune quotations from British or native papers bearing indirectly on the situation.

Of the Italian papers, the "Roma" is a good second to the "Journal du Caire" in its sympathy with the Nationalist cause. The other Italian papers are fairly sound.

The Greek press is strongly pro-British.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 25, 1919.

IN my despatch No. 125 of the 22nd March, I recounted, upon the basis of such information as was then available, the sequence of events in Egypt during the previous fortnight. Owing to the interruption of communications, reports from the provinces were necessarily incomplete, and the present despatch is designed to supplement, in the light of subsequent information, the account given in my despatch No. 125.

The immediate local cause, or excuse, for the attack on Menuf Markaz, on the 14th March, is said to have been the detention there of a number of men who had been recruited for the Egyptian Labour Corps: the men were released by the assailants, and the Markaz was burnt.

While on the 15th March disturbance was rife in the Delta, and in Upper Egypt, serious outbreaks occurred at Beni-Suef, and more particularly at Wasta, the situation in the towns further south remained in the stage of peaceful demonstrations, and processions were held at Assiut, Sohag and Qena.

There is little to add to my previous account of events on the 16th. A demonstration took place at Zagazig, resulting in damage to Greek shops, which had become a usual feature of demonstrations in the Delta towns.

On the 17th, as I stated, the greater part of Lower Egypt was in open revolt. A detailed report from Dakalia shows that demonstrations were rife throughout the whole province, with widespread damage to communications, interruption of the sittings of law-courts, and seizure of grain collected for the army. The local authorities seem usually to have been successful in restoring order. The chief demonstrations occurred at Mansura and Mit-Ghamr. No casualties were reported, with the exception of two at Mansura.

Zifta fell into the hands of the mob, after demonstrations in which Europeans are said to have taken part, and in the course of which the ex-Khedive's photograph was hoisted on the Markaz. From this date all traffic on the Delta Light Railways was suspended.

In the Fayoum began attacks by Bedouin bands upon communications and Government buildings.

On the 18th, in Qaliubia, attacks on communications were made by numerous bands of one or more hundreds, who were eventually dispersed by the troops or the police; Birket el-Sab' station was destroyed, and serious rioting at Mansura resulted in the death of ten persons and the wounding of thirty-four, among the latter being the Mamur. On the whole, however, a certain improvement was perceptible in the central and southern parts of the Delta.

Violence was rapidly developing, however, in the Fayoum and Southern Egypt. In the outlying towns and districts of the Fayoum much damage was done by Bedouins, accompanied by some of the settled inhabitants, and aided by arms captured from the police, who were compelled to withdraw from the remoter posts. In several places, however, persuasion by officials and notables secured the dispersal of the bands. In Medinet-el-Fayoum the Bedouin leaders demanded independence and the withdrawal of the Mudir, but after parley they were prevailed upon to desist: their followers, who remained turbulent, were dispersed by machine-gun fire.

In most places between Minia and Luxor there were scenes of violence and destruction, and an outbreak occurred at Assiut, while at Assouan, apparently at the instigation of a Coptic schoolmaster, rioters damaged the railway and telegraph wires, locked up the Mudir, and flew a flag bearing the cross and the crescent.

On the 19th, it became clear that a tendency to order was radiating from Cairo. Violence had practically ceased in the Delta towns. Tanta was outwardly calm. Zagazig and Mit-Ghamr were quiet under the government of local committees, the Moawin of police in the former town finding employment as a tax-collector. Kafr-el-Zayat was the scene of a large but peaceful demonstration. Lawlessness continued, however, in the country districts of the Delta, with a tendency to general calm in Menufia and Behera (except the west). Further damage was done to railways, particularly in Northern Gharbia, and in some cases to irrigation regulators.

The Bedouins of Western Behera remained dangerous, but their attacks were held at bay until the arrival of military assistance. Their number, however, was reported to be increasing, especially in the neighbourhood of Kom Hamada, Delingat, Hosh Issa, and Abu Matamir. Further disorder occurred at Damietta, south of Cairo, but for a disturbance at Giza, suppressed by the police, the country appears to have been quiet as far as Beni-Suef.

At Minia there was a peaceful demonstration, but at other places in that province communications were further destroyed, stores burnt, and grain collected for the army seized. More damage was done at Assouan.

On the 20th, the situation again improved, and with the exception of a renewed outbreak of small dimensions in Qaliubia, and continued pillage in Northern Gharbia, little disturbance appears to have occurred.

On the 21st, a serious attack was made on Kafr-el-Sheikh by a mob estimated at 6,000 persons, who sacked the Markaz and took possession of 200 rifles and 6,000 rounds of ammunition belonging to the police and Ghafirs.

A demonstration was held at Port Said, which had hitherto been peaceful. The demonstrators, having been prevented by British troops, who inflicted some casualties, from passing from the Arab to the European quarter, forced their way into the police station of the former quarter and caused some damage, but dispersed under the fire of the police.

Renewed gatherings of Bedouins were reported from the Fayoum, and some bands were apparently moving north from the Fayoum and Beni Suef.

Alexandria was perfectly quiet from the 18th onwards, and no danger was reported from the Western desert.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 135.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 30, 1919.

SIR M. CHEETHAM'S despatches No. 125* of the 22nd March and No. 131 of the 25th March contained an account of the demonstrations and disorders in Egypt between the 9th and 22nd March. I now have the honour to report to your Lordship the progress of events during the past week.

1. Position on the 22nd March.

Cairo was quiet; the strike of lawyers and students continued; cabmen were generally returning to work, and so, to a more limited extent, were railwaymen; a much-restricted service of trams was running, under military control; Government officials were attending their offices.

Alexandria had been normal for some days. Port Said had returned to calm after the disturbance of the previous day, and no disorder at all had occurred at Suez.

In Lower Egypt order had been restored in the provinces of Qaliubia and Menufia, though on this day an isolated case of damage to the railway was reported from Qaliubia; the Bedouins on the borders of Menufia were dispersing. The towns of Shakia province were fairly quiet, though not free from demonstrations; the outlying districts were still in disorder. In Dakalia the towns were by no means peaceful, while the country was very turbulent, and great damage was still being done to communications. The greater part of Gharbia province was calm, but disorder, with cattle-lifting and pillage, was rife in the northern districts. Behera was generally calm, but the always turbulent Bedouins who are settled on the western fringe of this province were very actively hostile, and considerable bands of them had been delivering dangerous attacks on the large villages of this district and on neighbouring communications. It was also feared that irrigation works had been destroyed. But for some unrest in Wadi Natrun the Western Desert had not been affected by the movement;

* See No. 151.

the coast Bedouin had rejected the overtures of emissaries from Behera, and many of them were helping to guard the Mariut Railway.

In Upper Egypt Giza province was still not entirely free from incident, but quiet had been almost re-established, and the border Bedouins were scattering. Considerable areas of this province and that of Beni Suef had remained unmoved. There had been, as I have reported, a most violent outbreak at Wasta, and in the course of serious riots in the town of Beni Suef the Assize Judge's house was completely wrecked. The situation here had at one time appeared critical, owing chiefly to the large numbers of Bedouins in the neighbourhood, but the local authorities, who acquitted themselves well, found support in a strong orderly element among the population and also among the Bedouins, and on the 22nd March the Mudir was able to report that the position was normal, markets and shops reopened, and foreigners, who had taken refuge in two houses under the protection of 100 Indian troops, safe. Reliable information exists concerning the fomentors of disorder in this area.

In the Fayoum the conditions had been alarming. The Bedouins here had driven in the police from the outlying posts, captured their arms, and occupied Etsa, 10 kilom. south of Medinet-el-Fayoum. The small military garrison and the apparently competent local authorities had found active support among the inhabitants against Bedouin aggression, and by the 22nd order had been re-established in the central districts and preparations were being made to recover control of the remoter areas.

The northern part of the province of Minia had become comparatively quiet, but from Mallawi to Assiut, an area which in normal times is notoriously criminal, had become perhaps more turbulent than any other part of Egypt. The inhabitants of Deirut bear the chief responsibility for the murder of a British official, Kaimakam Pope Bey, of the Prisons Department, and British officers and probably soldiers in the train from Luxor on the night of the 17th March, and this town was on the 22nd in the hands of an armed mob who had sacked the Markaz, and were prepared to hold up all traffic on the Nile. At Assiut itself the position had been extremely delicate since the 18th. Violent elements had been collected, but had not so far acted; feeling was very anti-British. The local Nationalist Committee, consisting largely of Copts, was issuing, with the prudent encouragement of the Mudir, circulars favouring independence, but deprecating violence, and, in spite of fighting in the southern environs of the town, it was hoped that acute trouble might be avoided.

What was occurring in the three southernmost provinces, Girga, Qena, and Assouan, is not yet quite clear. It appears, however, in general that the period of attacks by Bedouins and other hostile elements succeeded on or about the 18th to the period of peaceful demonstrations. Qena town and Luxor remained quiet until the 20th, but on the 22nd their situation was serious.

In the Soudan there was apparently no cause for anxiety, but rumours from Egypt were arousing uneasiness, and a certain agitation among junior Egyptian officials. Help was being sent to Assouan, and General Stack was asking for a British reinforcement of his garrison, which it has not been possible to afford.

2. Development from the 23rd March to the 28th March.

I do not propose in the present despatch to discuss the movement of political opinion in Cairo.

Except for the scarcity of trams, the presence at various points of British or Egyptian pickets, and certain groupings of religious or other students, the town has outwardly presented its normal aspect, and men have been gradually returning to work at the railway shops. Alexandria and Port Said have remained perfectly quiet.

In Lower Egypt Qaliubia and Menufia provinces remained uninterruptedly tranquil, and military reports mention the definite friendliness of the inhabitants in some districts. In Sharkia isolated incidents occurred, of which the most important was an attack upon a construction train, but normal conditions became rapidly prevalent, and in the course of the restoration of order arrests were made of many persons, including several omdas. Zagazig remained quiet, the inhabitants pursuing their business as usual. I understand that the local Nationalist Committee have decided to cease active operations, and to send a delegation to Cairo with the object of putting their grievances before me. Dakalia became less unsettled, though in many districts acts of violence occurred, among which I may instance the destruction of locks near Simbellawein, and of a light railway bridge near Dekernes, on the 25th March, and the burning of Irrigation buildings at Mit Samanud on the 27th. Gharbia also was mainly calm, though a

demonstration of 2,000 people attacked the Markaz of Zifta on the 25th March, and only dispersed on the police threatening to fire; damage was also done to the railway near Zifta. A disaffected area remained in the north of this province, its centres being Dessuk and Kafr-esh-Sheikh. On the 26th March, Kafr-esh-Sheikh was surrounded by a flying column, and arrests began to be made, while, on the same day, the mob destroyed a Coptic church near Dessuk. Over almost the whole of Behera conditions became normal, the notables of some localities forming committees for maintaining public safety and food supplies. In the west, on the 24th March, an attempt was made by 200 persons to destroy a bridge near Kafr-ed-Dawar, but by the next day a mobile column was moving to the fringe of this province, and arrests were being made at Hosh Issa. Kom Hamada was occupied by a mobile column on the 27th March without opposition.

In the provinces of Giza and Beni Suef, no incidents were reported with the exception of an attack on the sugar factory at Hawamdin, which the troops and police repulsed, inflicting three casualties.

No trouble occurred in the Fayoum, which was reported clear of Bedouin bands on the 27th, or in the northern parts of the province of Minia. South Minia and North Assiut remained hostile areas, but the normal life of the country went on while roving bands committed occasional outrages. Shots were fired at flying boats or steamers near Mallawi, Manfalut, and Deirut on the 26th. South of Deirut, General Huddleston's force proceeding to Assiut encountered some opposition, and I regret to report that Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Hazel, O.B.E., Inspector of the Ministry of the Interior, was fatally wounded. At Assiut itself the tumult, which it had been hoped to avert, broke out violently. Pillage and burning, with severe fighting between the local garrison and the Bedouin and other assailants, continued from the 23rd to the 25th, when critical situation was saved by the arrival of General Huddleston's force. Very extensive damage had been done, including the destruction of Government buildings and of a chaff press belonging to the military authorities, with some 30,000 tons of chaff.

Meanwhile, the province of Giza was calm, but Qena and Luxor reported on the 24th that the situation was still serious, and that troops were urgently required. On the 25th the force, which had been despatched from the Soudan to relieve Assouan, left Shellal for Luxor by rail, but they were forced to return, owing to a break in the railway. They left again by river, and, arriving at Luxor on the 26th, reported all well. On the 25th an improvement had been reported both from Luxor and Qena.

Assouan was calm from the 22nd onwards, and the troops from the Soudan appear to have found the Arabs of this province ready to give them every assistance.

3. Position on the 29th March.

By yesterday order had apparently been restored throughout the country, except in certain parts of Dakalia province, where sporadic rioting continued.

In Cairo the strike of lawyers continued. The primary schools, which opened yesterday after a normal vacation, were attended by about half the pupils. The secondary schools and higher colleges in Cairo were unattended, but more than half the students of the Ras-el-Tin secondary school at Alexandria were working. There was some hope of an early settlement of the tramway strike.

Though on the surface life was proceeding normally, there were numerous sub-currents of rumour alleging the probability of further strikes accompanied by outrages on life and property to take place, it was most freely indicated, on the 2nd April. Al Azhar had definitely become the centre of resistance to pacification.

Arrangements had been made with the object of preventing the departure from Cairo of persons likely to instigate further trouble in the provinces.

In Lower Egypt the main communications were wholly under military control, and the chief railway, telegraphic, and telephonic communications were operating. Military columns were working east and west from the main railway lines. The light railways were still out of action. Irrigation does not appear to have suffered greatly; though there have been breakages of locks and canal banks with some flooding, it is not known that serious damage has been done to pumping plants except in one place. No estimate of the material damage done is yet possible. There have been isolated murders, but the number of lives lost is not yet known.

In Upper Egypt a force was moving southwards from Wasta, another was in occupation of the Assiut district, while the provinces of Assouan and Qena had been secured by forces from the Soudan. The railway was operating from Cairo to Wasta,

and the line from Wasta to Fayoum was open. There was also, probably, railway service between Luxor and Assouan. The telegraph was working, restrictedly, between Cairo and Assouan. Though very great damage has been done to Government property throughout Upper Egypt, especially in Beni Suef, Minia, Deirut, and Assiut, irrigation appears to have suffered lightly. The sugar factories at Arment, Baliana, and Nag Hamadi are believed to be intact, and to have worked uninterruptedly. What loss of life there may have been is still unknown, but, apart from isolated murders, it appears that European communities concentrated wherever necessary and held out until they were relieved from the river, or until the troubles subsided.

I have alluded occasionally in this despatch to the conduct of Egyptian officials. I propose to devote a subsequent despatch to this subject, but I may here remark that the behaviour of the officials responsible for maintaining order (of whom, no doubt, the vast majority are in sympathy with the Nationalist cause, if not with the extreme party of independence) has been on the whole worthy of much praise. Some have been weak, some have lost their nerve, some, it will probably be found, have been deliberately negligent. On the whole, however, not only have they displayed resource in most difficult circumstances, but, more especially where, as in the Fayoum and the South, the outbreak has rather taken on the form of alien aggression, they have organised stout resistance, while the lower ranks have performed many notable acts of bravery.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General.
High Commissioner.

No. 185.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 2, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 465 of the 31st March, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of the memorandum therein mentioned, as addressed to me by the extremist deputation.

This document, which from internal evidence of style and composition can hardly have been written by any member of the existing deputation, is probably intended to present the Nationalist case in more moderate language than that hitherto employed. You may specially note the expression that British interests are not irreconcilable with Egyptian aspirations. I am led therefore to hope that useful discussion may take place at a later stage.

I propose to comment on the Nationalist memorandum in greater detail in a further despatch.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 185.

Memorandum addressed to General Sir E. Allenby by the Extremist Deputation.

(Traduction.)

Le Caire, le 29 mars 1919.

RÉPONDANT à votre invitation du 26 mars, les soussignés, membres de la Délégation égyptienne, ont l'honneur de soumettre à votre Excellence ce rapport sur les causes du mécontentement des Égyptiens. Bien que les déclarations de Lord Curzon nous mettent dans une situation spéciale en ce qui concerne les troubles actuels, cela ne peut nous faire manquer à nos devoirs patriotiques et humanitaires les plus sacrés, devoirs qui nous obligent à vous éclairer sur la genèse de ces troubles, dans l'espoir que vous voudrez bien, dans votre haute sagesse, supprimer les causes pour faire disparaître les effets.

Ce mouvement d'un caractère général, qui n'était prévu par aucun de ceux qui s'occupent de politique en Égypte, n'a pas dans les âmes égyptiennes pour mobile un

sentiment de haine contre les Anglais en général, comme on pourrait en déduire des expressions de Lord Curzon qui dit que nous voulons chasser de notre pays le plus puissant Empire de l'univers. Au contraire, rien dans la conduite des Égyptiens, depuis l'occupation jusqu'à nos jours, n'indique qu'il existe aucune haine de quelque nature que ce soit, mais tout dans cette conduite prouve le sentiment naturel à chaque peuple d'aspirer à son indépendance. Ici, ce sentiment était mêlé de l'espoir que la sympathie du noble peuple anglais nous aiderait à obtenir notre indépendance, convaincus que nous sommes que l'occasion que cherchait Lord Salisbury, dans sa déclaration du 3 novembre 1886, se réalise actuellement.

En effet, il est impossible qu'il vienne à l'esprit du peuple égyptien, qui est le plus calme des peuples, d'irriter la Grande-Bretagne alors qu'il compte sur son concours pour obtenir ses libertés. Les hommes d'État anglais qui se trouvent en Égypte ne peuvent nier les bonnes dispositions des Égyptiens qui, en échange de l'indépendance de leur pays, offraient d'aider dans la mesure de leurs moyens la Grande-Bretagne dans la défense de la cause de la justice et de la liberté des petits peuples. Ils ne peuvent nier, non plus, que, lors de l'intervention de la Turquie dans le conflit, certaines personnalités égyptiennes responsables renouvelèrent les marques de ces mêmes dispositions. Par son attitude irréprochable durant toute la guerre et les grands sacrifices qu'il a consentis, le peuple égyptien attendait d'être traité avec sollicitude et d'être récompensé, la suzeraineté turque ayant pris fin, par la reconnaissance de son indépendance.

La Délégation égyptienne, qui fut chargée de la mission de revendiquer cette indépendance, inscrivit en tête de son programme la nécessité de son départ pour l'Angleterre afin d'exposer ses vues au peuple britannique et gagner sa sympathie pour l'Égypte et les Égyptiens, de même que pour montrer à l'opinion publique anglaise qu'entre les intérêts de la Grande-Bretagne et l'indépendance de l'Égypte un terrain d'entente n'était pas impossible, mais, au contraire, facile à trouver. La Délégation égyptienne comptait également pour le succès de ses démarches sur le témoignage favorable que vous avez donné sur les Égyptiens, après que vous ayez remporté la victoire et que la triomphe ait couronné vos efforts. Ainsi tout indique bien que le mouvement n'est point le résultat d'une haine enracinée dans les âmes, quoiqu'il soit, en général, l'un des effets de la désillusion.

I.

Lorsque le protectorat sur l'Égypte fut proclamé, les Égyptiens se demandèrent avec étonnement comment il était possible qu'avec les Anglais, peuple libéral, leur situation politique fût pire qu'avec les Turcs? Mais loin d'admettre une telle chose, ils ont cru qu'il ne s'agissait que d'une nécessité momentanée de guerre. Certainement la classe cultivée fut la plus troublée par cet événement. Néanmoins, la classe ouvrière ne tarda pas à éprouver le malaise résultant des humiliations de toutes sortes qu'elle eut à subir à la suite des mesures prises par les agents de l'autorité en ce qui concerne le volontariat et les autres charges imposées. De là, le malaise pénétra dans les classes moyennes. On peut même constater dans des enquêtes officielles les traces de ce malaise qui s'était généralisé. Il s'aggrava encore devant les menaces que les jeunes inspecteurs anglais adressaient à certains notables au sujet du traitement plus humiliant qui serait appliqué lorsque l'Égypte serait entièrement dévolue à l'Angleterre.

Mais l'espoir de résoudre la question égyptienne conformément aux aspirations des Égyptiens était le palliatif à cet état de malaise. Cet espoir allait augmentant de jour en jour, à la suite des discours des hommes d'État anglais et américains que le peuple lisait dans les journaux, et surtout après le discours du Président Wilson sur la liberté des petits peuples et dans lequel il assurait qu'à l'avenir il n'y aurait ni peuples dominateurs, ni peuples assujétis, mais que tous seraient égaux dans la confraternité humaine.

Cet espoir, cependant, ne manquait pas d'être troublé, parfois, dans les milieux intellectuels, par les renseignements qu'on publiait sur les travaux législatifs préparatoires, c'est-à-dire, les travaux de la Commission des Capitulations. En effet, l'économie de ces travaux ne contentait personne, ni les Égyptiens, ni les étrangers, mais le Gouvernement ne fit pas cas de ce mécontentement. Pour qui observe de près le cours des événements en Égypte, il n'est pas possible de ne pas reconnaître que ces travaux législatifs effrayaient les Égyptiens quant à l'avenir du pays, attendu que tous les intérêts y étaient envisagés à l'exclusion des leurs. Ainsi ils étaient amenés peu à peu à perdre leur espoir dans la sympathie de la Grande-Bretagne.

Ces travaux furent ensuite suivis d'un projet de loi organique dont l'esprit s'accordait parfaitement avec l'esprit de la législation préparée pour l'unification des

juridictions. De ce projet de loi organique on peut inférer clairement que les Égyptiens n'étaient considérés que comme une quantité négligeable, ne devant avoir aucune part dans la gestion des affaires de leur pays. Profondément affectés, ils ont cependant cru que tout cela était le fait du parti impérialiste et que le peuple libéral britannique était loin de souscrire à cet état de chose, et ils ont continué à compter toujours sur l'opinion publique anglaise et sur la Conférence de la Paix, dont les principes étaient établis par les quatre nations libérales : Angleterre, France, États-Unis et Italie, sur les bases de la liberté, du droit et de la justice.

C'est lorsque des principes furent publiés que la Délégation fut constituée. Ses membres ne sont point irresponsables et ne sont pas loin d'exprimer l'opinion publique égyptienne, comme on le prétend. Au contraire, outre la qualité de députés à l'Assemblée législative de son Président et de plusieurs de ses membres, elle a entre ses mains les mandats de plus de trois quarts des députés qui composent actuellement l'Assemblée législative. La Délégation possède aussi les mandats d'autres corps représentatifs, tels que les conseils provinciaux et les conseils municipaux et ceux des notables du pays.

La Délégation ayant demandé des permis de voyage pour l'Angleterre et la France, ils lui furent refusés. Elle se plaignit au Haut-Commissaire, Sir Reginald Wingate, puis à M. Lloyd George, et elle frappa ensuite à toutes les portes pour qu'il lui soit permis de partir. Entre-temps le Ministère Ruchdi démissionnait, parce qu'on refusait de laisser partir deux de ses membres en temps voulu. L'interdiction de partir faite aux Égyptiens, Ministres et particuliers, ne pouvait naturellement que créer cette supposition : que la politique anglaise ne comptait pas prêter l'appui dans lequel les Égyptiens espéraient—supposition qui faillit se transformer en une conviction ferme, si Sir Reginald Wingate, voyant que le Ministère subordonnait le retrait de sa démission à la levée de l'embargo, n'avait promis aux deux Ministres qu'il insisterait lui-même auprès du Gouvernement anglais et qu'il espérait fermement aboutir à ce qu'on levât l'interdiction de partir. Cette promesse du Haut-Commissaire était tellement sérieuse que la discussion se porta même sur la facilitation des moyens de transport, en sorte que tout le monde fut convaincu que la Délégation se préparait effectivement à partir. Si ce départ avait eu lieu, le mécontentement des Égyptiens causé par l'interdiction faite à ceux qui devaient exposer leurs revendications aurait été dissipé et aurait été dissipée aussi l'anxiété naturelle qui accompagne l'attente.

Pendant ce temps, les Égyptiens lisaient avec étonnement les nouvelles concernant les Délégations d'autres pays : Hedjaz, Arménie, Syrie, Liban, &c., qui, hier encore provinces turques, se trouvaient pour la plupart en guerre contre les Alliés, alors que l'Égypte plus riche, plus civilisée et jouissant déjà d'une autonomie garantie par un traité international, avait aidé à la conquête de ces mêmes pays. Or, seule elle n'avait pas le droit d'avoir sa Délégation et seuls les Égyptiens ne pouvaient pas partir pour soumettre leur cause à la Conférence de la Paix, pas plus qu'à l'opinion anglaise elle-même. Qui peut douter que ce traitement devait engendrer la colère dans les âmes ?

Lorsqu'il fut déclaré ici que l'interdiction de voyager était définitive et que la démission du Cabinet fut acceptée, démission dont le "Morning Post" a dit, dans son numéro du 29 janvier, qu'elle se présentait dans des conditions qui rendaient très difficile à un autre Égyptien de former un nouveau Ministère sans s'exposer à l'impopularité, les esprits furent troublés et le désespoir de voir la situation s'améliorer commença à gagner le pays. C'est alors que nous présentâmes à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une requête pour le prier d'intervenir afin de soulager l'inquiétude qui remplissait les cœurs, et c'est alors que, partant d'un même point de vue, des députations de tous les points du pays commencèrent à affluer pour soumettre à Sa Hautesse des requêtes dans le même sens.

Les autorités supérieures ne purent convaincre personne, parmi ceux qui étaient qualifiés pour assumer les charges de la situation difficile créée au pays par la politique de rigueur, de former un Ministère. L'autorité militaire nous convoqua ensuite et nous avertit que nous mettions des entraves au fonctionnement du Gouvernement en essayant d'empêcher la formation du Ministère ; et deux jours plus tard elle procédait à l'arrestation de notre Président, Saad Pacha Zagloul, et nos trois collègues, leurs Excellences Mohammed Mahmoud Pacha, Ismaïl Sidky Pacha et Hamad el-Bassil Pacha, et les exilait à Malte.

II.

Cela avait lieu, alors que tout le pays était bien convaincu que nous n'avions rien fait d'illégal tant aux yeux de la loi commune qu'au regard des ordres de l'autorité

militaire. A peine la nouvelle de l'arrestation de nos collègues fut-elle connue, qu'un groupe nombreux d'étudiants des écoles supérieures sont venus nous informer qu'ils étaient résolus à faire des manifestations. Nous les avons conseillés longuement de renoncer à leur intention et de poursuivre tranquillement leurs études. Mais il semble que leur jeunesse n'a pu supporter plus longtemps l'émotion provoquée par la politique d'oppression et que, dans cet état d'âme, ils n'ont pu réfléchir sur nos conseils ou qu'ils n'ont pu persuader leurs camarades de nous écouter.

Le lendemain de l'arrestation, les étudiants se livrèrent à des manifestations pacifiques : près de 300 furent arrêtés. Le jour suivant, le 10 mars, les étudiants de l'Université d'Al-Azhar participèrent aux manifestations ; quelques apaches en profitèrent pour attaquer les tramways et casser les vitres de quelques magasins. Le 11, une autre manifestation pacifique d'étudiants fut reçue par des coups de fusil, qui en tuèrent un certain nombre. Le 12, mêmes manifestations pacifiques enrayées par le feu des mitrailleuses, qui causa la mort de plusieurs jeunes gens. Le même jour, à Tanta, une manifestation pacifique d'étudiants est accueillie par le feu nourri des mitrailleuses, faisant de nombreuses victimes, morts ou blessés. Les 13 et 14, nouvelles manifestations au Caire qui subissent le même sort.

Nul doute que le fait par les troupes anglaises de tirer sur des étudiants désarmés se livrant à de pacifiques manifestations, dans les circonstances que l'on sait, était de nature à provoquer dans le pays des conséquences fâcheuses. Ce devait être la dernière goutte qui fait déborder la coupe trop pleine. En effet, les nouvelles commencèrent à parvenir d'attentats sur les voies de communication, et aussitôt le pays tout entier participa à ces troubles graves. Le mécontentement contre le traitement cruel infligé, en pleine paix, à un peuple tranquille et sans armes, n'a pas gagné que les hommes. Les grandes dames de la société égyptienne n'ont pu, elles aussi, supporter en silence le choc de l'émotion, et le rideau qui les sépare ordinairement du monde extérieur ne les a pas empêchées d'exprimer leurs sentiments. En effet, près des trois cents d'entre elles, qui comptent parmi les familles les plus distinguées du Caire, organisèrent, le 20 mars, une manifestation simple et digne, après qu'elles eurent lu dans les journaux du matin que l'autorisation avait été accordée. Mais quand elles furent descendues de voiture et qu'elles arrivèrent à la hauteur de la maison de Saad Pacha Zagloul, les soldats britanniques les cernèrent de tous les côtés, les visant baïonnette au canon et les obligèrent à rester, deux heures durant, au soleil sans leur permettre ni de marcher, ni de monter dans leurs voitures pour rentrer chez elles. Cette dernière permission ne leur fut accordée qu'après qu'elles aient été vues dans cette situation par le personnel des agences diplomatiques des États-Unis et d'Italie. Ce fut encore là une des manifestations de cette politique de vexations qui, justement et équitablement, doit seule être tenue responsable de toutes les conséquences.

L'autorité militaire, cependant, nous convoqua une autre fois, le 16 mars, pour nous déclarer qu'elle nous tenait responsables des troubles et nous obliger à les faire cesser ; mais cette fois elle nous permit de discuter sur la question de la responsabilité. A ce sujet nous répondîmes que les troubles ne pouvaient être ni la conséquence prévue, ni la conséquence imprévue de nos travaux, que notre programme ne les encourageait d'aucune façon, qu'au contraire nous étions les premiers à les regretter ; et quant à les apaiser, nous ne possédions pas les moyens efficaces pour y parvenir. Nous conseillâmes, comme le meilleur moyen d'arriver à ce but par la voie pacifique, la formation d'un Ministère qui se présente avec quelques concessions qui puissent satisfaire le peuple et lui permettent d'assumer les lourdes charges du pouvoir dans les circonstances actuelles. (Ce fut aussi l'opinion de l'élite du pays : Ulémas, Patriarche copte orthodoxe, Ministres, députés, &c., ainsi qu'ils l'ont déclaré dans leur lettre du 24 mars au Général Commandant en Chef les Forces britanniques en Égypte.)

Le lendemain, le 17 mars, nous avons été voir les Ministres Ruchdi Pacha, Adli Pacha et Sarwat Pacha, et nous les avons convaincus de montrer leur bonne disposition à entrer en pourparlers pour la formation d'un Ministère qui pût maîtriser un mouvement effrayant dont les suites inconnues étaient à craindre. Ils firent preuve de leurs bonnes dispositions à la Résidence, mais cela n'eut pas de suites. Les troubles ont pris, depuis, des proportions et des formes dont les conséquences dans l'âme du peuple ne sont pas chose facile à apprécier.

III.

Ce que nous pouvons assurer à votre Excellence, avec la plus grande franchise, c'est que le mécontentement des Égyptiens est aussi causé par le fait qu'ils ne sont pas traités sur le même pied d'égalité que les petits peuples qui ne les dévancent pas en

civilisation puisqu'on veut les empêcher d'exposer leurs aspirations nationales à la Conférence de la Paix. Tous les Égyptiens, du plus grand au plus petit, partagent ce grief. C'est le désespoir qui les a poussés à exprimer leur sentiment. Chacun l'exprime à sa façon. Les hommes autorisés, fonctionnaires ou non, l'ont fait par diverses protestations écrites; les avocats, en outre, ont interrompu leur activité professionnelle; la jeunesse s'est livrée à des manifestations pacifiques. Quant aux habitants de l'intérieur ils l'ont traduit, les uns par des manifestations également pacifiques, les autres par des attentats divers, ainsi que nous en avons eu connaissance par les communiqués officiels, et dont quelques-uns nous inspirèrent les plus vifs regrets.

Telle est la réalité de la situation où se trouve notre pays en ce moment. Nous avons exposé à votre Excellence un résumé exact que nous vous prions de bien vouloir vérifier. Nous avons tout espoir que votre justice fera cesser le mécontentement du pays en supprimant les causes qui l'ont créé.

Venir en aide à tout un peuple, c'est l'un des devoirs les plus sacrés des grands hommes.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

ALY PASHA SHARAWY.
HUSSEIN PASHA WASSEF.
ABDEL KHALIK PASHA MADKOUR.
ABDEL AZIZ FAHMY BEY.
AHMED LUTFI EL-SAYED BEY.
MOHAMMED ALY BEY.
SINNOT HANNA BEY.
MAHMOUD ABOUL NASR BEY.
GEORGES KHAYAT BEY.
DR. HAFEZ AFFIFI BEY.
ABDEL LATIF EL-MEKABBATY BEY.
MUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS BEY.

Le Caire, le 29 mars 1919.

No. 186.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 142.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 2, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information copy of a report, compiled by the General Staff Intelligence, upon the political situation in Egypt on the 1st April.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General.

Enclosure in No. 186.

Report by the General Staff Intelligence upon the Political Situation in Egypt on April 1, 1919.

THE atmosphere in Cairo seems clearer than it was twenty-four hours ago, though at the same time rumours persist and further cases have been reported of intimidation. The extremist party appear to be aiming at a general strike which will paralyse everything. Their tactics are professedly passive. They are, however, rather puzzled by the position taken up by the British Government officials to adopt on their side a similar passive attitude, and to take no steps against those who go on strike beyond locking them so many days pay. It is not anticipated that the strike will be more than a demonstration. It is curious what far-reaching results Lord Curzon's speech has had in this country. It is reported that the Sultan is very indignant at Lord Curzon's statement that he, the Sultan, asked for assistance. Again, Lord Curzon's

remark that the Government officials were solid with the British Administration has created a great deal of excitement, and is supposed to be definitely responsible for the coming strike by which the Government officials hope to register their protests against Lord Curzon's misrepresentation of their sentiments.

A further curious rumour has arisen recently. The educated Egyptians say that the Peace Conference, in adopting the resolution that missions should visit countries which were to be placed under mandatory power, included Egypt in the list. A statement to this effect is reported to have been made by the "Manchester Guardian." The rumour goes on to say that, when the Peace Conference's report on the eventual disposal of Armenia, Syria, &c., was passed through the cables, the censors in Egypt deleted Egypt from the countries to be visited by a mission. This is a further testimony of the false impression raised in Egypt by President Wilson's publication of his fourteen clauses, and it is a well-known fact that many of the outrages which have been committed in Egypt have been perpetrated in the hope that by hook or crook, they would be reported in America and would attract the President's attention.

In the political circles there appears to exist a better understanding of the general position here, and one which is more likely to produce a satisfactory solution of the present impasse.

The raids for the purpose of seizing arms in the cafés last night have re-acted in a wholesome way on the hot-heads, making them feel the strength of the mailed fist under the velvet glove.

From the provinces there are reports of an atmosphere of expectancy, similar to that which has been recently experienced in Cairo. It is probable that the coming demonstrations here may find an echo in the provinces.

(For Lieutenant-Colonel, G.S.I.),

O. M. TWEEDY, Captain.

*Second Echelon, G.H.Q., E.E.F.
April 1, 1919.*

No. 187.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 582. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 15, 1919.

NO incidents are reported to-day from Cairo or provinces, the officials' strike, however, shows signs of spreading to the provinces. There is evidence of growing hostility to Cairo lawyers on the part of provincial landowners, who realise that movement will threaten property.

Prime Minister yesterday thought strike in Cairo would end to-day or to-morrow, but there are no signs of this to-day.

No. 188.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 2, 1919.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 386* of the 26th March (enquiring when report referred to in No. 27 can be expected), I have the honour to forward herewith a note by Sir George Macauley, General Manager Egyptian State Railways, on the question of the future working of Palestine railways; and in particular, the Kantara-Rafa section.

I regret that through an oversight these remarks were not forwarded before as promised in Sir R. Wingate's telegram No. 112 of the 20th January.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Peace Delegation.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

* Not printed.

[2568]

T 2

Enclosure in No. 188.

Sir G. Macauley to General Sir E. Allenby.

Excellency,

Cairo Station, January 9, 1919.

PALESTINE military railways.

With reference to your letter No. 324 of the 11th December, 1918, addressed to The Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, and the Foreign Office cablegram No. 23 of the 5th January, 1919, in reply.

The proposition is not so simple as it might appear.

1. The existence of a line east of the Canal will necessitate a guard at the Egyptian frontier; without the railway, the hundred-mile stretch of practically waterless desert was guard enough for Egypt and the Canal.

2. If the line to Palestine is to be worked permanently, some permanent means of crossing over or under the Suez Canal will be wanted; the present bridge was only allowed by the Canal Company on the condition that it was removed after the war; it certainly narrows the channel considerably. A permanent crossing will cost a great deal of money. Who is to pay for this?

3. Passenger stock is wanted for the line: the Egyptian railways have hitherto supplied it, but will want theirs back after the war, being very short of it. Many of the engines supplied by the War Office are very old.

4. The main workshops for the whole Palestine railways are at Kantara. If the State railways are to work the Kantara-Rafa section, a running shed for engines and another for wagons will be all that is necessary at Kantara; heavy repairs to engines and rolling-stock on this section could be done at Boulac shops in Cairo. This does not apply to the rest of the line, however, and repair shops will be wanted for the other sections of line—probably the best thing would be to move the main repair shops from Kantara to Ludd or Haifa. At present it would not be possible to find enough good workmen to man these shops from Egypt; later on, when the Continental armies demobilise, and it is possible to get Italian and Greek workmen again, something might be done.

5. What is the military traffic going to be in six months' time from now? A great deal depends on this.

6. It is improbable that the line will pay with civilian traffic alone, at all events, for some years to come.

The railway is parallel to the sea coast, and close to it, so that coasting steamers will probably compete successfully for freight. The Palestine ports are poor at present, but can be improved; even as it is, Jaffa managed to pass 1,000,000 tons out and import 1,000,000 tons yearly before the war.

7. Who is to fix rates? They will affect the Kantara-Rafa section considerably. It will have no traffic of its own, being laid through desert, and so will have to depend for revenue on its share of through traffic to and from other sections of the railways.

8. The Kantara-Rafa section runs through practically a waterless country. It would therefore be necessary either:—

(a.) To maintain the pipe line, pumps, &c. This may lead to difficulties with the Suez Canal about syphons—the pipes in the bed of the Canal prevent them from dredging.

(b.) To provide condensers.

(c.) To run tanks of water on each train.

These are all expensive proceedings.

The staff along the line will have to be watered and fed by the Administration.

9. Part of the line is on low-lying, flat land, which would be flooded if the Bardawil peninsula is cut again, so that the Bardawil fisheries could be reopened. It would cost a good deal to raise the line, and pitch the bank with stone, which would probably be necessary to make it safe. The fisheries have been closed during the war.

10. I do not think that 60,000*l.* is an excessive estimate for quarters—indeed, it will be difficult to keep within this figure unless prices drop. It must be remembered that there are no villages or houses available for lodging staff. Civilians will not stay without their families. The figure does not include goods sheds or quarters for goods staff, as these will probably not be needed for army traffic, and I did not therefore consider them a fair charge to the army. The numbers of staff were calculated on a basis of six trains each way daily.

I divided the houses required into the following six classes:—

Class A: 4 rooms, kitchen and servants' quarters, &c.

Class B: 3 rooms, kitchen and servants' quarters, &c.

Class C: 2 rooms, kitchen and servants' quarters, &c.

Class D: 2 smaller rooms, kitchen, small yard.

Class E: 1 room, kitchen, small yard.

Class F: 1 room, small yard with native oven.

I estimated that the following would be wanted:—

1 of Class A; 5 of Class B; 8 of Class C; 29 of Class D; 219 of Class E; 872 of Class F (includes 250 permanent sand men).

Besides the above, tents are wanted for 700 temporary men for clearing sand for four months yearly.

I think it will not be easy to get all the above for 60,000*l.*, but I hope to do so by using old rails, &c., as much as possible in construction.

I have, &c.

G. B. MACAULEY.

No. 189.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 707.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 17, 1919.

WITH reference to telegram No. 569* of 13th April from Cairo.

Matter is at present being discussed, but moment is not propitious for approaching Italian Government.

Would it be helpful to endeavour to secure recognition by some of minor Powers who have not yet given their assent, such as Greece, Roumania, Norway, and Switzerland?

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 26.)

No. 190.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 589.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 16, 1919.

THERE are no fresh incidents to report in Cairo or the provinces, but strike of Government officials still continues in Cairo, post office and railways being much crippled thereby. Strike has spread to Ismailia and other railway centres, and arrangements have been made for a limited but sufficient service to be run by military. Foreign communities are somewhat uneasy, but I am reassuring them, and taking measures for their protection in case it should be necessary.

No. 191.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 590.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 17, 1919.

MERTON, "Times" correspondent, is shortly leaving Egypt. I am most anxious that he should be replaced by first-class man. Could Lord Northcliffe produce one? It is also desirable, if possible, that a good French correspondent should come out here. I am told Vayssié† is not returning, but in any case his activities would be directed against us. Allusions to Egyptian crisis in European press received up to date have been very meagre, and in view of propaganda which Nationalists will certainly carry on abroad, and large sums they will be willing to spend on subsidising more venal newspapers, it is essential that leading journals like the "Temps," "Débats,"

* See No. 176.

† Editor of the "Journal du Caire." He went to Paris to inaugurate Nationalist propaganda.

"Écho de Paris," "Journal de Genève," "Corriere della Sera" should be supplied with full and accurate information as to what is going on here.

If you concur, I would suggest that His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Rome, and Berne should be supplied either through Foreign Office or direct from here with a weekly news telegram for such use as they care to make of information thus given.

General lines on which propaganda might be carried on are:—

1. Danger of a Nationalist movement with Turkish sympathies spreading along North African littoral, also complicating already difficult situation in Syria and Anatolia to detriment of both French and Italian aspirations. Use of Turkish flag in recent demonstration and attacks on Armenians in Cairo indicate that Turkish spirit is still active, and movement here is taking on a distinctly fanatical colour.

2. Growth of Bolshevik anarchical spirit, cutting of communications, sabotage, intimidation of Government employees, throwing of vitriol at workmen returning to work, demand for division of State domains and big properties by fellaheen, &c.

3. Menace to life and property of Europeans. Massacre of unarmed British officers returning from holidays at Luxor. Murder of Greeks and great damage inflicted on Greek property throughout provinces. It is significant that Italian colony in Egypt, a section of which at commencement of movement had identified itself in some measure with Nationalists, have formally applied through Italian agency for protection of British military authorities.

4. Disturbance to trade and menace to foreign interests, business, and institutions like the "sucreries" in French and Belgian hands.

It is needless to comment on deplorable results which any success extremists may have in bringing about a state of anarchy would have for all Europeans interested in Egypt—landholders, business men, or any other class of persons interested in this country.

(Repeated from Foreign Office to Paris, Rome, and Berne.)

No. 192.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 635. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 17, 1919.

GENERAL ALLENBY'S telegram No. 578* to Foreign Office of the 15th instant respecting the visit of Egyptian notables to Europe.

While I have no doubt that we may be sure that Allied statesmen here will give calming counsels to Egyptians, I have some anxiety as to what may happen outside Government circles. There are still *milieux* in France, even in the official world, who cannot forget that France once had the first place in Egypt, and who resent the extension of British influence, and advanced parties who may quite likely sympathise with their grievances, and encourage them on the lines of the rights of Egyptians to self-determination.

The feelings of bitterness aroused here with regard to Syria, and our supposed support of the Arabs against the French, has created a favourable atmosphere for reception of discontented Egyptians. The "Journal des Débats" article yesterday practically says that we are punished for our support of native opinion in the Near East against France, as it has recoiled on us in Egypt.

(Communicated to peace delegation; repeated from Foreign Office to Cairo.)

No. 193.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 595.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 17, 1919.

THERE are no fresh incidents to report in Cairo or the provinces. Azharists offered assistance to police in maintaining order, and proposed to form a corps of so-called national police for Cairo. Some of these have appeared in streets with distinguishing brassards. I have forbidden this and ordered arrest of any who appear in streets.

Officials' strike continues.

* See No. 181.

No. 194.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 599.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 18, 1919.

MR. BALFOUR'S telegram No. 707* to you, repeated to me No. 26.

I fear I have not made the situation clear.

Hopes of Egyptian extremists are centred on (1) America, (2) Italy, (3) France.

No declaration by any small Power would be of use. It is common talk here that America and Italy have not recognised Protectorate, and it is confidently expected here that they will refuse to recognise it when the question arises at Peace Conference.

If no pronouncement can be obtained from America, or if Allied States do not make it clear to Egyptians who visit them in Paris that British Protectorate over Egypt is a *fait accompli*, the present movement in Egypt will continue and will have to be repressed by force of arms.

(Sent to Mr. Balfour, Paris, No. 599.)

No. 195.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 477.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 578.

Nationalist leaders will shortly be arriving in Paris, and we desire to form a clear idea as to what will be the best course of policy to adopt in regard to their reception and treatment.

Would it be preferable that their presence in Paris should be ignored, and that they should be refused all access to British peace delegates, or that they should be received by the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, who would convey to them in unmistakable terms that their programme and pretensions had no prospect of being entertained?

As regards Allied peace delegates it is probably better that they should not personally see the Nationalists, but they might either ignore their approaches altogether, or might answer them in writing, rejecting their claims for independence and reaffirming the fact of the British protectorate over Egypt.

I shall be glad of your early advice and observations on the subject.

No. 196.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 478.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1919.

AS foreshadowed in my telegram No. 427 of 5th April, His Majesty's Government desire to send to Egypt, at an early date, an important Commission of five members, with Lord Milner at its head. This commission will investigate existing conditions in Egypt, enquire into the causes which have led to the present outbreak, and will determine the future form of the British protectorate and the extent and nature of the constitutional reforms and administrative changes that may be considered necessary.

It seems desirable that this Commission should proceed to Egypt and commence its labours at the earliest moment possible after order has been completely restored, and I shall be glad to learn your views as to the approximate date at which you consider the Commission might start, and moment at which announcement should be made.

No. 197.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 600.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

FOLLOWING is result of enquiry into death of Mr. A. Dykes, Egyptian State Railways, shot in Abdin Square on 3rd April:—

Dykes was shot opposite to, and 30 yards from, barracks of Egyptian Army band, an unarmed unit, and received two wounds. He had left patrol car to assist mounted

* See No. 189.

patrols in attempted removal of mob. Two British witnesses state that they saw Egyptian soldier fire from barracks railings, one witness that he saw shot fired from first-floor window of barracks. All British eyewitnesses agree only two shots fired altogether, and that no firing by British troops occurred at all. Native witnesses mostly testify to considerable firing by British patrols.

Of one British and one Egyptian officer standing together within earshot, first states there were two shots, second three or four. Arms and ammunition of Sultan's bodyguard, neighbouring armed unit, were examined soon after by Lieutenant-Colonel Castle-Smith and found correct, and showing no evidence of recent use.

So far there is no evidence against any particular person.

No. 198.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 601.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 18, 1919.

ALTHOUGH there was slight increase yesterday in the number of employees at work in some departments, my general impression of Ministers and their actions in last few days is one of weakness.

Situation in Cairo and provinces is unchanged.

No. 199.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 602.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

MY telegram No. 496.

Following persons have now been identified as murdered on Assiut to Minia train on 18th March, between 8 A.M. and noon: Kaimakam A. Pope Bey, Inspector Egyptian Government Prisons; Major C. Jarvis, M.C., 20th Deccan Horse, I.A. Staff; Lieutenant R. F. B. Willay, General List.

361171 A.C. Q.M.S. Summersgill, A.	} 812th Aerial Employment Company.
549259 A.C. Q.M.S. Peacock, P.D.	
360529 A.C. Q.M.S. Culyer, A. G.	} 813th Aerial Employment Company.
362433 A.C. Q.M.S. Field, G. H.	

18930 Private Redding, L. H., A.A.M.C.

Pending final establishment of facts by proper official enquiry, I send following supplementary details obtained by personal investigation by British political officer on the spot. There had been much excitement along railway line, including greeting of trains with patriotic cries, free travelling by crowds, and demonstrations of hostility to some English inspectors. Deirut was reinforced from Mallawi by crowds, who remained near station till next day. Express stopped at Assiut, evidently because of rumours of trouble, and murdered men therein arrived at Assiut at 7 A.M. on 18th in local train which stopped at every station. They were all unarmed and were collected in front first-class carriage. Native ticket inspector and two native officials travelling made unsuccessful efforts to deceive and divert attention of mob, but on arrival at Deirut they battered at closed doors and windows. Kaimakam Pope Bey and two others who got out on other side were murdered and bodies put in brake van. Though acting station-master had sent message to local police on seeing threatening attitude of mob one hour before train was due, police officer only arrived about twenty minutes after arrival of train with some six unarmed men out of forty armed men available. He did nothing and sent no warning ahead. Acting station-master, in spite of opposition, eventually got train away, natives swarming all over it, and remaining British at bay in two compartments. At Deir Moes another dense mob attacked train; two British managed to reach engine, and they and native driver tried to start train, but vacuum brake had been applied. Driver fled, and two British were overpowered and battered to death. Three remaining British also gained engine and made no effort to work levers, but fought till overpowered. Five bodies battered beyond recognition were thrown on platform, stripped, and subjected to worst indignities. Mob screamed

with delight, women taking leading part in orgy. Sixty Egyptian soldiers returning from Soudan by train to join reserve leaned out of windows cheering; their officers took no effective action. Police again arrived late and did nothing. Bodies were thrown into brake-van, and finally, after recurrent attempts at stations to stop train and see bodies, train arrived Minia, where native railway inspector promptly had van and wrecked compartment shunted away out of reach of mob. Savagery was apparently deliberately incited by local organisations, whose agents probably travelled by train. Many railway officials and employees did all they could, but behaviour of police, native officer passengers and others seems to have been very bad.

No. 200.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 603.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 19, 1919

YOUR telegram No. 477.*

It is desirable that some of Egyptian notables when they arrive in Paris should be received by Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, who would explain impossibility of granting their extreme demands.

I think it also desirable that they should have access to Allied peace delegates, who should reaffirm fact of British Protectorate over Egypt.

These Egyptian notables cannot correctly be described as Nationalists, as they ask far less than true Nationalist Party, whose demands include complete evacuation of Egypt and the Soudan by the British.

As I said in my telegram No. 578, I think it is very important that they should be granted a hearing.

(Sent to Mr. Balfour, Paris, No. 603.)

No. 201.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 607.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

THERE are no particular incidents to report to-day from Cairo or provinces. Strike of Government officials continues, and El Azhar remains centre of agitation.

No. 202.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 641.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 19, 1919.

"MATIN" publishes following telegraphic message from Marseilles:—

"Egyptian Mission arrived at Marseilles yesterday on its way to the Peace Conference at Paris. The head of the mission, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, made following statement: 'Our great hope is that wishes of Egypt may be fulfilled by the Conference. The movement in Egypt was spontaneous, the result of the systematic suppression of a nation 13,000,000 strong, unanimous in its ideals.

"No foreigner was molested in the rising. French, Italian, and American flags were displayed. As for the Armenian incidents, we certify that they were caused by Armenian agitators as will be shown by documents to be published."

The delegation left yesterday evening for Paris.

Extreme Socialist organ "Populaire" writes of heroic efforts of Egyptians for their independence and approaching discomfiture of mercenaries of London Government.

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No. 203.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 645.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 19, 1919.

PRINCIPAL evening newspapers reproduce observations of Egyptians transmitted you in my telegram No. 641 to-day.
(Repeated to Cairo.)

No. 204.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 609.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 478.*

It is impossible at present to say when order will be completely restored. I suggest middle of May as approximate date for visit of Commission to Egypt, and will telegraph later regarding moment at which announcement should be made.

No. 205.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 610.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

1. IT is probable that garbled stories of events in Egypt reach India (and *vice versa*) by native travellers or by letters which escape censor. It would be of interest to know, if you consider that recent events in the two countries have any connection or if you have any reason to believe them to have been instigated from a common source.

2. I propose to send you in future daily news bulletins regarding unrest here, and should be glad to be supplied with similar information from India. Can this be arranged?

3. As El Azhar University is centre of sedition in Egypt, I may be compelled shortly to close El Azhar. It is, of course, a place of learning rather than worship, but, in view of its favour amongst Moslems generally, I should be glad to learn your views as to probable effect on public opinion in India of such action.

(Addressed to India.)

No. 206.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 614.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 20, 1919.

I HAVE had two meetings, one yesterday, and one to-day, with Rushdy and Adly. They have earnestly requested me to let them make a statement to Grand Mufti to effect that events of past few weeks, and fact that Egyptian notables, including Zaghlul, have been allowed to visit France show that these notables represent nation.

This is consequent on an offer from Grand Mufti to bring strike to an end, if Zaghlul and his friends are recognised by Peace Conference as representing wishes of Egyptian people. I have refused to allow this or treat with those who encourage strike and continuance of illegal acts. Grand Mufti, Sheikh Bekhit, always rather suspect has lately taken strong anti-British attitude. Nevertheless, I think that Zaghlul now represents opinion of majority of Egyptian Intellectuals.

Rushdy and his Ministry have done their best, but have little real influence in present temper of country.

(Repeated to Mr. Balfour, Paris, No. 614.)

* See No. 196.

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No. 207.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 615.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 20, 1919.

SITUATION is unchanged.

One man of Kumaon Rifles killed and three injured yesterday afternoon in attack by natives on waggon party near Tanta.

No. 208.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 145.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 6, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a note written by Mr. Greg, Director-General of the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the attitude of the foreign diplomatic agencies with regard to the present Nationalist agitation.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 208.

Note on Attitude of the Foreign Agencies.

France.

M. LEFÈVRE PONTALIS, the French Minister, has, as Sir R. Wingate had already reported in his despatch No. 352 of the 27th December, shown himself in his official as opposed to his social relations with the Residency touchy and querulous ever since his arrival in Egypt last summer. He landed with the fixed idea that the British officials in Egypt had in no way changed since the time of Fashoda, and were constantly creating unnecessary difficulties for the French. He particularly singled out Sir William Brunyate as an object of attack a few days after his arrival, and before he had time either to meet that official or form any opinion for himself as to what was going on here. He next directed his attacks on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, then on the Egyptian local authorities in general, and finally his attention having been directed from Egypt to Syria his complaints were against the military authorities, charged with the affairs of that country.

I called to see him at Sir Milne Cheetham's request at the outbreak of the present disturbances, but failed to discover what he thought of the situation, or in what sense he had been reporting to his Government. I saw him again not long ago and had a somewhat more satisfactory conversation with him. He did not express any sympathy with us in our present difficulties, but alluded somewhat pointedly to the embarrassment caused him by the persistent attempts on the part of Egyptian Nationalists to enlist his sympathies and compromise the French agency with the Residency. I gained the impression that these attentions of which his agency had for a long time past been deprived had made a certain appeal to his vanity, and though I have no ground for supposing that he has ever in any way acted improperly or fallen into any of the numerous traps which have doubtless been laid for him by the Nationalists, it is clear that while acting up to the letter of his obligations as representative of the principal ally of Great Britain in this country, he has never gone beyond the letter or attempted to act up to the spirit of the alliance by rendering us any support. The attitude of the French colony in Cairo and Alexandria had been throughout the crisis rather reserved, but by no means sympathetic or friendly, and it is more than probable that the popular belief that France is well disposed to the Nationalist agitation has a measure of foundation in so far as local French opinion is concerned. The immemorial jealousy of England has perhaps something to do with this attitude, the abolition of the capitulations, and fear that the French language and French legal procedure will ultimately disappear is a more immediate cause, and in the case of the Minister himself, our alleged disinclination to see France established in Syria. I give the following

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incident, which, though in itself trivial, is characteristic of the attitude of the French agency. In the "Temps," of the 21st March appeared an article dealing with Syria, Asia Minor, Arabia, in which the writer stated that none of the various peoples scattered between Constantinople and Agadir were yet ripe for independence. This article produced a certain impression here as tending to show that the French Government dissociated itself with the extreme Nationalist movement, and the "Bourse égyptienne"—a very pro-British journal—quoted certain passages from it in a leading article, and applied them directly to Egypt. The "Journal du Caire," which, though run by, or perhaps owing to it being mainly run by Syrians in the absence of M. Vayssié in France (see my despatch No. 130 of the 25th March), enjoys the special protection of the French Agency, desired to publish the article in full pointing out that it had no bearing whatsoever on the Egyptian question. The Censor objected to the publication of the article in the local press on the ground that it was objectionable from the point of view of the Hedjaz. M. Lefèvre Pontalis then complained that the "Bourse égyptienne" had no right to misquote an article in a French newspaper, while the "Journal du Caire" was not allowed to publish that article in full. Finally a solution was arrived at by the insertion in the "Journal du Caire" of an anodyne statement to the effect that in order to appreciate properly the exact significance of the article in the "Temps," people would do well to refer to that newspaper direct. The French Minister was undoubtedly within his rights in taking action, but his anxiety to dissociate himself from any idea that he might be inclined to assist us is typical. Considerable comment has been roused not only by the excellence of the French in which the various protests addressed by the Nationalists to the foreign agencies is couched, but also by the thoroughly occidental political outlook and point of view displayed in this propaganda. The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Royer, who is unusually sympathetic and well disposed to England, went so far as to call my special attention to the matter, and begged me to discover the foreign hand involved. I have unfortunately not been able to do so.

Greece.

M. Sactouris, the Greek Minister, has repeatedly professed his sympathy with us, and from the first advised his numerous colony to keep quiet and act with us. He informed me that many of his compatriots were armed, and would, if called upon to do so, place themselves at the disposal of the British military authorities. Their zeal has indeed had rather embarrassing results, and the military authorities have brought to my notice several cases where Greeks have fired on the mob. M. Sactouris has been requested to put a summary stop to any such activities, which can only tend to inflame Egyptian opinion against an already hated alien. I think that there is little doubt that the Greeks are as a whole on our side. They despise but at the same time fear the natives, who in their turn detest them, especially in the country districts. The Greeks have undoubtedly suffered severely in the recent disturbances, and it is more than probable that a heavy bill will shortly be presented for damages. One murder has taken place, and it is probable that as information comes in from the provinces others will be reported. I do not know how far the disaffected Royalist element is still strong among the Greeks in Egypt, but if it still exists in any strength it is probable that it has used, and will continue to use, its influence against us. M. Lefèvre-Pontalis told me recently that some twenty Royalist Greek emissaries had landed here last January with a view to fomenting unrest and Bolshevism, and he seemed to think this fact, if true, might explain both the admirable organisation of the present movement and, at the same time, its anarchical and anti-property tendencies. I have no confirmation of the above, though I notice in an interesting article in the current "Round Table" on Russian Bolshevism that Egypt is one of the countries selected by the Bolshevik Foreign Office for intensive propaganda. It must, however, be borne in mind that this movement was probably planned in its main features by the Germans four years ago, and that Bolshevism is not restricted to the Russian peasant but is common to any half savage population, which I believe the Central Control to have weakened sufficiently to make rioting and looting a relatively safe pursuit.

The above is perhaps only worth mentioning as an additional instance of the widespread belief that some foreign and highly intelligent agency is at work.

M. Sactouris said he had been much struck by the moderation shown by the British troops in Cairo under great provocation, and had reported to his Government in that sense.

Italy.

It has been persistently rumoured that the Italian colony has been actively unfriendly to us, and have done their best to promote and encourage the present movement. The Italian representative, Marquis Negrotto Cambiaso, admitted to me that in the earlier stages his compatriots had, in fact, favoured the new ideas, partly on sentimental and liberal grounds, partly from soreness at the approaching abolition of the capitulations, to which local foreigners cling with fanatical, if misplaced, tenacity. Another reason may be that a considerable number of the Italian residents are poor workmen, who are doubtless to some extent influenced by socialist, possibly anarchist, sentiments. Marquis Negrotto added that he had summoned the leading members of his colony and warned them to avoid mixing themselves up in a political situation which in no way concerned them. He is himself fully aware that any large measure of Nationalist success here must inevitably react most unfavourably on the Italian position in Cyrenaica, and might, indeed, prejudice Italian aspirations in the Adriatic and Levant as well. I think that, now that the seriousness and distinctly anti-foreign trend of the movement is better appreciated, the educated and well-to-do foreign element—both Italian and French—are revising their first impressions and earlier sympathies for the Nationalists. The only Italian who has actually been unfavourably reported on by the military authorities, is a certain Mr. Parvis, who may have to be expelled, but at the request of Marquis Negrotto Cambiaso, he is being given one more chance. He is a well-to-do individual, who has not only a large business here, but looks after the interests of an important Italian missionary society, who own considerable property in Cairo. Marquis Negrotto Cambiaso is personally very sympathetic, and I am convinced that he is too much of a gentleman, and at the same time, too good a diplomatist to lend himself to any under-hand intrigue which, as in the case of Commendatore Serra and the Mariut Railway in 1914, would inevitably come to light sooner or later.

The Bedouin unrest has not so far, he had heard from Rome, affected the Bedouins in Cyrenaica, but the Italian Government has begged that the patrolling of the frontier shall not be relaxed. The coast district west of Alexandria has happily been quiet and there is, therefore, little ground for apprehension on this score, as it would be principally by that route that trouble would come, if at all.

United States.

The American representative, Mr. Hampson Gary, has been from the very beginning extremely cordial and sympathetic, and he has always advocated an increase rather than a diminution of British control in Egypt. I have every reason to believe that he has reported strongly to his Government on more than one occasion in this sense. He has even more than his French colleague been the object of Nationalist attentions, but, beyond receiving a deputation of Egyptian ladies, he has been most careful not to see any of the various deputations which parade in front of his doors in and out of season. I believe him to be sincerely pro-British and in favour of the closest possible relations between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race. I have the impression that he regards the present movement as childish in some of its manifestations, and dangerous in others.

The American colony in Egypt is almost entirely composed of missionaries.

The remaining agencies are so unimportant that there is little to say about them. The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Royer, has shown himself exceptionally pro-British, sympathetic, and well-disposed, and owing to the Belgian interest in the Sucreeries establishments scattered about in Upper Egypt, he has been able to give some valuable information on the situation. I am happy to say that none of these important factories have suffered.

The Dutch agent and consul-general drew my attention some time ago to the hostility of the foreign colonies as a result, he thought, of our Capitulations policy, and it is probable that this soreness explains to some extent the want of sympathy shown to Great Britain in the earlier phases of the present movement. There is no Dutch colony here, and M. van Lennep has only been of importance during the war as representing Austrian interests. He has fulfilled this rather thankless rôle with tact and wisdom, and the relations between him and the Residency have been and are excellent.

R. GREG.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 147.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 6, 1919.

WITH reference to Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 130 of the 25th March relative to the attitude of the press in Egypt, I have the honour to make a further short report on this subject, as follows:—

Both the announcement of my appointment as His Majesty's Special High Commissioner, and my declaration as to the course of action I intended to pursue, were favourably received by the press in general newspapers elected, according to their complexion, to emphasise either the need for the restoration of order or the need for enquiry into grievances.

The Arabic newspapers, with the exception of the "Mokattam," whether Moslem, Coptic, or Syrian, are all in varying degrees Nationalistic; but while an extremist organ, such as the Syrian "Ahrām" (whose policy is traditionally anti-British), prefers to criticise our misinterpretation of the movement and to preach the solidarity of Moslem, Copt, and Syrian, the Moslem "Wadi el Nil," which now adopts a moderate Nationalist tone, tends more particularly to appeal to Egyptians of influence to discourage violent methods. But whether moderate or extreme, the Arabic press agrees in sharply distinguishing the peaceful methods and political motives of the organisers of the movement and the educated classes from the predatory motives and destructive actions of the rabble, the brigands, and the Bedouin.

On the whole the tone of the press has become distinctly healthier, though it shows some signs of the effect of intimidation.

The Coptic organ "Misr" (extremist) has been suppressed by the military authorities on account of two articles which allude to England, one as a demon which stalks the world in diabolical might, striking hearts with horror, and the other as a cancerous growth in the North Sea whose excision is recommended by "Dr. Washington." It is believed that the late censor who passed these articles had been intimidated.

Among the European newspapers the French "Journal du Caire" has now, presumably under instructions, adopted a more correct attitude. The least satisfactory element is the "Egyptian Gazette." The usual irresponsibility of this newspaper has not deserted it during the present crisis: no assistance at all has originated with its editor (who has published no leading article on the situation except under direct military pressure), and such second-hand matter as it has culled from other newspapers, Egyptian or English, has been noticeably unsuitable for reproduction.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 647.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 21, 1919.

CAIRO telegram No. 603 of 19th April.

National Egyptian delegation has communicated to radio Agency here a note explaining that movement in Egypt is directed to obtaining independence and has no religious or anti-foreign character, nor any connection with Young Turk or German agents.

Saad Pasha spoke to "Petit Parisien" correspondent of "Complete Independence." "Journal des Débats" states on information received from Alexandria 20th April that chiefs of the national movement are, on their own initiative, watching over French interests in order to prevent any damage. Notably, they are guarding French sugar refinery at Cairo.

There has been no word of reprobation in French press of outbreak in Egypt nor anything favourable to us.

(Repeated to Cairo.)

Mr. Balfour, "Astoria," to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 731.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 21, 1919.

FOLLOWING sent to Cairo, No. 27:—

"Your telegram, Urgent, of 13th April.

"I have received following letter from Mr. Lansing:—

"In answer to your enquiry, President has authorised me to inform you that he recognises the British Protectorate of Egypt, which was announced by His Majesty's Government 18th November, 1914.

"President has no objection to this decision being made public, as he understands that it may help in restoration of order, and in prevention of further bloodshed in Egypt.

"You will no doubt, realise, my dear Mr. Minister, that in accord with this recognition the President must necessarily reserve for further discussion details of former recognition, together with question of a modification of any rights of United States which this decision on his part may entail."

"You may therefore issue a statement in accordance with first paragraph."

Mr. Balfour, "Astoria," to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 736.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 22, 1919.

MY telegram No. 27 of 21st April.

Please telegraph at once text of notice issued by you, in order that I may have it reproduced in press here.

(Addressed to Cairo, No. 29.)

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 618.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 21, 1919.

SITUATION remains unchanged. All is quiet in Cairo and provinces, except for attempt made to damage railway near Mansura.

(Sent to India and Khartoum, No. 618.)

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 623.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 22, 1919.

WHEREAS by the proclamation of the 2nd November, 1914, it was declared that martial law was instituted in Egypt in order to supplement and not to supersede the civil administration, and all civil officials in the service of the Egyptian Government were required to continue the punctual discharge of their respective duties; and

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whereas a number of officials and employees have recently deserted their posts, and it has been made clear that they have taken this action with the object of dictating a course of policy to the Government of His Highness the Sultan and of repudiating the Protectorate which His Majesty's Government has established over Egypt; and whereas such officials and employees have for the most part refused to return to their work when called upon to do so by the President of the Council of Ministers; and whereas any official or employee wilfully absents himself from his work in the above circumstances is committing an offence under the proclamation above cited, and any person promoting or leading this movement or preventing officials or employees by threats or violence from doing their work is liable to severe penalties under martial law; and whereas the time has now come for the intervention of the military authorities in this matter in support of the civil administration: now I, Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, by virtue of the powers conferred on me as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in Egypt, hereby order that all Government officials and employees absent from their duty without leave are to return to their posts forthwith and punctually and efficiently to perform the duties assigned to them. They will receive no pay for the period of their absence without leave. Every official or employee who shall not return to his post on the day next following the date of this proclamation and thereafter punctually perform the duties of such post shall be considered for all purposes as having resigned, and his name shall be struck off the list of Government officials. Every person who by persuasion, threats, or violence shall prevent or seek to prevent any person from complying with this order will be liable to arrest and to prosecution before a military Court.

No. 215.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 624.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 22, 1919.

NO incidents have been reported during last twenty-four hours. Cairo was quiet yesterday, and Shem-el-Nessim holiday passed uneventfully.

My immediately preceding telegram gives text of a proclamation I have issued to-day under martial law.

No. 216.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 625.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 22, 1919.

I HAD several interviews with Rushdy yesterday. In the morning he was hopeful of being able to end strike, but later, owing to obvious loss of influence with country and his colleagues, wrote a letter resigning Premiership.

This letter he presented this evening, and I have advised Sultan to accept, resignation. I think resignation of this Ministry will have no ill effect on situation, which shows signs of improvement.

American consul-general to-day communicated to me recognition by United States of America of the British Protectorate over Egypt. I am publishing this letter in to-morrow's press.

No. 217.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 626.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to state that I have been directed by my Government to acquaint you with the fact that the President recognises the British Protectorate over Egypt, which was proclaimed by His Majesty's Government on 18th December, 1914.

In according this recognition the President must of necessity reserve for further discussion the details thereof, along with the question of the modification of any rights belonging to the United States which may be entailed by this decision.

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In this connection, I am desired to say that the President and the American people have every sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people for a further measure of self-government, but that they view with regret any effort to obtain the realisation thereof by a resort to violence.

(Addressed to "Astoria.")

No. 218.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 627.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 23, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 29 of 19th April.

My immediately preceding telegram gives text of official note from American representative, handed to me yesterday and published in press this morning.

(Addressed to Mr. Balfour, Paris.)

No. 219.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 630.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 23, 1919.

MY telegram No. 609 of 19th April.

I should be glad to receive as soon as possible authority to publish a notice to the following effect:—

"At the request of Special High Commissioner, His Majesty the King is sending to Egypt a Royal Commission under the presidency of Viscount Milner to assist his Excellency in enquiring into cause of the recent disturbances in Egypt, in investigating existing conditions in Egypt, and in determining future form of the British Protectorate, and extent and nature of constitutional reforms and administrative changes that may be considered necessary."

I have framed this announcement with a view to giving special emphasis to following points:—

1. Sovereignty of King and reality of Protectorate.
2. Powerful nature of Commission.
3. Supreme position of High Commissioner in Egypt as His Majesty's representative.

As regards date of sailing of Commission, I think it should start about middle of May, but this must depend on conditions of tranquillity in Egypt, though I think announcement of intention to send Commission may be published at once.

(Sent to Mr Balfour, Paris, No. 630.)

No. 220.

Mr. Anstruther to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

Sir,

"Brooks's," April 22, 1919,

IN continuation of my letter of the 7th March,* I have now the honour to forward you a copy of a letter, dated the 16th April, from the Director of the Suez Canal Company to myself.

The Director recapitulates the arguments which have weighed with his Comité de Direction in opposition to the proposal of the Judicial Adviser in Egypt to establish a court at Zagazig to which the community of Port Said, and of the zone of the Isthmus of Suez generally, would be obliged to take all cases of litigation.

It was evident from the Judicial Adviser's former letter, of which you were good

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* Not printed.

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enough to communicate a copy to the Company, that he did not regard this as an ideal solution of the problem.

The Canal Company now asks that, should it still be found impossible for the time being to set up a court with full jurisdiction at Port Said, the zone of the canal should remain attached to the court at Cairo. I am still in hope that upon reconsideration of the case, the Secretary of State may, for reasons of policy, be disposed to advise the adoption of the court at Port Said from the outset. It appears to me, with deference to other views, that a scheme that is complete in its form from the outset would be more satisfactory, even if the volume of business does not yet seem to warrant the court at Port Said. It is evident, from the Judicial Adviser's letter, that he has in his mind that this must be conceded in the near future.

However that may be, I have to ask for your favourable consideration of the observations of the Committee, as I have given my assurance, after a conversation with the High Commissioner, that the Foreign Office would gladly receive and examine any further remarks which the Committee might submit to it.

I have, &c.

H. T. ANSTRUTHER.

Enclosure in No. 220.

M. Bonnet to M. Anstruther.

Cher M. Anstruther,

Paris, le 16 avril 1919.

VOUS avez bien voulu me communiquer les documents contenant la réponse du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique au vœu que le conseil d'administration de notre compagnie avait formulé dans sa séance du 4 novembre 1918, en vue d'obtenir, par une modification du projet de réforme judiciaire actuellement à l'étude en Égypte, la création d'un tribunal de plein exercice dans la région du Canal de Suez. Ces documents comprennent : (1) une lettre du Foreign Office, en date du 6 février 1919 ; (2) une lettre de son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté britannique en Égypte, Sir Reginald Wingate, en date du 16 décembre, 1918 ; (3) une note du rapporteur de la Commission des Capitulations, Sir William Brunyate, en date du 12 décembre 1918.

Après en avoir pris connaissance dans sa séance du 7 avril dernier, le conseil d'administration m'a invité à résumer les observations auxquelles cette communication a donné lieu et à vous prier de les soumettre à la bienveillante attention du Gouvernement britannique.

Le conseil tient tout d'abord à préciser que le vœu qu'il a exprimé n'était nullement inspiré du souci des intérêts de la Compagnie du Canal. Ces intérêts, dans l'espèce, sont tout à fait au second plan. Ainsi que Sir William Brunyate le constate très justement, le passage des navires par le Canal ne donne pas nécessairement naissance à de nombreux litiges : les procès auxquels la compagnie peut être directement ou indirectement mêlée sont en fait extrêmement rares. Mais la question est plus haute. Le conseil a demandé la création dans la région du Canal d'un tribunal de plein exercice, parce qu'il lui a semblé que l'importance et plus encore la nature des intérêts qui se trouvent concentrés dans cette région justifiaient qu'elle ne fût pas rattachée à une circonscription judiciaire dont elle diffère essentiellement. Aussi ne pouvait-il manquer d'apprécier la confirmation donnée à sa propre manière de voir par le rapporteur de la Commission des Capitulations : "Je dois avouer," écrit Sir William Brunyate, "que je ne suis pas très épris d'un système qui fait éventuellement juger à Zagazig des procès maritimes." C'est exactement ce que le conseil avait donné à entendre dans le premier memorandum qui a été soumis au Gouvernement britannique. Sa préoccupation toutefois avait un caractère plus général. Il ne pensait pas seulement aux procès maritimes, mais aux affaires de toutes sortes que peut comporter l'activité économique de la région du Canal de Suez, si profondément différente de celle qu'on rencontre dans la province de Charkieh.

Sur le fond, par conséquent, l'accord est près d'être complet entre le rapporteur de la Commission des Capitulations et la Compagnie de Suez, et la discussion porte seulement en vérité sur une question d'opportunité. Il est allégué, d'une part, que l'Égypte va se trouver à court de juges ; d'autre part, que le volume des affaires provenant de la région du Canal n'est pas assez considérable. Il n'appartient pas au conseil d'administration de discuter ces deux affirmations. Qu'il lui soit seulement permis de faire observer que l'une d'elles est bien imparfaitement justifiée par cette

phrase de l'honorable rapporteur : "La preuve de l'absence d'un volume important d'affaires à Port-Saïd est fournie par l'absence même d'un barreau sérieux dans cette ville." On ne peut vraiment pas s'attendre à trouver un barreau sérieux dans une ville où il n'y a pas de tribunal.

Ce qui est certain, toutefois, c'est que la population groupée dans la région de l'Isthme n'est pas comparable en nombre à celle d'une moudirieh, et que ce nombre est nécessairement l'un des éléments de l'importance des affaires litigieuses. Mais cette considération est-elle dominante ? Un régime d'exception a déjà été admis pour la région du Canal, puisqu'elle a été constituée, comme le Caire et Alexandrie, en Gouvernorat indépendant. Il est permis de penser que cette exception a été motivée par le caractère spécial de la population et par la nature des intérêts qu'elle représente. En demandant la création d'un tribunal distinct de celui de Zagazig, le conseil d'administration a pensé que sa proposition se justifiait par des raisons du même ordre, et il n'a eu d'autre but, en la présentant, que de servir les intérêts d'une région dont le développement et la prospérité sont dus pour une certaine part à la Compagnie du Canal et ne peuvent la laisser indifférente.

Cette proposition n'est pas d'ailleurs une critique de l'œuvre de la Commission des Capitulations ; elle marque, au contraire, le désir du conseil de collaborer à cette œuvre, dont il souhaite le plein succès. Au surplus, son intervention ne fait que déférer au vœu même de la Commission. Répondant par la voie de la presse à une protestation du barreau égyptien, Sir William Brunyate s'exprimait ainsi, à la date du 10 janvier dernier :

"Nous nous proposons, à une date aussi rapprochée que possible, et avant d'aborder nous-mêmes l'examen définitif du projet, de lui donner la publicité la plus large, de façon à nous assurer le bénéfice des observations de tous les intéressés. En tout cas, nos recommandations ne sont que des recommandations, et nous n'avons guère le désir de voir adopter aucune de nos propositions sur la base de notre seule autorité."

Le conseil d'administration de la Compagnie de Suez ose donc espérer que le Gouvernement britannique ne refusera pas d'examiner à nouveau la question. S'il était définitivement reconnu que, dans les circonstances présentes, il ne peut être donné satisfaction au vœu de la compagnie, le conseil prend la liberté de suggérer une solution transactionnelle dont l'idée même est inspirée par une observation contenue dans la note de Sir William Brunyate. Après avoir reconnu que le tribunal de Zagazig n'est pas la juridiction qu'il aurait souhaitée pour des procès maritimes, le rapporteur de la Commission des Capitulations déclare qu'il préférerait, en conformité des traditions anglaises, que ces procès fussent jugés au Caire. Il est de toute évidence qu'il ne saurait être question de déterminer la compétence d'un tribunal d'après la nature du litige à lui soumettre. Mais ne serait-il pas possible de rattacher complètement la zone du Canal à la circonscription judiciaire du Caire ? Zagazig, sans doute, est plus rapproché ; mais il n'y a pas à envisager seulement une question de distance. On doit tenir compte aussi des affinités commerciales, économiques, sociales ; or, il n'est pas douteux que ces affinités établissent des liens étroits entre la région du Canal et le Caire ou Alexandrie, tandis qu'il n'y a entre cette région et Zagazig qu'un point de contact géographique. Les garanties d'une bonne justice, d'une justice devant laquelle les affaires, — tout au moins européennes, provenant de la zone du Canal, ne constitueraient pas une matière d'exception, seraient donc mieux assurées par le rattachement à la circonscription judiciaire du Caire. Aussi, ce rattachement donnerait-il, provisoirement au moins, une satisfaction suffisante au vœu de la Compagnie de Suez. Le conseil d'administration croit donc pouvoir le recommander à l'attention du Gouvernement. Il va de soi qu'aucune objection ne serait élevée si le rattachement à Alexandrie, qui se rapprocherait davantage de l'état de choses actuel, était jugé préférable. Mais la distance plus grande, par comparaison avec la distance du Caire, semble écarter cette solution.

Telles sont les observations que j'ai l'honneur de présenter au nom du conseil d'administration, qui compte sur votre aimable obligeance pour les soumettre au Gouvernement de sa Majesté britannique.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Directeur,

EDGAR BONNET.

No. 221.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 498.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 543.*

Owing to shortage of cereals in India, Wheat Commission have made no purchases there for some time, and it has been necessary to arrange for shipments of Australian wheat to cover requirements of Indian population.

No. 222.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 491.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 23, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 614.†

Statement by Egyptian Ministers that Zaghlul Pasha and his followers represent Egyptian nation.

You will of course continue to refuse sanction to any such statement.

No. 223.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 496. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 23, 1919.

FOLLOWING information has been received from Switzerland:—

"Egyptian National Committee formerly at Berlin is now at Berne. Committee composed as follows:—

"President, Farid Bey; Vice-President, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish; members, Ismail Kamel, Abdel Hamid Said, Abdel Malek Hamza, Ahmed Taher, Awad-el-Baharawa.

"Money is in all probability supplied by German propaganda fund, and particularly from Turkish Red Crescent. Committee is in close connection with Pan-Islamic movement. Trouble might be expected in Turkey, Tripoli, and French Africa."

No. 224.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour ("Astoria").

(No. 540.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 23, 1919.

EGYPT.

General Allenby's telegrams, and especially his No. 614† of 20th April, show clearly that effect of arrival of Zaghlul Pasha and his partisans in Paris is that they are coming to be regarded more and more throughout Egypt as the representative deputation of Egyptian nation to the Peace Conference; further, that Ministers in Cairo, feeling ground crumbling under their feet and hope of native support disappearing, are inclined to throw up the sponge. It is also evident from Lord Derby's reports that this deputation and its demands are likely to receive considerable encouragement in sections of the French press and in other quarters in Paris.

In his telegram No. 603 of 19th April General Allenby draws a distinction between Zaghlul and his party and the extreme Nationalists. I would, however, remind you that avowed programme of Zaghlul in November last was "complete autonomy for Egypt, which would leave to Great Britain only a right of supervision in the matter of public debt and facilities for our ships traversing the Suez Canal." He also "agreed with the principles of Mustafa Kemal and Mohamed Farid while disavowing their methods." Since then, to judge from his recent utterances reported

* See No. 173.

† See No. 206.

in French press, his views appear to have become more extreme. No useful purpose can be served by negotiations with Egyptians holding such opinions.

Apart from immediate dangers of situation, which are sufficiently apparent, we seem likely to arrive at a position in Egypt in which we shall only be able to obtain Ministers from ranks of Zaghlul's party, and this would render satisfactory government of the country almost impossible.

I am convinced that these dangers can only be averted by the adoption of a firm and resolute policy. In the first place, it is essential that Zaghlul and his party in Paris should not only be given no encouragement in any responsible quarter, but should, if possible, receive a sharp and public rebuff, which would become generally known.

I earnestly trust that your reception of Zaghlul will be inspired by this consideration, but it will be still more salutary if a severe rebuff could be administered by Allied, and especially by American, delegations, and I hope you will find it possible to arrange for this to be done.

Recognition of our protectorate by President Wilson is a first and very important step in the right direction.

No. 225.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 500.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 590.*

I quite agree that it is very desirable that leading papers in France, Italy, and Switzerland should be supplied with full and accurate information as to events in Egypt.

Please send weekly news telegram here, and it will be transmitted to His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Rome, and Berne. I am communicating to them the general lines for propaganda, which you suggest, and which I approve.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 789; Rome, No. 460; and Berne, No. 444.)

No. 226.

Lord Acton to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 698.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berne, April 23, 1919.

I HAVE received petition from certain Egyptians who call themselves Committee of Egyptian Nationalist Party in Berne, in which they ask permission to proceed to Paris and London. For their names, please see my immediately succeeding telegram.

They justify their request on the ground that they learn from papers that General Allenby has abolished all restrictions on Egyptian Nationalist travelling from Egypt, and that as members of Independent Party have been allowed to proceed from Egypt to Paris and London, they should be accorded equal facilities. I assume that your Lordship will instruct me to return negative reply.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 28.)

No. 227.

Lord Acton to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 699.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berne, April 23, 1919.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Mohamed Farid Bey, retired judge, President.

Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish, retired Inspector in the Ministry of Public Instruction, Vice-President. Abdel Malek Hamza Bey, Advocate, Secretary. Dr. Abdul Hamid Said Bey, Member of the Council of Gharbia Mudirieh, Advocate. Awad El Bahrawy, Advocate. Ismail Kamel Bey, Advocate. Dr. Ahwed Taher, Doctor in Medicine. Mohamed Aly Mohamed, Engineer.

* See No. 191.

No. 228.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 148.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 6, 1919.

MR. BALFOUR'S despatch No. 4* of the 3rd January last, transmitting copy of correspondence with the Manchester Chamber of Commerce on the subject of the use of the English language in the Egyptian Courts and the application of English principles of law in the codes to be drafted, asked in particular for Sir William Brunyate's opinion as to the utility of an agreement with France to put a time limit on the use of French as a judicial language.

I beg to enclose a memorandum on this latter point which was addressed to the Residency by Sir W. Brunyate, but has, I regret to say, been mislaid.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 228.

Memorandum by Sir W. Brunyate.

The Residency,

YOUR 5752/8 of the 20th January, 1919, enclosing for favour of observations Foreign Office despatch No. 4 of the 3rd January, 1919.

The question of the position of French as one of the judicial languages in the future has been raised anew by the memorial recently circulated by the Mixed Bar, a memorial which I am transmitting to his Excellency the High Commissioner under cover of my Confidential Memorandum No. 12 which is now with the printer. The memorandum in question was drafted before receiving the despatch under comment, and in paragraph 9 I specifically referred to the question of the form in which the French language would ultimately be cut out.

I see that in the despatch under comment you are asked whether you agree that the consent of the French Government should be asked to a time limit of ten years being placed upon the admissibility of French as one of the judicial languages. I can only repeat that it appears to me that all we can reasonably ask from the French Government is that they should be content with an assurance that no change will be made in the position of the French language during the next ten years. It is, indeed, clear that it is the French Government which will have to ask for this assurance and not ourselves, who require the help of the French Government to dispense with the French language. If an assurance is being given to them, I should say that ten years is a reasonable time limit during which no change should be made, but, if I were in the place of the French Government, and were asked to concur in legislation at the present moment which definitely declared that the French language should cease to be a judicial language after ten years, I should very strongly urge that we might usefully wait and see what the position was at the end of those ten years.

So far as I can myself form an opinion, ten years will be an insufficient time, although I have no doubt that at the end of ten years the continued privileges of the French language will be becoming a nuisance owing to the generalisation of the use of English. I should be interested to know what precedents, if any, exist in favour of the proscription of a language a number of years in advance. As I read history it is exactly such language questions that give rise to the acutest conflicts, and I should regard such a formal proscription of the French language here as on much the same footing as a similar attempt in the Island of Mauritius or as a proposal that in ten years' time the Dutch language should disappear from the Law Courts in South Africa.

If, as a matter of policy, it is desired to press the English language, then it is clear that His Majesty's Government must take the necessary steps to make that policy effective. As the Mixed Bar Memorialists point out, the first measure necessary is that schools should be provided with teaching in English of substantially the same calibre at present provided by the French schools. I have already insisted in my Confidential Memoranda on the urgent necessity of taking up the

* See No. 8.

question of Levantine education, but, so far as I have been able to gather, my recommendations have reached no one, either at the Residency or in the Foreign Office, who has realised that they are worthy of being translated into action.

Assuming that His Majesty's Government should decide on a forward educational policy and should either be prepared to provide the necessary funds or should direct that they be found by the Egyptian Government, it would then be necessary for them to consult their educational advisers as to the time likely to be required for constructing and staffing the necessary schools, and thereafter for carrying into effect the necessary educational revolution.

His Majesty's Government would then require to consider what legislative machinery should be set up in Egypt which could be relied on to give effect to a policy of anglicisation. I happen myself to have put forward for discussion proposals as to legislative machinery, but so far as I can interpret such Foreign Office comments as have been as yet received, they seem to me to amount to a suggestion that such proposals were rather premature. Until, however, some decision is taken as to legislative machinery in the future it is very difficult for us here to forecast the kind of legislation which will be passed ten years hence. All one can say at present is that were the legislature to be purely Egyptian, legislation imposed on foreigners and hostile to the French language would certainly be regarded as grossly oppressive, while were the legislature to be a mixed one I see no probability that the legislators themselves would within ten years be prepared to support a policy hostile to the French language. If the Manchester and other Chambers of Commerce desire that the English language should be encouraged, their best course is to send out merchants and so capture the local trade. When they have done that and a thorough knowledge of the English language is becoming a necessary part of the equipment of traders in Egypt, I should expect the necessary schools to be provided by private effort if not by the Government, and at some future date thereafter I should expect the French language to disappear for practical purposes much as the Italian language already has done. In other words I regard the whole question as a practical one rather than as one of policy. The general tendency at present is undoubtedly in favour of the displacement of French by English, and if we are content to wait and to provide such facilities as should be necessary I should anticipate that in twenty years' time the French language would practically have disappeared. If we are instructed as a matter of policy to hasten the process, it is possible that the period might be somewhat shortened, but an incidental result will be that the whole of our proposals will have against them such a steady current of public opinion as will make the life of senior Anglo-Egyptian officials far from a pleasant one and will probably necessitate their asking for a continuous measure of support from His Majesty's Government such as I see little probability of that Government being prepared to furnish.

W. E. BRUNYATE,
Acting Financial Adviser.

January 25, 1919.

No. 229.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 7, 1919.

I BEG to transmit herewith copies of a memorandum on the political situation in Egypt, written by Mr. W. G. Hayter, Sultanian Counsellor, which contains much that is of interest.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 229.

Memorandum as to the Political Situation in Egypt.

1. IN order to explain the present position in Egypt, it seems necessary to go back to the period of about ten years before the war, during which the country made considerable advance in the direction of constitutional government.

2. When I first came to the country in 1904, Egypt was, in fact, governed by

Lord Cromer. The Ministers had been many years in office and were all elderly men who hardly pretended to take much interest in public affairs. There was a small Legislative Council, to which laws had to be submitted; but any opinions which it expressed could be, and frequently were, disregarded. It was considered rather a striking incident when a draft law for the better government of the Western Desert was withdrawn, because it was so much disliked both by the Council of Ministers and by the Legislative Council. The law instituting Assize Courts, which was almost equally disliked, was nevertheless put into force. The English Advisers and Under-Secretaries received their orders from Lord Cromer, and carried them out after such consultation with their Ministers as common courtesy required. It was said at the time that the Minister of Finance always took his annual leave at the period devoted to the discussion of the Budget.

3. It became clear during the last few years of Lord Cromer's period of office that the Egyptian people were not at all satisfied with this state of affairs. Lord Cromer had restored the material prosperity of the country, as they all recognised, but they thought, not unnaturally, that the time had come when they ought to be given more share in the government of their own country. The result was the Nationalist agitation led by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, which in the year 1906 became somewhat serious.

4. After the resignation of Lord Cromer, early in 1907, Sir Eldon Gorst, who succeeded him, tried the perfectly legitimate experiment of governing the country in close association with the Khedive, Abbas Hilmy. The experiment failed, but during his term of office the Ministers were replaced by younger and more energetic men, all of whom had had considerable experience as judges or administrators. These Ministers soon came to take a far more active part in public affairs than their predecessors. It became apparent that the Council of Ministers was not prepared to accept draft laws, proposals for concessions or special credits, without full explanation of the objects in view, and of the means proposed to secure those objects. Many of these proposals emanated from the Ministry of Finance, and it became the practice in that Ministry to furnish to the Ministers full notes on any new project some weeks before the matter came officially before the Council, in order that they should have an opportunity of studying the question and sending for the officials concerned to obtain the necessary information. Subject to the control which the representative of His Majesty's Government exercised in important matters, the Council of Ministers developed into a real and fairly effective governing body of the country. At the same time, far more weight was given to the opinion of the Legislative Council, Ministers being very unwilling to pass any legislation of which the Council disapproved.

5. It was during this period that the question of the extension of the Suez Canal Concession was submitted by the Government to the General Assembly. That body under the old Organic Law only met once in two years, and usually had only formal business to transact. The proposal was that the Suez Canal Company's Concession should be extended for a considerable term of years against immediate payment of the sum of 4,000,000l., and a contingent share in future profits. At the instance of the Ministers, the General Assembly was specially summoned to consider the proposal, which they unanimously rejected. The reasons which they gave were not very convincing, but I have always thought that the decision of the Assembly was the right one.

6. Important advances were made in the time of Lord Kitchener in two directions. In the first place, he did a great deal to improve the position and enhance the dignity of the Mudirs and Governors. In the second place, there was passed during his term of office the Organic Law, which laid down the present constitution of Egypt. Under that law, a Legislative Assembly was instituted composed of about 100 members, of whom the great majority were to be elected. It is, I think, important for present purposes to consider in some detail what were the powers conferred on the Legislative Assembly by that law.

7. No law could be promulgated, without first having been presented for opinion to the Legislative Assembly. For that purpose, the expression "law" is defined as including any enactment as to the internal affairs of Egypt affecting the organisation of powers within the State, or bringing into force any general measure as to the civil or political rights of its inhabitants. Other enactments can be made by decree of the Sultan taken on the advice of his Council of Ministers (article 9). No law or decree can be promulgated, unless it has been countersigned by the President of the Council of Ministers, and by the competent Ministers.

8. Under article 11, the Assembly has the right of initiating legislation, except with regard to constitutional laws. If any member brings forward a Bill, the Assembly has first to decide whether it will be taken into consideration. If the decision is in the affirmative, the Bill is examined first by a Special Commission, and then in Committee of the whole House. If the Bill is approved, it is transmitted to the Council of Ministers. The Council can then either return the Bill to the Assembly with or without amendments, or can reject it. In the latter case, the Council is bound to give reasons for its rejection. No public discussion can take place of any Bill initiated by the Assembly until it has been approved by the Council of Ministers.

9. Under article 12 of the law, any Bill submitted to the Legislative Assembly by the Government (which would include any Bill initiated by the Assembly and approved by the Council of Ministers) may be accepted as it stands, amended or rejected by the Assembly. Under article 13, the Government, if it does not agree with the Assembly, is to return the Bill with an explanation of its views. The Assembly is then entitled to discuss the explanations given by the Government and, if it does not accept those explanations, a conference takes place between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly sitting in Committee.

10. Under article 14, if the conference does not result in an agreement, the examination of the Bill is adjourned for fifteen days. After that period, the Bill is again submitted to the Assembly either in its original form or with such amendments as the Government may have introduced which are not inconsistent with the principle of the original Bill or of any agreed amendments.

11. It is provided by article 15 that if, after the adjournment, the Assembly and the Government are still unable to come to an agreement, the Government may either dissolve the Assembly or may promulgate the law in the form of its last proposals, with any amendments which it may find itself able to accept. The Government has to inform the Assembly of its reasons for not giving effect to the advice of the Assembly.

12. It is provided by article 16 that, if the Assembly is dissolved as the result of a disagreement as to any particular Bill, then that Bill, if it is resolved to go on with it, must be submitted to the new Assembly in its first session, and will have a priority over all other questions whatever, except the Budget.

13. The result of these provisions is that legislative powers are given both to the Council of Ministers and to the Legislative Assembly. No legislation can be passed, except with the approval of the Council of Ministers. No important legislation can be passed, except with the approval of the Council of Ministers, after consultation with the Legislative Assembly. Legislation which is not approved by the Assembly could only be put into force after considerable delay, and on condition that the Ministers are prepared to disregard the considered opinion of the Assembly. This, in practice, they would seldom be willing to do. The result seems to be that it would be so difficult as to be almost impossible to put into force any important legislative enactment without the approval of the Legislative Assembly.

14. Besides these powers in matters of legislation, the Assembly has other powers of very considerable importance. Under article 17, no new direct or personal tax or land tax can be imposed until it has been voted by the Legislative Assembly. Under article 18, the Assembly must be consulted as to the issue of any loan, as to any railway or irrigation project affecting several provinces, and as to the classification of lands for purposes of land tax; and the Government has to give reasons if it does not accept the advice of the Assembly. The Assembly also has the power to pass resolutions of its own motion on any Egyptian question, so long as it does not touch on the relations of Egypt with foreign Powers, and so long also as it does not fall under certain other specified exceptions.

15. The annual Budget has to be submitted to the Assembly at least forty days before the end of the financial year. The Assembly is entitled to discuss the Budget and to communicate its views to the Ministry of Finance; and that Ministry is obliged to give reasons in every case where it does not accept the views of the Assembly.

16. The members of the Assembly have the right to question Ministers on all administrative matters of general interest, subject to certain conditions which are laid down.

17. It should, perhaps, be added that the Assembly meets on the 1st November in each year, and sits until the end of May in the following year. Its members are elected or nominated for six years, one-third of them being replaced every two years.

The members to be replaced after the first and second periods of two years are determined by drawing lots.

18. This Assembly sat only for one session, that of 1913-14. I made it my business to read the reports of all the debates, and I had to attend one or two Committee meetings to explain legislative measures. My opinion was, and is, that a very promising beginning was made. Members worked very hard in Committee, and the proceedings got steadily more business-like as the session went on. It is, I think, beyond all doubt that the proceedings of the Assembly were followed with great interest by Egyptians generally.

19. The institution of this Assembly made a considerable change in the position of the Ministers. Its proceedings were conducted exclusively in Arabic, and it was therefore only the Ministers who could introduce measures, answer questions, and defend the actions of their administrations; no English officials would be prepared to make speeches in classical Arabic. This made it necessary to leave to individual Ministers a wide discretion as to the line which they should take, as to the amendments which they should accept, and as to the answers which they should give to inconvenient questions. One session was not sufficient to allow the measure to have its full effect on methods of administration; but it became apparent that the tendency would be for the Minister to become more and more responsible for decisions of principle, and for the English adviser to become more and more his technical assistant.

20. As will be seen from the sketch given above, the Ministers were nominally not responsible to the Assembly. But, in fact, a Minister who was unable to defend his measures with success before the Assembly would soon have found himself in an almost untenable position, and have been considered a source of weakness by his colleagues. If the system is revived in the future, it will, I think, be found impossible, or at least very difficult, to carry on government with Ministers who are not acceptable to the Assembly.

21. It may be said on the whole that Egypt, before the war, had got at least half-way to parliamentary government. More than that, it had got so far on the road that parliamentary government at some not distant date seemed to have become practically inevitable.

22. Then came the war; and by a decree of the 18th October, 1914, the commencement of the next session of the Assembly was adjourned to the 1st January, 1915. It was provided by the same decree that any decree not essentially temporary which should be promulgated without being submitted to the Assembly, if it ought to be so submitted under the Organic Law, should lose all effect fifteen days after the meeting of the Assembly, if it had not within that period been submitted with or without modification to the Assembly. The meeting of the Assembly was again postponed by successive decrees and finally, by decree of the 27th October, 1915, was adjourned to a date to be fixed by a subsequent decree. By the same decree the provisions of the Organic Law as to the replacement of members by partial elections were suspended.

23. The result has been that the Egyptian Constitution has been suspended for nearly five years. During that period constitutional questions have largely fallen into the background, and the people of Egypt, to speak quite plainly, have become hewers of wood and drawers of water for the great armies which have been based on Egypt. No doubt this was inevitable, but it was a state of things that no patriotic Egyptian could be expected to regard without great anxiety. Their hope was that it was essentially temporary, and that, as soon as the war came to an end, their full constitutional rights would be restored to them, with such additions and amendments as their services during the war might seem to merit. I think it is only fair to say that, during the war, they showed great patience, and that Egyptian Ministers rendered a very considerable service in keeping things quiet.

24. The Egyptians, like most other people in most other countries, expected the return of peace conditions as soon as the last shot had been fired. They were disappointed in this expectation, as was inevitable, but they can hardly be blamed for it. Their efforts to lay their views before His Majesty's Government failed, under circumstances which are well known.

25. To the knowledge of all educated Egyptians, a great body of new legislation applicable to Egypt was in course of preparation by the Capitulations Commission. They had no means of knowing how it was proposed that the legislation should be put into force. I have never known myself. The proceedings of the Commission were confidential, only concise summaries being published. The whole legal world in Egypt acquired on very insufficient evidence the belief that a completely English system of

justice was going to be imposed on the country, and that the English language was to be to a large extent the language of the Courts. As very few of them are acquainted with our language, the prospect filled them with dismay.

26. There finally came to their knowledge a confidential document containing a preliminary sketch of a possible international constitution for Egypt, which was intended only for the eyes of Ministers. I am assured by an Egyptian friend that there is not a single Egyptian who can read who has not read this document from beginning to end. When I informed him that I had never seen it myself, he received my statement with polite incredulity.

27. If there is one thing which has been made clear to me in conversations with Egyptians during the last fortnight, it is that they hate and fear any suggestion of the abolition of the Capitulations. This may seem strange at first sight; but, from the point of view of an Egyptian Nationalist, I think that it shows a sound political instinct. They know quite well that they cannot get rid of the large foreign colonies in Egypt and that, if they could, they would ruin the country in the process. If these colonies are to stay without the protection of the Capitulations, they will certainly demand, and as certainly obtain, their share of representation in any Egyptian Parliament and their part in the general government of the country. It is this that all Egyptians most strenuously wish to prevent. They would much rather leave to foreigners all kinds of privileges and special rights than allow them to interfere in administration. It is also to be noted that none of the foreign Powers are likely to abandon their rights under the Capitulations unless they are assured of the permanence of the British protectorate. For the Egyptian the abolition of the Capitulations would mean the abandonment of all hope of ultimate independence.

28. Educated Egyptians who take an interest in politics thus became thoroughly alarmed for the future of constitutional government in the country. It would be quite a mistake to suppose that this feeling is confined to a few agitators or malcontents; it is, in fact, shared to my personal knowledge by a number of steady-going and capable Egyptian officials, who are earning good salaries in the service of the State, and make no complaint as to their personal position. The Egyptian staff of the State Legal Department consists mainly of Copts, and I have been very much struck by the fact that for the first time in my experience these Copts are giving whole-hearted support to the movement, in so far as it is a constitutional one. They have, up to now, remained at their duty under very considerable difficulties, while all the other advocates have gone on strike; and they are taking part in the proposed abstention from work very unwillingly and under a great deal of constraint. But they do not make any attempt to conceal in conversation their sympathy with the constitutional movement.

29. The movement started by the educated classes would not have made much headway if there had been no other grievances than those suggested above. The fellahs have their grievances too, which arise naturally and inevitably when a drastic system of requisition of foodstuffs, fodder and animals has been in force for a long period. The recruiting of the Labour Corps has also given rise to difficulties. I will not dilate further on these matters, as to which other people can give much better information than I can.

30. Once the disturbances began, the various classes of people in Egypt did after their kind. It will have been remarked that a great proportion of the atrocities have been committed by the inhabitants of Deirout, the most criminal markaz in Egypt. The Beduin, as is their habit, looted and burnt wherever they thought that they could do so with impunity; the town mobs, of course, looted the shops.

31. These people are for the moment in a great state of excitement and the extremists among them have quite got the upper hand. We are told that they will accept nothing except complete independence, that all Egyptians detest the English and that no sort of compromise or arrangement is possible. In my opinion, none of this is to be taken too seriously. This sudden blaze of enthusiasm is beginning to die down already, and the more moderate people will soon make their opinions heard. We have no common ground with the extremists; and the only real question is what line should be taken when the time comes to deal with the moderates.

32. I venture to submit that there is one duty which we owe to all Egyptians, and that is to make our position and theirs perfectly clear, so far as it is possible to do so. The use of the word "protectorate" without explanation has been already a fruitful source of trouble, since it has been used in the past to describe a great number of international arrangements of very different kinds. It may mean an arrangement under which the protecting Power takes charge of the foreign relations of another

country and protects it from outside foes, while leaving it entirely free in matters of internal government. But in Africa the word has been freely used to cover the relations between a European Power and its dependencies. Has Egypt for this purpose become a part of Europe, to use a phrase of the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, or is she still a part of Africa? I think that during the last four years most Englishmen have construed the phrase in the one sense, and most Egyptians in the other.

33. It is quite impossible for us to retire from Egypt, even if we wanted to, unless some other Power will take over the responsibility from us. We have built up an elaborate system of irrigation and communications, which enables us to maintain in comfort and prosperity a population of some 13,000,000 or 14,000,000. It would be impossible for the Egyptians to carry on this system without assistance, while its breakdown would entail the starvation of a large proportion of the population. Apart from that, Egypt would be quite unable to defend herself against Beduin raids.

34. These elementary facts must be well known to the more intelligent leaders in the movement. They must be either relying on outside assistance or putting their claims as high as possible in the hope of getting better terms. I refuse to believe that they contemplate the possibility of Egypt being left to her own devices, whatever the young hot-heads may think.

35. The first thing to do, in my opinion, is to make it quite clear to the whole people that the Protectorate is an established fact approved by the Powers, and not open to discussion. It would very much help matters here if His Majesty's Government found it possible to fix a term of (say) twenty years, after which the whole question would be open to reconsideration.

36. When that has been done, the Egyptians might be given their choice. If they will accept the Protectorate, we could return as soon as the disturbances are at an end to the constitutional form of government which existed before the war. If competent men will consent to form a Ministry, a decree might be issued summoning the Legislative Assembly for the 1st November next, and declaring that the period of five years from the 1st November, 1914, should not be taken into account as forming part of the term of the mandate of its members. This would obviate the necessity of a general election. Between now and the meeting of the Assembly, there would be ample time for a discussion between His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Ministers of a programme which, so far as it entails legislation proper to be submitted, would be laid before the Assembly. At the same time, the Powers might be asked to entrust His Majesty's Government with the defence of the rights of their nationals under the Capitulations, and arrangements could be made, either for the renewal of the mandate of the Mixed Tribunals, or for the establishment of Protectorate Courts to take their place.

37. I must say frankly, though with great regret, that, in my judgment, the scheme for the abolition of the Capitulations, for the unification of Egyptian Courts, and for the introduction of legislation applicable to all inhabitants of Egypt alike has become impossible. So far as I can judge, it has met with the disapproval of all classes in Egypt, foreign as well as native. It would be impossible to bring it into effective operation against the will of practically all the inhabitants of Egypt, even if it were desirable to do so. We must be prepared to carry on the government on the old lines, at least for the present, with only such modifications as may result from any special position assumed by His Majesty's Government, with the consent of the Powers, for the protection of foreigners.

38. One of the grievances commonly put forward by the Egyptians is that too many of the high posts under Government are held by Englishmen. That is clearly a question which could be discussed when regular constitutional government is restored. Most of these posts could not be occupied by Egyptians, without a long preliminary training.

39. If the people and their leaders refuse to recognise the Protectorate, to form a Ministry, or to consider any kind of compromise, the only alternative is military government until they come to their senses.

No. 230.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 632.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, April 23, 1919.

WHEN may I expect Sir R. Crawford to arrive here? He is urgently needed.

Brunyate has been seriously ill and leaves for England 26th April.

Patterson has already gone on sick-leave.

Dowson has repeated attacks of fever, and it is doubtful whether he can return to work.

Hayter is in charge of Ministry of Finance, but is wanted elsewhere for legal work.

Depletion of whole senior staff of finance is a serious matter, and I trust Sir R. Crawford may come at once

No. 231.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 633.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 23, 1919.

NO untoward incidents have been reported in last twenty-four hours.

Large majority of Government employees of effendi class returned to work this morning, remaining absentees being for most part workmen, especially of the railways.

Strike has, I think, collapsed, and this coming simultaneously with publication of American recognition of British protectorate has thrown extremists into a mood of depression, though it is too early to say what will be effect on general public.

Sultan has accepted resignation of Ministry.

(Sent to India and Khartoum, No. 633.)

No. 232.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 502.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1919.

FOLLOWING for Cotton Seed Board from Ministry of Food (No. 111):—

"Control and purchase of cotton seed by Food Ministry will cease with end of present season, but Ministry desire that all cotton seed should come to this country, and steps should be taken to secure this. Consult High Commissioner, arrange with him regarding public announcement, and cable when matter is in order and date of announcement so that simultaneously public notice may be given here."

No. 233.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 144.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 24, 1919.

WITH reference to the memorandum from His Majesty's Embassy at Rome to the Italian Government, dated the 16th September, 1917, on the subject of correspondence with Mohammad Idris-el-Senussi, a further request has now been received from the Italian Embassy here that such direct correspondence should cease.

His Majesty's Government consider that the moment has now arrived to act on the principle which was previously accepted, namely, that such communications should pass through the intermediary of the Italian authorities.

It is felt that the continuance of direct relationship between the British or Egyptian authorities and Mohammad Idris is not in the interests of either the Italians or ourselves, while it tends to give Mohammad Idris a feeling of independence from which no good result can be anticipated.

I have to request, therefore, that you will issue such instructions in this matter as will give effect to the decision of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

*Memorandum by Colonel Garner.**(A.)—Transfer of the Egyptian International Quarantine Board to the Egyptian Government.*

AS it is understood that the transfer to the Egyptian Government of the functions of the Alexandria International Quarantine Board has been decided upon as a matter of policy, this Administration is assuming that the draft treaties of peace with enemy Powers will confirm this transfer.

(B.)—Allocation of Quarantine Work when taken over.

It is proposed that the various branches of the work should be apportioned to the sections of this and other departments concerned.

For example:—

The accounts work would be dealt with by the Accounts Section of this Administration.

The building work would be carried on by the State Building Department, Ministry of Public Works.

The lazaretto work would fall largely into the Public Health Administration, Hospital Section, and the laboratory work into the Public Health Laboratories.

The work involved in the actual measures to be taken against ships would come to the Epidemic Section, military, police, or coastguard forces being indented upon to supply "police sanitaire" as required.

(C.)—Staff.

The staff of the Quarantine Board would, in respect of permanent posts, be taken over.

Considerable modification may be necessary, but as far as possible this staff would be absorbed; unsuitable or superfluous employees would be dispensed with, their financial interests receiving consideration.

The direction of both quarantine and town health work at Port Said and Suez would be placed in the hands of one official in each case.

Similarly for Alexandria in the event of the Government ever directly taking over the health work of that town. Otherwise a separate Director of Quarantine paid by and responsible to the Government would be appointed.

Adequate specialised staff would be maintained for quarantine work in the ports—members of the staff of the local hospitals would be available when required as consultants.

In Suez, in view of the importance of the work, the staff would be almost entirely European.

In the smaller ports, such as Rosetta, Damietta, Kosseir, &c., the local Medical Officer of Health would undertake the quarantine duties.

The extra staff required to deal with the pilgrimage would be derived from the general reserve of the Public Health Administration, from its service of epidemic medical officers, and from specially engaged medical officers.

(D.)—Policy.

1. Protection of Egypt itself.
2. Protection of Europe against the East.
3. Pilgrimage.

It is presumed that under the arrangements by which the International Quarantine Board is abolished all its special powers as laid down in Parts II, III, and IV of the Paris Convention will be transferred to the Egyptian Government.

1. Protection of Egypt.

This Administration is of opinion that, in view of the development of the Health Services (especially of the Passenger Control Service) in this country, of the new political status of Egypt, and of the existence of railway connection with

Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Asia Minor, the measures designed for the protection of Egypt should be modified, so as to conform as clearly as local circumstances will permit to the quarantine system followed in Great Britain.

It is presumed that, as a sovereign Power exercising protection over this country, it would be within the prerogative of Great Britain to modify the measures referred to, by simply informing the signatory Powers of her intention to do so.

Briefly, the directions in which power is required to modify existing measures are:—

All ships in the case of both cholera and plague, except ships on which pneumonic plague had appeared, would at once be given free pratique as soon as the sick, suspects, and passengers were landed and the necessary disinfection had been carried out. The crews of such ships would be kept under observation.

The measures necessary against bubonic plague would be confined to isolation of the sick and suspects, rat destruction, address taking of the contacts and passengers, with subsequent medical observation at destination, only those unable to give proper addresses being detained.

In the case of pneumonic plague, the existing regulations would be applied.

In the case of cholera, it would be desired to modify the obligation to quarantine the crew and passengers till the completion of the five days period, substituting passenger control and observation where necessary.

2. Protection of Europe.

This Administration desires to emphasise the fact that the conditions under which it was first decided internationally to use Egypt as an advanced quarantine station for the protection of Europe no longer exists.

This country, as stated, is now in direct railway communication with Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Constantinople, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, endemic centres of cholera up to the present.

This cardinal fact renders obsolete and illogical not only the maritime measures laid down by convention for the protection of Egypt itself, but also the special arrangements designed for the protection of Europe applicable to ships passing through the Suez Canal in transit.

Under these circumstances, the administration most strongly urges that the same principles of quarantine as it has advocated above for the treatment of ships with Egypt as a destination, should be applied in all Egyptian ports to ships in transit for Europe.

As far as Europe is concerned, this involves no departure from accepted principle, as it is in effect an enlargement of the right of vessels to pass the Suez Canal in quarantine, and of those ships not wishing to conform to existing regulations to land their passengers and cargo and take the sea.

3. The Pilgrimage.

The opinion expressed above as to the necessity of mitigating the severity of existing quarantine regulations is not held with regard to the treatment of pilgrims.

These represent a closely aggregated mass of probable infection in the case of cholera, the disease with which this country is chiefly concerned.

They travel under such crowded conditions that it is difficult to recognise disease. They are very frequently extremely poor, ignorant, and of the class which conceals disease.

They are more difficult to control than ordinary passengers, and a passenger observation system would not provide an adequate safeguard.

These arguments show the necessity from this country's point of view of quarantining Egyptian pilgrims.

With regard to those of other nationalities returning via the Suez Canal, this administration, for the reasons stated above and from the point of view of the protection of Egypt, would be entirely opposed to pilgrim ships passing the Canal in quarantine as a matter of ordinary routine.

The administration therefore proposes that, in so far as Egypt itself is concerned, the existing regulations as to the use of Tor should continue to be followed in their general principles in dealing with cholera. In the case of plague, the regulations should be modified in accordance with the general principles stated above.

The work at Tor should be carried out by the Egyptian Government under whatever conditions may obtain in the Hedjaz after the Peace Conference.

This country has the most direct and immediate interest in the matter, and as its administrations are preponderatingly Moslem, it would appear sound to leave the conduct of the work in its hands.

The direction of the Souakim station should be handed over to the Sudan Government.

With regard to the Hedjaz itself, the views of this administration are:—

(a.) That the lines of defence which existed before the war should be preserved.

On the maritime route the use of Tor and Camaran should be continued. Stations should be maintained in the Hedjaz ports for use against arrivals from the west coast of the Red Sea.

On the railway line a station is required outside holy territory—Maan would probably be the most suitable place.

The caravan routes must be left to the supervision of the Hedjaz Government. They represent less danger than the other two routes.

(b.) That if the Hedjaz falls under the control of one or more of the great Powers, that that Power or association of Powers should take over the quarantine duties at Camaran and on the Hedjaz Railway.

In view of the inefficiency of the Hedjaz ports services, it would also be advisable that this Power or association of Powers should assume control of the quarantine and town health work in these ports.

(c.) That if no direct political control is exercised by a Power or group of Powers, that the work outlined in (b) should be dealt with by a joint board of the Powers interested in the pilgrimage. It might in that case be found difficult effectively to enforce international control inside the Hedjaz. If so, special arrangements for dealing with pilgrims from the west littoral of the Red Sea would require to be made, possibly by quarantining them at the ports of departure.

(d.) That it should be pointed out to the Foreign Office that it would probably be advisable that the solution of the question should form part of all agreements at the Peace Conference with regard to the future of the Hedjaz.

(D.)—General.

This administration proposes to limit quarantine work on the Palestine railway to medical inspection and address taking, with medical observations at destination, retention of cases, suspects, and persons unable to give satisfactory addresses.

It is presumed that the predominant Powers in Syria, Palestine, Asia Minor, and Constantinople will take control of the quarantine arrangements in these places. Here again attention should be drawn to the advisability of settling the constitution of the quarantine authority in each particular port of the Near East at the same time as the political future is arranged.

The constitution of these quarantine authorities being determined, it would be advisable that a new Sanitary Conference should be called, as there are many questions touching the technicalities of quarantine which demand reconsideration. For example, the existing definition of infected "circumscription" was adopted in order to limit the application of the severe measures prescribed by the Convention. It is necessary that if quarantine measures are to be made more reasonable and less stringent, the definition of circumscription must be broadened.

The methods of dealing with plague urgently require revision.

CATHCART GARNER.

Cairo, March 11, 1919.

No. 235.

Memorandum by Dr. Buchanan on Dr. Garner's note of March 11, 1919.

Quarantine Arrangements in Egypt, &c.

DR. GARNER'S note of the 11th March appears to me to indicate a change of administration which is welcome in its promise of increased efficiency not only as

regards Egypt, but in securing necessary co-operation with other countries on modern lines of prevention.

I trust that proposal (B) "Alteration of the Quarantine Work when taken over" means that the Egyptian Public Health Department will have full authority, responsibility and funds, and that the Department will be in a position to obtain all necessary assistance in the work from the other departments of administration which are referred to. The Egyptian Public Health Department should be in position to furnish full and frank reports which will give the Foreign Office ample knowledge of the work accomplished, and of the views of the expert advisers of the Egyptian Government on the developments and requirements of the service. It is of great importance to our home administration to be kept informed of such facts.

With the observations under (D) "Policy," I am in general agreement, provided always that the adoption of the policy carries with it efficient administration in practice. It will be remembered that the British system of substituting surveillance of persons suspected of having been exposed to infection for detention in quarantine is only rendered possible by the enforcement of orders which prescribe in detail the duties of medical officers at the ports, and by action on the part of the central public health authority to ensure that the local observation of these persons is a reality. This is no doubt realised by the Egyptian Public Health Department when they propose to substitute surveillance for five days' quarantine in the case of passengers and crews of ships infected by cholera.

It will be an important part of the new policy that notifications of infectious disease on board vessels leaving Egypt for the United Kingdom should be regularly sent in advance, and probably the same system should be applied to such vessels leaving Egypt for other countries.

I fully agree with Dr. Garner's contention that special measures must be maintained in connection with the pilgrimage. In this matter the conditions laid down by the Paris Convention, to which Great Britain is a party, should be substantially maintained by whatever authorities control the quarantine arrangements of the Red Sea.

An interdepartmental discussion has recently taken place at the Foreign Office on the question of the pilgrimage. At this discussion it was arranged that the question of the quarantine requirements, particularly the temporary arrangements which will be necessary to meet the conditions of the pilgrimage of 1919, should be considered by a committee which should consult with Major Thomson on his arrival from Egypt. This matter had perhaps best be left to that committee, on which the Local Government Board will be represented, and kept separate from the general questions dealt with in Dr. Garner's note.

In considering how the policy suggested by Dr. Garner could be given effect to, it is obviously necessary to obtain the views of the Foreign Office at an early stage, especially as these suggestions include recommendations for action at the Peace Conference. This applies particularly to the important suggestion under the heading "General" on page 7 that the predominant powers in Syria, Palestine, Asia Minor and Constantinople should, as part of the terms of peace, be required to undertake control of the quarantine arrangements in those places.

Another important matter on which it is important to ascertain the Foreign Office view is Dr. Garner's suggestion in D (1) that it is open to us to adopt measures differing from those of the Paris Convention by a simple notification to the signatory Powers.

It would be convenient if the Board were to inform the Foreign Office that a representative of the Medical Department will be glad, if desired, to discuss these questions with them and Major Thomson at an early date.

I may add that I fully agree with Dr. Garner that an international conference for the revision of the convention is necessary. As I stated in a recent memorandum on the Mecca pilgrimage, however, I think we should not press for an immediate international conference, but endeavour in 1919 to establish good working arrangements which can be presented to the conference with unanimity and force by the British delegation when the conference is held.

G. S. BUCHANAN.

March 27, 1919.

No. 236.

*Inter-Departmental Pilgrimage Quarantine Committee.**Minutes of a Conference held at the Foreign Office on Friday, April 25, 1919, at 3 P.M.*

Present :

Dr. G. BUCHANAN, C.B., Local Government Board (*in the Chair*).

Sir HAVELOCK CHARLES, G.C.V.O., India Office.

Major C. P. THOMSON, D.S.O., R.A.M.C., Egyptian Government.

Major H. W. YOUNG, D.S.O., Foreign Office.

THE Committee had before them the Minutes of the Conference on the Pilgrimage held at the Foreign Office on the 18th March, in which it had been decided that the Committee should consider the steps necessary for this year's pilgrimage, and should also prepare a draft scheme for the future control of the quarantine arrangements connected with the pilgrimage for submission to the Peace Delegation at Paris. It was understood that, as far as the International Quarantine Board of Egypt was concerned, the necessary steps were being taken by the British Delegation at Paris to come to terms with the Allied Powers concerned with a view to the Egyptian Public Health Department taking over the duties of this body. It was also understood that a clause was being inserted in the peace terms with Germany providing for this transfer. The Committee decided to ask the Foreign Office to obtain confirmation of this from Paris, as it was essential to the consideration of the steps necessary at Tor and Suakim that they should know what authority was in future to be responsible for the quarantine arrangements at these stations, which have hitherto been undertaken by the Egyptian International Quarantine Board.

With regard to the steps to be taken at Jeddah and Yembo, it was understood that whatever arrangements might be in view for the replacing by mandatory powers of the International Board at Constantinople, which has hitherto been responsible for the control of all Turkish quarantine arrangements, there was no question of a mandate being granted to any Power for Arabia, where King Hussein was to be allowed to establish an independent kingdom, in which His Majesty's Government would have an exclusive interest. This point also needed confirmation before the Committee could usefully discuss detailed arrangements for the future control of quarantine arrangements in the Hejaz. The Committee were of opinion that it was impracticable to divorce this year's arrangements from future arrangements, and considered that any steps taken this year should be modelled on lines which would be suitable for future years as well.

It was considered that an independent inspecting officer should be despatched forthwith to report upon the existing conditions at Kamaran. It was decided to ask the Foreign Office to invite the Local Government Board to spare the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson for this purpose. This decision was reached in view of the conflicting reports which had been received as to the state of affairs at Kamaran, and especially in view of the disquieting telegram of the 1st April from the Government of India, which appeared to contemplate the possibility of the Kamaran station not being ready in time for this year's pilgrimage.

Sir Havelock Charles pointed out that Sir Armand Ruffer's report was open to the objection that he was unfamiliar with Indian conditions. This objection could not apply to Colonel Wilkinson, who had had considerable experience as medical officer in India. He added that if the Government of India were to be held responsible for quarantine arrangements at Kamaran, they could not accept this responsibility until the position there had been reported on by an independent inspecting officer. Adequate sanitary arrangements in the Red Sea would entirely remove from India the odium of introducing epidemic disease from India to Europe in connection with the pilgrimage. It was therefore essential that the Kamaran quarantine station should be put in order with the least possible delay. The Committee decided, as soon as Colonel Wilkinson's mission was approved by the Local Government Board, to ask the India Office to inform

the Government of India that he was proceeding to Kamaran and to give him every facility for his inspection of the quarantine arrangements there.

With regard to Tor, Major Thomson explained that the quarantine arrangements there were still under the control of the International Quarantine Board of Egypt, but he thought that, even if the Committee had been incorrectly informed as to the proposed transfer to the Egyptian Public Health Department of the duties of this Board, there could be no objection to Colonel Wilkinson visiting Tor and Suakim on his way to Kamaran if arranged with the President of the Board that he should visit these places (Tor and Suakim) *en route* for Kamaran on the ground of advisability of his seeing them before visiting Kamaran.

With regard to Jeddah and Yembo, the Committee were strongly of opinion that, whatever might be General Allenby's answer to Foreign Office telegram No. 148 of the 4th April as to the best method of ensuring effective control in the Hejaz, this could never be done except by a staff to be nominated by the High Commissioner for Egypt and to work under British supervision. Major Thomson was asked to prepare detailed suggestions for the formation of this service, which are attached to the Minutes (Appendix). The Committee considered that, in the event of its being considered impossible to induce King Hussein to approve of the formation of a Hejaz Quarantine Service staffed by nominees of the High Commissioner at Cairo, to be paid out of King Hussein's subsidy, it would be unavoidable that some form of international control should be instituted to perform the duties of the Constantinople Quarantine Board at these ports.

It was decided to ask the War Office when an answer might be expected from General Headquarters, Egypt Force, to their telegram No. 76984 of the 11th April, on the subject of pilgrims proceeding by land from the occupied enemy territories of Syria.

With regard to Colonel Wilkinson's expenses, it was decided to ask the Foreign Office to approach the Treasury for sanction to the payment of the necessary charges in the first instance, subject to the understanding that it would ultimately be debited to the authority becoming responsible in future for the sanitary arrangements in question, on the analogy of the decision by the Inter-Departmental Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 18th March.

The Committee decided to meet again on Thursday, the 1st May.

*Foreign Office,
April 25, 1919.*

APPENDIX.

SUGGESTIONS FROM MAJOR THOMSON.

THE object of this note is to give some suggestions as to what may be required to instal an efficient Maritime Quarantine Service in the Hejaz.

Three stations are necessary :—

- One at Jeddah.
- „ Yembo.
- „ Kurfudah.

There is no need for a very large lazaretto at any of these places as the work for which they are mainly required is the control of the traffic from the western littoral of the Red Sea and only exceptionally for ships coming via Tor or Kamaran, on which infectious disease has broken out since the Tor or Kamaran inspections.

At Jeddah a lazaretto capable of dealing with 2,000 persons would be sufficient.

At Yembo provision for 1,000 should be made.

At Kurfudah, dhow traffic only has to be catered for. It would probably be sufficient to provide accommodation for 100 people.

Existing Conditions.

At Kurfudah and Yembo these are not known. It is believed that no quarantine arrangements of any sort exist at Kurfudah and that those at Yembo are rudimentary.

At Jeddah the quarantine arrangements may be divided into—

1. Port Service.
2. Two island quarantine stations.

1. The Port Service has its offices at the principal landing stage. There is here also a covered wooden pen about 40 by 15 m. for the examination of embarking passengers. There is no disinfecting apparatus here and no equipment of any sort. The service has three sailing boats for the purpose of conducting ships' examination. The ships are moored in the roadstead about 2 miles from the shore.

2. The two island quarantine stations, Abou Saad and El Wasta, are situated about 6 miles to the south of the landing-stage. Abou Saad is the nearer to Jeddah. It has accommodation in four sections for about 200 people in stone-built houses.

It has, in addition, in stone buildings—

- (a.) A water condenser. This has been smashed to pieces. The water is piped to the various sections.
- (b.) Two high-pressure disinfecting machines and bathing houses.
- (c.) A small hospital of about twelve beds, with dispensary and bacteriological laboratory, very sketchily equipped.
- (d.) A house for the permanent staff.

The diameter of the island is about 120 m.

El Wasta is situated about a mile to the south of Abou Saad. Its diameter is about 300 m. It has accommodation in stone-built houses, in ten sections, for about 500 people. It has no water supply and no equipment of any sort.

The expense of maintaining the quarantine service at Jeddah now amounts to about 180*l.* a month.

Previously the Constantinople International Quarantine Board levied a tax of 10 piastres on each pilgrim above 7 years landing at the Red Sea ports, and as at Jeddah the average number of pilgrims was between 80,000 and 90,000, their income there cannot have been much short of 7,000*l.* a year.

In addition, they charged 7 piastres for each person disinfected at the quarantine station and 7½ piastres per head per day for each day's residence in the quarantine station.

Steps now Required.

At Yembo and Kurfudah quarantine stations should be made containing—

- Disinfection stations, with baths.
- Medical inspection rooms.
- Offices and staff quarters.
- Lazarettos, in sections, holding 50 or 100 people.
- Hospital stores; and (at Yembo)
- Laboratory.
- Motor-launches.

The accommodation required should be provided by tents pending the erection of buildings.

It is impossible to give even an approximate estimate of the capital cost of erecting and equipping these two stations in the absence of detailed information, but it might be put down at 12,000*l.* for Yembo and 3,000*l.* for Kurfudah.

At Jeddah.

The existing buildings should be put in a proper state of repair. The additional accommodation required for 1,300 people will involve the building of the following additional premises:—

- Disinfection stations on Wasta and the third Island.
- Thirteen pavilions, each holding 100, on Wasta and the third Island.
- Hospital of fifty beds on the third Island.
- Land medical inspection rooms and disinfection station and laboratory are required, also a proper service of motor launches and lighters.
- A proper system of sewage disposal for the three islands must be devised.

The expense for these Jeddah changes is estimated at not less than 10,000*l.* Total for the three stations, 25,000*l.*

Staff

The head of the service must be an English medical officer. He would presumably belong to the service of King Hussein, but should be directly responsible to the English official charged with the surveillance of Hejaz affairs.

An English assistant director and bacteriologist is also required.

The medical officers must be Moslems. They should be recruited as far as possible among Arabs. The normal number required would be four—one at Yembo, two at Jeddah, and one at Kurfudah. During the pilgrimage temporary medical officers should be engaged.

With regard to the remainder of the staff required, engineer, clerical staff, disinfecting staff, storekeepers, sick attendants, motor-launch chauffeurs, gardes sanitaires, &c.; these should all be appointed by the Director of Quarantine.

The appointment of the chief accountant and of his clerical staff might be left to King Hussein if it is arranged that the Director of Quarantine should have the right of paying all expenses direct from the subsidy.

The provision of a corps of gardes sanitaires under the direct and exclusive control of the Director of Quarantine is a necessity.

The expenses of the Quarantine Service should be borne on the subsidy, the money, if possible, being made directly available to the Director of Quarantine. It is estimated that the running expenses of the Quarantine Service would probably not be less than 14,000*l.* a year, viz.:—

	£
Upkeep of buildings and machinery	1,400
„ of equipment	2,000
„ and running expenses of laboratory	300
„ „ „ motor launches	1,300
Running expenses disinfecting station	300
Staff	8,700

It is estimated that if a flat rate of tax of 15 piastres per pilgrim above 7 years of age were levied, and ordinary quarantine charges were made on normal shipping, there would be no deficit on the running of the Service. The former rate was 10 piastres, but to this had to be added daily charges for persons in quarantine and other charges for disinfection.

The selection of the English Director of Quarantine should be proceeded with as soon as King Hussein is induced to accept the proposed arrangements. If it is found impossible to obtain at once a suitable permanent employee, an attempt should be made as a temporary measure to obtain the seconding of an R.A.M.C. officer with a knowledge of Arabic. Such an official might be secured temporarily from the Egyptian Army by arrangement with them and the War Office. The pay of the post should be from 1,000*l.* to 1,200*l.* A good man will not be secured for less. Great tact and a sufficiency of firmness will be required as well as administrative ability.

The official, as soon as selected, should proceed to arrange all details for this year's pilgrimage, and to draw up plans for putting the Service permanently on a proper footing.

No. 237.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 637.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 24, 1919.

CAIRO is quiet. Seven strike leaders were arrested last night. Practically all Government officials are back at work. Attempts were made to intimidate them this morning, but agitators were dispersed and some arrested. Government workmen are returning more slowly, and many of this class are still absent from railway workshops.

A few slight incidents have occurred in provinces, but there is nothing of importance to report.

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No. 238.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 639.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 25, 1919.

RUSHDY Ministry, which resigned on the 21st April after holding office for a fortnight, were a useful stopgap during a period of difficulty when feeling was at a high pitch. Task which they undertook as Ministers upholding protectorate was to put an end to strike in public departments, a necessary preliminary to further political action. This task Rushdy Pasha and his colleagues failed to accomplish. On the 20th April they suggested recognition of Zaghlul as representative of Egypt, which insubordinate officials demanded, and to which I could not agree. From that moment their failure was obvious, and resignation only a matter of time. Ministry had carried on no public business and had lost popularity which they enjoyed on taking office.

I then issued proclamation under martial law ordering all officials to return to their duties which was published on the 22nd April and communicated to you in telegram No. 623. A section of Ministry, headed by Adly Pasha was opposed to this policy and declared that were it adopted they could not remain in office. And knowledge that I was going to take this action led to resignation of Ministry. Rushdy Pasha had, no doubt, miscalculated the extent of his influence. He evidently believed a Cabinet which only claimed a large measure of autonomy but not independence would be able to command public opinion.

Sultan entirely agreed that it was useless to ask Cabinet to remain. I discussed with His Highness formation of another Government and he has made certain suggestions which are under consideration, but I think some time will elapse before suitable Ministers can be found. This delay, however, would do no harm. Great majority of officials in large departments returned on Wednesday, in compliance with terms of my proclamation, and if situation continues to improve chance of obtaining a useful Ministry will increase. Meanwhile, British heads of departments will carry on under my authority backed by martial law.

No. 239.

Count de Salis to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

The Vatican, Rome, April 25, 1919.

IN a note received to-day Cardinal Secretary of State has informed me of nomination of Father Couthurier to be Apostolic Visitor in Egypt. Cardinal Secretary of State trusts that appointment will give satisfaction to His Majesty's Government.

Father Couthurier's consecration as cardinal will take place next Sunday.

Effect of appointment is that Father Couthurier becomes for the time being supreme ecclesiastical authority in Egypt; that he is to examine into the whole subject of religion administrative in the country, and that Apostolic delegation at Alexandria will remain vacant until after receipt of his reply.

(Repeated to Cairo.)

No. 240.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 509.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 25, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 633.*

Are you attempting to form another Egyptian Administration, or are you considering alternative of dispensing for a time with native Ministry?

* See No. 231.

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No. 241.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 644.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, April 25, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 414* of 3rd April.

Egyptian Government consider it premature to decide question of granting concessions to private firms.

I have consulted Sirdar, who agrees (see Sir R. Wingate's telegram No. 1929 of 23rd December last).

No. 242.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 647.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 25, 1919.

CAIRO and provinces are quiet, and situation is steadily improving. Railway workmen in provinces have come back to work, and those in Cairo are coming in well. (Sent to India and Khartoum.)

No. 243.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 659.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 25, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 790 of 24th April.

I have seen Minister for Foreign Affairs, who assures me he has already given directions to newspapers in accordance with your views.

He will repeat them.

I am bound to say, with the exception of extreme Socialist papers, these instructions seem to have been generally obeyed. With reference to good French correspondent being sent to Egypt, Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that to send correspondent for one particular paper would be of no value, and he will see if he can obtain someone suitable as a representative agent.

I will see personal friends of mine connected with newspapers here and do all I can to carry out your wishes. Meanwhile, may I suggest some use might be made of London correspondents of French papers? If material were supplied them to counter Egyptian propaganda which they could telegraph from London to their papers here I think it would be of use. There is news regarding situation in Egypt in this afternoon's "Temps" which is contributed by that paper's London correspondent.

No. 244.

Lord Acton to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 717.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berne, April 26, 1919.

MY telegram No. 698.

Ali Shamsy, member of Egyptian Legislative Assembly, residing at Geneva, has also applied for permission to join Zaghlul Pasha either in Paris or London.

(Repeated to Cairo.)

No. 245.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 654.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 27, 1919.

IT has been suggested by various notables of Soudan that a representative party of official, administrative, and religious leaders should proceed to London on

* See No. 132.

behalf of Soudan to present congratulations to King on occasion of signing of Peace Treaty. They would take opportunity of expressing their contentment under British rule and their hopes for future of Soudan.

Governor-General considers that this would have reassuring effect in Soudan, where there is apprehension that a realisation of Egyptian aspirations might lead to increase of Egyptian influence in Soudan.

Deputation would probably be composed as follows:—

Official: Mufti and Inspector Mehkemehs.

Administrative: Three principal Nazirs.

Religious: Sir Said Ali El Morghani, Shereef Yusef-el-Hindi, and Abderrahman-el-Mahdi.

If this suggestion is approved, one month's notice would be necessary, as some of sheikhs live at a distance.

I consider effect would be good provided representatives were suitably entertained and put to no personal expense.

No. 246.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 149.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 7, 1919.

I HAVE lately received, directly or indirectly, a number of letters and memoranda from Englishmen and Egyptians who have felt a desire to express their opinions on the causes of the present discontent in this country.

Many of these are interesting as expressions of the views of men of experience or as typical of the opinions of large and active classes, and I have the honour to transmit herewith the following selection:—

1. A letter from Mr. A. H. Hooker, Norwegian consul in Cairo, and a very old resident in Egypt.
2. A memorandum by Sir William Willcocks on the views of friendly Egyptians, dealing in particular with the grievances of the fellahs.
3. A note by an Englishman who wishes to remain anonymous. He is in touch with the Residency and upper circles of Egyptians.
4. A report of the views of Sheikh Mohammed Mahdi, a professor at the school of Kadis, who holds moderate views.
5. A letter from Amin Effendi Yussef, a lawyer of Damietta, nephew by marriage of Saad Pasha Zaghlul.

I have, &c.
E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 246.

Mr. Hooker (Norwegian Consul in Cairo) to Sir E. Allenby.

Excellency,

THE present political excitement in Egypt, and the excesses in connection therewith were foreseen and intimated to the authorities by not a few of the older English residents in Egypt.

The British Chamber of Commerce sounded a warning note, and I have reason to believe that the Intelligence Branch of the Army was fully alive to what was being prepared.

That which was not expected was the careful and extensive preparation of the movement, which includes Moslems, Copts, and Bedouins, not to mention practically the whole agricultural population.

This is important, as it is the first time in modern Egyptian history that the whole of the native population has co-operated in a political movement.

The causes which have inspired the movement are in no sense obscure, and may be classified under the following headings:—

1. The uncertainty as to the political status in Egypt
2. The Nationalist movement, backed up by the University of El-Azhar.

3. Belief that a popular movement would influence President Wilson to oust the British from Egypt.
4. Agricultural discontent, due to grievances in connection with the war.
5. Educational blunders.


I.—*The uncertainty as to the Political Status in Egypt.*

I look upon the indefinite political status of Egypt as the main cause of the present unrest.

Had it been made clear to the Government and people of Egypt that England definitely and permanently assumed the protectorate, and in some ceremonious way had celebrated the occasion, I feel sure that the present agitation would never have assumed its present proportions and probably never have taken place at all.

A fundamental error was made when Egypt was severed from the Turkish suzerainty, in retaining what is practically the Turkish flag as the national emblem. Whether a red flag has a crescent and one star, or a crescent with three stars, makes very little difference.

The error in judgment on the part of our Foreign Office was all the more strange, as there was a recognised Egyptian flag already in existence. I possess an old atlas in which there is a plate showing the flags of all nations; the Egyptian flag is depicted thus:—



II.—*The Nationalists.*

The Nationalist movement is the natural result of the educational evolution in Egypt.

The leaders are men who style themselves the Intellectuals of Egypt, and are mostly men of legal training, many of them educated in Europe, also journalists, graduates of European Universities, to which may be added the fanatical Ulama of the El-Azhar University.

The outstanding leaders are men whose ambitions have been disappointed, men of intense vanity, and who, if given power, would be the first to misuse it; Saad Zaghlul and Ismail Sidky, Mohammed Mahmoud, a Balliol man who took a good degree at Oxford, looked upon himself as the equal of any European, and was disappointed at not being taken at his own valuation. All of these men are capable and dangerous.

They, together with many others, deliberately set to work to stir up discontent with the existing order of things.

They stirred up agitation in the Law School which was a fertile field for their propaganda, and gradually the whole of the advanced schools were infected with the Nationalist idea, and were organised as the executive of political demonstrations.

The movement, at first confined to Cairo, spread gradually to Alexandria and the Provinces, and to-day it may be said that the Nationalist movement embraces the whole country, with the result that the present outburst has been general throughout Egypt.

It would be useless for me to enlarge on the many causes which have combined to bring about the present situation, and I will confine myself to certain observations which, owing to my experience of forty-one years, may be of use in forming an opinion as to what policy might in the future be adopted.

It was, I think, a great mistake to give publicity to the proposed legal reforms and the placing of the English language on a par with French in the Law Courts.

Such a reform is necessary and should be carried through, but its announcement should have been kept back until the political status of Egypt was established beyond question. Its premature discussion caused consternation amongst the French-trained lawyers, both Egyptian and foreign, and the discontent aroused placed another weapon in the hands of the malcontents, who hoped with the help and sympathy of European lawyers to strike a blow at England before her position as the protecting or suzerain Power was definitely and irrevocably established.

The University of El-Azhar.

It may safely be said that without the support of the El-Azhar University any popular movement in Cairo would have been stillborn.

No matter what schools the young Egyptians attend, their religious education is given by graduates of El-Azhar.

The main, I may say the only, permanent stimulus to political and religious excitement is that supplied by the El-Azhar Ulema.

It would be great political stroke if the El-Azhar University could be removed from Cairo to Mecca or Medina, and it might be well if it were indicated to the Rector of the University that if further difficulty were experienced with his students such a measure was within the bounds of practical politics. I believe such a threat would do more to quiet the fanatics than anything else.

I am moreover of opinion that such a measure would not be unpopular with the Moslem world as a whole, and it would certainly enhance the prestige of the King of the Hedjaz.

III.—Belief that a popular movement would influence President Wilson to oust the English from Egypt.

The speeches of President Wilson have made a great impression on the minds of the agitators, and have stimulated them to immediate action.

They thought that the moment had arrived when they could make a combined movement with some prospect of success. I mention this, not in any spirit of criticism of the speeches, but merely to indicate that they were not without influence in bringing to a head the present agitation.

IV.—Agricultural discontent, due to grievances in connection with the War.

A far more difficult and complex problem is the discontent existing amongst the fellaheen.

The students and other agitators have entered into the movement with their eyes more or less open, the fellaheen blindly.

The action of the fellaheen in the recent disturbances is much more difficult to explain than that of the political agitators.

In material matters the fellah has little to complain of, and yet many men who know him intimately assert that his grievances are very real and deepseated.

Enough care was not taken when requisitioning camels, fodder and foodstuffs, to impress on him that these were essentially war measures.

Great laxity was shown in allowing a vast amount of unsupervised compulsory power to be placed in the hands of rich and unscrupulous provincial Omdehs and Greek and Syrian go-betweens, with the result that enormous profits were made by the already rich, while the fellah got but little.

The result was that the poorer fellaheen, who for many years regarded the English as protectors, felt that they had been abandoned to the tender mercies of their richer compatriots without any appeal to their former protectors. The older men felt that they had again fallen on the evil times of the Khedive Ismail, and had good reason for thinking so.

As was to be expected, the Nationalist leaders made the most of the growing discontent, and at once started a propaganda that would appeal to the passions and prejudices of the fellaheen, and a potent weapon was placed in their hands when the British authorities decided to recruit a Labour Corps for war purposes.

As a matter of fact, the men recruited had the time of their lives, good pay, good food, clothing and infinitely better conditions than they had ever experienced before. That certain risks attended their service did not seem to affect them, and

I believe that on the whole they were contented with their employment and enjoyed it.

The real grievance was not amongst the recruited men, but the proprietors who had temporarily lost their services.

Here there was a weapon which the agitators could and did use with effect to inflame the agricultural population against the British. The land-owners and the wives and families of the recruited men lent ready ears to the exhortations of the agitators, and were thus prepared to take part in organised demonstrations when the signal was given.

The heads of the movement, with full knowledge of what was likely to happen, deliberately organised an outbreak which they must have known they would be powerless to control.

Many of the most dangerous weapons in revolutionary movements were ready to their hands: religious fanaticism, cupidity, hatred of the foreigner, combined with Nationalist enthusiasm, which for years had been carefully fostered.

V.—Education.

I consider that too much stress cannot be laid on the faulty system of education adopted by the Government, to which much of the trouble amongst the students is to be traced.

The system is based on European requirements, where the students, when educated, pass into the various professions and callings which their country opens up to them. The army and navy, the church, civil service, law, medicine, commerce trades and manufactures, all absorb the educated youth of European countries.

In Egypt, those who have passed through the schools restrict themselves to the civil service, the army, law, medicine, engineering and agriculture. Trade and commerce, manufacturing industries, &c., have no charms for the educated youth of Egypt. Such callings entail responsibility and hard work, both of which are avoided, when possible, by Egyptians.

The result is that certain professions are overcrowded. There are limits to the number of men who can be employed in the Government service, and the candidates for employment always far exceed the vacancies.

Law and medicine offer the greatest attractions. The legal profession is consequently greatly over-crowded, with the result that in its ranks are to be found the great majority of malcontents and agitators.

The Law School has always been the centre of all student demonstrations, and may be looked upon as the executive of the malcontent lawyers of Egypt.

Without question, the Medical School has given the best practical results in the professional education of Egyptians, and many excellent surgeons, entirely trained in Egypt, are to be found all over the country.

When framing the educational system in Egypt, those responsible failed to foresee the result of allowing boys from the provinces to come under the influences of a great city. In England our great schools and universities are situated far away from the excitements and temptations of large towns, and even the great schools of London, with centuries of tradition behind them, have found it expedient, in the interests of their scholars, to move into the country.

The young Egyptian, when sent to school, is deficient in many qualities which are characteristic of the European boy. Speaking broadly, there is no moral training of children in the Egyptian home, and parental discipline is generally lax.

Mothers of children are for the most part uneducated, and fathers pet and spoil their children to an extent unknown in Europe. Children moreover are left in charge of ignorant and fanatical servants, who instil hatred of the foreigner in their minds to an extent which would be incredible, if not easily proved.

Under these conditions, it was essential that any educational system should have been based on strict discipline, and special attention should have been paid to the moral training of the students, and it is in this regard that I consider that those responsible have failed.

The employment of Englishmen in the Civil Service.

One of the causes which has conduced to the present situation in Egypt is the lax way in which the employment of Englishmen has been permitted.

It seems to have been considered that there need be no limit to their employment.

Efficiency was the excuse for their admission.

AYERST HENHAM HOOKER.

April 1, 1919.

Enclosure 1 in No. 246.

*Memorandum giving the views of friendly Egyptians on the Situation to-day,
March 4, 1919.*

THE keystone of the British occupation of Egypt was the fact that the fellaheen were for it. The Sheikhs, Omdas, governing classes and high religious heads might or might not be hostile, but nothing counted for much while the millions of fellaheen were solid for the occupation.

The British have undoubtedly to-day lost the friendship and confidence of the fellaheen; and the party opposed to British rule is consequently strong for the first time since 1885.

The friendship of the fellaheen has been lost for the following reasons. When the so-called voluntary enlistment of men for the Labour Corps and commandeering of animals for the army was set on foot, it was allowed to drift into a means of oppression of the poor and helpless. No serious supervision was exercised, and unscrupulous Omdas and officials had it all their own way. This was bad enough but worse followed. When the demands were first made for corn and fodder, the rich were principally drawn upon as they could most easily afford it. They naturally complained, and, being influential people, had a hearing. Gradually, as the war was prolonged, the collection of corn and fodder became an instrument in the hands of the unscrupulous Omdas and officials to greatly oppress the poor and helpless. The more the stores of corn and fodder diminished the harder became the surrender of these stores; and the feelings of the fellaheen were outraged by seeing, for the first time in the British occupation the most oppressive Omdas and officials patted on the back as men of action. It is quite common to hear the fellaheen saying to-day that the days of Ismail Pasha have returned. We thought the British the most capable and fair governors the world possessed when they first came; but since the proclamation of the protectorate, they have begun to show their hand and the wholesale plunder of the fellaheen has begun as it was under the Turks.

The upper classes have always been hostile. They have deeply resented the ever-increasing number of Britons in the Government service, who have taken the places coveted by the Egyptians themselves. *Every well-paid post with authority attached to it* has been gradually monopolised by foreigners, and the Egyptians are becoming daily less capable of governing. The men chosen for Ministers and sub-Ministers are those who are meek and submissive and incapable of ruling.

The really patriotic Egyptians would like to see a few *really capable and sympathetic Britons* at the heads of departments but all the other posts in the hands of their own countrymen.

To win back the loyalty of the fellaheen and convince them of the good-will of Great Britain towards them, an official enquiry should be made into the ruinously high rents the fellaheen are being made to pay. The mass of the fellaheen either own no land or possess such small holdings that their one occupation is renting land. The high prices of everything and the uncertainty of the yield of the cotton crop owing to the boll-worm having upset the calculations of the fellah. Unscrupulous landlords, in tens of thousands, adhere to the very letter of the engagement when the season turns out unfavourable but break it with impunity and take more than their share when *the season is favourable*.

For the fellah to-day there is no appeal.

So far the views of the friendly Egyptians. I would like to add on my own account:—

The enquiry should be followed up by legislation protecting the fellaheen.

Perennial irrigation should be introduced into the fellaheen provinces of Kena, Girga and Assiut, and the State Domain lands which are under cultivation should

be divided into five feddan lots and sold to the fellaheen at reasonable rates and reasonable terms.

In the interests of the ever-increasing number of educated Egyptians, the policy should be rigorously applied of filling up all vacancies by Egyptians and gradually leaving *only really capable and sympathetic Britons as heads of departments*. The British are here to teach Egyptians how to govern themselves and this is the only way in which it can be done.

Such procedure will entail hard work and incessant supervision and inspection on the part of the men who remain, but this is what existed in the early days of the occupation and no one was the worse for it.

Not one oriental in a hundred thousand has any idea of abstract truth, justice and loyalty. Everything is concrete. Many orientals, working with capable and sympathetic chiefs are as honest as the day, while the same men under incapable and unsympathetic chiefs are rascals.

This is the key to understanding oriental history.

W. WILLCOCKS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 246.

Note by an Englishman who wishes to remain Anonymous.

(Confidential.)

TO go back to the causes of the discontent culminating in the recent disorders, one must go back to the moment when the Khedive left this country, and realise that the vast majority of the Egyptians, though disliking him personally, and his immoral habits and stinginess, admired his anti-British policy, and looked on him as their protagonist just because he had persisted in it, and in encouraging a policy of passive resistance to all authority, if emanating from Great Britain. Lord Kitchener did much to counter him, and there is a possibility if he had remained long enough that the Egyptians would have changed their ideas, especially the fellaheen, who are illiterate almost entirely, and are much impressed by *personality*, especially as Lord Kitchener made special efforts to gain their confidence, and to guard their interests and improve their lot. Part of the Khedive's propaganda among them was the power of Germany and a Turkish Caliph of Islam whose glories had been revived by the assistance of the Emperor.

In December, 1914, Sultan Hussein was proclaimed and the British protectorate. He was known widely throughout the country as the friend of the fellaheen. He was a distinct personality and spent largely, as a Sultan should, and his services to the British Empire were very exceptional. It is due to him that the fellaheen and the Egyptian did not create more trouble than they did during the attack by the Turks on the canal. Unfortunately, his health was bad, and he had an incurable disease which overshadowed the last eighteen months of his life.

The war lasted four years, during which time the fellaheen have been pursuing their ordinary vocations. They were little affected by it in the ordinary course until the last two years, when the military authorities, who had then advanced north into Palestine, and who needed labour for roadmaking and fodder and animals, were obliged to have recourse to the Egyptian Government for their assistance. The idea was natural. Unfortunately the officials of the Government were not as wise as they should have been, and the affair was very much left to the junior officials—Mamours, Mudirs, and doctors, &c.—who took the opportunity of showing favouritism in the selection of the men and in acting unjustly, and the opportunity thus arriving of showing their zeal and thereby a reason for promotion in the service, was increased by the authorities placing a premium on the promptitude of supply, both in regard to men and material. As it was all in a cause for which they were not wholehearted—as they are very religious and detest the idea of fighting or affording any assistance to the men fighting the Turks, their religious masters—this added to the discontent. Added to this, there were continued stories, which were believed, of the joint victory of the Turks and Germans in Europe, and the true state of affairs is only beginning to dawn upon them. They were, therefore, in a state of sullen passive resistance and distinctly inflammable material. President Wilson's speeches on liberty percolated, and were understood by the Omda and the Sheikh classes and the younger generation of fellah.

So much for the fellaheen at the time of the announcement of the armistice.

Sultan Hussein formed the first Ministry under the protectorate from the relics of

the old Abbas Cabinet of Mohammed Said Pasha, with Sir Hussein Rushdy as Prime Minister.* They worked loyally enough until the death of Sultan Hussein, though the Advisers really had control, as was inevitable, as the country has been all the time under martial law, and the real power was that of the British army.

The Legislative Council† has remained suspended ever since the outbreak of war. They consist of sixty-six elected and seventeen nominated members. They are men with a grievance.

Their Vice-President, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, had tried to become a Minister in 1917, and was actually nominated, but refused by London. If he had been accepted it is very doubtful whether the Party of Independence would have ever been formed.

He was, at the beginning of the agitation, quite willing to acknowledge the protectorate and only confine his proposed visit to London. He received a decoration under the protectorate. But later on, as the Peace Conference began sitting, and the news of the mandatory power for the former provinces of Turkey arrived, and he had received a rebuff in response to his first request to be allowed to proceed with others to London, he increased and extended his demands. Nothing was heard from the Government in London, and there was nothing to show that Egypt would be treated differently from those provinces. The proclamation announcing the protectorate was treated as a temporary measure taken in consequence of the war, liable to be upset if the Powers so decided, and the Party of Independence which was formed and included, and gradually absorbed all the other parties, became merged in the Nationalist Party, their intention being to state their case before the Peace Conference; and they were undoubtedly encouraged by the discontented foreigners living in Egypt whose circumstances had changed owing to the war, and who thought they would be aiding their Governments in raising difficulties for Great Britain. Then the Government at home, in reply to Rushdy and Adly Pashas' request to be allowed to proceed to London to discuss the affairs of Egypt, told them that they were too busy for the moment to receive them, but that they would be happy to welcome them for the purpose in March. As they and the Ministers were not in accord, and they were jealous of the increasing power of the Independence Party, and apprehensive of their future political career, they resigned in the beginning of November, and Rushdy Pasha, in his letter of resignation, made an impertinent turning of his resignation into patriotic propaganda, which was distributed widely throughout Egypt. Saad Pasha and his party had meanwhile not been idle, but had begun asking for a mandate from the fellaheen and provinces, accompanied by agents, who asked them, if they were good Moslems, to sign it, and if they wished the English to leave the country. This was to some extent stopped by the Ministry of the Interior. But none the less it was signed and well known throughout the larger towns in Egypt. Then came Rushdy's reply, as far as I can gather, to a memorandum by Sir William Brunyate, which was prepared for the Capitulations Commission, and presumably a confidential document, but it was treated as a public document by Rushdy Pasha, and a copy distributed alike in the provinces and given the widest publicity. It was a move in the political game and distinctly unfriendly, but that does not seem to have stood in Rushdy's way in his efforts for popularity and notoriety. The house of Saad Pasha became an office and hive of activity. All letters sent to President Wilson or consuls-general protesting against their treatment were carefully distributed among the provinces. They were thus kept in a state of excitement and looked on the Independence Party as their saviours. At what time Rushdy and Adly Pashas became a partner with the Committee, and whether the Court of Enquiry will establish their undoubted close connection is difficult to say. That they had a close knowledge of all their most intimate transactions is clear. The part played by Abdel Khalik Sarwat is very suspect. At the Council of Ministers, when Rushdy Pasha and Adly Pasha resigned individually and announced their decision as already having been taken (a curious procedure, as they had not yet consulted the others), one Minister asked Sarwat Pasha what he had decided to do. He said: 'I think by staying in the Ministry I shall do more good as a negotiator than if I resign, and have therefore decided not to do so.' He therefore has continued at his post and has had one or two attempts at taking Rushdy Pasha's place, but was threatened if he did so that the Committee would remove him, and that his sons would commit suicide. He has not failed to pose as a deeply innocent and injured man with the British, to whom he has communicated the threats used against him. The truth may

* Rushdy Pasha succeeded Mohammed Said as Prime Minister in April, 1914. His Cabinet was confirmed in office with a few changes on Prince Hussein's accession.

† The Legislative Assembly is meant.

be that he has not been threatened at all by his intimate friends, but they have invented the story between them for British consumption. He is the most intimate friend of the lawyers, who are the kernel of the Committee and Nationalist Party. The position was such since November, the Government of Egypt being run by the advisers and under-secretaries, the Government in London being silently contemptuous of Egypt, and no doubt this attitude added fuel to the little fire already more than kindling. The Sultan, who is a weak and ignorant man, surrounded by a gang of courtiers as dishonest as that gambling hell the Mohamed Ali could produce, was visited by the Committee at night and kept informed as to their proceedings and cajoled and intimidated to throw in his lot with them. In the absence of a strong *personality* to advise, he has gone from bad to worse, so that now he is really afraid for his throne, and, much more important, his salary.

All through the months of January and February this comedy was proceeding. The Government continued to leave it to the authorities here to control the political situation as best they could. The High Commissioner, alive to the situation, went home in a hurry to try and persuade the Foreign Office to take some action, and found it difficult in London to obtain a satisfactory result. The position out here thus became much aggravated, the members of the Committee joined with the Nationalists and lawyers, who were bitterly anti-British connection, and grew bolder as time went on, as the silence of the British authorities was interpreted as weakness and encouraged the Independence Party in their programme, and they were egged on by the foreign members of the Bar, and they began to use intimidation with the doubting spirits who hesitated to join them with sure success. The leaders of the Committee outvied each other in their bitterness and bearded the military authorities, and as soon as they had all ready for the demonstrations and were sure that all would pass off according to programme, began seriously to annoy the authorities with a view to exasperate them and cause their arrest. Then that would be the signal of their adherents looking on them as martyrs and rising altogether in protest. That is what actually happened: the first news of the arrest of the four and deportation was received with mixed feelings. The situation was really pathetic. Our policy in the minds of our friends among the Egyptians was incomprehensible: it was so like that of a cat playing with a weak mouse or bird. The various corporations of public utility and Government schools and offices all had symptoms of unrest, and profiting by the opportunity of the demonstration by the law students, organised by the lawyers, the school of Kadis were with the technical school the first in the field. Then followed the schools of medicine and students of the Azhar. The police were powerless. The military took the situation in hand, and motor-cars with machine guns which they used on the mob, who were composed very largely of the lowest elements, in three days restored order. But the tramway employes, who had been much intimidated, thought fit to take advantage of the situation and air their grievances as to hours and pay. It was developing into a general strike, and the object of the Committee in rendering the Government powerless was nearly gained. The railway workshops ceased work, and the news of the disorder in Cairo spread to the provinces. The fellaheen also had a grievance as has been stated. If they had wanted to, they would have risen in revolt during the attack on the canal, but they were now still suffering from great irritation as a consequence of the injustice they were subject to, and especially the cotton regulations had disaffected them. Hence the outrages on persons and property.

The Egyptians all have a grievance, or think they have. The real cause of the unrest is not having a *personality* empowered to do as he thinks fit without consulting London, and this has been our weakness, added to the awkwardness of having three authorities—the Residency, the Savoy Hotel, and the Palace.

I think that the first thing to do is to restore everything to a normal condition and then to form a Ministry among the Moderate Party, but not until order is restored and the excitement prevailing has been allowed to calm down in six weeks' time.

March 25, 1919.

Enclosure 4 in No. 246.

Memorandum of a Conversation with El Sheikh Mohammed Mahdi.

THE Sheikh Mohammed Mahdi is a professor at the school of Kadis, and is the only member of the staff of that school who refused to sign a protest against the recent deportation of Saad Zaghlul. He has in consequence become extremely

unpopular, was roundly cursed by his colleagues and received threatening letters, which he tore up.

He is a man, I should suppose, of between 50 and 60; my acquaintance with him arose out of the fact that he is a good chess player.

His political views are those of a modern reformer, and, as he expresses them with complete frankness, it is possible that they may be of interest at the present moment.

I will endeavour to summarise as accurately as I can his opinions under the following heads:—

Causes of the Present Unrest.

1. The fact that the deputation was not permitted to go to Europe to lay their views before the Peace Conference.

He told me previously, at the moment when the deputation was refused, that he felt it would have a very regrettable effect; he did not criticise the decision, because, as he said, he was not aware of the reasons which gave rise to it; but he regretted it.

2. The fact that the Ministerial crisis had continued so long without solution.

3. The fact that so many small nations, including the British colonies, were being represented, whereas Egypt was not; I pointed out to him that Egypt had given no indication of a desire to form part of the British Empire, and therefore lacked the status of the colonies.

4. He mentioned the King's letter to the Sultan as having had a disturbing effect—chiefly, I think, from the feeling that nothing had as yet been done to give effect to it. In fact, a great part of his remarks could be summed up by saying that the Egyptians were ignorant of our intentions—they did not know where they were; he seemed to feel that a franker statement of our views would have had a good effect.

5. As regards disturbances in the districts, he thought the effect of the collection of crops from the smaller men had been bad; the crops collected had by no means all gone to the military authorities, and there was considerable feeling of injustice.

He did not mention recruiting.

Regarding the Nationalist Party, he admitted things had got into the hands of the extremists, and he trusted none of the leaders; they were all playing for their own hands, notably, Saad Zaghlul, whom he clearly does not trust at all. Mohammed Mahmoud talked about independence, and used it to beat people; El Bassal took all he could get from the English and then turned against them; he would sell himself in turn to anyone else (they all would, Saad would come over to-morrow if you offered to make him Prime Minister). Sidky was damned by his private character.

These people, he said, use phrases, and can't or won't say what they mean by them; he was inclined to think that their refusal to go beyond phrases was deliberate; the people who followed them had no notion what the phrases meant—none of them had been able to tell him what they meant by Ishglal.

Their turning against the abolition of the capitulations seemed to him either dishonest or mad; it was done to annoy the English; the continuance of the capitulations could not be for the good of the country. Two months or more ago, he told me he had been for a drive with El Bassal, and had asked him on what they were relying ("Enta masnoudin ala eh?"), and had told him that the best policy for the country was clearly to come to an agreement with England; to see England replaced by another Power would be disastrous.

He thought Italian and to a certain extent French interests were fanning disorder; French intervention seemed to puzzle him; the Italians, he thought, were playing in some way for their own hand (he suggested with an eye on Tripoli), and he was clearly a good deal disturbed at the growth of Italian companies and interests.

As for a solution, he admitted that one was very difficult to find; he thought if some way of allowing a deputation to proceed could be found that would have the best effect; in fact he seemed to regard it as an indispensable element in calming public opinion.

He thought a Ministry of sound administrators ought to be formed—he mentioned Gaafar Waly (of whom he has a very high opinion), Mustapha Mahar, "and one or two of the Mudirs" (Hassan Hassib, by name, a little doubtfully); he was indifferent to the suggestion that a Ministry so composed might be regarded as made up of English nominees.

He assented, but doubtfully, to Adly Pasha's name; he seemed to have some reserve about him.

If Prince Omar could be associated with the Government, he thought it would be

an excellent thing; he admitted he might decline, but, if he did accept, he thought he would play the game; he was clearly averse to Ministers, who have no independent position—they could never be trusted. If Prince Omar would accept the situation, he felt certain that he would at least be unswayed by personal motives. He suggested the return of Abdul Moneim; he by no means resembled his father, whose differences with the Prince's mother would keep them apart. He was quite aware that this idea would appear to require justification; but he regarded Abdul Moneim as a decent boy of good education, who would be open to influence for good. His idea may have been a desire to avoid annexation and a preference for working under known forms; as regards annexation, I think his feeling would be that, as we had not declared it on the outbreak of war, any such action now would be interpreted as having been intended should the war turn out successfully; therefore, all our actions would become suspect. He made the remark about the Nationalist Party that, having accepted the protectorate at the outbreak of war, when victory was uncertain, it was folly to object to it now when victory was on our side.

As to policy, he desired that the limits of the protectorate should be made clear; Egyptians wanted to know within what sphere they were free to take their own line; concurrently, a place must be given to Egyptians in higher administrative posts; a policy of thus far and no further would not attract good men.

He desired more attention to be given to native institutions, the Wakfs ("people ought to be able to get what is due to them"), El Azhar (a proper higher education), and the Mehekmehs; the English should do everything they could to encourage reform in these institutions *discreetly*; he deprecated the insistence which had been laid on primary education; he begged for a genuine encouragement of the Arabic language (Saad Zaghlul's policy here had been window-dressing; he refused to admit that Saad knew Arabic). He wanted a really good university.

I think he felt that European education was wanted, but not for everyone; there were people like himself who desired to live in an Eastern country; not in a cheap imitation of Europe, and they were not being catered for.

One other remark of interest which he made was that, as far as he could judge, the British Government attempted to do too much in this country; he wished decisions to be taken by the man on the spot, and to have a little less of Government by cable.

V. GASCOIGNE HOGG.

March 19, 1919.

Enclosure 5 in No. 246.

Amin Effendi Yussef to Sir R. Wingate.

Sir,

Cairo, March 23, 1919.

RACES have been conquering each other since the dawn of history, and the practical results, in course of time, have been that the conquered race either fused with the conquerors, or was exterminated, or at length recovered its liberty.

During the more recent past, the civilised nations of Western and Central Europe have conquered, or it would be more accurate to say, gained dominion over the coloured races of the world on a scale which has no parallel in history, so that full independence is to-day enjoyed by but few of those groups of human beings to whom we apply in common parlance the term "native."

Not only have the groups dominating and dominated become far larger, but there is a greater divergence between their moral and physical characteristics than was to be found in earlier historical times. These differences have been accentuated by the appearance from time to time in history of great leaders of thought, and of the founders of religions.

The history of the British occupation in Egypt was a great success for the system of indirect rule. I mean a system of administration which leaves in existence the administrative machinery created by the natives themselves. It recognises the authority of the Khedives, afterwards the Sultans, the native councils, the native courts of justice, native police controlled by native executive, as real living forces. It brings European influence to bear on the native indirectly through the native officials, and not directly through European officials; and under it the European, keeping himself a good deal in the background, leaves the mass of native individuals to understand that the orders which come to them emanate from their own native officials rather than from the

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all pervading white man. The underlying policy of this system is to assist the native to develop that civilisation which he can himself evolve. This policy was the one carried step by step by Lord Cromer in his career in Egypt, and the characteristic point of his rule was that he emancipated the fellah from being nearly a slave to be the equal of his patron before the law. He has succeeded in reforming the financial position of the country, and I believe that one of the essential causes that led to the moral aspirations of the Egyptian people was the good material progress that Egypt enjoyed during the time of Lord Cromer.

Inspect into the psychology of the movement of to-day, and you will find its source lies in the change of policy that has been followed in Egypt after Lord Cromer's long career.

There is not an Egyptian who denies the great material success during the British occupation in Egypt. But what are material benefits compared to fellowship, society of equals, pride of race, and patriotism?

Permit me to say that we have become liberal-minded through you, your literature, and your history. Whenever you permit a people like the Egyptians to read your books, your papers, and understand your way of thinking and liberal ideas, you must not suppose that they do not deduct from them what they believe to be their moral aspirations. When the Egyptians balance the material success they have gained through you against the disadvantage of their moral inferiority, the scale turns against you.

The different policies that have been carried in Egypt after Lord Cromer, were not in accordance with each other, less in accordance with the policy of Lord Cromer.

If we inspect into the mind of the uneducated fellah at present we find out that he has not totally understood the voice of national aspiration from the writing of the press and the intelligential, but from the exactions that he was submitted to, certainly to some extent under necessity of war, but which he could not understand, and greatly increased by the maltreatment and oppression of those who executed the orders. Moreover, Lord Cromer has taught him to be the equal of his landlord and his superiors, and now he finds that the Mamour, the Omdeh, and the Ghaffir have always the support of the Central authority, whether they are right or wrong, as long as they are enforcing the orders of the military, even to their private ends. This reason, more than any other, was the predominating cause of the rise of the Egyptian uneducated fellah, and through this he understood and supported the national ideas in his own way. To this we may add that the old policy of keeping the European official in the background was greatly altered.

If we look into the causes that led the intelligential inside the Government to support those outside the Government, we will find that much of it is due to the moral aspirations encouraged by the attitude of the leading officials in the Government all believing in the doctrine of Dr. Wilson that nations can choose the form of Government they desire.

This movement was greatly strengthened by the refusal of the British Government to permit the Ministers and the delegation to go to Europe. Moreover, the delay for four months in accepting the resignation of the Prime Minister has greatly weakened the authority of the Government and strengthened the national movement of independence. But some of the reasons are also due to the state of the Egyptian officials in the Government, especially during the war, when he found out that he was threatened under the new régime to be replaced by the English. Moreover, he has suffered very much during the war, and has not received an equal share in the material prosperity of the country which would allow him to live his usual life as before the war.

As to the landlords or rich proprietors, the national aspirations is paramount, mixed with what they suffered in money and materials during the war.

As I have already said, the system of indirect rule has not been followed during the war, and the native organisation has morally been swept away to the extent that the people began to feel the iron hand of the English yoke, and found out that it was a great obstacle in the way of a healthy self-respecting national spirit among all classes of a native unit.

The new policy of direct rule, together with the change of the organisation of the Government, have led to the full agreement between Moslems and Copts to the extent that we hear to-day the Copts preaching in the mosques and the ulemas, and students of El Azhar take the place of horse in a coptic funeral, and carry the deceased to the grave.

I have tried to go into the psychological reasons that led to the present state of

affairs, as it is necessary to follow them in order that you will understand the present position thoroughly.

Now I am going to try to examine the remedy that I have referred to in my former remarks.

I repeat that force alone can never have at present good results, and it is more a revengeful punishment than a repressive one against those villains who committed the horrible crime for their personal ends, and these measures would never have an effective remedy to the present chaos that reigns in the provinces.

I believe, if it succeeds, it is only momentary success which leaves more harm than good, and would be a great obstacle in the way of good understanding in the future.

It is the duty of civilians who are responsible for the government of Egypt to examine the matter thoroughly before they lose for ever the prestige and good name that have been the characteristic of British rule.

In my opinion, which is really the opinion of the sincere Egyptians, it is very necessary to have a strong Egyptian Government to take matters in hand at once, strengthened and helped by the moral support of the intelligential, even if it is necessary to work under the guidance of the military authorities or backed by them, to work hand and foot and bring order out of chaos, and using the severest measures against crimes in the provinces, in order to gain back the moral prestige and fear of Government which has nearly been lost. I believe that a less severe measure in the name of a strong Egyptian Government is more effective than the severest measure in the name of British military authorities.

The price of this is very cheap, and lies in the power of the sound and good advice of the British civilians in the Egyptian Government.

All the enlightened Egyptians are ready to join within their hearts to the extent of using all their personal powers to achieve this end, and I hope that my words will find place in the hearts of the British officials who are responsible for any step they refuse to take before God, their conscience, and their country, as representative of Great Britain, that is known to be the most civilised country in Europe.

I remain, &c.

M. AMIN YUSSEF,

Lawyer, Damietta.

No. 247.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 153.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 8, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to me by members of the medical profession in Egypt in which they put forward their objections to announcements regarding Egypt made in the House of Lords and the House of Commons by your Lordship and Mr. Dudley Ward.

This letter was brought to the Residency by three members of a committee of doctors, who stated that the signatories proposed to signalise their protest by a strike, which, in view of the special obligations of their profession towards the public would last for only one day.

I enclose also for your Lordship's information a note by Colonel Garner, the head of the Public Health Department, which shows the attitude of the medical profession in the present circumstances. I may add that a number of other letters which I have received protest specifically against the announcements referred to above.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 247.

Note by Colonel Garner.

Cairo, April 1, 1919.

MOHAMED BEY IZZET, senior Egyptian Medical Officer of Health, Cairo City, came to me on the morning of the 29th instant to report that he had been informed that a meeting of the practitioner doctors in Cairo had elected him as president of a Committee they were forming. He asked me for my advice as to whether he should or should not attend. He agreed that it was absurd that he should accept the chairmanship of a Committee whose objects he was not aware of. I, however, advised him to attend, insisting upon the fact that Public Health officials must necessarily keep clear of politics, and counselling on no account to mix himself up with politics. The following morning he reported that he had attended at a meeting at Aly Bey Ibrahim's house, that after discussion it was agreed that it was the duty of all medical men to attend even gratuitously all sick and wounded in the streets or other public places where disturbances may occur. A proposal was then made that all doctors should strike and that if necessary they should take private houses to deal with sick and wounded rather than use Kasr-el-Aini or other Government institutions. Both Mohamed Bey and Aly Bey vehemently protested, pointing out how disgracefully unprofessional such conduct was if the proposal was carried out, and quoting as example lying-in women, strangulated hernia, and other urgent operations, also the necessity for carrying on Public Health Office duties, such as registration of births, permits for burials, licences for trade, &c. After this the discussion became political, and Mohamed Bey refused to have anything to do with it and left.

This morning, the 1st April, Aly Bey Ibrahim reports that the wildest schemes for striking and paralyzing Government hospitals and institutions were proposed, and after long discussion the meeting finally agreed to be guided by a council of eleven of the senior and most reputable doctors in the town. The names of the council are:—

Representing Kasr-el-Aini Hospital: Doctors Aly Bey Ibrahim and Mahfouz.
Representing Cairo Health Office: Mohamed Bey Izzet.
Representing Wakfs: Aly Bey Labib and Salim Hindawi.
Representing Central Laboratories: Neguib Skandar.
Representing Criminal Investigation: Mahmoud Maher.
Representing Public Instruction: Talaat Bey.
Representing General Practitioners: Habib Khayat Mahboub Sabet and Mahmoud Taher.

Aly Bey states that for the present this council can control the fiery spirits of the younger men, and it has been agreed by the meeting that the daily work of hospitals, dispensaries, public health offices and medical Government institutions shall not be interfered with, but that a certain number of doctors not necessary for the conduct of affairs at these institutions shall be allowed to quit work for one day as a protest against Lord Curzon's speech.

It is to be noted that this council of eleven is composed of leading doctors here. Aly Bey states that for the present the council can keep control, but that if any other meeting is called and they are outvoted, they and the other moderates may have to retire.

He finally solemnly stated that the vast majority of Egyptians do not believe that the Allied nations are really in favour of a British protectorate and that if an open declaration by the Allied Conference at Paris was made that they approve of a British protectorate in Egypt any further disturbances would cease.

Cairo, April 1, 1919.

Enclosure 2 in No. 247.

Members of the Medical Profession in Cairo to General Sir E. Allenby.

Excellence,

LES soussignés ont l'honneur de vous adresser cette protestation contre les déclarations de Lord Curzon à la Chambre des Lords et de Mr. Dudley Ward à la Chambre des Communes britannique au sujet du mouvement politique égyptien, et de vous prier de vouloir bien la communiquer à votre Gouvernement.

Ces déclarations, qui ne s'accordent pas à la vérité, ont été faites dans le but d'exposer sous un faux jour les événements récents d'Égypte, d'en diminuer l'importance et d'influencer l'opinion publique en Europe, en vue d'empêcher la réalisation des aspirations nationales du peuple égyptien renommé d'être calme et paisible.

Il est regrettable que le peuple égyptien, tout en étant confiné dans ses frontières, soit accusé, par ceux responsables de ce traitement, de faits qui entachent sa renommée comme nation libérale.

Les susdites déclarations comportent ce qui suit :

1. Que les manifestations qui ont eu lieu récemment en Europe tendent plutôt au pillage qu'à un mouvement politique ;
2. Que l'opinion égyptienne responsable est représentée dans la personne de Ruchdi Pacha et de Adli Pacha ;
3. Que Saad Zaghloul Pacha et ses collègues sont des chefs irresponsables qui ont organisé le mouvement actuel dans le but de chasser les Anglais de l'Égypte.

I.

Le mouvement politique égyptien ne date pas d'aujourd'hui. Il a toujours eu pour but de demander par tous les moyens pacifiques l'indépendance de l'Égypte. L'occasion de réclamer haut cette indépendance s'est présentée à la suite de la conclusion de l'armistice. Le peuple entier a alors manifesté ses désirs en déléguant des représentants pour plaider sa juste cause devant la Conférence de la Paix. Mais les autorités anglaises, après des longs atermoiements, ont empêché le départ de ces représentants. Elles allèrent même plus loin et arrêtaient Saad Zaghloul Pacha et trois de ses collègues. Le peuple, froissé dans ses justes réclamations, a fait des manifestations pacifiques pour protester contre ces agissements.

Au lieu de chercher à s'entendre avec la nation, l'autorité militaire anglaise a eu recours à la force pour étouffer ces sentiments, en se servant alors des fusils et des mitrailleuses contre les manifestants pacifiques et non armés, et faisant ainsi beaucoup de victimes, dont des vieillards et des enfants innocents, voire même de femmes.

Ces manifestations pacifiques n'étaient pas restreintes à certaines classes de la population ni à certaines localités, mais elles étaient générales et d'un caractère purement politique, et n'avaient nullement pour but le pillage, comme votre Excellence a dû d'ailleurs le constater.

II.

Lord Curzon est d'avis que Ruchdi Pacha et Adli Pacha sont les seuls représentants responsables de l'opinion égyptienne. Avec tout le respect dû à ces deux Ministres, nous ne pouvons pas concevoir comment ils peuvent être les représentants de l'opinion publique, étant donné que la nation n'avait pris aucune part dans leur choix et qu'en Égypte les Ministres ne sont pas responsables devant le peuple. D'ailleurs, ces deux Ministres, reconnaissant la force de cet argument, ont exigé le départ des représentants de la nation. La théorie de Lord Curzon ne s'accorde donc pas, à notre avis, avec les principes de l'équité.

L'honorable Lord se déclare prêt à recevoir, en Angleterre, ces deux Ministres ou d'autres hommes d'État qu'il considère comme responsables, afin de discuter avec eux la forme définitive que prendra le protectorat anglais à l'avenir. Pareille déclaration est incompatible avec les désirs réels de la nation, qui ne reconnaît pas ce protectorat, ni quant au fond, ni quant à la forme ; elle est en tout cas tardive ; le différend actuel entre le peuple égyptien et le Gouvernement anglais ne peut être tranché que par la Conférence de la Paix et conformément aux principes énoncés par le Dr. Wilson.

III.

Saad Zaghloul Pacha et ses collègues (dont la plupart sont des membres de l'Assemblée législative) sont les véritables représentants de la nation égyptienne, parce qu'ils sont les mandataires de l'Assemblée législative, de Conseils provinciaux, des Commissions municipales et locales et de tous les autres corps représentatifs, ainsi que des médecins, avocats, notables, &c., en vue de plaider la cause de l'Égypte et de réclamer l'indépendance complète de l'Égypte et du Soudan par devant la Conférence de la Paix. D'ailleurs, la nation entière, en protestant par les dernières manifestations contre le refus de donner l'autorisation aux membres de la Délégation à partir en Europe et l'arrestation de quatre de ces membres, a confirmé d'une façon éclatante ledit mandat.

Nous vous prions donc, M. le Ministre, de vouloir bien exposer à votre Gouvernement la vraie situation et la qualité représentative conférée à la Délégation par la nation égyptienne.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Signée par Docteurs :

Kamel Ibrahim, Anis Onsy, Armia Dos, Taha M. Marsafy, Guirguis Naguib, Habib Khayat Bey, Mahmoud Maher Bey, Scander Guirgawy, Sayed Abdel Hamid Soliman, Osman Banhawy, Ahmed Hamed, Ahmed M. Kamel, Mahmoud Sherif, Aly F. Sheharty Bey, Abdel Wahed el-Wakil Mohamed Abbas Bakly, Mohamed Nafia, Abdel Hamed Kraby, Salem Hendawy, Aly Labib Bey, Hassan Shahine, Ismail Diai, Abdel Rahman Iwad, Ahmed Shafik, Zaki M. Bashara, Tewfik Hanna, M. Kamel Kholy, Abdel Maguid Nahmoud, Mohamed Abdel Salem, Abdel Hamid Alf, Georgy Canelly, Aly el-Bakly Bey, Abdel Aziz Nasmy Bey, Mohamed Amin Haridi, Abbas Kamel el-Kafrawy, Aziz Scander, Ahmed Husséin Samy, Ali Choucha, Abdel Hamid Taha, Naguib Mahfouz Bey, Mohamed Mobarak, Naguib Scander, M. Abou Alam, Ibrahim Shawky, Aly Hassan, Zaki Khaled, Mohamed Saleh, Garas el-Dab, Husséin Ezzat, Mohamed Taher Bey, Mahgoub Sabet Bey, Alu Ibrahim Bey, Abdel Moneim Eraky, Selim Guirguis, Awad Sidky, Hamed Zahran, Husséin Hassan Ahmed Zaki, Mohamed Bashrat, Hassan Mahmoud, H. Mahmoud, S. Abdel Kader, Mohamed Sharaf, Suliman Azmy, I. Hassan, H. I. Massoud, M. K. B. Selim, A. I. Razmy, I. F. Minyaw, M. R. Barrada, A. Y. Minkarious, S. Moftah, M. Ezzar Bey, S. Sayegh, L. Awad, R. Youssef, B. Farag, G. Sobhy, F. Elia, G. Kosséim, Y. Kedwani, T. Wasfi, M. Fouad, H. Yacoub.

No. 248.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 163.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 12, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 149 of the 7th April, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the following documents:—

1. A note on the situation in Egypt by Mr. Louis Fanous.
2. A report of a conversation with Mohammed-es-Sayed Lutfi Effendi.
3. A summary of opinions formed by Mr. Aslan Cattau on the basis of conversations with prominent Egyptians at the Mohammed Ali Club, Cairo.

Mr. Fanous is the son of Akhnoukh Fanous Bey, late head of the Coptic Community at Assiut. He was educated at Oxford, where he took a diploma in economics. He afterwards wrote for the "Manchester Guardian." A few months ago his father (who is now dead) sent him to Cairo to consider the desirability of joining the Independence Party, but he did not join it. He is about thirty-five, and regards himself, without sufficient justification, as a leader of Young Egyptian opinion.

An account of Mohammed-es-Sayed Lutfi Effendi will be found in enclosure 9 to my despatch No. 309 of the 5th December, 1918.*

Mr. Cattau is the son of Aslan Cattau Pasha, member of the Legislative Assembly and Director-General of the Sultania Agricultural Society. He is in a position to be familiar with the conversation of Ministers and other Egyptians at the Mohammed Ali Club.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

* See Part II, No. 18.

Enclosure 1 in No. 248.

Mr. Fanous to Mr. Keown-Boyd.

Dear Keown-Boyd,

Shepherd's Hotel, Cairo, April 5, 1919.

IN reply to your request for a written statement of my views on the present situation (which I had already partly conveyed to you in the course of friendly conversations), I herewith comply with your wishes, in order that you may be able to communicate same to General Allenby as you desire.

It is not without some hesitation that I have prevailed upon myself to do so for I feel the task to be one of great responsibility; but as at such critical times as we are now passing through one must not shirk responsibilities, I have felt it my duty to be as frank and as explicit in my statements as I honestly believed the occasion required. My motto throughout has been the old Arab proverb, so familiar to you, "Sadikouka man sadakaka la man saddakak," and it is as one who esteems and appreciates your friendship that I have ventured to write you as frankly and as intimately as I did.

As you know, I am a Nationalist, and it is as a Nationalist who sincerely believes that there is no real or fundamental antagonism between true nationalism and friendship with the British, once our claim to national independence is recognised (as I believe it will be recognised before long), that I have thought it my duty to avail myself of your kind invitation to expound at some length (which I hope you will excuse) my views on that question, and I assure you that this conception of our nationalism is widely shared among the Young Nationalists, with whom the future lies.

My sincere hope and earnest prayer is therefore this: that you on your side may take a sufficiently broad view of the issues under consideration, and having once come to recognise the correctness of our estimate, you may then set your great heart with equal vigour to ours into the task of bringing our respective national interests together into true harmony. This seems to me our special mission to-day. May the Almighty help and guide us to fulfil it.

Yours sincerely,

L. A. FANOUS.

The Egyptian problem: Facts and Suggestions.

The present situation, to which the country has been drifting for lack of native leadership or British guidance, is, indeed, one of great complexity and grave difficulty.

A dispassionate analysis of the facts would reveal, I believe, two distinct sets of problems for solution:—

The first is psychological in nature, and requires political measures for its solution. This is the problem of the future status of Egypt.

The second is administrative; and can only be settled by measures, the very nature of which must be primarily determined by the proper appreciation of the psychological nature of the problem. This is the problem of restoring peace and order. In my opinion the two problems are so bound up together in the minds and spirit of my countrymen, that it seems to me almost futile to attempt a solution of the latter without being clear and definite as to the former, which is the cause of the whole trouble.

The people of Egypt are not to-day rebellious in the administrative sense, but rather in the spiritual. They are not enemies to law and order, but to the political system which they suspected was being forcibly imposed on them—a system which was not congenial to their spirit, and seemed to them to imply a deep insult to their national dignity, and a real menace to their future as a political entity.

That such an opinion of the "Protectorate" should have been formed in the minds of the Egyptians, and that feeling should have risen so high against it; for all this, you must thank the lack of consideration for Egyptian susceptibilities, and the utter absence of respect for native opinion and feeling, which was systematically shown throughout, as well as at the time of its declaration (*e.g.*, when the legal and administrative changes consequent upon it were being formulated *in camera*), by the superior British authorities in Egypt, without reference to the people, and without consultation with their respective leaders.

In fact, what is surprising in the present situation is not so much the intensity of the explosion or its dimensions, as the fact that it had not occurred sooner, or taken a more violent form. For this mildness in character, as for the fact that it was conjured till the war was well over for its manifestation, you must thank the political leaders of the people and the saner elements of the population, who have throughout the war been actively but unostentatiously engaged in calming the spirits and checking the rising tides of passion, by holding out the hope that, when peace shall have arrived by the triumph of the Allies and their principles, Egypt would then peacefully come into her own, and get her due share of the liberty which all had joined to achieve, and to the cause of which Egypt had contributed her quota, as well in blood as in other suffering.

The continuous trumpeting by Allied statesmen, in season and out of season, of their "Principles and War Aims," and in particular the advent of President Wilson, with his obvious disinterestedness and high moral purpose—an advent which greatly helped, not to inflame, but to calm the burning passions which were surging in the breasts of men, as a result of the infectious spirit of heroism and self-sacrifice for national rights and honour which was sweeping the world—all this had acted as a dope to the feelings and passions of the Egyptian people, who maintained, throughout the war an attitude of exemplary loyalty and calm, in spite of much provocation. For, while the professional and intellectual classes were suffering from an oppressive censorship, and the sense of martial law, with all that this means in the way of suppression of opinion and suspension of political life; and while the fellaheen and the agricultural classes were enduring hardships at the hands of the recruiting officer and the requisitioning agents of the military authorities: nevertheless, the people of Egypt had remained absolutely quiet during the war, and had spontaneously and tacitly postponed their opposition to the "Protectorate" till the crisis of human liberties was over and the cause of freedom was safe.

The people of Egypt suffered patiently and in silence, because they were sustained throughout by the buoyancy of hope and it was not till it became self-evident to the most sanguine optimist that it was futile any longer to hope beyond hope for a spontaneous and generous recognition of Egypt's legitimate claims from the British Government, that the people of Egypt burst in passion against the system which they were now driven, by the policy of the British authorities, to regard not as a "liberal and humanising protectorate," but as a veiled despotism, foreign and of the worst type, which was at once an insult to their self-respect and a death warrant to their national aspirations.

Towards the closing period of the war, and when the victory of the Allies was looming on the horizon, the conduct of certain British advisers and their satellites became such as to cause the gravest doubts and darkest suspicions to rise in the mind and trouble the soul of the Egyptian people—as well its classes as its masses. Confidence in British honour and fair-play and hope in British Liberalism were thus being gradually and steadily and forcibly driven out of the soul of our people, and in their place fear, suspicion, and resentment were as surely being planted by the reckless manner in which every Liberal tradition of British policy was being thrown to limbo. Everything from now onwards seemed to strengthen and confirm the worst and most fatal suspicions.

Thus, when at last the armistice was declared in November, the crisis came; the clouds of war had cleared, and at last the sky seemed clear enough, but the Egyptians looked in vain towards the horizon for the liberty and that national self-realisation which they, with the rest of humanity, had been studiously taught to expect from the final triumph of the Allies.

The victory was now complete—the victory which they with other nationalities had been conjured to help to achieve, and had in fact helped to ensure, as well by their pacific attitude as by their active contribution to the common effort. Accordingly, it seemed to many Egyptians that the proper time for the recognition of Egypt's claims has at last arrived; and, when the French and British Governments issued their joint proclamations to the peoples of Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia—all neighbours of Egypt—the Egyptians set their ears to hear the message of hope for their race too, but this message never came, and they were sad and depressed beyond measure.

The Peace Conference was then announced. Their neighbours were all to be heard—Arab, Syrian, and Libanese were all to be there, but not the Egyptian. We thought we were merely forgotten, and so we ventured to call attention to the fact that we were still here and instead of being invited, as our neighbours were, we

had to take the initiative ourselves. We asked to be heard, but our request was rudely turned down. We were shocked, but we still dared to hope.

Leading Egyptians therefore rose to voice the general feeling of their countrymen, and formulate the common will in terms of law and politics—a thing natural enough and indeed desirable in itself. They asked for a hearing from the British Government—as well they were entitled to do. At the same time they asked their own people to tabulate their claims and authorise the formulæ for their presentation, in an authoritative responsible manner, to the competent British statesmen at home, as was only fit and proper in handling such grave matters. In short, they did what seemed right and proper, according to their lights under the circumstances, by reducing to concrete form, in legal language, the general will of their people and the common aspirations of their race.

As would readily be admitted, some such course of action was the primary duty of all serious leaders of public opinion; and however tactless and undiplomatic some may think Zaghlul Pasha or his friends may have been in their methods of procedure, there can be no doubt that, regarded in this light, I venture to think, Saad Zaghlul Pasha could not be considered to have overstepped the boundaries of decency, or legality, either in formulating a programme as he did, or in seeking as he did by recognised and constitutional methods the approval of the programme and its confirmation by the representative men of the country and the leading men among his countrymen.

It is not the place here to discuss that programme, or pronounce upon its merits; but I am bound to say that responsible Egyptian opinion, and I believe also a large and weighty section of British and European opinion as well, are agreed on this point—that Zaghlul Pasha was designated for this task by all the circumstances of the case as a man of recognised leadership in Egyptian public affairs. An old Arabist Nationalist, a forceful self-made man, an ex-Minister of known Nationalist convictions, which were never in doubt, and actually the elected Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly, which in itself is a hall-mark of his exceptional political status as popular leader of the country. All this combination of circumstances must have made it incumbent on Zaghlul Pasha to take the lead at this crisis which he did; and it may well be doubted if anyone else could have been in a position to challenge his leadership, or his title to it.

Whether he had been happy in the choice of his collaborators or his methods of procedure, which some may have criticised, it is outside my scope to pronounce an opinion upon; at any rate this seems now a question more for history to judge than for practical statesmanship to consider, the fact being that to-day Saad Zaghlul Pasha is the one man in Egypt who can command universal respect or inspire general confidence among our excited masses or our thinking classes. I venture to think that this fact is now sufficiently well established to require further comment, and this being the case it could serve no useful purpose to enlarge upon this subject. A fact is a fact, and at such critical times as these through which we are now passing, facts must be squarely faced and never shirked, for that would be fatal to all sound policy.

The situation to-day, as you would readily admit, is sufficiently grave to permit neither of procrastination nor of any hesitation in the due recognition of facts, hard as they must sometimes be, while the interests at stake are so great and of such vital importance to all concerned as to require the highest degree of moral courage and intellectual rectitude in handling the facts above all other considerations.

It is now high time for your statesmen and our own leaders to pull together and jointly set to work to save Egypt and rescue your own reputation as a liberal people and an imperial race from a threatening disaster, as well moral as material, which is now daily coming nearer to complete materialisation. The good work which you had accomplished in years of hard work, devotion and self-sacrifice, is to-day on the verge of an abyss from which it would be difficult to retrieve even the wreck. It is therefore for you and you alone to rise to the occasion, being true to yourselves to be true to the principles for which you had so recently fought and for the introduction of which you had come to Egypt in 1882—namely, the establishment in Egypt of an independent strong Government that would rule the country for the good of her people, which is no other than the enthronement of Egyptian democracy as an independent national political entity. To accomplish this to-day would only be the honourable fulfilment of the task which you had set yourselves to accomplish in 1882, and at which you have really been continuously though at times unconsciously working ever since. What, therefore, you require to realise to-day in order to meet

adequately the exigencies of the present crisis is none other than the necessity of continuity of policy, *i.e.*, the policy you had defined for yourselves in 1882. The people of Egypt are to-day indeed making no other claim than that you should not deviate from the straight path of that policy. Is this too much to expect from the people who have only so recently risked their all for the sake of honour, liberty, and the sanctity of international engagements; for is not our case to-day exactly covered by all of these principles for which the British Empire and her Allies have been so recently fighting to a successful conclusion and for the final triumph of which they have willingly shed their best blood? To do justice by the Egyptians to-day on these lines is therefore the bounden duty of your government, not only in justice and fairplay to the Egyptians, but also and above all in fidelity to the spirit of your brave and noble dead.

What then is the difficulty? Is it not the fact that under stress of war conditions and for temporary but urgent military and diplomatic exigencies you had declared in 1915 a protectorate over Egypt? Surely the very circumstances of this act are in themselves sufficient, now that these exigencies no longer exist, for an immediate return to the original basic conditions of Anglo-Egyptian policy, the fundamental condition of which had always been the recognition of the principle of Egyptian independence and the essentially temporary nature of the British occupation. Surely the normal course of development in such a policy is in the direction of gradual release from tutelage not towards its perpetuation.

The duty of British statesmanship is therefore now quite clear, and knowing the British public and British statesmen as I do, the very soul of honour and integrity in public affairs, there should be no serious apprehension as to the course of action they would ultimately take once that they come to know and duly recognise the facts of the situation and the national will of the Egyptian people. Of this you can now have no doubt, nor can they any longer do so.

This being the case, I now beg to submit for his Excellency's most serious consideration certain measures which there is reason to believe should succeed in relieving the tension of the present situation and go a great deal towards the final solution of its difficulties. These measures are of two distinct orders:—

The first are calculated to pacify the country, but cannot solve the real position, and therefore these may be considered merely as palliatives of momentary efficacy. These are as follows:

(a.) The immediate cessation of all shooting by British troops on unarmed crowds of students and other demonstrators in Cairo and elsewhere, thus an end will be put to all unnecessary spilling of innocent blood, which has been one of the chief causes of the vehemence of the present popular exasperation and hostility towards the

(b.) For purposes of maintaining public peace and order the Egyptian police force, reinforced if necessary by Egyptian military, should be exclusively employed under the immediate command of native officers, and only accompanied by British officers of the Egyptian Army when deemed absolutely necessary on rare occasions if these should ever arise for purposes of consultation and advice. There is good reason to believe it to be the fact to-day that the appearance of British troops upon any crowded scene has an effect on the spirit of the crowd not unlike that of the proverbial red flag upon the temper of the infuriated bull. This is a deplorable fact, but it should be well taken note of, as it only means otherwise the perpetuation of useless bloodshed and the creation of deep racial animosities which it would take years to eradicate. Such an eventuality could only mean in the long run the defeat, and may be the condemnation to failure, of the measures of political conciliation which may hereafter be agreed upon by our political leaders. It would therefore be almost criminal to prejudice in advance the future work of statesmanship by any inconsiderate military action to-day. We must never forget, be it even for a single moment, that we must always and normally be friends in spite of the tragic events through which we are now passing, but we hope that out of this darkness there may yet be light and great light for ever more, for our destinies are entwined, and therefore there must always be between us at least mutual goodwill.

(c.) The immediate declaration of a general amnesty for all persons implicated in recent events in Cairo or in the provinces—except such as may be convicted by direct judicial evidence of personal predatory or other acts of personal violence such as render them liable under ordinary criminal procedure. But no one should hereafter be molested for any acts of a political significance.

(d.) The immediate return of Saad Zaghlul Pasha and his colleagues from Malta and their restoration to complete personal freedom as well as freedom for lawful political activity. This is essential in order to permit Saad Pasha personally to assume the political leadership of the leaderless mass, and thus save the country from drifting towards political "bolshevism" and anarchy.

(e.) The abolition of martial law and the censorship, in so far as these war measures bear upon and affect the right and facilities for orderly political public meetings or hamper the freedom of expression of free public opinion in the press or otherwise. Also permission for the formation of political parties with full liberty for orderly political propaganda and association throughout the country. This is necessary in the interest of public peace and order, because it would provide regular and recognised channels for political life, and thus an effective check would be put upon the tendencies towards political anarchy which unorganised activity usually tends to take for lack of intellectual leadership and party discipline.

(f.) In the meantime, and pending the solution of the present acute stage of the crisis, facilities should be afforded to the students for the peaceful ventilation of their excited feelings by formal acquiescence in the holding of orderly and properly organised demonstrations under the personal responsibility of the organising committees.

In order that these measures may be put in force steps should be taken for the formation of a National Ministry, with a man like Adly Pasha Yeghen at its head, pending the return of Saad Pasha and the settlement of the bigger problems as hereafter explained. In these preliminary stages of solution His Highness the Sultan can and should take a leading and conspicuous part, in order to restore to him some prestige and favour with the public whose sympathies he has lately been running a great risk of losing. The Throne ought to be given some show of power for national service and utility, and the present crisis affords a good opportunity for such a step.

The second set of measures to be considered are of a political nature, and deal with the question of the political status of Egypt and her future relationship with Great Britain.

(a.) As regards the status of Egypt, there seems to be no reason why the British Government should not, of its own accord and initiative and by direct *entente* with our political leaders, recognise the *principle of our national entity as an independent nation*—which is an established fact resulting from the extinction of Ottoman suzerainty by the war. There would have been no difficulty in the way of such recognition, but for the fact of the declaration by the British Government of its "protectorate" over Egypt during the war, which was primarily a war measure as explained above. Apart from this fact, the protectorate once it is repudiated by the Egyptian people, as has lately been done, because *ipso facto* morally an untenable anomaly, because it would thus be a one-sided act, in direct contravention of the formal engagements taken by British statesmen, as well at the inception as during the occupation, while, apart from this, the fact that the Egyptian people consider the forcible imposition of the protectorate without their free consent as an act of international violence calculated to wound their national consciousness in its most sensitive point, this fact should of itself be sufficient to bring about a reconsideration of the question by the British Government, inasmuch as it would seem altogether incredible that the practical common sense of the British statesmen should risk the reality of Anglo-Egyptian community of interest and sentiment for such a technical shibboleth as a "protectorate," seeing that in reality, whatever form of government Egypt may have in the future, her very existence, and by far the greatest part of her economic life, is and must in the interest of both equally be closely and intimately entwined. And as free consent is the best and surest foundation for all association, would it not be after all best for both countries that their future relationship should be settled by mutual free consent and agreement, seeing that their interests are fundamentally harmonious and mutually indispensable and beneficial?

And inasmuch as the only obstacle to the free and willing co-operation of the two countries, and the cause of the present momentary estrangement, is entirely due to the question of the protectorate, and its conflict with the rising tide of the national self-consciousness of the Egyptian people; and since such a conflict is not one due to antagonism of interest, but merely due to adventitious circumstances, is it too much to look to Great Britain herself, as the best qualified and most competent authority for the removal of a moral hardship, which the Egyptians can no longer endure?

This, by generous and far-seeing statesmanship, you may yet regain the sympathy and affectionate respect that was once yours by right in the heart of every Egyptian.

Surely it should not be necessary for us to go to the Peace Conference, and there wash all our household linen in full public view of a curious world, in order to obtain what we can readily arrange by direct negotiation between our leaders and your responsible statesmen, for the question of independence requires no more than the recognition of an established fact of the war, which is in absolute harmony with all the recognised principles of the Allies as of yourselves.

I am venturing to make this proposal because I feel confident that with a little more bold initiative on your part you can readily solve the problem; because I am convinced in my heart that you mean and have always meant to play fair by us Egyptians; and that the present crisis has merely been brought about by some unfortunate "bungling."

(b.) If it is possible to obtain the direct recognition by Great Britain of the principle of Egyptian independence before going to the Peace Conference, such an act should greatly help to remove any doubts that some may entertain as to British intentions regarding Egypt, and should materially promote any movement to bring about a correct understanding on all matters of detail between us; for the best men in Egypt and her true leaders in thought can never forget that Great Britain has been, and by the nature of the case will always be, the best friend and only natural ally of the Egyptian people.

For while our interests are harmonious, our principles and our political ideas have been by force of association for 36 years derived primarily from yours, and these facts should in themselves constitute the soundest and strongest bond that could unite two peoples such as ours together with mutual advantage. Such basic harmonies can be disturbed only by lack of sympathy, foresight, and the sense of reality on the part of the British statesmen.

It is therefore on your shoulders that must ultimately fall the burden of events and their responsibility if you now fail to recognise these fundamental verities. We are and must always be friends if only you would recognise our rights as a free people; for on such a basis we could settle all outstanding questions between us.

The practical way for arriving at such a solution is now almost self-evident. It is to bring back Saad Zaghlul Pasha, ask him to reconstruct his group upon a wider and more national basis as a political party; form a national Ministry, which could carry the moral weight necessary for handling such vital matters; and then negotiate with the Sultan, at the head of such a weighty Ministry, the details of the settlement.

Personally I believe that such a solution is perfectly feasible; and that there should be no difficulty in agreeing on all details, once the principle of independence shall have been recognised, which is the fundamental condition.

We could then arrange it (having once agreed upon the details) that an Egyptian delegation, which in this case would be truly representative, shall go to the Peace Conference with a definite programme approved beforehand between our leaders and yours, in which case, when the question of the "mandatory" shall arise, we ourselves could then ask for your help and assistance for the future, as may be necessary in the form of a mandate from the League of Nations, the terms of which shall have been already settled between us beforehand by mutual consent.

Such I feel is the kind of settlement which is worthy of your services to Egypt in the past, of your moral position in the world to-day, and of your prestige for the future as a Liberal Empire in the East.

Enclosure 2 in No. 248.

Note on a conversation with Mohammed Es-Sayed Lutfi.

I HAD a talk this evening with Mohammed Es-Sayed Lutfi, brother of Ahmed Lutfi Bey Es-Sayed, who has recently arrived in Cairo from Samalut (Minia) where he is Mamur Markaz.

He gave me an account of what had happened there. He had had an extremely difficult time, but by diplomacy and with the help of other local officials and notables, he had prevented any actual outbreak of violence. In this respect his Markaz had been singular. It is interesting to note that he took the step of arming the Europeans in his Markaz. He recounted various incidents, among which

I will mention that a mob, excited by the murder of those officers in the train, came to his Markaz; he condemned the murder; they replied that the English had sent away four Egyptians, and that justified the murder of the English officers; he argued that a just retribution would have been not to murder the officers but to take them away and hide them, and the crowd appreciated the argument. He attributed his success partly to the fact that he had always used extreme care in carrying out the demands of the Army for labour and fodder. The Mamur of a neighbouring Markaz, who was generally thought to have collected more than the Army asked for and to have kept the balance, had now suffered for it and was cursed by the inhabitants to his face as being worse than the English. He said incidentally that the Mudir of Minia (whom he has always disliked) had been so hopelessly inefficient that he ought to go to a lunatic asylum. He thought it would take six months to re-establish public security, and that military force would never definitely re-establish it. The natives were prepared (or thought they were) to sacrifice themselves at the rate of ten for every British soldier they would kill. (It is to be noted that he was talking about Upper Egyptians, whose temper when roused is very different from that of the Lower Egyptians.)

As to Cairo, the sub-Governor had told him to-day that he thought all would be quiet in four days. He doubted it himself, and thought that things might be fairly normal in a fortnight if a dose of concession was administered every four or five days. He said that hatred of the Armenians (founded on the fact, if it is a fact, of the Armenian in Abdin Square having fired a revolver from his window the other day) was extreme and increasing, and that Armenians ought to be taken out of harm's way. The hatred did not extend to Syrians and Greeks, but soon would if a Syrian or Greek let off a revolver. Hatred of the British uniform was also most intense, but there was no appreciable hatred of British civilians in general. He thought soldiers ought to be kept away from the populace. He represented that the Independence Party were a quietening influence, and that a mob armed with sticks and knives which assembled near Zaghlul Pasha's house were restrained from violence by an emissary of Shaarawy Pasha.

We discussed the causes of the present outbreak, and his analysis was the familiar one which (apart from special agitations) is no doubt essentially correct.

1. General anti-English predisposition due to unfulfilled promises of evacuation.
2. Declaration of Protectorate.
3. Disappointment at the non-withdrawal of the Protectorate at the end of the war.
4. Disappointment of hopes raised by President Wilson.
5. Refusal to allow the Egyptian delegates to leave when delegations were going to Europe from Arabia, Syria and Cyprus.
6. Deportation of Zaghlul Pasha, &c.
7. Fear of an aggravated protectorate or annexation.
8. Policy of Sir William Brunyate.
9. Hatred of the British Army (involving also provincial Government officials), due to requisitioning of men and fodder at low prices and by arbitrary methods. (In this connection he recalled Lord Cromer's view of the importance of at least doing no material detriment to people with whom one could have no real moral or intellectual community.)
10. Dislike of certain British officials in themselves or for their policy.

He expatiated on (10) and talked particularly about the three officials who are chiefly on people's minds.

Mr. Haines he regarded as stupid and self-important, essentially the wrong man for the post (with an allusion, by way of contrast, to Sir R. Graham), the object of contempt, but not of personal dislike.

Sir W. Brunyate had succeeded during the last year in arousing the combined hostility of all educated elements in Egypt, and was largely responsible for the actual crisis; people had the greatest fear and dislike of his policy. Though it was he who had precipitated the crisis, he had perhaps received more than his due share of unpopularity.

Mr. Dunlop had been the curse of the English in Egypt for fifteen years. When Lord Cromer and Sir W. Willcocks had been winning for England the admiration of Egyptians, Mr. Dunlop had been winning their hatred. As long ago as Denshawai, any Egyptian who wanted to write against the English tended

primarily to write against Mr. Dunlop; he had sown the seeds of hatred of the English in every boy who had been through the Government schools, and was himself immeasurably more disliked than any other English official.

He thought it quite essential that these three officials should go.

The release of Zaghlul Pasha, &c., had of course had an excellent effect on educated upper class opinion, but he doubted whether, coming as late as it did, it had done very much towards placating the people.

The formation of a Ministry was also calculated to have an immediately good effect on the official classes and perhaps the students, but it should be remembered that Rushdy Pasha was far from being a really popular man.

Among isolated remarks of interest that he made I record the following:—

1. If the hopes of Egyptians were not to be realised, their disappointment would be much less formidable if they felt that the League of Nations and not solely England was responsible for their non-realisation.

2. That attacks on communications were at first commonly made with the idea of preventing British troops from getting out of Cairo into the provinces and shooting the inhabitants as they believed the inhabitants of Cairo had been shot.

3. That the Mudir of Behera ought to be retired; otherwise he would be assassinated. The ground for this opinion, which rather surprised me, was that the use of mere force without diplomacy must have aroused such resentment as would in the present state of people's minds produce an act of vengeance.

R. FURNESS.

April 9, 1919.

Enclosure 3 in No. 248.

Summary of information gleaned, and conclusions formed, by Mr. Aslan Cattau, of the State Domains Administration, from the conversation of prominent Egyptians at the Mohamed Ali Club, &c.

1. GREAT exception is taken to the terms "Protection" and "Protectorate." These terms offend the excessive vanity which is a prominent feature of the Egyptian character, as reducing any holder of office under such a form of government to the status of a mere figure-head, in the eyes of his own countrymen.

Both Rushdy and Adly Yeghen are reported to have said that, were some less objectionable nomenclature adopted, it would help greatly towards a solution.

Mr. Cattau is convinced that the Moderate Party, with which these two Pashas are identified, is sincerely desirous that Egypt should form a part of the British Empire. Vanity, again, is an important factor in determining this view. Realising the extent of British prestige throughout the world, these people aspire to appear before the world as the equals of the British.

2. Both Rushdy and Yeghen complain that, in face of the open hostility of the extremists, and at considerable personal risk; they stood firm on the British side throughout the war, in the conviction that the Allied cause was the right one, that it would triumph, and that England would reward their fidelity in some way which would right them in the eyes of their compatriots. Instead of this they have been "treated like little schoolboys," and cut off with vague promises. A Cyprus delegation was allowed to go to Europe, while the departure of the Egyptian delegation was to be delayed until the affairs of the world had been settled.

3. The political status of India is much discussed in club circles, and there appears to be a general opinion that India has obtained nothing concrete. But at least, they say, the Indian leaders have been honoured, and so justified in the eyes of their own people. The raising of Lord Sinha to the British peerage is particularly commented, and contrasted with the absence of honours for Egyptian notables.

4. The programme put forward by Saad Zaghlul is said not to be his own. He originally favoured much more moderate demands, but, threatened with a split in his party, rather than sacrifice his position as leader of the extremists he adopted a programme really framed by Prince Toussoun.

5. Mr. Cattau is convinced that Rushdy and Yeghen are loyal to Britain, according to their lights.

6. He considers that jealousy, misunderstandings, and offended vanities are at the bottom of the troubles.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 164.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 6, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 135 of the 30th March, and to inform your Lordship of the progress of events in Egypt during the week ending yesterday.

On the 29th March, as I indicated in the above despatch, the aspect of Cairo was calm, but there was a disposition to expect an aggravation of strikes and a renewal of disorder on or about the 2nd April. From the 30th March onward an intense campaign of intimidation developed. Letters emanating from so-called Committees of National Defence were showered on Government officials and shopkeepers, warning them upon pain of death to strike or close their shops, while other letters contained more general threats of impending outrage.

A strike of Government officials had been part of the original plan of the extremists, and I recorded in my despatch No. 125 of the 22nd March a temporary cessation of work on the part of the clerks of the Ministries of Education and Public Works. So partial a success stimulated the agitators to attempt methods of intimidation and personal propaganda, and while these methods no doubt had their effect upon many individuals, a new political cause had begun to work upon the official mind.

The bulk of Egyptian officials are quietly disposed persons, not prone to insubordination, or inclined to imperil their salaries, and their political opinions are often mild. Normally they would not as a body support the Independence Party, or that Party's programme, but no doubt after the deportation of Saad Pasha Zaghlul the Independence Party became to them the party representative of patriotism: they were unwilling that it should be said that they did not sympathise with such a party, and it seemed to them suitable to demonstrate their sympathy by striking. To illustrate their point of view I append to this despatch a translation of an open letter to the Sultan which they desired, but were not allowed, to publish in the "Mokattam."

Under the operation of these two causes, several Government offices struck on the 2nd April, and on the 3rd April the cessation of work was general. The State telegraphs were affected, but a limited service has been maintained by the military. The duration of the strike was doubtful, but it was generally expected to last for three days. On the 5th April, however, a large meeting was held in the mosque of Ibn Tulun, at which it was decided not yet to return to work. In spite of this decision of the employees of the Ministries of Finance and the Interior, and those of the Police, all returned to their offices in the morning. Many employees of the Ministries of Works, Justice, and Education also returned. Those of the Court of Appeal and the Parquet presented themselves and left again. A partial cessation of the lawyers' strike is foreseen, and would be an event of good omen.

In sympathy with the students of other schools, and with the officials, the cadets of the Military School marched out on the 3rd April. They left a letter addressed to the Commandant in which they explained in moderate and respectful language the reasons for their action, which they argued, should not be construed as insubordination, since they had left behind their arms, equipment, and private property; they demonstrated outside the Sultan's Palace and the American Agency, being joined by some cadets from the Police School.

On the same day a party of soldiers, under orders to proceed to Wasta, broke ranks and went to Cairo. They eventually returned to barracks, and after being harangued by an Egyptian officer, left for Wasta the next day.

The conduct both of the army and the police has hitherto given cause for satisfaction, but the extremists are actively conducting propaganda among both forces, and there is reason to doubt their loyalty being proof against the strain if it is much longer continued.

Intimidation was also not without its effect upon the shopkeepers, and for the last three days a considerable number of shops in Cairo have been shut, or very covertly open.

The campaign of intimidation was probably not so serious as its victims feared, but concurrently with it developed a more dangerous form of agitation. The more ignorant and inflammable elements of Al Azhar had already shown themselves

unamenable to the influence of their religious superiors, and this mosque became the nightly resort of large crowds, who assembled to hear irresponsible preachers address them in extravagant language of sedition and fanaticism. The town was full of material which required little kindling.

On the 3rd April a crowd, composed at first, it appears, of boys, gradually assembled in Abdin Square; stones were thrown at officers; a house from which a shot had been fired was invaded and the furniture taken out and set on fire. Troops called upon the crowd to disperse, but without effect, and were obliged to shoot. During the turmoil an English official of the Egyptian State railways was killed by a shot which is believed to have been fired from the neighbouring barrack-yard by a soldier of the Sultan's bodyguard; and this occurrence is being investigated by a Court of Inquiry. In this disturbance and in minor affray elsewhere 10 persons were killed and 56 wounded.

During the 4th and 5th April Cairo remained outwardly quiet. Fewer cases of intimidation were reported, perhaps because the main objects of the campaign had been sufficiently attained, but the atmosphere remained electric, and Al Azhar the chief focus of danger.

It is satisfactory to record that an agreement has been arrived at between the management of the Tramway Company and its employees by which the latter receive several not undeserved concessions. A larger number of trams are running, and it is hoped that the service will soon be normal.

I stated in my last despatch that order had been restored in the provinces except in parts of Dakalia, and there have been few incidents worthy of note during the last week. Mobile columns have been active throughout the Delta, recovering large quantities of stolen property, and arresting agitators, rioters, and thieves. Where the ringleaders have not been arrested their names are usually known: at Zifta they fled, with a number of students, before the approach of the troops. With or without military support, the authority of the Government seems to have been everywhere restored, and is being as a rule satisfactorily exercised, and the local committees have sunk into comparative obscurity. The population is in most places rather sullen than friendly towards the troops; misunderstandings are naturally not infrequent, and collisions have sometimes occurred. Repairs to railways are being actively carried out.

Since the 4th April there has been a slight recrudescence of trouble, the reflection no doubt of the continued agitation in Cairo. Partial strikes have been reported from Tanta and Mansura, and unrest from Benha and Faraskur.

In Upper Egypt there has been no further indication of disturbance south of Qena. The four chief ringleaders of the movement at Assouan were arrested on the 29th March at the request of the Mudir and sent north.

That conditions at Qena itself remained delicate is evidenced by a telegram from the Mudir to the Sultan asking for the release of Saad Pasha Zaghlul; according to a subsequent report from the inspector of the province, the Mudir was obliged in prudence to despatch this telegram in order to avert renewed disturbance. A serious fight occurred on involving several villages in this neighbourhood; troops intervened, but the affair is reported to have had no political significance.

No news of any trouble has been received from the area between Qena and Assiut. Assiut appears to have remained determinedly rebellious, even after the arrival of Brigadier General Huddleston. On the 2nd April, however, a report arrived from him that he had restored order in this district and was dealing with offenders. He had required the town of Assiut to pay for the damage done to the houses of two British officials, which were thoroughly sacked.

Detailed news was received on the 30th March of the constitution of a town council at Minia some twelve days previously. This council, modelled somewhat on the plan of a soviet, Nationalist, anti-Governmental, and anti-British in its policy, took upon itself the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the town of Minia. Side by side with it in the town and also nominally maintaining public order was the Mudir with his force of police and a detachment of the Egyptian Army.

This council succeeded in reducing the affairs of the town to confusion. The Mudir found that, having originally acquiesced in the council's existence, he was powerless to restrain it when its members began to quarrel among themselves. He had been discredited by his early complacency, and his efforts to assert his position subsequently were useless. After the departure southwards of Brigadier General Huddleston's force the town apparently lapsed into a state of chaos. Mob law

reigned, the prisons were opened and all the prisoners were released. The Egyptian detachment was not harmed, but was quite unable to cope with the situation, with the result that when a detachment of British troops returning from Assiut arrived there on the 28th March they received the news that indiscriminate shooting had been taking place for some time, and they found several unburied bodies in the streets. The landing of the troops had a salutary effect, and no disturbance has been reported since.

The provinces of Beni-Suef and Fayoum have remained quiet, and order has been re-established.

There remained, however, a centre of disaffection in the province of Giza. At Mazghuna, on the afternoon of the 30th March, soldiers who were guarding a reconstruction train went unarmed to the neighbouring village of Shobak-el-Ghufara to buy provisions. They were fired upon by the natives, and the village had to be cleared by troops. Seven soldiers were wounded, and fifty-eight casualties are known to have occurred among the villagers, the sheikh of the village being among the killed. The Omda, who was apparently among the leaders of the attack, has been arrested. The behaviour of the local police officer and his six men is reported to have been admirable.

By the 2nd April the district from Giza southwards to Ayat had become orderly, but on this day the railway line was cut in the rear of the construction train at a point near Matania south of Ayat. Up to the 4th April fifty-five arrests had been made in Ayat Markaz; the Mamur himself appears to have been implicated in the disorders.

The railway is working from Cairo to Wasta, from Wasta to the Fayoum, and from Minia to Assouan; while repairs to the line between Wasta and Minia are nearing completion.

On the 1st April eighty-two refugees from Assouan, Luxor, and Wasta, fifty-six of whom are British, reached Cairo by river.

I have, &c.
E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 249.

Translation of an open letter to the Sultan.

[Submitted by the "Mokattam" and stopped.]

Your Highness,

WE have the honour to submit to your Highness the following:—

Telegrams have communicated to us the speech which Lord Curzon has made in the House of Lords in England regarding the present movement in Egypt, in which his Lordship wishes to make out of the officials, or the greater part of them, a special party who live with hopes different to the hopes of the Egyptian people, and lay on them the responsibility of the hopes of remaining under the British rule in such a time when all the classes of the Egyptian nation without exception have agreed on demanding her natural rights, which all public opinion at present has agreed to affirm and realise to all nations.

Nothing can be more regretted than to ignore the political significance of the movement, which exhibited itself by the protestations of the deputations representing all classes of the nation to the local and foreign authorities, and by the strike of advocates, students, and labourers protesting against the ignoring of the general feeling for no special reasons connected with their work or trades, and by exhibition of peaceful demonstrations. Nothing is more regrettable than to ignore all this and only to mention what has accompanied these demonstrations, cutting communications and destruction of public property which has been described as plunder and ravage, although it is not possible that such great demonstrations, comprising as they do the population of the whole country, which followed one another in Egypt could have been more peaceful and law abiding, and it was not possible to avoid what occurred in the way of cutting communications and destroying Government property in circumstances where the military authorities enraged the feelings of the population by treating them with various kinds of severity, and killing the innocent to stop them doing actions which are lawful for them, there being no other means whereby to show their feelings when all doors had been closed in their faces. And the foreign element here testify to the conduct of the demonstrators,

in that they respected their persons and property; and will also testify to the behaviour of the military authorities in regard to the demonstrators.

It offends us that the voice which emanates from the breast of the whole nation demanding her independence should be described as a movement worked up by irresponsible persons self-appointed to foment disturbances, although they had nothing to do with this movement except that the people delegated them as their representatives to defend their demands in the Egyptian question before the Peace Conference, and it offends us to find that the whole nation has been prevented from using their personal liberty.

Your Highness knows that your nation is the first nation in the East that has gained her liberty, and that she is not less fitted than any other nation for it. And that her coming forward to call for independence is not by the instigation of one person or party, and that she has done nothing but repeat collectively your Highnesses lofty words in which you greeted President Wilson at the opening of the great Peace Negotiations.

The officials have continued during the time that the different classes of Egyptians were rising up to voice their national demands, and they did so in order to safeguard the interests of the public and they never thought that their continuing to carry out their duties would be interpreted as a failure to combine with the different classes in feelings and demands until Lord Curzon spoke as he has done. So it is their duty now to demand its correction and eliminate all doubt regarding their attitude towards the general movement. Therefore we, the undersigned officials, thought that in order to express our feelings, and show that we are at one with all classes of Egyptians in demanding liberty and independence, we should cease work for three days only, so that the interests of the public should not be impaired.

We beg in closing to express ourselves in terms of sincerity and loyalty.

No. 250.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 166.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward a report received from the Assistant Director of Intelligence, Khartoum, dealing with some aspects of the Nationalist movement as it affects the Soudan.

As regards some of the personalities referred to in it; Mahmud Pasha-el-Dib is a man of 45 to 50, enjoying both position and reputation in native circles, educated locally, but speaking French and a very little English. Until recently he was reported, while a keen pro-Egyptian, to be friendly to British interests.

Sir Sayed Ali Morghani is a descendant of the Prophet, and member of a family which is held in the greatest reverence by all Mohammedans in the Soudan.

Sherif Yusef Mohammed-el-Hindi is a leading religious notable of the Soudan.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner),

MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 250.

Report received from Assistant Director of Intelligence, Khartoum.

(Secret.)

AFTER the great excitement which prevailed among the Egyptians in the Soudan after the receipt of the first news regarding the movement in Egypt, there was a period of quietness during which they were contented with the course of events in Egypt, having been told that the delegation headed by Zaghlul Pasha was going after all to proceed to the Peace Conference to lay before them the demands and national ambitions of the Egyptians. They believe that the Rushdy Ministry only lingered in office on this understanding. The departure of the High Commissioner confirmed this belief, and it was generally said that it was he who opposed the Zaghlul policy and for that reason he was recalled to explain matters, and it is expected he will not return.

Recently however the interest in, and talk about the affairs in Egypt have again been rife as a result of Mahmud Pasha-el-Dib and Isawi Bey Zayed's visit to Khartoum.

The former is a wealthy cotton merchant of Alexandria who owes his fortune to transactions in the Bourse. The latter, a wealthy landowner of Menoufia, who brought up with him a doctor and a singer. The former brought up his family and his ostensible reason for coming up was to see the Soudan and show it to his family, being of those who believed in the necessity of closer relations between the two countries. The latter said he had just recovered from influenza and wanted a change of air. The information collected tends to show, however, that both these visitors were volunteers on behalf of the Zaghlul Party. Their object is said to have been two-fold:—

- (a.) It is supposed in Cairo that there is an idea prevailing among the military party and other Egyptian officials in the Soudan that the higher Egyptian class and notably the one leading the movement at present does not give the Soudan due attention, and ignores the Egyptians in the Soudan. The visit was intended to impress on the party in the Soudan that they are treated with due consideration, and that those in authority in Egypt are always thinking of their welfare, and that under the new Egyptian régime all those in the Soudan will be given their due.
- (b.) The Zaghlul Party were anxious to know the real attitude of the Soudan in view of their agitation in Egypt, and, as both delegates were well known notables and their word carried weight, to try and see a few of the Soudan notables secretly and explain to them the value of the assistance they can render by themselves supporting the Egyptians to turn out the British from Egypt and the Soudan. An informant states they had a written statement proposing the action to be taken in the Soudan, and defining the future of the Soudan if the movement proved successful.

The main feature was that, the Egyptians, as good Mohammedans, had waited for and were confident in the victory of Germany and Turkey, which really meant the revival of Islam and its predominance in the East. They have, however, been disappointed in the result of the war, and the partitioning of Turkey meant the death of Islam. Egypt, as a wealthy and progressive nation, must take its share of responsibility in trying to make a lead in reforming this condition, otherwise the future looked very dismal.

These two notables are said to have had lengthy interviews with the Grand Kadi, Sheikh Hussein Kuraa, Hassan Bey Ahmed, Hamed Bey Saad, and others, among whom are mentioned Sheikh Mohammed Kur, of the Education, and Yuzbashi Shukry Eff., A.D.C.

As a result, the Egyptian notables were advised not to try to interview or utter a word to any Soudan personality; the religious leaders being traitors to their religion, who have sold their conscience during the war for British money, and other Soudanese are animals who know nothing except their women and food. The Soudanese nation is still in an ignorant condition, does not comprehend higher things, and requires fanatical leaders to move it. The only sheikh who, in the opinion of those in the Soudan is a real Mohammedan and could be trusted, is Sheikh Abu El Gasseem, President of the Board of Ulema, as was the late Sheikh Omar Banna.

It was explained that the hope of Islam must lie in the new generation of Soudanese, who are being educated in Government schools, and in the new generation of merchants, who all are supposed to have begun to understand the British methods of enslaving people—the delegates were assured that in nine or ten years great hopes should be based on this new generation which have the making of a violent Nationalist Party, and would be more troublesome to the English than the Egyptian Nationalists. It was given as an example that the treatment of young Soudanese in a department like the railways is enough to breed this spirit.

Whenever these two notables, on their visit to the Soudan, met in a large party they deprecated the Zaghlul movement as badly conducted, El Dib Pasha said that the High Commissioner was very lenient, and his leniency led to unwise movements, but now that he was gone matters would reform.

No information could be obtained about any adverse propaganda by the Governor of Assuan. It is only said that he saw, at one time, Sir Sayed Ali for about one hour, in which interview Sagh. Mohammed Labib Shahed, of Mil., W.D., was present. What conversation took place is not known, but according to information to hand Saad Ali is described as the worst pro-British, with Sherif Yusef only second to him.

It is gathered that the policy of the New Egyptian Party, in case their movement fails, is to get the whole Egyptian nation into a state of passive resistance, to obstruct

all administration, to boycott all men who accept Government positions against the party's advice, and on the whole to show their antipathy and disgust in all that they do. The King of the Hejaz is to be the special object of persecution and to begin with, Egyptian pilgrimage would be discouraged as long as he is in Mecca and assistance, as far as possible, to him is to be cut off. Other lines of action will depend on the future of Syria and Mesopotamia, and it is said that 150,000l. is already in the party's treasury for work on propaganda as soon as liberty of travel and writing is available. Many Egyptian wealthy people have promised their full support in money annually; and many hot-headed Egyptian young men, students especially, have sworn a life-long fight, and in case they fail to quit Egypt and live in Switzerland and the United States of America.

Up to the present the Egyptian community in the Soudan is convinced that the movement in Egypt will be successful, and that if it fails (which is highly improbable) Egypt will continue seething until an issue is found.

*Intelligence Department, Khartoum,
March 14, 1919.*

No. 251.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 167.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 164 of the 6th April relative to the progress of events in Egypt, I have the honour to transmit herewith an account of the incidents which have occurred day by day in Cairo and the provinces from 6th April to 12th April inclusive.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY, *General.*

Enclosure in No. 251.

*An Account of the Progress of Events in Cairo and the Provinces from
April 6 to April 12, 1919.*

Cairo, April 6, 1919.

THE position in Cairo on the 6th April showed little alteration. The town was outwardly quiet, though trenches were being dug, and barricades erected by the natives of Old Cairo but there was no improvement in the general attitude of the public. Strenuous endeavours were being made by extremist agitators to undermine the discipline of the Egyptian army and police.

About 5,000 persons took part in the funeral procession of a native killed the previous day; they included ulema and students, Egyptian army officers military and police cadets, and members of the coastguards and palace police.

The proceedings were orderly.

The Sultan's appeal to the people to abstain from demonstrations was issued on this day, but apparently produced very little effect on general opinion.

Provinces, April 6, 1919.

Feeling in Alexandria was uneasy; inflammatory pamphlets were being circulated, and strikes were anticipated. In the evening a crowd of about 200 attacked the railway station; the guard fired, and one person was killed.

At Port Said there was a strike of labourers at the salt works.

Two attempts were made on the railway line near Mansura, and at Mit Salsil, near Lake Menzala, a patrol was attacked; five natives were killed, twelve were wounded, and ten were arrested.

Otherwise the provinces were orderly, though a certain restlessness was reported from Menufia and Behera.

Cairo, April 7, 1919.

The news of the decision to release Saad Pasha Zaghlul and his companions became public in the late morning, and signs of jubilation became immediately manifest. Small

parties of Egyptians, and sometimes of Europeans, were to be met everywhere, walking or driving, waving Egyptian and other flags, and shouting in honour of independence, Egypt and other countries, including occasionally England, and cheering for Zaghlul Pasha, Mohammed Pasha Mahmud, Rushdy Pasha, Adly Pasha, and others.

In the afternoon small processions and meetings were organised, and though detrimental allusions to England were to be heard, the attitude of the populace was in general friendly, even to British officers and men.

By the evening proceedings had become more disorderly, and in the course of a turbulent demonstration near Shepheard's Hotel, two natives were shot and four wounded. A collision also occurred between a procession of soldiers and a procession of Egyptians, and shots were exchanged.

At Abbassia, a military motor-lorry was attacked, and the men in charge severely handled. Troops came to the rescue and a few casualties occurred.

A very large meeting was held at Al Azhar, at which violently anti-British speeches were made by Copts; the Moslems were more restrained and a moderating speech by the Grand Mufti was received with great applause. He defended the British from a charge of poisoning water, food, and cigarettes, made by a previous speaker, excused the action of the troops in firing, and called upon his audience to respect the British Government, its representative, and its soldiers, and to endeavour to forget the dark days they had passed through.

Provinces, April 7, 1919.

A large and orderly demonstration took place at Alexandria in the morning. In the afternoon an unruly mob did some damage in the lower quarters of the town.

Orderly demonstrations were held at many places in the provinces. The demonstration at Faraskur (north Dakalia) was hostile; it became necessary to fire on the crowd, and three native casualties resulted.

At Tanta, Government servants returned to work, and the shops were reopened.

On this date news was received that fifty Bedouin had been arrested in the Fayoum for having participated in the attack on Etsa Markaz, and seventy-six persons for looting in Medinet Fayoum, while all missing police, horses, and practically all stolen police arms had been recovered.

Cairo, April 8, 1919.

On the 8th April the situation disimproved.

A very large procession of all classes made its way through the streets in the morning. Though noisy it was orderly. Quantities of flags were carried—Egyptian, French, Italian, American, Egypto-Coptic, Turkish, and nondescript—as well as placards bearing inscriptions in favour of independence, photographs such as those of Mustapha Pasha Kamel, and the Coptic Patriarch.

A still larger procession formed in the afternoon; it was also in the main orderly, but several incidents occurred which were chiefly due to the resentment aroused in British soldiers by the carrying of Turkish flags. This was the cause of a collision outside the Ezbekia Gardens, in which shots were fired, and several demonstrators and British soldiers, as well as an officer, wounded or injured. Some men of the Egyptian army interfered in the mêlée, on which side the accounts of eye-witnesses differ, and suffered injuries.

Isolated attacks on British soldiers were reported during the evening.

During the night of the 7th-8th April, the telegraph and telephone wires were cut between Cairo and Maadi, and on the 8th April Tura station on the Helouan line was held up for three hours by a crowd of about 3,000; troops ultimately succeeded in dispersing them without firing.

Most Government servants attended at their offices, but left at once in order to participate in the demonstrations.

Provinces, April 8, 1919.

At Alexandria, Government employees were mainly on strike, but a number of clerks of the police refused to strike in spite of much intimidation. A large procession moved through the streets, carrying flags and shouting, but, in spite of inflammatory speeches, no damage was done and there were no casualties. The police did their duty loyally. A disorderly demonstration in the afternoon was easily dispersed.

At Port Said, no incidents occurred, though there was manifest excitement, and the strike which had begun on the 6th still continued.

At Tanta, there was a large demonstration which was well handled by the police and ghafirs and ended without mishap.

Large crowds assembled near Zagazig station, and were dispersed with one casualty.

Otherwise the provinces were quiet.

On this date a report was received from a camel patrol which had been touring the Western Desert and Wadi Natrun. The whole district had been found to be quiet, and the reception of the patrol was everywhere friendly until they entered the cultivated area on the western edge of Behera province, where the attitude of the inhabitants was sullen.

Cairo, April 9, 1919.

Practically all Government servants were absent from the Ministries, and all postal employees and the great majority of railway employees were on strike.

Processions, more or less orderly, continued; but on a much smaller scale.

On the other hand, there was a considerable amount of rioting and looting by crowds armed with sticks and iron bars, the shops and houses of Armenians in particular being attacked: a family of four Armenians were murdered in their house in the Musky.

Armed patrols and pickets were more in evidence.

Two thousand Armenians were collected and placed under military protection.

Damage was done to the permanent way and to signals at Saida Zeinab Station, on the Helouan line.

During the day 30 killed and 30 wounded were removed to Kasr-el-Aini Hospital.

There were many cases of public incitement to violence by students and others, with picketing and intimidation of Government employees, and several isolated attacks on British soldiers.

Some of the 4th Battalion of the Egyptian Army, resenting the harm done to certain of their comrades in the affray outside the Ezbekia Gardens on the 8th April, intimated their intention of going into the town to revenge themselves. Their own officers, however, formed them up and took away their ammunition. The men resumed their ordinary occupations, and in the evening the General Staff Officer of the Egyptian Army reported that the situation was good.

The non-military casualties in Cairo between noon on the 8th April and noon on 9th April were as follows:—killed, 14 (including 5 Armenians and 3 Greeks); wounded, 39 (including 5 Armenians and 1 Greek).

Provinces, April 9, 1919.

A very large demonstration took place at Alexandria in which judges, lawyers, students, and Government officials participated, followed by the riff-raff of the town. All Allied Powers were cheered except Great Britain, and no British flags were carried. No conflicts occurred, but there was considerable rowdyism and the mob showed some disinclination to disperse. Cab-drivers were prevented from plying, and telegraph employees were forced to strike. Late in the evening, four British engine-drivers were attacked by a crowd at the station and were obliged to fire; three of the assailants were reported killed and four wounded.

There were large peaceful demonstrations at Zagazig, Mansura, and elsewhere, but no disturbances were reported from the provinces.

Cairo, April 10, 1919.

The strike of the employees of the railways and telegraphs and the postal administration abated, though the workmen in the railway repairing shops remained out; but otherwise Government servants continued on strike.

A circular (translation attached) was distributed by the National Party, under the leadership of Ali Fahmi Kamel Bey, brother of the late Mustapha Kamel Pasha, and another (translation attached) by the strike leaders, among the Government employees.

Attacks on Armenians continued, and several Armenian houses and shops were looted. The Armenian community generally was in a state of great alarm.

During the night a railway patrol trolley was fired on at close range between Shubra and Cairo signal-cabins. One soldier was killed; four soldiers and three trolley-men were wounded.

Near the citadel a military patrol-car was attacked with sticks and stones. The patrol opened fire and wounded three persons.

An attack was also made on army stores near the station, but was easily repelled.

The non-military casualties in Cairo between noon on the 9th April and noon on the 10th April were as follows:—killed, 24 (including 2 Armenians and 1 Greek); wounded 61 (including 3 Armenians and 1 Greek).

The casualties to troops between the 7th April and noon on the 10th April were:—7 other ranks killed; 3 officers and 17 other ranks wounded.

Translation of Circular Distributed on April 10.

The Directing Committee of the National Party has learnt of the formation of a Ministry under his Excellency Hussein Rushdy Pasha. In consequence of this, and owing to the well-known fact that Rushdy Pasha has a policy, laid down previously to his resignation, which does not go beyond the protectorate and which is not in conformity with the wishes of the nation, the Directing Committee has sent a deputation, consisting of Ali Bey Fahmi Kamel, Abdel Latif Bey El Sufani, Mohammed Bey Hafiz Ramadan, and Mohamed Effendi Zaki, to ascertain the facts of the case and to assure the Prime Minister that the formation of a Ministry has been agreed to "In view of the present situation, and in the hope of reaching a solution satisfactory to the nation."

It is understood from this statement:—

1. That this Ministry is temporary;
2. That it is not in conformity with the Prime Minister's policy, referred to above;
3. Considering that it is seeking a solution satisfactory to the Egyptian nation, and that it is a Ministry which has been formed under exceptional circumstances, it should possess exceptional and extraordinary powers.

The only solution satisfactory to the Egyptian nation is the following:—

Immediate and complete independence of Egypt, its Sudan and dependencies, this independence to be entirely free from any occupation protectorate, agency, advisorship, any foreign control, or any limitation whatsoever.

The National Party expect that his Excellency Rushdy Pasha and his colleagues will consider this demand, with the aspirations of the Egyptian nation and the efforts that it is making daily to obtain the realisation of this noble aim, which it will never relinquish.

God is the protector of them that strive.

Translation of Circular Distributed by Strike Leaders among Government Employees.

On the 10th April, 1919, the delegates of the various Ministries and Government Departments met at the Ministry of Justice and decided upon a strike, to continue from the 12th April until the following demands are granted:—

1. The Egyptian Government should officially declare that it recognises the validity of the mandate of Saad Pasha's deputation to represent the Egyptian nation before the Peace Conference.
 2. The Egyptian Government should officially declare that the formation of the present Ministry does not imply a recognition of the protectorate, and that the decision upon Egypt's situation, after the cessation of the Turkish sovereignty, should be left entirely to the Peace Conference.
- Martial Law should be abolished, armed British troops should be withdrawn from the streets in cities, towns, and villages, and the matter of maintaining order and security should be placed in the hands of the Egyptian Police.

It has been further decided that the following will be exempted from taking part in the strike for a period of one week :—

- (a.) Clerks of the Council of Ministers.
- (b.) Men of the police.
- (c.) Gaolers.
- (d.) Government physicians and those whose services are indispensable to them.

Cairo, April 12, 1919.

Provinces, April 10, 1919.

In the morning disturbances occurred in a native quarter of Alexandria, and troops were obliged to intervene, inflicting a few casualties. In the afternoon, anti-Armenian riots occurred, and troops were attacked by the mob. Seventeen of the rioters were killed, among them being several ringleaders, and a large number of arrests were made.

Owing to persistent rumours that Armenians were to be massacred, the public were warned to be in their houses by 8 P.M. Public establishments were closed, and the town was strongly picketed. No disturbance took place.

In the Western and Central Delta there were some signs of disquiet in certain districts; in one case railway points were interfered with, and in another case telephone wires were cut; arrests were made.

There was a slight hostile demonstration against troops near Beni-Suef, and the telephone wires were cut at one place between Beni-Suef and Minia.

Otherwise the provinces were quiet, and in particular the situation between Shellal and Sohag was reported to show great improvement.

400 prisoners were awaiting trial at Assiut and 100 at Minia.

Cairo, April 11, 1919.

The strike of Government employees continued.

There were no disturbances in Cairo; efforts were being made by moderate Egyptians to pacify public feeling, and outwardly the situation showed a marked improvement.

A crowd which collected in the northern suburbs, with the alleged intention of attacking Armenians, was taken in hand by the military, converted into an orderly procession, and eventually dispersed with cheers for the officer who had controlled it.

Non-military casualties between noon on the 10th April and noon on the 11th April were as follows: killed, 3; wounded, 15.

Provinces, April 11, 1919.

A deputation of lawyers called on the general officer commanding Alexandria district to express regret for the disturbances of the previous day, and appreciation of the patience of the troops. The Ulama, by speeches and public notices, exhorted the inhabitants to remain quiet, and leading Egyptians took steps towards calming the feeling against Armenians.

At Port Said a large crowd assembled to meet the deputation on its way to Europe, but there were no disorders.

At Suez the shops were shut, and peaceful demonstrations were held there and at Ismailia.

Fifty thousand persons took part in a demonstration at Mansura, and a large demonstration was also held at Talkha on the opposite side of the Nile. There were no disorders.

At Quesna a party was caught in an attempt to cut the telephone wires; two of them were killed and one wounded.

No other incidents were reported from the provinces.

Cairo, April 12, 1919.

Strikes continued.

During the night a British soldier was attacked and wounded outside the Ezbekia Gardens. The telephone wires were cut between Cairo and Embaba, and the Cairo-Feh-el-Baroud Railway line was damaged at Oussim, north of Embaba.

The outward appearance of Cairo on the 12th was practically normal, though a few shops remained shut, and no trams were running except on the Heliopolis line.

In Cairo itself no incidents occurred, with the exception of a few cases of damage to Armenian houses; but at Tura prison, near Helouan, the convicts revolted and the Sudanese guard was obliged to fire. Twelve convicts were reported killed and seventy wounded; 108 were still missing in the evening, of whom some were believed to have been drowned in the Nile.

The night of the 12th to 13th April was quiet.

On the morning of the 13th a limited tram service was running.

Provinces, April 12, 1919.

Alexandria was quiet, but there were isolated attacks on Armenians and also on Jews.

The leaders of the Independence Party left Port Said amid scenes of orderly enthusiasm.

No incidents were reported from the Delta, but large numbers of seditious pamphlets were circulated at Zagazig.

In Upper Egypt troops entered the village of El Bahlul, near Beni Suef, where a hostile demonstration had been made. They were fired on by the villagers, and returned the fire, killing five persons and wounding three. The village was searched, arms were seized, and eleven arrests were made.

Up to this date, 106 persons had been arrested at Wasta.

No. 252.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 653.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 26, 1919.

ALL is quiet. Government officials are back at work and railway workmen are returning.

(Addressed to Khartoum.)

No. 253.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 655.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 27, 1919.

IT is rumoured here that Zaghlul is visiting England. I would emphasise the necessity of his not being regarded in any way as a delegate or being granted any concession that would enable him to pose as a hero on his return to Egypt.

No. 254.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 662.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 26, 1919.

"HUMANITÉ" this morning publishes an interview with Zaghlul Pasha, describing events from 1881 onwards which have led up to present situation in Egypt. Zaghlul comments on dissatisfaction which was aroused in Egypt at declaration of Protectorate in 1914, but which at instigation of leading Egyptians themselves was kept under control during war. He refers to war services rendered by Egypt, reception accorded to subsequent demand for independence, and rejection of suggestions respecting British control of national defence and of Suez Canal.

Zaghlul states that his delegation has come to ask Conference for justice and

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liberty for 13,000,000 Egyptians. He lays stress on unity of Copts and Mussulmans, and denies anti-Christian nature of movement. He appeals on latter point to French Minister at Cairo, who, he states, has announced publicly that there was no truth in accusation of xenophobia brought against Egyptians. Zaghlul similarly ridicules suggestion of connivance with Turks and Germans.

"Humanité," commenting on above "moderate" declarations, adds that English have pitilessly repressed Egyptian manifestations, and that, if it be true, as is affirmed, that defenceless Egyptian villages have been destroyed by bombs from British aviators, such cruelty dishonours British cause.

(Copy to peace delegation and Cairo.)

No. 255.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 663.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 26, 1919.

"HUMANITÉ" this morning publishes letter addressed to President Wilson by Egyptian Association of Paris expressing hope that he will contradict report as to his recognition of British Protectorate, such recognition "being in absolute contradiction to all principles of liberty proclaimed in his speeches."

Association states that it cannot believe that at moment when delegates of Egyptian people have come to submit their claims to Conference United States should thus close door of justice. It adds that Egyptian people awaits application of those principles of justice so loyally defended by the United States and accepted by all the Allies.

(Copy to peace delegation.)

No. 256

Foreign Office Minute on Transfer of the Work of the International Egyptian Quarantine Board to the Egyptian Public Health Department.

DR. BUCHANAN and Major Thomson conferred with Mr. Loyd at the Foreign Office on the 28th April, on question arising out of Dr. Garner's despatch of the 11th March, 1919, and subsequent correspondence (Local Government Board letter 35490 M.I. 1919 dated the 28th March, 1919, enclosing Dr. Buchanan's memorandum).

The principal matter of public health concern is the new situation which is created by the railway route from Syria to Egypt, and by other circumstances which make the arrangements for the protection of Egypt against an introduction of cholera and plague, established under the Paris Convention of 1903, in some respects inapplicable to present conditions. It now seems reasonable, for instance, to discontinue the practice required by the 1903 Convention of holding up ships for a specified number of days on their arrival at Egyptian ports from ports in Syria and elsewhere at which cholera or plague is prevalent. This proceeding interferes greatly with commerce, and it would be better that the methods of dealing with the introduction of infection by rail or by ship should be assimilated. If this is done, the Egyptian practice as regards ships will be made parallel with the British practice. While infectious sick are isolated and actual contacts can be detained on shore for a necessary period of observation, there would be no detention of the ship except for purposes of disinfection. It should also be possible to allow persons from such ships to proceed without detention provided that the places to which they are going are known and they can be kept under necessary medical examination there. The matter was fully discussed in Dr. Garner's despatch.

Major Thomson explained that the new system would be applied with great caution so long as the internal administration in Egypt was unsettled. There was no intention of running any risk by allowing contacts of infectious diseases to go to their destination in places where the medical observation could not be thoroughly carried out. Dr. Buchanan was of opinion that with this reservation the new policy proposed was the right one.

The departure from the practice laid down by international agreement to the Convention would be easy to justify as the result of obviously changed conditions, and the question was discussed whether it would not be reasonable that, without any

formalities, the Egyptian Public Health Department on taking over the service should in appropriate cases substitute what may be called the British practice for the present Convention practice.

Mr. Loyd pointed out from the political and diplomatic point of view there might be serious objections to this course especially in the present somewhat electrical condition of matters relating to foreign rights and privileges in Egypt. His view was accepted that if any departure from the Convention is to be made the proposal should first be formally submitted to the Foreign Office, and official steps should be taken either to obtain the assent of the parties to the Convention or at least formally to notify the change which was proposed.

Dr. Buchanan pointed out that it was undesirable to give a precedent to other countries of rejecting any clause in a Health Convention which they found inconvenient merely by process of notifying the signatory Powers. There have been occasions, e.g., with the United States Government, when it was important for us to insist that the signatories of the Convention ought to hold themselves bound by that document.

On further discussion it appeared very probable that the necessity would not arise for any infraction of the 1903 Convention before there is a new International Conference to revise the existing Conventions. Already there are a number of questions, in particular the definition of infected and suspected ships in regard to plague and international measures for dealing with plague-infected rats, which make a new Agreement very desirable. Moreover, the disappearance of the Constantinople Health Board the new methods of controlling the Hedjaz pilgrimage, and the changes in the Egyptian administration itself will all render the existing Conventions out of date. The Local Government Board (Ministry of Health) would probably be moving to get a new Conference for this purpose in 1920. Mr. Loyd pointed out that although the transfer of the work of the Egyptian International Health Board to the Public Health Department had now been recognised in the Peace Treaty, and would be notified to the enemy countries, it did not follow that the disappearance of the International Board would immediately result. Various other formalities of notification to the Powers concerned would be required, and it was quite possible that the actual transfer of function would not take place before the end of this year. In that event the new port sanitary administration under the Public Health Department would find themselves within a very short distance of a new International Conference. It was agreed that in these circumstances it would be a right policy for the Public Health Department to maintain the requirements of the Convention for the short interval which would be in question. Should it appear, say at the beginning of 1920, that contrary to expectation there is no immediate prospect of a new International Conference, the Egyptian Government should raise the matter again formally with the Foreign Office as suggested above.

Reference was also made to the importance to Egyptian port administration of efficiency in the Quarantine Service at Constantinople, at Syrian ports, and other places previously under the control of the Constantinople Health Board. From this point of view and also from that of this country it is important that the health authority replacing the Constantinople Board at these ports should be controlled or directed by the appropriate controlling or mandatory Power, so that international agreements as to quarantine in these Eastern Mediterranean areas would not be made with Turkish authorities or authorities which, like the Turks, could not be relied upon to observe the necessary health conditions and principles in practice. It was understood that this matter was one for settlement at Paris. Presumably the course desired will automatically follow the settlements now being made, but in order that some inquiry can be made it was arranged that Dr. Buchanan should send a note to Mr. Loyd which could be forwarded to the proper quarter.

April 29, 1919.

No. 257.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 516.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 29, 1919.

ITALIAN Chargé d'Affaires states that Italian Government have received news that Anglo-Egyptian authorities have sent a present of 100 camel-loads rice and 20 camel-loads maize to Said el Idriss.

What reply should be given?

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No. 258.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 662.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 27, 1919.

POLICE cadets returned to studies on 26th April; other students not yet returned.
Railway workmen continuing to come back. There is nothing otherwise to report.

No. 259.

Earl Curzon to Lord Acton (Berne).

(No. 455.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 28, 1919.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 698, 699, and 717: Application from Sheikh Abdul Aziz.
Shawish and others to visit Paris and London.

No facilities should be afforded.

No. 260.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 665.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 28, 1919.

ALL is quiet.

Military school cadets have returned to work.

No. 261.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 666.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 28, 1919.

MY telegram No. 603 repeated to peace delegation.

It is of importance from a military point of view that I should have early information as to what reception is accorded by any prominent persons in Paris to Zaghlul and his companions, and what are their present activities.

(Addressed to Lord Derby, Paris.)

No. 262.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Wingate.

(No. 526.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 29, 1919.

A LONDON firm are negotiating for purchase of a steamer for Egyptian Navigation Company of Alexandria, and enquire what flag certificate steamer would obtain. Please report immediately by telegram whether there is an Egyptian flag for merchant ships and whether ships can have Egyptian registry.

No. 263.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 524.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 29, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 654.

His Majesty's Government will be glad to welcome the party from Soudan; all necessary arrangements for their accommodation and entertainment will be made.

I should like to announce their visit as soon as possible.

Have no Egyptians except Nationalist leaders left Egypt for Europe, and would it not be well to encourage some of more friendly elements to come?

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No. 264.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 528.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 29, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 655.*

I am not clear whether you recommend that Zaghlul, if he comes to England, should be treated as you proposed for Paris in your telegram No. 603, or that he should not be officially received at all.

We have not yet heard of any hearing having been given to him by our representatives at Paris.

No. 265.

Earl Curzon to Italian Chargé d'Affaires.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON presents his compliments to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, and with reference to his memorandum No. 1230 of the 2nd instant has the honour to inform him that instructions have been sent to His Majesty's Special High Commissioner for Egypt that all communications with Said Idriss el Senussi should in future pass through the intermediary of the Italian authorities.

Foreign Office, April 29, 1919.

No. 266.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 672.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 29, 1919.

SIR WILLIAM BRUNYATE will reach London about 6th May. You will no doubt discuss with him present position with regard to capitulations. I should be glad to be informed. Acting Judicial Adviser suggests following points:—

1. Policy in regard to capitulations has hitherto been to obtain by consent of interested Powers to surrender ex-territorial rights on basis of assurances embodied in draft of Judicature Law and codicils contemplated as ancillary thereto.

2. In so far as these legislative projects relate purely to native concerns, it appears questionable whether it will prove politic to carry them through at an early date, at any rate in their present form. This matter will doubtless be considered by proposed Commission. If it is considered, no scheme of judicial reform in so far as it affects purely native matters can now be carried on without public discussion and a measure of indigenous consent, a considerable time must probably be allowed.

3. For this reason, it would seem that if final agreements are to be concluded with foreign Powers with regard to capitulations at an early date, such agreements cannot rest on any detailed plan of judicature reform, but should perhaps be based on a series of assurances with regard to treatment of foreigners.

4. Binding guarantees, if cautiously drafted, are not wholly unwelcome, since they will tend to protect British interests against nationalist pressure.

5. As transition period is not unlikely to be prolonged, it appears undesirable that mixed courts should be continued on their present footing as suggested in paragraph No. 2A of "Memorandum on British Desiderata in Egypt." While it may be necessary to continue these courts for some time beyond next November with present jurisdiction, it is desirable we should obtain free hand as to appointments with a view to increasing British element.

6. In this connection attention is called to question of possible claim by enemy Powers to retain their representation in mixed courts so long as latter are continued on their present footing. In absence of express provision, it might be contended that right of present enemies to litigation in mixed courts and their liability to process therein, which is not excluded by terms of memorandum, involves right to representation on Bench.

* See No. 253.

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7. Attention may be called to question of possible claim by enemy Powers to continued representation on "Caisse de la Dette" for so long as this institution continues.

8. Is it proposed to guarantee foreign privileges to Ottoman subjects as appears to be contemplated by paragraph 2 of memorandum referred to in paragraph 5 above?

No. 267.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 673.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 29, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 500.

Egyptian news, 14th to 27th April:—

Situation much improved. During strikes period which lasted to 22nd April, El-Azhar agitation passed to more fanatical phase.

Methods of intimidation by strikers included cases of vitriol-throwing, petty employees' blackmail of small merchants and others, and forced levies ostensibly for political propaganda. Shops, even if in European quarters, were required to close by strike committee, who attempted to assume guise of Soviet. A few isolated cases of sabotage and attacks on individual British soldiers and other Europeans reported. Assaults on Armenians, perhaps inspired by C.U.P. sympathisers, necessitated concentration of Armenians in refugee camp near Cairo. In spite of repeated attempts on the part of Moslems, who see their mistake in initiating massacre of Armenians, to induce the latter to return to their homes, they still prefer safety of British-protected camps. Official note has been received from Italian Agency stating that Italians throughout the country were extremely nervous and begged for protection of troops. Everything that is possible is being done for their protection, as well as for other foreign communities.

Appearance of British troops in provinces and punishment of outrages committed previously produce excellent effect on fellaheen, who now realise that they were misled, and suffer from interruption of communications. Reduced railway services, owing to railwaymen's strike, has much interfered with trade and individual travel, and assisted to promote healthy reaction amongst sensible people of all classes of population against agitators. Ministry, having lost authority, resigned on 22nd April, and strike of Government employees which was organised by extremists, partially ended 23rd April as a result of Commander-in-chief's Proclamation ordering strikers back to work on pain of dismissal. American recognition of British Protectorate had immediate effect in inducing great majority of employees to withstand all efforts of few extremists and rabble of intimidators to prevent them resuming their functions.

Order appears to have been restored throughout the country.

(Repeated to Paris, Rome, and Berne.)

No. 268.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 675.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 29, 1919.

NO incidents of importance have been reported to-day. Number of workmen employed on State Railways is now practically normal. Students have been ordered to return to their schools and colleges by 3rd May.

No. 269.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 676.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 30, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 524.*

It will be some time before Soudanese delegates are ready to leave, but I will let you know when they are able to start.

No Egyptians except Nationalists have left for Europe or expressed a desire to do so, and I do not think it would be of any advantage to us to attempt to persuade those who sympathise with us to visit England.

* See No. 263.

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No. 270.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 533.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 30 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 632 of 23rd April.*

I am afraid that Sir R. Crawford, who has been ill, will not be able to leave for Egypt for some weeks yet.

No. 271.

Mr. Erskine to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, May 1, 1919.

BRITISH vice-consul at Cairo, passing through Rome, reports that an Egyptian named Wakif Rifaat was on his steamer travelling to Switzerland, and believed to be carrying secret documents regarding unrest in Egypt. He spoke openly of his hostility to British rule.

(Sent to Cairo and Berne.)

No. 272

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 540.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 2, 1919.

IT is reported from Switzerland that letter has been intercepted which shows that Egyptian nationalists have succeeded in inducing Irish delegates at the Berne Conference to take up their propaganda in the United Kingdom.

No. 273.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 677.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 30, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 528 of 29th April.†

I consider treatment of Zaghlul in London should be same as that I recommended for Paris in my telegram No. 603‡ of 19th April.

No. 274.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 684.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 30, 1919.

NUMBER of men working on railways remains normal, but men of workshops at Gabbari have struck, it is believed not on political grounds.

Terrorists had ordered all shops in Cairo to close to-day, Wednesday, but very few did so, and a man caught terrorising shopkeepers was arrested by police. It appears doubtful if students will return to work on 3rd May, and meetings continue at El-Azhar. Otherwise all is quiet.

No. 275.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 180.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 163 of the 12th April, I have the honour to forward further memoranda containing expressions of opinion on the present political difficulties.

* See No. 230.

† See No. 264.

‡ See No. 200.

The first of these is put forward by Mr. A. H. Hooker, Norwegian consul, Mansfield Pasha, Sir William Willcocks, and Mr. W. E. Kingsford, Swedish consul, and representative of the "Associated British Manufacturers (Egypt), Limited."

The second is from Judge Percival, the third from Judge Van den Bosch, and the fourth is a memoir setting forth at some length what purports to be the position of Saad Zaghlul and his party.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 275.

British Residents in Egypt to General Sir E. Allenby.

Excellency,

Cairo, April 11, 1919.

AS some of the oldest British residents in Egypt, we have the honour to submit the enclosed memorandum on the situation for your consideration.

We are all of us ready to help your Excellency to the utmost of our power because we have implicit faith in you, but we want to know what your policy is. Of recent years concealment has become a disease of the British Residency; we are all working at cross purposes and defeating each other's aims. We implore you to proclaim openly what the intentions of the British Government are, so that Englishmen, with heavy stakes in the country, may know where they stand, and render such aid as is possible in an effective way, especially in moulding Egyptian opinion.

The financial and commercial, British, and all European interests are most seriously affected by the situation and future policy. We feel that their protection would lie in a frank and open declaration of the intentions of Great Britain as to her future position in Egypt.

We have seen the control of the water supply of the country used as our most powerful weapon in the hands of capable heads of departments in the early days of the occupation, with the very happiest results. We have recently seen it thrown away deliberately with the most disastrous results by timid and fearful men. Every non-official with experience has been recently considered as not worthy of being consulted, while inexperienced and weak officials have been allowed to weaken the hands of the Residency.

We have seen the day when the great preoccupation of the strong men at the heads of departments was the winning and keeping of the affection of the fellahen, and we have in the last two years deplored the spectacle of the ill-informed official world acting with real indifference to their feelings. We won the affection of the fellahen at a time when we had not a single ally with us; and, assured of this affection, we triumphed over all our ill-wishers. To-day, with the fellahen against us, we are defied by Egypt at a time when the foremost nations of the earth are our allies.

Excellency, there is but one deduction.

We have, &c.

AYERST HENHAM HOOKER.

ELLIS MANSFIELD.

W. WILLCOCKS.

W. E. KINGSFORD.

Memorandum on the Situation in Egypt.

"Give me the canal heads, and I am master of Egypt."—*Mehemet Ali.*

"The Egyptian question is the irrigation question."—*Nubar Pasha.*

"If the fellahen are with you, Egypt is with you."—*The Khedive, Tewfik Pasha.*

"England's patience is as long as a winter's night, and her arm is as long as a summer's day."—*Afghan Frontier saying.*

"When my generals tell me of their difficulties, I tell them to see if the difficulties before their enemies are not greater than theirs."—*Napoleon Buonaparte.*

1. Any general cutting off of the water supply of the country will be a tactical mistake. It will tell equally against all, and all will sympathise with each other and blame us. It would be far more effective to cut off the water supply of those who

were creating disorders, and give it to those who were aiding us to keep order. If fellahen complained of the supply of a canal being cut off, they could be informed that they had it in their power to bring their wealthy non-resident landlords, who were fomenting disorder, to reason. They would act with promptitude.

2. That your Excellency is really a well-wisher of Egypt has been made patent to all; and, in our opinion, the time has come to show your power and protect the peaceable inhabitants from the fomentors of disorder. Our position in Egypt has been greatly weakened since the beginning of the occupation, because we have never stood by our friends. Egyptians have said openly and steadily that it matters little to one of them whether he is friendly or hostile to us, but that it matters very considerably whether he shows friendship or hostility to our enemies.

3. The granting of concessions affecting the whole community is a very difficult matter in this country, as the Egyptians give us credit for fear every time we make one. It is, on the contrary, very easy to grant substantial concessions to the poorer part of the community. The selfish rich grudge the concessions but they are afraid to openly oppose them.

A real effort should, we submit, be made to win back the affection of the fellahen. We won it effectively in the early years of the occupation by "the abolition of the Corvée" and "the Adjustment of the Land Taxes." Both measures were secretly opposed by the rich, but openly they professed admiration for them. We could win it again by two concessions:—

1. Letting the fellahen know that we recognised their rights to reasonable rents, and were determined to see that they got them in the way the "Occupancy Laws" protect the Indian fellahen from rack-renting landlords.

2. Dividing the State domains into 5-feddan lots and letting the fellahen purchase them at reasonable rates and on reasonable terms.

(These measures are greatly disliked by the lawyers who are interested in keeping the fellahen hostile.)

We therefore propose to your Excellency that the civilian delegates attached to the Generals commanding in the villages should be empowered to proclaim to all:—

(a) The full measures of the concessions your Excellency is prepared to give the Egyptians in the matter of education, the appointment of Englishmen to the Government service, and the measure of self-government to be allowed.

(b) The determination, in imitation of Mohammed Ali, to use the power you have to close the canal heads on all those who do not submit to the authorities. How the Alexandria and Port Said supply will be assured is given in a private memorandum.

(c) The recognition of the rights of the fellahen to have fair rents, and to the purchase of the State domains on fair terms. These to be sold only to those who have not fomented and are not fomenting disorder.

We recognise, Excellency that there may be difficulties ahead of any measures you may take; but we feel that the difficulties ahead of acting as we propose are infinitely less than those ahead of the want of action.

We ask your Excellency, to insist on frankness among the Residency staff, and to appoint, or get the British non-official community to appoint, a consultative body of experienced Englishmen to assist your Excellency with advice.

AYERST HENHAM HOOKER.

ELLIS MANSFIELD.

W. WILLCOCKS.

W. E. KINGSFORD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 275.

Note on the Future Government of Egypt.

THIS is a moment of comparative calm, very suitable to be used for considering the political situation, present and future. The whole of Egypt believes that Saad Pasha Zaghlul and his friends are going to Paris as a recognised deputation of the

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Egyptian nation to ask for its complete independence from British interference. The more ignorant section of the nation believes that this demand will be granted. I understand that the view of the British authorities is that this is an entire misconception of the intention of the concession made by the proclamation and of the status of the deputation. It seems, however, to be very much in the British interest, that our status in Egypt should be defined by the Peace Conference.

The Egyptians will never accept a definition made by England, and they certainly have some claim to ask for a ruling in view of the fact that they are one of the countries separated from the Ottoman dominions by the war.

Moreover, it is impossible for the more moderate Egyptians to discuss the conditions of the government of Egypt till the claim for full independence has been finally ruled out.

Assuming this claim is ruled out, and it is laid down that no nation other than the British Empire has any authority to interfere with the government of Egypt, it remains to be determined what England's responsibilities are to be.

It appears to me that there are only two possible alternatives:—

- (a.) That England shall be responsible for the good government of Egypt, while ensuring that it shall be carried on as far as possible by Egyptians.
- (b.) That England shall be responsible for the protection of foreign (i.e., non-Egyptian) interests, leaving all matters affecting Egyptians to Egyptians.

It is clear that it is for His Majesty's Government to determine which of these two alternatives it shall adopt, but it is for the British authorities in Egypt to explain to His Majesty's Government exactly what each alternative entails, and to make clear that (as it appears to me) an intermediate course is impossible.

It has been the attempt to carry on an intermediate and varying policy under a vague and undefined status that has led to the present *impasse*. It is essential to lay down in clear terms the future relations of England and Egypt.

It should be clearly understood that alternative (a) with all it involves is bound to be fiercely opposed in Egypt. Egypt has up till now had so large a measure of independence on paper, that it will be impossible to make her future position appear more free, even though in fact the Egyptians be given a greater share in the management of their affairs. Moreover, if England is to be responsible for the good Government of Egypt, it must involve the Government of all the people in Egypt, i.e., the Capitulations must disappear. The experience of the last thirty years has proved that it is impossible to introduce any real measure of reform in the country unless the Government is in a position to legislate for, and deal administratively with, all the inhabitants of the country. This is almost an axiomatic proposition, and will in the future be even more true than in the past, in view of the great social and political changes which will be taking place in all parts of the world. This particular fact is, moreover, I believe, well realised in England. No good Government is possible in a country where different laws apply to different sections of the community.

The corollary of the above proposition is that if the Egyptian Government is to have power over the large and important foreign community in the country, a greater British control will have to be exercised than in the past.

Hence it appears that if England is prepared to stand by policy (a) Government in Egypt will have to be carried on, at any rate, for some time, with a considerable measure of force, and against the wishes of a large section, if not the majority of the inhabitants.

It is then our first duty to consider how this policy can be made least distasteful. The matter has to be considered from four points of view, viz.:—

1. The national,
2. The constitutional,
3. The judicial, and
4. The administrative status of Egypt,

the importance of these matters being in the order indicated above.

As regards 1, three alternatives are possible:—

- (a.) Egypt might be incorporated in the British Empire.
- (b.) England might continue the Protectorate.
- (c.) England might accept the position of mandatory power.

There is little doubt that the first solution is most in the interest of England, and in the long run of Egypt also, and of the world, as being the most stable position. It would, however, appear to the Egyptians to be the most intolerable of all.

The second solution is probably the worst. It has the fatal defect of being vague and undefined. In fact, ever since 1914 it has been understood in one way in England, and in almost the opposite way by the Egyptians. It gives less confidence to the non-British foreigners, and leaves the door open for constant efforts on one side or the other to vary its effect. If it is adopted, its exact meaning and limits should be most clearly laid down. The omission to do this in 1914 was probably one of the mistakes which has led chiefly to the present situation.

It is, therefore, worth considering the third solution, which would probably be accepted by a good number of Egyptians. It is a new idea, conceived by President Wilson, to whom they still look as the apostle of liberty, and holds out hopes for them in the future. It is the vague character of these hopes that is the chief objection to this solution. Their existence would be a source of anxiety to the foreigners. The proposals also would probably be unpopular in England and with the British inhabitants of Egypt. Before adopting it, the duties and power of a mandatory nation with regard to its ward, and to the League of Nations, should be more clearly understood than is now the case.

The constitutional question is even more difficult. If the capitulations were abolished, Egypt must have power to legislate for all the inhabitants in the country. This, of course, raises a question that has been present to the minds of the authorities in Egypt ever since 1905. Lord Cromer proposed a mixed legislature. It is very doubtful whether this is practicable, and the more favoured solution now seems to be the creation of two legislative bodies, with possibly some system of a joint sitting in case of difference. This is a matter for which a Commission of Enquiry set up by the British Government, once the national question has been decided, seems the only practicable way of obtaining a satisfactory solution. It would be as well, however, to work out a proposed system now, none of those so far put forward having obtained any general approval.

The judicial question seems easier to solve, as it has already been very fully considered. A modified form of Sir William Brunyate's scheme, giving rather more satisfaction to the Egyptians, may be found quite satisfactory. It may be desirable to keep the two sides of the courts more separate than as provided by the scheme.

The administrative question is of great practical importance, and is the one to which the natives will probably attach great weight, but it is quite useless to go into it until the other three problems have been solved, as the amount of administrative independence which can be given to the Egyptians will depend to a very great extent upon the solutions adopted. At the same time, it may perhaps be assumed that certain Departments may be almost entirely handed over to them. What is perhaps more important is that all advisory and other nominally non-executive posts (the holders of which, however, have, in fact, almost all the power) should be abolished, and that the different branches of the service should be open to British and natives on much more equal terms (as regards position and responsibility, though not necessarily as regards salary) than is the case at present, more on the lines of the present native courts. It should be understood that at present no single post of Director-General or Inspector-General is held by a native.

The question of the position and numbers of the Egyptian Army and the British Army of Occupation are also of first importance, but it is not for a civilian to make proposals on these points.

It is evident that the difficulties in the way of carrying out alternative (a) are very great, and in view of these difficulties and the unwillingness of the British nation to coerce a nation when there is hardly even an influential minority which asks for British assistance, it is possible that His Majesty's Government may incline to alternative (b).

This policy, which would be warmly welcomed in Egypt, would probably be found fairly simple to work out. England would presumably annex the Sudan, and a strip on each side of the Suez Canal. The capitulations would, of course, continue, but in the form of a single treaty made with Great Britain, who would bind herself to see that all foreigners received the same privileges as Englishmen. The Mixed Courts would doubtless also continue in a modified form as British Courts. The Caisse de la Dette would be revived, and it would probably be necessary to have some control over the Egyptian Foreign Office and Customs. No Egyptian legislation or new taxation would apply to foreigners unless approved by His Majesty's Government. As regards the British and other foreigners now in the service of the Egyptian Government, some might agree to continue in the service, some would find places in the administration that would have to be set up for the canal and for the protection of foreign interests, and the rest would have to be pensioned on very liberal terms. A British army would

have to be retained for the protection of the canal, probably with detachments at Cairo and Alexandria.

The objections to this alternative solution are of course numerous and serious. It would be one of the great confessions of failure of the British Empire in the course of its history. It would perpetuate a distinction between a numerically small but rich and powerful section of the inhabitants, and all the rest of the community. It would almost inevitably result in a great deterioration in the administration of the country, which would probably return to something like the state of affairs in Ismail's time, though the Government would be likely to take the form of an oligarchy rather than an autocracy. The country would also run a great risk of being exploited by foreign adventurers, and of being a focus for future international jealousies and disputes.

While admitting that of the two alternatives put forward, one is difficult and the other objectionable, the main object of this note is to suggest that no intermediary system is possible.

The system introduced by Lord Cromer of a vague undefined control, combined with a very skilful personal government carried on really by consent, was only possible for a limited period, was already tending towards failure at the end of his time, and has now irretrievably broken down. Lord Cromer himself, Lord Kitchener, and President Roosevelt all realised that England must either take up her responsibilities or abandon them. A further makeshift arrangement which might possibly be made would probably hardly last a year. Opportunities of putting the Government of Egypt on a permanent and satisfactory basis have occurred in the past, but have been let slip. Now that the whole world is putting her house in order, it seems unanswerable to argue that the status of Egypt must be defined.

If the problem is faced in a frank, courageous, and above all, open manner, the situation may be saved; a further policy of drift is certain to end in disaster.

J. H. PERCIVAL.

April 17, 1919.

Enclosure 3 in No. 275.

Memorandum.

J'AI la conviction que l'agitation qui vient de se révéler en Égypte par de si graves événements a eu son foyer de formation en Suisse, dans l'entourage de l'ex-Khédive, auquel vint se joindre ensuite l'entourage de l'ex-Roi Constantin de Grèce.

J'ajoute qu'à partir de cette jonction, cette agitation eut un second foyer à Athènes.

Ici je dois entrer dans des précisions: en octobre, novembre 1916, j'ai remis ici à l'Intelligence Department une note où je signalais qu'à la suite d'un voyage de propagande belge en Suisse, j'avais pu me rendre compte de l'activité suspecte des lieutenants de l'ex-Khédive et de leur souci constant de demeurer en contact avec l'Égypte; je désignais comme chevilles ouvrières de cette intrigue Yeghen Pacha, homme de confiance du Souverain déchu, et un Suisse-Allemand intéressé dans les affaires égyptiennes, le sieur Haccuis; et je mettais l'autorité britannique en garde contre les allées et venues, prétendument commerciales, entre la Suisse et l'Égypte de certains Suisses-Allemands d'ici.

Or il y a deux mois, le hasard m'apprit qu'à la faveur de la situation de la Belgique, Yeghen Pacha et le sieur Haccuis avaient transporté à Bruxelles une partie de leur activité, et sous le couvert d'une Société belgo-égyptienne (la Société de l'Esbekieh), dont Abbas Hilmi est le principal actionnaire, et sous prétexte de venir s'enquérir en Égypte des intérêts de cette société, ils tentaient d'envoyer ici des émissaires. J'ai alors écrit une lettre à Sir W. Brunyate, Conseiller financier, lui signalant instamment la nécessité, même si ces émissaires étaient belges, de ne pas permettre ce voyage. Je conseillais, de plus, aux autorités britanniques d'avertir le Gouvernement belge des "dessous" de cette affaire pour qu'il mît en garde certains compatriotes siégeant à Bruxelles dans le Conseil d'Administration. Enfin, je me permettais de signaler à M. le Conseiller financier l'importance de cet incident qui révélait que l'ex-Khédive tentait par tous moyens de reprendre son action sur l'Égypte.

J'en viens à présent à la Grèce et plus particulièrement à Athènes. Aux mois d'août et de septembre je fus chargé par le Gouvernement belge d'une mission en Grèce; à la fin de mon séjour, je rencontrais à l'Hôtel d'Angleterre à Athènes, un certain Wellis, sujet danois, ayant résidé à Port-Saïd, et expulsé d'Égypte comme suspect; ce Wellis était accompagné de sa femme, une demoiselle Psalti, appartenant à une famille grecque

ultra-royaliste de Port-Saïd. Personne ne sut me dire quelle fonction occupait Wellis et quelles affaires il traitait. La personnalité de Wellis et sa présence à Athènes m'amènèrent à observer ses agissements. Et je remarquais qu'il s'intéressait de près aux mobilisés grecs d'Égypte, et particulièrement à ceux qui étaient renvoyés dans leurs foyers. Il les recevait à sa table et les accompagnait au bateau de départ. J'aurais voulu pousser plus avant mon enquête sur les manœuvres du sieur Wellis, mais je fus rappelé en Égypte par mes devoirs judiciaires.

En résumé, je suis persuadé que les faits ci-devant signalés sont en relation directe avec le mouvement révolutionnaire qui a éclaté en Égypte et qu'une enquête habile, sur la base de ces faits, en Suisse, à Bruxelles et à Athènes, amènerait des révélations intéressantes et utiles.

FIRMIN VAN DEN BOSCH,
Juge belge au Tribunal mixte.

Le Caire, 26 mars 1919.

P.S.—En même temps que j'écrivais à Sir William Brunyate, j'ai, par lettre, attiré l'attention du Gouvernement belge sur la situation signalée.

Le sieur Haccuis semble avoir été en relation avec plusieurs notabilités indigènes et être venu ou avoir tenté de venir en Égypte, depuis la guerre, sous prétexte d'affaires.

Le sieur Wellis était très lié à Athènes avec un Grec d'Alexandrie, Violara, qui, quoique mobilisé, ne portait pas l'uniforme; c'était Violara qui lui amenait les soldats grecs retournant en Égypte. Wellis et Violara correspondaient activement avec un frère de Violara, se trouvant en Égypte et faisant de l'importation en Grèce et en Égypte.

Le Violara d'Alexandrie doit être rentré ici en décembre; il disposait en Grèce de beaucoup d'argent et a même souscrit 500 fr. à l'œuvre de guerre belge.

Enclosure 4 in No. 275.

Memoir on the Egyptian Question and the National Aspirations of Egypt.

(PRÉCIS.)

(By AMIN EL RAFFI, Advocate, Editor of "El Shaab.")

(Translation.)

FORCE has ruled the world for centuries, and has produced false conditions which many peoples have felt from time to time. Their endeavour to oppose right to might and enforce respect for international law has led to bloodshed and unjust suffering.

President Wilson is the herald of a new order.

"The era of territorial conquest and secret treaties is past. Every nation whose aims conform with justice can now proclaim her aspirations. Unless we do justice we cannot expect justice. . . . Justice for all nations on a footing of equality in the matter of liberty and security is the resultant of these principles. . . . National aspirations must be respected, and no nation should be dominated or governed without their consent." (Speeches of the 8th January, 11th February, 27th September, 1918.)

Egypt demands application to herself of these principles.

The Egyptian Question.

Her geographical position makes her a centre of importance in the world.

The nation dominating her puts the balance of international power in peril in the Mediterranean. Hence the international character of the form of government decided upon for Egypt by the Powers, guaranteed by international treaty. Hence also the outcry against the British occupation, which is against treaty and international law.

All the efforts of Egyptians, faced by thousands of illegal and liberty-restricting measures, have been directed to this sole end. They realised that President Wilson's principles brought their release in sight.

Modern Egypt dates from the Convention of London of 1840, confirmed by the firmans of the 13th February and 1st June, 1841. These agreements also cover the Soudan, which owes its restitution to Egypt to Mohammed Ali, to which country it belonged in Pharaonic times.

The occupation of Egypt is abnormal and contrary to all law.

Recapitulation of events leading to the British occupation:—

The bombardment of Alexandria was unnecessary and wrong, and the French did not approve of it and withdrew their fleet. The Turks demanded the withdrawal of British troops after dispersing Arabi's army.

The British occupation is unlawful, and has nothing in common with occupations by conquest of territories without proper rule.

The British General (General Wolseley) declared that he only fought to maintain the Khedive's authority. There was no "state of war," so the occupation was unjustified.

The Turkish Government protested against it.

The other Powers only gave Great Britain a mandate to act for them in restoring order.

He quotes French legal opinions on the status of Great Britain in Egypt.

British politicians' opinions on the subject:—

Mr. Gladstone, 1882: We have no intention of occupying Egypt; this would be incompatible with His Majesty's Government's principles and promises.

Lord Granville, 1882: England desires neither to establish a protectorate in, or impose her will upon Egypt.

Mr. Gladstone, 1883: To annex Egypt would bring dishonour upon Great Britain.

Lord Granville, 1884: His Majesty's Government's views are set forth in a circular addressed to the Great Powers in January 1883, in which His Majesty's Government declared her desire to withdraw her forces as soon as the situation of the country permitted it, and the authority of the Khedive is assured. She will withdraw early in 1888 if the Powers consider that order and peaceful conditions in Egypt permit it.

Mr. Gladstone 1884—to above effect and that to remain thereafter would be inconsistent with honour.

The Convention of 1904.

Does it legalise the position in Egypt? M. de Freycinet: "France and England are not competent, and have no right to make any modifications on the Egyptian situation." France only engages not to obstruct England in Egypt: the question of the lawfulness of the occupation is not affected.

Dr. Wilson: "No peoples should be transferred from one sovereignty to another by International Conference or arrangements between rivals or adversaries." The above was approved by the Powers. Thus the Egyptian question remains where it was.

The Egyptian Soudan and Dependencies.

Sherif Pasha resigned because abandonment of Soudan by Egypt was demanded by His Majesty's Government; they (Egypt) were responsible for the Soudan.

Nubar Pasha (1884) had to accede to the request.

Such an act has no judicial weight, and does not separate Egypt from Soudan.

The Firman of 1879 forbade the abandonment of any Egyptian territory by Khedive.

After its evacuation by Egypt, under British pressure, latter occupied it in part and participated it with other Powers in part.

Convention of 1899 makes of the Soudan an Anglo-Egyptian conquest. Has this any weight?

Sir James Fergusson (1891) states "suzerainty over Soudan appertains to the Sultan of Egypt, who never abandoned his rights."

Lord Salisbury (1898) "I have always maintained in a general way that the Nile Valley, in spite of the Mahdist occupation, always belonged to Egypt, and that now with the Anglo-Egyptian victory of Omdurman any obstacle to or diminution of her title of possession has disappeared."

The Fashoda incident supports the contention that the Soudan belongs to Egypt.

Thus (1) Fashoda incident proves Egypt's claim to Soudan was not abandoned.

(2.) The Khedive had no right to abandon Soudan in 1884.

(3.) Firmans approved by Great Britain render Khedive's signature to Soudan conventions null and void.

(4.) British occupation of Soudan was a breach of Ottoman rights by treaties of 1840, 1856, 1878, 1882.

M. Freycinet: "Neither Sultan nor any Power having adhered to the Act of 1899, England's position in Soudan is illegal and to act from international standpoint is void."

The gains to Egypt from Anglo-Egyptian Association in Soudan.

The "Anglo-Egyptian" point of view is only accentuated when money is in demand. 1896-1912 the Soudan cost Egypt 18,000,000l.

Egypt has suffered agriculturally by Soudan development: both from drain of water and want of money due to Soudan demands.

Soudan railways built with Egyptian money to develop Soudan were made long before Wadi Halfa was linked up with Aswan. Commerce with Egypt has not been fostered, whereas Port Soudan trade more than doubled 1908-1911. The danger to Egypt of Soudan irrigation development is a serious one. The union of Egypt and Soudan is a vital one for Egypt. Egypt does not regard Soudan as theirs, but as one with them.

Suez Canal and Freedom of the Seas.

As long as the canal is in Great Britain's power the "Freedom of the Seas" has no meaning. The military occupation of the canal is an infringement of the International Treaty of 1888. This is a reason why Egypt should be under no single Power. This is the time when England should acknowledge this principle.

Conclusion.

1. British occupation of Egypt is contrary to international treaties and is acknowledged to be so by British statesmen.
2. The Powers have often protested against it.
3. The Egyptian people have always demanded independence and the evacuation of Egypt.
4. Before the occupation Egypt had complete autonomy guaranteed by the Powers.
5. A rich nation of 14,000,000 inhabitants has the right to perfect freedom.
6. The Soudan was never *res nullius*, therefore the Convention of 1899 is null and void.
7. The Soudan and Egypt are inherently one and cannot be separated without endangering their vital interests.
8. The principles of President Wilson enjoin that people should be governed or dominated according to their will, and liberty is the right even of the weakest.
9. All the belligerent Powers have proclaimed their adhesion to this principle.
10. Egypt has the right and duty to state her desires in this matter.
11. Egypt engages to safeguard the commercial and judicial rights of foreigners in Egypt under the independence Egypt claims. The Caisse de la Dette will be sufficient guarantee to foreigners for the safeguarding of their rights. Egypt will submit to a return to the *status quo* before 1904 in the matter of contracting no new debts without consent of the Powers. The Mixed Courts will be a sufficient guarantee of the judicial rights of foreigners.
12. The Peace Conference can safely leave the Canal to the Egyptian Government under control of agents of all the Powers as an International Commission who will exact necessary measures. To leave it to one or two Powers endangers the freedom of navigation.
13. Egypt has the right to make known her desires before the Peace Conference.

For all the above reasons Egypt demands complete independence for herself and the Soudan, and immediate evacuation of their country by England, while themselves undertaking to safeguard the neutrality of the Canal.

This is the opinion of all Egypt, and it can be proved to the Peace Congress if press and other restrictions are removed.

Egypt is unanimous in demanding complete independence.

This memoir was approved by Saad Zaghlul Pasha and the Egypt delegation.

Supplement, quoting declarations of British Statesmen (1881-1895) to the effect that the occupation is only temporary.

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No. 276.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 167.)

Foreign Office, May 3, 1919.

Sir, WITH reference to my despatch No. 120 of 2nd April, I transmit herewith copy of a letter³ from Mr. Anstruther enclosing a communication from the Director of the Suez Canal Company once more urging the establishment of a Central Court at Port Said.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 277.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 692.)

Cairo, May 1, 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

SMALL demonstration of some 200 students was easily dispersed in Abdin Square this morning; there were no casualties.

Nine hundred men absented themselves from railway workshops at Boulac, but work goes on. Italian community are somewhat agitated, and feeling against President Wilson is strong amongst them. Italian Minister has warned his colony that they are on no account to make demonstrations.

Otherwise there is nothing of importance.

No. 278.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 693.)

Cairo, May 2, 1919

(Telegraphic.)

TO-DAY there are no incidents to report.

Absentees from railway workshops began to return in large numbers yesterday afternoon, but to-day, Friday, being a holiday, it is too early to judge results.

No. 279.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 684.)

Paris, May 3, 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING addressed to Cairo :—

“(Secret.)”

“Your telegram No. 666 of 28th April.†

“So far as I am aware Egyptian delegation has not been received officially by any prominent persons in France. Their activities are apparently mainly confined to endeavouring to enlist sympathies of French through press and deputies, and thereby to create atmosphere favourable to Egyptian claims. They are in touch with Socialist newspapers such as ‘Humanité’ and ‘Populaire,’ and with Socialist deputies, especially M. Longuet, but better class of newspaper has so far shown no signs of co-operating with delegation. I do not believe that delegation will receive any encouragement from French official class. Its relations are mainly restricted to Egyptians and other Orientals living in Paris. It gave big luncheon party this afternoon at Hotel Continental, for which it issued 125 invitations but only about 60 persons sat down. These included a few American journalists, but none of note.

“I have been personally assured by Minister for Foreign Affairs that he will give them no official support, and that he regards French interests in Egypt as being identical with our own.”

(Repeated to peace delegation.)

• See No. 220.

† See No. 261.

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No. 280.

Lord Acton to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 757.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berne, May 3, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 455.

Swedish Minister called yesterday and informed me he had met at Berne party of members of so-called Egyptian Nationalist Committee here. M. Adlerkreuz who was in Egypt for ten years as member of Mixed Courts was approached on present occasion by Sheikh Abdul Azil Shawish, who indulged in violent abuse of British authorities, and of alleged brutality with which disorders had been repressed.

Swedish Minister declined to listen to this language, and has complained to Political Department here of presence of said committee at Berne.

(Despatch in this sense was sent by Foreign Office to Cairo.)

No. 281.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 701.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 3, 1919.

FEW students of the secondary schools returned to-day, but practically none of higher schools.

An attempted demonstration this morning was easily dispersed.

Number of men at work on railway is practically normal.

No. 282.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 711.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 4, 1919.

MY telegram No. 590.

It is clear an attempt will be made to work up a press campaign against alleged atrocities committed by British troops in Egypt.

A printed report respecting punishment of certain villages near railway line just south of Cairo has already been published by Giza Provincial Council; it seems villages involved are Bedrashein, Azizia, and Shobek. Troops are said to have burned entire villages, raped women in streets, shot, and looted. In fact, after prolonged provocation, destruction of railway material, and sniping, a search was made at night for arms. Portions of villages were accidentally set on fire; women were naturally frightened, but no more. It should be noted Egyptian villages are made of mud, with roofs of dry cotton stalks, and contain nothing of value from European point of view save hoarded money and gold and silver jewellery, which natives hide in ground. Village fires are of constant occurrence, regarded as natural, if annoying, feature of everyday life.

Another case likely to be taken up is that of Saft-el-Meluk village, whence villagers ambushed and killed three and wounded five British troops without slightest provocation. Soldiers were naturally enraged, and were with difficulty persuaded not to take matter in their own hands. Villagers having refused to assist in identification of murderers, a number were collected in an orderly manner and flogged, this punishment undoubtedly saving them from far severer reprisals by troops.

Extremists are apparently using as models for documentary propaganda British and French Blue Books dealing with German atrocities in Belgium and Northern France, for no regret whatever was expressed at massacre in March last of unarmed British officers and men in train in Upper Egypt, British railway officials at Wasta, attack on Peni Suf, and siege of British and American residents, including missionaries, women, and children, at Assiut, which if successful would unquestionably have led to massacre on a large scale.

These incidents and wanton destruction of communications could only be met by forcible repression. Troops showed most praiseworthy restraint, and in opinion of foreign witnesses, and even of natives, measures taken were not sufficiently drastic. Former have expressed unstinted admiration for calmness shown by our troops under

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great provocation in Cairo, and Greek Minister has reported in this sense to his Government.

Total number of natives killed during whole period of disturbances is estimated at under 1,000, including casualties among Bedouins settled in Nile Valley (as opposed to tribes of the desert, who behaved well), who in March started open armed insurrection in southern and western provinces.

Capital is also being made out of bombing by us from aeroplane of certain villages where headquarters of insurgents attacking Assiut were established, and on armed bands of natives firing at Nile steamers.

These are represented as atrocities on defenceless villagers.

British casualties for period are approximately seventy-five (exclusive of Indian casualties), including a number of brutal murders of isolated unarmed British soldiers by mob of natives armed with sticks and knives, and sniping of patrols and sentries.

There is some excitement in Cairo and Alexandria at reports of serious breach between England and Italy over Fiume question. In event of any public statement being made in London or Paris on this subject, I should be glad if it could be telegraphed here for publication, as any alleged difference between Great Britain and other Powers is eagerly seized upon for propaganda purposes.

(Repeated to Paris (Embassy), Rome, and Berne.)

No. 283

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 705.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 4, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 502.*

Cotton Seed Control Board point out they only act on behalf of His Majesty's Government in carrying into effect purchase scheme and that with abolition of scheme their powers lapse. Nor, in my opinion, can Alexandrian merchants who have given much time and trouble to this work during war reasonably be asked to continue their labours after peace is declared. If it is desired that all exportable cotton seed should be diverted to United Kingdom through ordinary commercial channels, it will be necessary, in view of existing commercial treaties, to make an order under martial law chartering export to United Kingdom. Possibility of obtaining cotton seed crop for United Kingdom by Egyptian legislation was discussed in my telegram No. 1886 of 1918; there is now no prospect of securing such legislation under which Supplies Control Board and War Trade Department have been able to effect temporary limitation of less important Egyptian commodities to United Kingdom, but it seems inadvisable to limit export of such a staple product as cotton seed by this method.

Such an order under this would not be well received here, and I may point out that in 1911, 1912, and 1913 United Kingdom and Germany obtained between them 95 per cent. of cotton seed export, France taking 4 per cent. In 1915, when Germany was eliminated, and export was still unrestricted, United Kingdom took 99 per cent. In the circumstances, I suggest, for your consideration advisability of making early simultaneous announcements that restrictions on trade not only in cotton (see my telegram No. 704), but also in cotton seed, will not be continued after 31st July, and I suggest, further, that export of latter should not be confined to United Kingdom.

I should be grateful of your instructions, including date for announcements if you agree to them

No. 284.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 175.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith minutes of an interview I had yesterday with the representatives of the non-official British community in Cairo,

* See No. 232.

together with fuller notes on the speeches of two of the speakers and copy of resolutions and suggestions passed at a meeting of the non-official British community held on the day previous.

I have, &c.,

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 284.

Meeting of Sir E. Allenby with Deputation of Members of Non-Official British Community.

A DEPUTATION of twelve members elected at a meeting of the unofficial British community was received by his Excellency at the residency at 10 A.M. on the 18th April.

Mr. W. E. Kingsford, Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce, after presenting each member to his Excellency, referred to the object of the deputation; namely, to submit fuller details as to the effects and results of the present disturbances upon commerce and society generally.

Mr. Kingsford then read the resolutions passed at the meeting. He referred to the assurance given by them of support and co-operation. They all felt the position acutely. Their personal and financial interests alone were not suffering, but it was having its effect in Europe. They were being asked questions they were unable to answer. Foreigners think nothing was being done. He hoped his Excellency would be able to reassure them. He explained the interests represented by the different members of the deputation. He briefly ran over the various ways in which the present disturbance had affected Government, public and private interests, in the suspension of communications and the dislocation of the postal service. This was having a serious effect, and he had offered the Post Office the assistance of volunteer British residents. Transfers and remittances were gravely affected, both here and in Europe—agricultural and mortgage interests had suffered—intimidations continued, and seditious and lying propaganda. The suggestions they respectfully put forward to counteract the movement were:

1. Suspension of Ministry till order is restored.
2. Enforcing martial law.
3. Arrest of leaders.
4. Appointment of a non-official advisory board.

Mr. Kingsford begged leave to express the feeling of their meeting in one respect not stated in writing, namely, the want of faith in his Excellency's Advisers.

He suggested that his Excellency should have a Board on the lines of the Advisory Board in India, composing of persons who had had many years' experience in the country.

Three members of the Committee gave their opinions on the strike in its effect upon departments and public interests upon which they were specially competent to speak:—

Mr. J. W. Eady stated that business was completely paralysed, wholesale merchants could not meet their financial engagements as collections from the villages are precluded. Small local native traders are intimidated into closing their shops. The Nationalists wish to paralyse trade and so force European intervention. The native traders only ask for proper protection of life and property to open their shops. The impossibility of getting goods out of customs is causing severe loss, not only from storage dues accumulated, but loss of sale as prices are falling, and British manufacturers cannot obtain payments for shipments as customers cannot take up their papers. He predicts general bankruptcy if things continue thus for long, to avoid which a moratorium will be necessary, with consequent loss of credit in Europe. Other departments of commercial activity, in which large capital is involved, have also suffered.

Mr. C. R. Beasley emphasised that agriculture was the body and soul of Egypt, and future development depended on the reclamation of the Northern Delta. The reclamation of the Delta requires careful handling, and many British firms were engaged in it. All had now been stopped, and cattle were in danger of dying for want of proper water. The brackish pit water is bad for them. The question of

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fodder was serious. The Bersim (clover) will not last as long as usual—dry forage will not be procurable. He was going to England, and was glad he would be able to say they had seen his Excellency and explained the nature of the crisis. The fellah was tractable and liked to be led and so was an easy victim. The bane of the village was the Azhar graduate (fiki), who stirred up opposition to local authority. He had found sudden changes in feeling in villages were traceable to these persons. Local native officials run grave risks to life and property. They ask when we are going to declare ourselves. They think we are preparing to leave Egypt because the Azhar propaganda is unchecked. He expected it would be long before Englishmen could safely visit the remoter districts. In April rents are due in Upper Egypt on cereal crops; the money is being attached by forced measures by propagandists. In reply to a question from his Excellency, Mr. Beasley explained that such pressure was being brought to bear upon them, even in occupied parts of the country. As far back as last November the people were told not to trouble about payments as the Turks would soon replace the English here. These propagandists are still at liberty. The fellaheen will never believe in our power as long as they are at large.

Sir William Willcocks explained that the expression of native opinion he would give was obtained with great difficulty. It is generally considered that the present Ministry is either at heart with the conspirators or represents no one. All they need is time to collect enough money from the country and then they can defy us with impunity and strike as long as they like. Causes of unrest and anti-British feeling are: (1) Report that we are about to assess at £ E. 5 tax per feddan. (2) Stories of village burning and violation of women by British soldiers; these create great indignation. (3) The Mufti has blessed the four demands. Waverers are going over to the Nationalists to save their property from participation when we withdraw. Cairo is the centre of trouble. Some speedy dramatic action is necessary (Sir William instanced the effect of the prosecution of Menshawi Pasha for the murder of a servant, and the abolition of the corvée, in furthering British prestige in Lord Cromer's time). Sir William recommended the dismissal of the Ministers, the arrest of the forty-three new conspirators, and seizure of their funds, the removal of the Mufti and election of a new one (Lord Cromer affords a precedent), and government of the country by major-generals.

Mr. F. N. Walton speaking on the subject of banking interests said, so far, they had not been touched, but in time the bigger merchants will be affected and not be able to pay in, as the fellaheen are at the beginning of the chain of dealers and traders ending with the big business men on whom the banks depend. English shareholders will certainly suffer in time if things continue. Mr. Eady had already dwelt on the effect of the interruption in postal communications.

Mr. J. P. Foster hoped his Excellency would avail himself of the advice of the non-official members of the community. They distrusted, with few exceptions, the officials upon whom his Excellency depended for advice.

His Excellency thanked the deputation for their expression of confidence and their valuable statements. He would gladly avail himself of their services as an unofficial advisory board, with whom he would communicate at need through Mr. Kingsford. He was glad to see the word *apparent* in section 2, as they certainly would *not* triumph. A categorical pronouncement will shortly be made, but his Excellency was unable to say more than that at present, but he was sure they would be satisfied. The views of the members who had spoken had greatly impressed him, and he would be glad to receive communications from any others.

Sir William Willcocks asked if they might publish his Excellency's above statement. His Excellency replied that he wished it kept secret for the present.

Sir William Willcocks. "Is there any truth in the rumour that we are giving up the country?"

His Excellency: "None whatever, or the protectorate. Reports of the return of Turkish suzerainty with the ex-Khedive and limitation of our protectorate to the Suez Canal may be contradicted."

Mr. Foster supposed his Excellency was aware of hostile European intrigue in the country.

Mr. Beasley suggested it would be well to have his Excellency's statement disseminated in the Markaz towns, as the fellaheen believe we are on the point of leaving the country. His Excellency asked how he would propose to do it. Mr. Beasley suggested through the British officers in local control. A proclamation being suggested by Sir William Willcox, his Excellency doubted if it would be of any use; he thought it would be regarded as a sign of weakness. Dr. Mifsud considered

it would weaken our case. Mr. Beasley suggested efforts should be made to spread it by word of mouth. Mr. F. H. Russell pointed out that all this was an argument for a definite declaration of policy by His Majesty's Government. Mr. W. D. Hart suggested enquiries should be made in the provinces regarding building sites as though the intention was to erect barracks all over the country. This would quickly get to the ears of the fellaheen and have an excellent effect. The suggestion met with the approbation of the other members of the Deputation.

Regarding the postal service, with special reference to registered letters, his Excellency said he had spoken to General Bols on the subject, who said he would see what could be done with the aid of V.A.D's. His Excellency would refer to the matter again.

Mr. Kingsford referred to the serious situation as regards railways—goods as well as passenger service. His Excellency said two goods and one passenger train served each line per day, but the goods service was chiefly engaged in transporting provisions. No natives were being allowed to travel and British soldiers were replacing strikers.

Mr. Kingsford thanked his Excellency for what he had told them, and for his promise to avail himself of their services as an unofficial advisory board.

Deputation.

Mr. W. E. Kingsford (*President*).
Mr. C. R. Beasley.
Dr. D. M. Beddoe.
Mr. W. B. Delanoy.
Mr. J. W. Eady.
Mr. J. P. Foster.
Dr. J. Grech Mifsud.
Mr. W. D. Hart.
Mr. R. H. Roberts.
Mr. F. H. Russell.
Mr. F. N. Walton.
Sir William Willcocks.

Information.

1. Stoppage of all Government business, private enterprise, public services, and communications.
2. Serious financial situation—affecting transfers, remittances, collection of money, &c.
3. All agricultural and mortgage interests affected.
4. Intimidation still unchecked, endangering life and property.
5. Seditious and lying propaganda carried on with impunity.

Suggestions.

1. Suspension of Ministry until law and order be restored.
2. Martial Law in its most rigid form to be enforced immediately. All strikers to be forbidden the use of the streets. Stoppage of the use of motor-cars and telephone communications for all natives who are known to be unfriendly. *Dossiers* of Delegates to Europe.
3. Arrest of the leaders, who presumably are paying out organisation funds.
4. Appointment of a non-official Advisory Board of old and experienced British residents.

Enclosure 2 in No. 284.

Mr. Kingsford (*British Chamber of Commerce, Cairo*) to Sir E. Allenby.
Excellency, Cairo, April 16, 1919.

A GENERAL meeting of the unofficial British community in Cairo has been held to-day, at which the following resolutions were unanimously passed:—

It was considered desirable that these views, expressive of the whole-hearted support of the community and confidence in your Excellency, might be communicated to the English public, should you have no objection.

I have, &c.

W. E. KINGSFORD (*Chairman*).

Resolutions.

1. That his Excellency the Special High Commissioner be respectfully assured of the loyal support and co-operation of the unofficial section of the British community residing in Cairo and district, in the carrying out of any measures necessary to secure a prompt return to conditions of security of life and property, and the reassertion of British prestige.

2. That this meeting representative of the experience of the unofficial community, expresses its concern at the apparent triumph of the forces of organised terrorism and disorder, as being incompatible with the terms of the official communique from London dated the 21st March, 1919, announcing the appointment of His Majesty's Special High Commissioner, which reaffirms His Majesty's protectorate over Egypt.

3. That for the sake of the future of the country and for the reassuring of the moderately inclined section of its inhabitants, pronouncement should not be delayed by the Home Government as to some definite and irrevocable programme with regard to Egypt, and this pronouncement being made, steps should be at once taken, if necessary, to enforce such a ruling in a manner that could not leave any possibility of it being misunderstood in the East, and which would protect foreigners residing in Egypt now and for all time from insult, robbery, or murder.

4. That his Excellency the Special High Commissioner respectfully be asked to receive a deputation from this meeting in order (1) that they may present these resolutions, and (2) that they may explain in more detail how their knowledge and experience of this country has led them to put forward the resolutions.

W. E. Kingsford, chairman British Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, chairman and managing director Associated British Manufacturers (Egypt) (Limited).

W. D. Hart, branch manager for Egypt, Syria, and Palestine of the Gresham Life Assurance Company (Limited).

Jeffery W. Eady, agent for thirty English firms.

H. Diacono, general manager of the Anglo-American Nile Company.

W. Delanoy, commission agent, import and export.

A. H. Hooker, F.I.C., F.C.S., member of Committee of the British Chamber of Commerce, Cairo.

W. Willcocks, K.C.M.G., chairman of the Anglo-Egyptian Land Allotment Company.

D. Scott Moncrieff, branch manager, Standard Life Assurance Company.

W. M. Delany, director of several companies in Egypt.

W. Ablitt, of Messrs. W. & H. Ablitt and Co. (late Kuster and Co.), iron merchants.

A. de T. Chamberlaine, general merchant.

E. J. Lovegrove, manager Cairo Express Agency.

F. H. Russell, of Russell, Harris, and Co., chartered accountants.

S. Morelli, of S. Morelli and Co., commission agents.

W. Wright and J. S. Blyth, of Maspero, Frères (Limited), cigarette manufacturers.

George Walker, of Walker and Vallois, wine merchants.

W. D. Joseph, director, Egyptian Markets Company (Limited).

J. Day, of John Day and Co., engineers and contractors.

J. W. Williamson, contractor.

E. Davies Bryan, of Davies Bryan and Co., tailors, drapers, and general outfitters.

H. E. Simonds, baker and flour merchant.

Alex. J. Howie, of Howie and Co., the Hygienic Dairy.

S. A. Wisnom, general merchant and contractor.

A. Kvan, of Cumming and Co. (Limited), insurance agents.

W. M. Russell, solicitor.

C. Appleton, branch manager of Robert Hudson (Limited), light railway engineers, Leeds and Cairo.

H. MacLoughlin, manager, the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Cairo.

L. H. Mills Thomas, of Hickson and Thomas (Limited), of London, Cairo, Cyprus, Malta, Gibraltar, and Milan, general merchants, representing twenty-one English firms.

R. H. Roberts, of Roberts, Hughes, and Co., bootmakers and athletic outfitters.

Reginald Silley, barrister-at-law.

J. P. Foster, barrister-at-law.

Harold A. Cateaux, solicitor.

C. Walton Masters, solicitor.

W. T. Sparks, advertising agent.

D. M. Beddoe, surgeon and physician.

H. W. Butcher, of Congden and Co., army agents, auctioneers, contractors, &c.

C. E. Duffield, general manager, the Egyptian Markets Company (Limited).

H. S. Phillpotts, manager, the Egyptian Dredging Company (Limited).

J. A. Syson, manager, Morum's Oriental Stores.

Herbert E. Collacott, of Collacott and Son, tailors.

A. Moring, of Moring and Co., surgical instrument makers, cycle dealers, &c.

W. Edwards, general manager of Shannon (Limited), dealers in office fittings.

A. H. Williams, of Julius Liepmann and Company's Successors, textile merchants.

J. Grech Mifsud, LL.D., barrister-at-law.

S. Saver, of Saver and Collev, engineers and contractors.

M. Schemeil Bey, land interests.

F. H. Hayward, of W. H. Allen, Son, and Co. (Limited), engineers, of Bedford and Cairo.

Henry Wybrow, of H. Wybrow and Co., tailors.

C. R. Beasley, agricultural expert, controlling 24,000 feddans of land in Egypt, and representing large English financial institutions.

C. Sender, of Sender and Co., wine merchants, &c.

A. S. Merton, of Cairo.

F. N. Walton, manager, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank (Limited).

A. A. Mortimer, of David Sendemann and Son (Limited), of London and Cairo, wine merchants.

Business is completely paralysed, wholesale merchants are unable to meet their financial engagements as they are unable to make any collections from the villages. The native retail traders and other traders who are local subjects are forced to close their shops by the so-called national police. Although the president of the Native Society of Merchants agreed with the Nationalist Party to close every Wednesday as a protest against British occupation, the Nationalist Committee are now not satisfied with that agreement and insist on closing every day; they are desirous of stopping all business in order to try and force the intervention of other European Powers who have commercial interests in Egypt. The traders in the native quarters would be only too thankful to re-open their shops and resume normal business if only assured of proper protection to their lives and property.

The impossibility to withdraw goods from the Customs is entailing severe loss not only in the cost of storage, &c., but loss of sale, as prices are dropping down, and manufacturers are unable to obtain payment for shipments as customers are unable to take up the documents.

Briefly, if this state of things continues for a short while longer, I venture to predict a state of bankruptcy generally, or, to avoid same, a moratorium must be promulgated, in either case with consequent loss of credit in Europe.

The position of commercial and industrial companies and private enterprise of other nature in which large capital is involved, with which I do not propose to deal, has equally suffered.

J. W. EADY.

Rushdy Pasha's Ministry is either the creature of the conspirators or represents nobody. The conspirators only want them to stay long enough to collect the money they need by a forced subscription from the villages. In the meantime, whenever any strong action is proposed, they talk of "conflagrations" and weaken the English officials.

The propaganda in the villages now is:—

1. The English are going to raise the taxes to 5*l.* per feddan.
2. English or Australian soldiers are burning villages and, in the confusion, violating all the women.
3. Italy and America have refused to accept the protectorate.
4. The Mufti (Bakhit) has blessed and called sacredly legal the demands of the Public Official Committee.

Money is being collected in hundreds of thousands of pounds, by force and threats and promises, out of the villages. It is being collected to pay Egyptian public servants, as the English refuse to pay them and pay only themselves.

Landowners friendly to the English are told before the fellaheen that, the day the English go, their lands will be divided among the fellaheen.

At the beginning of the conspiracy the evil might, in the opinion of Egyptians, have been stamped out in the villages, but the poison to-day has gone too far. It can only be stamped out to-day by some striking and dramatic action in Cairo—some action speedy and effective. The action recommended is:—

1. The dismissal of the Ministers.
2. The arrest and removal far out of Cairo of the forty-three new conspirators.
3. The Sultan to dismiss Bakhit and put in a new Mufti.
4. The government of the country direct by major-generals, under the strictest and most speedy acting martial law.

Any slow action *will do nothing.*

W. WILLCOCKS.

April 18, 1919.

No. 285.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 182.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 20, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a note by Mr. Hayter, legal adviser to the Residency, on the behaviour of native officials during the recent disturbances.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 285.

Note by Mr. Hayter.

Behaviour of Native Officials during the Disturbances.

1. I HAVE now received a number of reports from heads of departments as to the behaviour of Egyptian officials on the first outbreak of disturbances. These include reports from the interior, the post office, the telegraph service, and the coastguard, and some notes from the irrigation service. They thus cover most of the provincial officials, except those of the State railways, as to whom I have received no reports.

2. The notes which I have seen are not in any case considered reports by the heads of departments; they are merely reports received by them from their provincial representatives, or summaries of such reports. On this material it is not possible to give any final appreciation of the acts of individuals; but it may be useful if I place on record the general impressions which I have formed after reading a great number of accounts.

3. I think it is clear that, with very few exceptions, the Egyptian officials of the Government at the first outbreak of disturbances behaved very well. Nearly all of them did their best and, in many cases, their best was very good. I need not refer to the action of Halim Pasha at Damanhour, or to that of some of the other Mudirs, whose success in maintaining order has already been recognised by the military authorities, but it seems clear that a great many officers and men of the police in all parts of Egypt maintained order and defended life and property under very great difficulties.

4. The work of the officers and men of the coastguard in maintaining order in the north of the Delta seems to have been uniformly good. As stated above, it is not yet the time to pass any final judgment on the action of individuals; but I cannot refrain from citing the case of an Egyptian officer of the coastguard who heard that Damietta was in the hands of the mob, marched on that town with a force of ten men, called in men from outlying posts till his force was raised to thirty, and restored complete order in the town without firing a shot or striking a blow. I cite this case as an illustration of the courage and capacity which have been displayed by Egyptian officers of all services on a sudden emergency, and not as suggesting that there were not many other officers serving under other departments whose action was not quite as deserving of recognition as that of the officer in question.

5. It will, of course, be understood that by no means all officers and officials showed the same courage and presence of mind. Some of them, as might be expected, lost their nerve; some were too rash, and others too cautious; but I find only few and doubtful traces of any deliberate abstention from duty on the first outbreak of the disturbances.

6. The employees of the telegraph and telephone service had a very difficult time, as the wires were constantly being cut, but they seem to have done their best in almost every case to maintain communication.

7. The employees of the post office in several cases showed real courage and devotion in protecting the mails and valuables committed to their charge. The post-master at Ghiza was attacked by the mob on the ground that he had sheltered two British soldiers. In spite of a most severe beating, which caused very serious injuries, he refused to reveal the hiding-place of the key of the office safe, and the contents of that safe were recovered intact. Three travelling postal employees on the upper Egypt train, which was held up at Rekka, had 8,000*l.* in their charge. Although the train was stormed and looted by a very dangerous mob, they succeeded in saving 6,600*l.* of this and bringing it back to Cairo. Other instances are reported in which postal employés have saved considerable sums at a great deal of risk to themselves.

8. The irrigation service appears to have been carried on throughout with very little interruption, a fact which shows great steadiness on the part of local officials. So far as I can understand, the ordinary rotations have been regularly carried out throughout the Delta, and no damage has been done to irrigation works, except in the neighbourhood of Zifta.

9. I do not refer to the behaviour of the police in Cairo and Alexandria as they have been acting in concert with the military authorities, who will, no doubt, furnish all necessary reports.

10. Egyptian employees in the central administrations remained at their work until the end of March, though it was known that a certain amount of agitation was going on among them. Towards the end of the month it was generally rumoured that a number of them intended to leave their posts in the early days of April, when they had received their March pay. My impression is that the very great majority of them were unwilling to come out. Their sympathies, generally speaking, were enlisted on the side of the Nationalist aspirations, but they feared the loss of their posts.

11. Early in April, the strike of officials and employees broke out. It has now assumed such serious proportions as to constitute a grave political embarrassment. It is not yet possible to give any authentic account of the elaborate organisation which has been set up, or of the methods of terrorism which have been employed.

April 19, 1919.

No. 286.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 178.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 20, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to send a note on a conversation which took place between the Sultan and Colonel G. S. Symes, C.M.G., D.S.O., almost immediately after the latter's return to Egypt.

The conversation is interesting, as it describes in frank language views which, I believe, His Highness now sincerely holds.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 286.

Colonel Symes's Note on Interview with the Sultan, April 17, 1919.

(Secret.)

HIS Highness the Sultan summoned me this afternoon and kept me in conversation with him for nearly two hours. He spoke with apparent frankness on a variety of matters connected with the present crisis, but very calmly and reasonably throughout.

He described—as to one who had been absent—the salient events of the past months and the actual situation as it appeared to him. In this connection, he gave me a detailed account of his interview of the 15th inst. with the new Ministry. His Highness had begged Rushdy on no account to resign, and had obtained from him an assurance that he would stand firm as long as the solidarity of the Ministry could be maintained. His Highness regarded this assurance as unsatisfactory. He was sure of Rushdy's good intention, but very mistrustful of Adly, whose personal allegiance he had lately been at pains to gain, and who had declared he could no longer retain office if sanction was required or given for repressive action by the troops. Adly, in His Highness's opinion, dominated the present Cabinet, and was totally unreliable.

His Highness gave instances of the intrigues of Omar Toussoun and other members of his family with the two principal Nationalist groups, and of his own unsuccessful efforts to induce various notables, previously reasonable, to appreciate the futility of their present courses. He remarked on the extraordinary influence of the women, and particularly of Mme. Saad Zaghlul, in exciting native hostility to the British. He had just heard, but had difficulty in accepting the story as true, that the Moseri Bank were negotiating a loan of 50,000l., guaranteed by a group of land proprietors, to the officials' "Soviet." His description of the composition of this "Soviet" tallied with the intelligence reports I have seen at the Savoy. It was dominated by an extremist faction, who were no longer open to reason and showed no symptom of surrender. Their present policy was to secure the resignation of the Rushdy Ministry and themselves to form a Cabinet which, failing any other possible combination, we should be compelled to recognise.

About half-way through the conversation, His Highness asked me point blank my personal view as to what action could now be taken. I replied that I had hardly had time yet to get a clear idea of the situation, that I had no knowledge of the intentions of the responsible military and civil authorities, and consequently could express no useful opinion. He pressed me, with much insistence, to answer his question, saying he quite understood that my opinion would be a purely personal one and based on such incomplete knowledge as I had acquired. As such he wanted it. I said it seemed evident that the present situation could not be allowed to continue, and that unless the activity of the Soviet declined in the course of the next few days, it must clash with that of the Government or the protecting Power. In that case the issue would be a simple one as between the supporters of the Soviet and British troops, and disastrous to the former. It seemed to me likely that this vital fact would have to be communicated to the Soviet leaders in the form of an ultimatum which they must accept, or refuse and take the responsibility for the massacre of Egyptians which would probably ensue. His Highness observed that the present temper of the British troops was, very naturally, such that their employment to surround any quarter where the Soviet leaders were collected would inevitably lead to wholesale shooting down of natives. I said I had used the word "massacre" advisedly, as I thought the contingency His Highness had anticipated should certainly be represented to the Soviet chiefs, and might even

contribute to a better frame of mind on their part. His Highness said his mature reflection had led him to much the same opinion, but that he was still searching for some expedient to be adopted "between now and Sunday next" which could ameliorate the situation and avert the necessity for military action. He thought if only the Egyptians could be forced to realise that the Great Powers—America, France, and Italy—had officially recognised the British protectorate over Egypt, an immense and pacifying effect would be produced on Egyptian public opinion. The French and Italian Ministers here, he hinted, had given no such impression. Could not Mr. Lloyd George or, better still, President Wilson or M. Clemenceau be induced to mention the fact casually in a published speech? Failing that, could not representatives of the three Powers to whom Saad Zaghlul and his associates might obtain access in Paris, tell them frankly that they could only address themselves to London?

Finally, His Highness expressed the hope that formal recognition of the British protectorate over Egypt would be extracted from Germany and her allies—including Turkey—in the terms of peace. He feared unless this recognition was now given by the enemy Powers, even if the present crisis was satisfactorily decided, Egyptians would continue to have hopes of a successful appeal away from London, and the prospects of a real *modus vivendi* between the English and the Egyptians would be effected. In this matter, he explained, he spoke as an Egyptian, and represented a point of view the importance of which a European might find it difficult to appreciate.

In recent events he saw one reason, and one reason only, for satisfaction, viz., that Egyptians had shown their willingness to die for an ideal. He hoped that their action, however misguided and perverse it might seem, would raise them in the esteem of Turks and other foreign residents in the country, and eventually assist them to secure sympathetic consideration for such of their aspirations as could be satisfied without prejudice to the welfare of all the inhabitants of Egypt.

I have omitted from this account all observations by His Highness of a retrospective nature.

No. 287.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 181.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 20, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 167 of the 13th April I have the honour to forward an account of the progress of events in Cairo and the provinces during the last week.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 287.

*An Account of the Progress of Events in Cairo and the Provinces from April 12 to 19, 1919.**Supplementary Note on April 12, 1919.*

THE Nationalist Party, on their side, evolved a proposal to send a deputation to France, via Italy and Switzerland. This party, whose activities have of late years centred chiefly in Switzerland, is presided over in Egypt by Ali Bey Fahmi Kamel, and the deputation was to have been led by the lawyer, Ahmed Lutfi Bey (to be distinguished from the Ahmed Lutfi Bey Es Sayed, who is a member of the "Egyptian delegation").

The chief items of the party programme are (1) complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan, (2) immediate departure of the British, (3) maintenance of the religious connection of Egypt with Turkey, and (4) abolition of the capitulations.

An attempt was made at Maadi to incite the native villagers to an attack on the English residents. The Omda resisted the attempt, and a faction fight resulted.

On the night of the 12th-13th one Armenian house was burnt down and another was looted.

Cairo, April 13, 1919.

The situation was quiet in general, but eleven cases of vitriol throwing occurred on trams, and similar attacks were made upon railway and post office officials. Post office employees were being much threatened, and one was assaulted and badly injured.

A proclamation by Rushdy Pasha, calling on Government employees to return to work, appeared in the morning's papers. At a subsequent meeting of employees it was decided to continue the strike indefinitely, and the moderates were denied a hearing; but reports agreed that considerable moderate opposition existed.

The Armenians concentrated under British guard now numbered 4,600. In further isolated cases Armenian property was looted, but the anti-Armenian agitation had by now largely disappeared. The Nationalists realised how much harm had been done to their cause by anti-Armenian outrages, and representatives of El-Azhar offered the Armenians nationalist protection, and made great efforts to persuade them to accept it.

The Greeks had been much moved by recent attacks on their compatriots, and the Greek agency was approached by three deputations of Nationalists which deplored the discreditable excesses of the mob, and suggested joint efforts by Egyptians and foreigners to prevent them.

The Barristers' Syndicate met and discussed the proposed deputation of the Nationalist Party. Those present were unanimous that any appearance of divided aims would be disastrous, and that the Nationalist Party (to whom they showed great hostility) should have sunk its difference with reference to the capitulations, and joined Saad Pasha Zaghlul.

Provinces, April 13, 1919.

Fraternising between Copts and Moslems was reported from Alexandria and Dammanhour.

Two Egyptian soldiers deserted at Wasta with their arms and ammunition.

At Zagazig the Mudiria and telegraph staffs struck; the railway traffic staff were also out.

At Port Said further demonstrations took place in the native quarter, but the local committees organising them undertook that European quarter should not be interfered with.

Delegates from Menufia saw the Prime Minister, and adopted a most uncompromising tone. A political officer from the same province reported that much extremist propaganda was being circulated; the fellah, for example, was being invited to believe that the Sudan irrigation scheme would rob Egypt of water, and that it was therefore necessary to expel the English from Egypt.

Cairo, April 14, 1919.

The strike continued. Only one-third of the officials of the Ministry of the Interior were working as compared with two-thirds on the two previous days. Employees of other Ministries were still out, the majority, it was believed, owing to intimidation. Strike money was being collected at El-Azhar by a committee of three sheikhs.

Abdel Latif Bey el-Sufani, a member of the proposed deputation of the Nationalist Party, stated, at a meeting at the Hanafi Mosque, that there was no intention of hampering Zaghlul Pasha's party. They meant particularly to go to Geneva to reorganise the Nationalist Party there, and ensure Mohammed Bey Ferid's return.

There were again several cases of vitriol throwing, one man being blinded.

Provinces, April 14, 1919.

At Suez a hostile crowd from Arbain demonstrated in front of the Governorate, and was dispersed by the military and police. On its return to Aebain some unknown person shot and wounded two natives. The streets of Arbain were then cleared with difficulty.

Two villages near Deirut were searched, and considerable quantities of arms taken.

At Zagazig the strike of railway employees' extended, and goods traffic was paralysed.

A commission arrived at Alexandria from Cairo to collect funds for the expenses of the Zaghlul mission. Serious dissension is reported between the supporters of Zaghlul Pasha and the Nationalist Party, supporters of the latter being strong in Alexandria.

Reports from Zagazig and elsewhere indicated that the main instigators of political unrest in the provinces, as in Cairo, were lawyers, many of them unemployed and living on party funds. The blackmail necessary to replenish these funds tended to create reaction. The landowners also were beginning to realise that they were the chief losers by the interruption of communications, and were growing distrustful of the lawyer and effendi class of the towns.

Cairo, April 15, 1919.

The situation remained quiet. There was no change at the Ministries. Vitriol-throwing was threatened should any Government employees return to work. There were signs that the extremists were finding it difficult to keep the majority out on strike. Among the many pamphlets issued with the object of arousing enthusiasm may be mentioned an alleged message from the Imam Ali (designed no doubt to stir members of the Shia sect) foretelling that Egypt would emerge triumphant from a welter of blood after exterminating the invader.

Parties of prisoners under military guard were employed to clean the streets, which owing to a strike of scavengers had remained unswept for ten days.

Reports were received that a "national police" force was being organised at El-Azhar.

The first issue appeared of a single sheet newspaper called "Complete Independence," printed for private circulation. Its politics are of the most extreme character, as will be seen from the attached extract in translation.

Two further cases of vitriol throwing were reported, making a total of nineteen cases.

Extract from the "Complete Independence" (Organ of the Egyptian Nation).

I.—DEPARTURE OF THE BRITISH.

When the British nation realised the generous character of the Egyptian race, and had tangible proofs of the extent of its forbearance, and received innumerable proofs of its capacity for national friendship, and its love for foreign races of all categories, with its hospitality to its guests from East and West, then the British started a policy of treachery and cunning, endeavouring to sow discord and strife between the Egyptians and their foreign guests who had lived in such peace and safety among them. But this trickery was unsuccessful, for the Egyptian had sufficient intelligence and the foreigners were sufficiently well intentioned to perceive the evil intentions of the English. For this reason all Egyptians irrespective of class—children, women, men, animals, and birds, nay even the mountains and rivers, plants, the atmosphere, the climate, the sun, moon, and stars—in fact all that is Egyptian—rose up with one mind and soul and with one voice cry out for "Complete Independence." Everything that had breath rose up in defence of its life, honour, and property, but the British nation adopted methods of savagery, to resist the peaceful nation that was making demonstrations of a most harmless nature and being devoid of any other arms but those of its innocence and the strength of its right. The British nation resisted it with outrage and destruction, committing crimes of the most atrocious savagery which went beyond all international law, violating women and shedding the blood of the innocent, destroying villages, making children orphans, burning the countryside, using cruelty and brutality which has blackened the pages of their vile history, adding still baser crimes to their former ones. The Denshawai incident will never fade from the memory; but the Egyptian whose rights have been infringed, who has been deprived of the benefits of his country, enslaved by an ignorant nation, outraged in his possessions, treated as an enemy in his own country which is fighting for its rights, interned in his own home, humiliated in his own land which has drunk of the bitter cup of oppression, and has tasted the gall of penury and hunger in his own fields—nay more, who has helped them with his life, with

his wealth and his food to open the path of signal victory in the conquest of Palestine, although the English are known for their faithlessness to treaties and their perfidy, has risen up in his wisdom and struck work to show its patriotism. He has openly declared his desire for absolute unconditional independence in every several direction. The Egyptian nation has been assured by the testimony of the Ambassadors of the Powers of the justice of England's evacuation of Egypt, the bride of countries and the flower of the world. Work, sons of Egypt, that the English may evacuate it absolutely. We know that the English have completely evacuated it politically and morally, and are again at the gates of the country, desiring to return as conquerors and as potential invaders.

The article concludes with an appeal to Egyptians to obtain arms, open prisons, and burn stores occupying the Government offices.

Provinces, April 15, 1919.

At Ismailia, the railway locomotive staff struck, and intimidation was used against any wishing to return.

At Zagazig all the station staff were out except the head and assistant station-masters.

At Minia a circular was received from the Cairo Strike Committee of Government officials, ordering a strike. This caused considerable excitement.

At Alexandria, relations were still reported strained between the Nationalist Party and followers of the "Egyptian Delegation."

Cairo, April 16, 1919.

Fewer railway employees were working, and as the strike was spreading to the provinces, it appeared that railway traffic would have to be further restricted.

One Indian soldier was attacked and shot, and one native civilian wounded; there were also four more cases of vitriol-throwing.

Notices signed by Abdel Latif Bey-el-Sufani were posted in one of the most frequented cafés, saying that the Nationalist Party had given up the idea of sending a separate deputation, and were returning the money subscribed for that purpose.

Armenians, who had hitherto been collected under insanitary conditions, chiefly in their own churches and schools, moved in large numbers to the camp provided for this purpose at Heliopolis by the British military authorities.

Representatives of El-Azhar again called on the Armenian leaders to dissuade them from accepting British protection, but without success.

The Greek and Italian communities began to consider plans for protection in an emergency.

A secret organisation styling itself "The Black Hand," which had been taking a leading part in the campaign of intimidation, was helping to provide strike funds for the Central Strike Committee, by levying blackmail in the poorer quarters, and even making collections in the European quarters.

Most of the shops were shut in the poorer quarters, the extremists having chosen Wednesday as the day when all shops must shut every week by way of protest, and having enforced this decision by intimidation.

Provinces, April 16, 1919.

At Alexandria things were quiet except that effendis were going about forcing shopkeepers in the native quarters to close their shops. Seditious notices were also posted urging that vengeance should be taken on British soldiers for the deaths among the fellaheen. A meeting was held in the Moharrem Bey Mosque, the purpose of which was reported to be the organisation of a provisional Government.

At Qaliub ten leaders of the riot in March were convicted and awarded sentences varying from three years' hard labour to fifteen years' penal servitude.

At Port Said the telegraph staff struck. Seditious notices were posted on the night of the 15th to 16th.

At Ismailia a few fitters and engine-drivers returned to work, but the guards went on strike.

At Zagazig many shops closed in sympathy with railway employees, who were still nearly all on strike.

At Tanta a railway strike began, and practically the whole staff went out.

At Kafr-el-Zayat four men, after first trying to buy ammunition, attempted to seize a sentry's rifle. One arrest was made.

In the villages near Deirut fresh seizures of arms were made.

Cairo, April 17, 1919.

The Government employees issued a circular containing a new demand, that an International Commission should be sent to investigate British atrocities. There were rather more employees working at the Ministries, but all railway clerks were out except Europeans and Armenians.

The pact which had been arrived at between the Nationalist Party and the followers of Zaghlul Pasha apparently broke down, and the two parties were reported to have definitely split, the former intending to act independently in future.

The so-called "national police," organised by El-Azhar, made a brief appearance in the streets. There were signs that El-Azhar was ambitious of developing an administrative machinery of its own, with a view to an eventual usurpation of the functions of Government. The Government employees had also developed an elaborate system of soviets, culminating in a Central Soviet or General Strike Committee. The word "soviet," however, is probably used without any very clear idea as to its meaning.

There were persistent reports of the manufacture of knives and swords in the Muski quarter.

Provinces, April 17, 1919.

At Abou-Za'bal, near Cairo, there was a disturbance in the convict prison, but it was easily quelled by the warders.

At the Barrage, all the native employees in the irrigation workshops left work through intimidation.

At Zagazig a postal strike began. Part of the railway station staff returned to work. All the shops reopened.

At Beni-Suef "Black Hand" notices threatening Government servants appeared.

At Tanta the strike was maintained.

Cairo, April 18, 1919.

No incidents occurred, except one individual attack on a British soldier, who was wounded.

Friday, being the weekly holiday, the Ministries were closed. The railway situation was unchanged.

A delegation from the supporters of Saad Pasha Zaghlul called on the Armenian National Union, and was annoyed to meet there a delegation from the Nationalist Party. They explained that their party, that of Zaghlul, was the only one with authority to call on the union. The purpose of both parties was to persuade the Armenians to indulge in open fraternisation with the Egyptians. One suggestion was that a joint delegation of Armenians and Egyptians should approach the American agency.

On the 17th April an order under martial law had been issued threatening the arrest of any persons found wearing the badge of the "National Police," and on the 18th April this body made no further attempt to appear in the streets.

The street cafés were more patronised than for some time past, and there appeared to be less excitement in the air.

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Provinces, April 18, 1919.

Alexandria was quiet, though there were rumours of an intended strike of Government servants. The staff of the Khedivial Mail Company's workshops struck.

At Port Said agitators were active, and it was rumoured that a general strike would be declared on the 20th April.

At Zagazig the strike was maintained, though some railway and telegraph officials were working.

At Tanta also the strike continued.

Cairo, April 19, 1919.

There were rather fewer employees working at the Ministries than on Thursday; on the other hand, a few more useful men had returned to the traffic department of the State Railways.

A native night-watchman was murdered in Cairo station, but the crime appears to have had no political motive.

There were otherwise no incidents to report at all, and the appearance of the streets was almost normal. The workmen on the Heliopolis tram line, however, who hitherto had refrained from taking part in the agitation, were now inclined to put forward demands for more favourable treatment.

Provinces, April 19, 1919.

The condition of the provinces was calm, though the existing strikes were maintained.

Engineers of State telegraphs struck work in Lower Egypt, which will render it difficult to maintain the working of the lines.

Otherwise no incidents were reported.

No. 288.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 715.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 4, 1919.

CAIRO quiet.

Same number at schools.

Dr. Ismail Sidky, arrested this morning, admitted a printing-press raided yesterday belonged to Nationalist Party.

Demonstration of Moslems and Copts at Alexandria was easily dispersed.

Provinces quiet.

No. 289.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 720.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 5, 1919.

CAIRO and provinces are quiet.

Extremists continue to urge for strikes, now mainly with a view to impressing Commission, which is rumoured to have started for Egypt.

An order was issued this morning under which students who do not return to work by 7th May will lose right of entry for any examination this year.

No. 290.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 188.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward a further selection of memoranda expressive of local opinion. They include letters from Mr. C. M. Firth, of the Department of

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Antiquities, and Mr. M. M. el Bolkeiny, of Mit Chamr; a summary of the views of Mr. R. E. Fischer, and extracts from a letter from Mr. A. G. Wainwright.

A copy of a circular, which emanates from Mansourah, and is supposed to have been written by a lawyer residing there, is also enclosed, as being illustrative of the attitude of mind of the extremists a short time ago.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 290.

Circular.

To his Excellency the High Commissioner.

AS representative of Great Britain, and relying on the declaration made before all the Powers, to grant unconditional independence to Egypt, we request, as a guarantee of the said declaration made by your Government, that you deliver to us everything held by the British, and immediately withdraw, with the briefest delay, all troops now stationed in Egypt, confining them in a limited zone preparatory to embarkation for their own country. This to be done in the presence of Egyptian delegates, who will have instructions to facilitate embarkation, and protect the troops from all injury, until the departure of your steamers from Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez. The same treatment will be applied to British civilians wishing to leave the country.

In future all power in the Ministries and Government Departments will be withdrawn from British officials, except to the High Commissioner, who will be considered merely in the capacity of a representative of a foreign Power. He will have no administrative power in the country, and will rank as any other diplomatic agent.

After these conditions have been fulfilled, Egypt will agree to discuss at the Peace Conference the conditions of foreign concessions, and the question of the Suez Canal, and the Egyptians will be at liberty to choose their own sovereign. It is understood that all these conditions apply as well to the Soudan Government.

In case of refusal in respect of any of these conditions, Egypt will break off relations with the British Government.

All the foregoing is the cause of the peaceable demonstrations which are taking place, and will continue to take place, as every Egyptian thoroughly understands British policy.

Enclosure 2 in No. 290.

Extracts from Letter of Mr. G. A. Wainwright, Tewfikieh School, Shubra, Cairo, dated April 14, 1919.

. . . I beg to draw your attention to the complaints which the peasants believe they have against the military authorities. The parties at fault, however, are not the military, but the native officials through whom they were obliged to work and who have very regularly taken the opportunity presented for extracting for themselves very great sums of money and supplies in the name of the military authority. The conscription for the Egyptian Labour Corps was also, I understand, most brutally carried out by the native officials, either by a wholesale raiding and driving off from districts of such men as they were able to capture, or by instructing the recruiting officers to take such and such men who were private enemies. The conscription again, I understand, was a great opportunity of which the fullest use was made for extorting large sums in bribes as exemption fees.

In at least one instance I can vouch for it that the proposed voluntary subscription to the Red Cross was made the opportunity of extracting large sums of money with the explanation that it was a new tax put on by the British to pay for the war. This case came within my own knowledge and occurred at Kift, in the Kena Mudirieh, in the south country. . . . I understand that great numbers of complaints have been deposited at the various Mudiriehs, but natives say that they are held up there as they

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have to pass through the hands of interested people. . . . The complaints seem to group themselves under the following heads:—

1. *Taking too much* in the way of supplies, the surplus to be divided among the native officials.
2. Failure to hand over to the peasants the money received from the military authorities in payment for supplies.
3. Compulsory subscriptions to the Red Cross under the name of a new tax imposed by the British to pay for the war.
4. Manner of recruiting for the Egyptian Labour Corps.

It is evident that the fair name of the British must have suffered heavily from this among the uneducated classes.

Enclosure 3 in No. 290.

Summary of Mr. R. E. Fischer's Views on the Effect of the Present Agitation upon the Fellaheen.

MR. R. E. FISCHER, by race a Hungarian Jew, was born in Egypt, and has spent most of his life here. He has a comparatively intimate knowledge of the peasantry all over the country. He is a land-owner, a dealer in agricultural produce, manages the "Traders and Grower's Union," and has occasional work for the Ministry of Agriculture.

By way of general remarks about the fellaheen, he said that they were happy as long as they were not interfered with: prone to superficial excitement, they would effervesce under the influence of propaganda, anti-foreign or anti-Christian propaganda for instance, but the effervescence would soon subside; essentially timid, there were three things they were hereditarily afraid of and wanted protection from—Bedouin, brigands and river pirates; they regarded the educated urban population as hardly less alien than the Europeans; they certainly had a general feeling that an English rather than an Egyptian official was the right man to take their grievances to, but their opportunities of doing so were too few.

The present agitation, carefully organised from the towns through lawyer and student emissaries, was often fostered and rarely counteracted by the local officials. The cry that the English were to be driven out stirred the fellaheen to superficial and temporary excitement, and in the absence of any external counteracting influence they were not restrained by any prudent feeling that they might be failing to take the stronger side.

The first attacks on communications were obviously organised (the Mamur of Qaliub, Mr. Fischer believed, was the nephew of a high dignitary of Al Azhar), the later ones may have been, but would have occurred anyhow by infection. In most places rioting might have been stopped at the outset by quite a small display of armed force by the police. There was of course a mass of peasantry who wanted to be quiet at the time; and among the others there was a quick revulsion in places, such as Behera, Menufia and the Fayoum, where the fear of marauding Bedouin was especially operative. The Bedouin had been playing the game of the English, and if they and the Nile pirates had been left to play a little longer, fellaheen opinion would have become solid on the side of order.

He had not noticed any important change in the attitude of the fellaheen during the war. They had grievances, of course, over the requisitioning of crops and the Egyptian Labour Corps. But it was their own Omdehs, or the Mamurs or their clerks, who had taken the opportunity of purloining fodder, exacting subscriptions for the Red Cross, or calling up 100 men for service where ten were required and releasing 90 on payment; and the fellaheen knew it. On the whole, peasants who returned from the Labour Corps were not by any means dissatisfied with their treatment; many might have died and others might have been badly treated in hospital, but their mentality was such that things of this sort did not leave any resentment.

They had been told that the English were to be driven out, but this did not seem to have happened, and at present there was a feeling of suspense; they wanted intensely to know who was going to come out on top. Meanwhile, it was not likely that they could be aroused to any new outbreak; they were opposed to the urban strikes, they were getting tired of hearing apparently fruitless cries of "Yehia el-Watan," and provided nothing definite happened to indicate that the party which

wanted to expel the English was to be paramount, the whole of the rural parts of the country would, by the application of judicious influence, swing round. Influence in the other direction, however, was still being strenuously exerted, and it was most desirable that it should be diminished.

Mr. Fischer doubted whether there was any very violent hatred of the British soldier among the fellaheen; anyhow, it would not have a lasting effect. Personally, of late he had been received with even more friendliness and respect than usual, and had the impression that the peasants he met looked to him for protection against they did not know what.

Mr. Fischer's more recent impressions were gathered from contact with the Fellaheen of Giza and Qaliubia Mudirias, but he considers that they apply to other parts of the country.

April 22, 1919.

Enclosure 4 in No. 290.

Mr. Mallaby Firth (Department of Antiquities) to Sir M. Cheetham.

Dear Sir Milne Cheetham,

April 7, 1919.

I VENTURE to send you this short memorandum not because I think it is of any value, but because I feel that the record of one's views, even if they are not all that they should be, is a slight personal satisfaction at a time when so many ridiculous opinions and rumours are abroad.

As I have been demobilised, there is no military reason for my not writing to you.

Yours sincerely,

C. MALLABY FIRTH.

Memorandum.

The present trouble in Egypt is due to two causes:—

1. The feeling of the town and educated population that they will be submerged economically and politically by the European and English colonies and officials.
2. Dislike of military control by the fellaheen, who have been oppressed in the name of the military authorities through the Omdas, &c., in the matter of requisition and collection of foodstuffs and labour for the Egyptian Labour Corps.

For the first time these two naturally antagonistic classes are united in having grievances. The object of the educated Egyptians is to obtain control of the country and the taxes paid by the fellaheen. They are actually less patriotic than the English advisers and officials. The Nationalist would also like to control the European colonies in the country. The European civilisation as represented in Egypt is curiously enough all that the Nationalist admires, imitates, or covets. He cares nothing for the main occupation of the country or for its art or history.

The main organisers and movers are the members of the native-Bar (cf. India). Their trade is to espouse causes, and they are naturally in touch with the criminal classes, and will intrigue against constituted authority. They care little for truth or justice. Their aim is the control of Government posts and salaries and the political dominion of Egypt by their own clique. A similar tendency may have been observed in England in political life.

An attempt should be made by means of propaganda to draw the fellaheen to our side:—

1. By abolition of the military service (conscription). The Egyptians if left in control will be obliged to do this sooner or later, and we may as well get the credit for it. Five years exemption from conscription on account of the services rendered by the E.L.C. during the war and the organisation of a small army on voluntary lines would be popular, and would fit in well with reduced armament plans and the freeing of the Egyptian frontiers from the Turkish menace. Should the Nationalists oppose it, they will lose popularity. The Army of Occupation will take the place of the Egyptian army.

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2. Threat of using the Nile water for irrigation projects in the Sudan *if the English leave Egypt*. This will put the landowners and agricultural population on our side.
3. Syrians and perhaps Copts to have a less share in Government administration. The latter to have only a proportion of the posts, the former to be entirely ineligible—their own country needs them.
4. Full publication of the names and deeds of those Egyptians who have helped or been loyal to us in the present troubles. Recognition of their services by the High Commissioner. This, while only fair, will create a pro-British party.
5. Opinion of Europe to be brought home to all classes that the present insurrection is a proof that the mass of the country is unfit for self-Government. Emphasise the character of the attacks on Government and European property which the Nationalists will be obliged to disown.
6. Proclamation of Sultan abolishing use of Turkish flag.

The Army of Occupation should be largely concentrated on the canal, so as to watch both Palestine and Egypt, and Ismalia, Kantara and Port Said made a military area, controlling the highway between Africa and Asia. The presence of many troops in the capital may prove a source of irritation.

Education to be remodelled in Egypt, so as to bring it into closer relation with the actual needs of the country. At present it produces numbers of young men whose ambition to hold a Government post, however small, is doomed to disappointment. On their return home they become café or village politicians, and centres of discontent round which all the unoccupied or criminal individuals group themselves.

Englishmen for the public service to be chosen of such a type as to ensure that they will be respected, trusted, and liked by the Egyptians. Each English official should be a centre of influence, and must spend as much of his time as possible in personal relations with his colleagues, and with all classes of Egyptians. A greater interest in the language and people of the country is very necessary. No organisation can replace personal knowledge and sympathy.

Enclosure 5 in No. 290.

M. M. el Bolkeiny to General Sir E. Allenby.

Sir,

Mit Ghamr, April 11, 1919.

IT is with diffidence that I write this, for your Excellency does not know me, and I lay no claim to prominence among my co-citizens or to experience in politics. But I understand your Excellency has invited the free expression of views on the present state of difficulty in this country. Therefore, I venture to hope that, in submitting my humble opinion, I am not risking being regarded as presumptuous.

British policy in Egypt has to contend with difficulties which it would be idle to under-rate. But I hesitate to think that it has not erred, and the recent ferment is the product of a variety of causes most of which, to my thinking, would never have arisen if, in the handling of affairs, an adequate comprehension of the national psychology, coupled with a broad sympathetic spirit, had been displayed by those in supreme control.

In the first place, Englishmen have consistently held aloof from intercourse with Egyptians who would have been delighted to come in contact with them. Opportunities could thus have been available for intelligent Egyptians to appreciate English character, habits, and modes of thought. This would not only have done much to remove misconceptions and prejudices in regard to England and the English (traceable, by the way, in a large measure to enemy propaganda during and before the war), but would have had a moral, educational, and social influence, the value of which it is difficult to exaggerate.

Again, such education as the State provided, should have aimed, among other things, at bringing home to the young Egyptian the true significance of British ideals and institutions. Something should have been done to arouse his curiosity to know more about England—that country which has done so much for the uplifting of humanity.

Last, but not least, British officials in Egypt should have gained more intimate experience of matters characteristically Egyptian before assuming positions of greater

weight and responsibility. It is commonplace that theory is one thing, and practice is another. To be able to rule, one should inspire that kind of confidence in the governed which can only be born of knowledge, sympathy, and understanding.

It is important that when the time for carrying out reforms comes, these considerations may not be lost sight of. I am a native of this country, and I am anxious that my kinsmen should realise that they stand to gain immeasurably by the assimilation of British ideals and culture, and the appreciation of the character of the British Empire, and what it really stands for. If they can be brought to that frame of mind, which I believe is not an impossible task, an incalculable victory over ignorance, over bigotry, over the forces of reaction, over perverted nationalism will have been achieved.

The first step in the right direction is the remodelling of the system of education on liberal and far-sighted lines.

I feel perfectly sure that your Excellency will rightly understand the spirit which I have penned these observations. I am actuated by no ulterior motive, nor do I propose to teach, certainly not in matters in which I am but an amateur.

I am, &c.

M. M. EL BOLKEINY.

No. 291.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

Sir,

Board of Trade, April 28, 1919.

WITH reference to your letter of the 10th March* on the subject of mining rights in Morocco, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, that while they are of opinion that the term "droits miniers," used in article 3 of the draft convention relating to Egypt and Morocco, covers (with one possible exception) the matters referred to in the penultimate paragraph of your letter under reply, they are disposed to think that it would be expedient to obtain from the French Government a written assurance that the term will be interpreted in a wide sense and will include, for example, the right to prospect, to obtain, licences and concessions, to import mining machinery, to construct means of transport for removing the output of mines, and to export ores.

The possible exception referred to above is the question of the export duties leviable upon ores sent to different destinations. In the opinion of the Board, article 6 of the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856 prevents discrimination between British and French exporters in Morocco, but not between exporters to the United Kingdom and exporters to France. It appears to the Board very desirable that there should be no discrimination between exports from Morocco to this country and those to France, whether of ore or of any other goods, and this point is one which would fall to be dealt with in a commercial convention. The matter of export duties appears, however, to be somewhat outside the scope of the present draft convention, and I am accordingly to suggest, for Earl Curzon's consideration, that it should be dealt with by an exchange of notes. So far as the Board are aware, there is no desire to levy export in Egypt at different rates on exports to France and the United Kingdom respectively, and it is therefore suggested that the French Government should be asked to agree to an arrangement whereby, pending the conclusion of a commercial convention, there shall be no discrimination in either Egypt or Morocco in the matter of export duties levied on goods exported to this country and to France.

I am, &c.

H. F. CARLILL.

No. 292.

Minute by Sir R. Graham.

Lord Curzon,

DR. GRANVILLE, President of the Egyptian Quarantine Board and an old and experienced Egyptian official, called on me to-day on his return from Egypt.

He confirmed generally the information which we had already received as regards the outbreak, but laid great stress on the fact that the British administration in Egypt

* Not printed.

had come to be completely out of touch with the natives. He said that the unpopularity of Sir W. Brunyate could not be exaggerated, and that he would certainly have been assassinated if an opportunity for doing so had occurred. Mr. Haines had made no effort to be in touch with the natives, and instead of, as in the case of previous Advisers to the Interior, his ante-room being full of natives waiting for an audience, no one was ever waiting to see him. The Residency had depended for information and guidance upon Sir W. Brunyate and Mr. Haines, and had been badly advised.

He considered that Rushdy, Adly, and Sarwat Pashas had all been playing in with the Nationalists. They could be seen dining with Saad Zaghlul and his friends any night at the Mohammed Ali Club, and long political discussions, mingled with gambling, had taken place afterwards.

I asked Dr. Granville, who has an exceptional knowledge of the foreign colonies in Egypt, what their attitude had been. He said that most of the Italians had certainly sympathised with the Nationalists, and had shown it. The French attitude, on the other hand, had been perfectly correct. A leading French resident, one of the "Députés de la Nation," had shown to him a circular order which he had received from the French Minister, M. Lefèvre Pontalis, instructing all French citizens not merely to give no encouragement to the Nationalist movement, but on the contrary, to remember that they were faithful Allies of the British, and were to render them every possible support. This was interesting, in view of the reports which we have had from the Residency, casting doubt upon the proceedings of M. Lefèvre Pontalis.

Dr. Granville took a hopeful view of the situation. He gave me a number of instances in which natives of all classes had shown devotion and courage in rescuing or saving British subjects from attack. He thought that if the situation was properly handled, with a mixture of firmness and sympathy, it might be restored before very long.

I questioned him about the alleged treatment of the Labour Corps. He said that there had at one time been much illness in it, and many deaths owing to defective hospital arrangements, but that these had been remedied. The fellaheen had been unable to stand the cold mountain air of Palestine, and pneumonia had been rife. The pay and feeding had always been good.

Dr. Granville gave a gloomy account of conditions of life in Egypt at this moment, owing to the breakdown of the railways. Only military trains, or rather trains run by soldiers, were in use, and the soldier engine-drivers refused to permit Egyptians to travel by the trains, declaring that they would only allow trains to be used for ordinary traffic if they were given trade union conditions of service. This made matters very uncomfortable for the natives, and was probably salutary. But the lack of transport made food conditions for all extremely bad, and meat was almost unobtainable in Cairo.

R. G.

May 6, 1919.

No. 293.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 2793.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1919.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a telegram (No. 672)* from His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt with regard to the abolition of the Capitulations.

I propose to discuss the points suggested by the acting judicial adviser with Sir W. Brunyate on arrival, but I should be glad to learn at your early convenience what provisions are being inserted in the peace terms covering the position of ex-enemy subjects in Egypt.

The memorandum referred to by General Allenby is that numbered P. 31 of the 12th December last.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* See No. 266.

No. 294.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris).

(No. 2783.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 557 of the 24th April,* relative to the draft convention with France concerning Egypt and Morocco, I invite your attention to my despatch No. 554 of the 24th ultimo* relative to the question of the postponement of the abolition of the Capitulations, and of the introduction of the proposed new judicial system. If it becomes necessary to abandon any immediate idea of abolishing the Capitulations, it is, of course, uncertain whether the convention with France can be signed; but in the meantime it would appear desirable to carry the negotiations to a point as near finality as possible, and I am therefore communicating to you my observations on the text contained in your despatch No. 325 of the 27th March.*

Article 3: The reply from the Board of Trade to the Foreign Office letter which was enclosed in my despatch No. 1300 of the 11th March is transmitted herewith.† You will observe that it is regarded as desirable to amplify the provision regarding mining rights in the present article by defining the scope of the term "droits miniers."

As regards the second paragraph of the Board of Trade letter, I presume that the undertaking which the French Government propose to take in regard to the "open door" in Morocco, implying equality of opportunity for all the Allied Powers, must be considered as comprising the question of taxation on exports.

I shall be glad, therefore, to know whether you consider the above-mentioned undertaking on the part of the French Government a sufficiently concrete safeguard for British interests in this respect.

Article 13, paragraph 2: The wording of the text raises the question as to the power of Egypt to conclude treaties in her own name. I am not sure whether the present status of that country should be regarded as giving her such rights or not, and I think it might be well if the matter could be carefully considered by the Legal Advisers of the Foreign Office.

With regard to the subsidiary points mentioned in the draft letter which it had been proposed to address to M. de Fleuriau, and which, as suggested in Mr. Vansittart's letter to Mr. Hubbard of the 27th April,* should, I think, be dealt with at Paris in conjunction with the resumed negotiations regarding the draft convention, there are one or two points in addition to those referred to by Mr. Vansittart which, in my opinion, require attention.

Paragraph 2 in covering letter to M. de Fleuriau. Unless the question has been otherwise provided for it would seem to be still necessary to obtain an assurance as to the meaning to be given to the words "contrôle scolaire."

Paragraph 3 of enclosure in letter: I enclose herein a copy of telegram from Sir H. White replying to Foreign Office telegrams of the 25th March,* of which a copy was addressed to you in my despatch No. 1802 of the 29th March.* In view of this telegram, and of Sir H. White's despatch No. 38,* I would suggest that the French Government should be invited to agree to the insertion in the convention of the original draft article concerning land claims, to apply, however, only to the case of freehold properties.

Paragraph 4: The Acting British Consul at Casa Blanca, who is now in this country on leave of absence, has furnished me with a memorandum on the subject of the increment tax, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. A despatch from Sir H. White is also enclosed* pointing out the insufficiency of the text of the letter to M. de Fleuriau on this point as it now stands, together with a Foreign Office memorandum on the subject.

As British subjects in Morocco have undoubtedly received an impression that His Majesty's Government regard them as being free from the obligation of paying the tax, it is, I think, important that they should be protected to the greatest extent possible from any form of penalisation after the abolition of the capitulation.

I therefore suggest that the French Government should be asked to instruct the Resident-General to give to His Majesty's Minister, if he has not already done so, the assurance for which Sir H. White instructed the acting consul at Casa Blanca to ask in his despatch of the 30th November, which forms an enclosure in his despatch to the Foreign Office of the 14th March.*

* Not printed.

† See No. 291.

At the same time it would be well to remind the French Government of the promise given to Sir H. White by M. de Saint-Aulaire in 1915, to the effect that, having regard to the peculiar position of British property owners in Morocco, the assessment of the tax upon their property when sold should be made "in a very liberal spirit."

With respect to the assurance regarding the status of the Director-General of Antiquities, which is asked for in the draft letter to M. de Fleuriau, I am not aware that the necessity for securing the safeguard aimed at thereby has ceased to exist, and unless some private assurance on the subject has since been received, I think that the matter should not be omitted in the present negotiations.

There remains the question of the position of the British Dominions in regard to the 1856 treaty with Morocco, which is raised in the Colonial Office letter of the 12th February.* That letter was sent to Mr. Hurst on the 3rd March last, and I have no doubt that a satisfactory arrangement could be effected at Paris in consultation with the Colonial Office representatives on the British Delegation.

As suggested in your despatch No. 325, I am communicating article 3 and the first three paragraphs of article 5 to the Association of British Morocco Merchants, and in view of the satisfactory guarantees offered by the French in regard to commercial equality in Morocco, I have no doubt that the members of the Association will be brought to regard the situation with greater equanimity than they have been inclined to show hitherto.

The Council of the Association will, of course, be informed that no publicity is to be given to the articles outside the limits of the Association itself.

I observe that in your telegram to Sir M. Cheetham No. 12 of the 27th February* it is stated that the French desire to arrange for the re-employment under the Egyptian Government of Egyptian officials who will lose their present employment in the French post offices in Egypt when the latter are closed. I shall be glad, for my guidance in dealing with the similar situation in Morocco, to learn what is finally settled in regard to this point.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 295.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon. — (Received May 7.)

(No. 723.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 6, 1919.

FOLLOWING message for Reuter has been received here:—

"Times" says that by one article of Peace Treaty Germany will recognise British protectorate over Egypt and renounce all her privileges arising out of Capitulations connected with Suez Canal.

"Powers hitherto belonging to Sultan of Turkey would be transferred to Great Britain."

Is this statement authoritative?

No. 296.

Projet de Convention relative à l'Application au Maroc et à l'Égypte de la Déclaration du 8 Avril 1904.†

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique,

Ayant, à la suite de la reconnaissance du Protectorat de la France au Maroc et de la Grande-Bretagne en Égypte, jugé le moment venu de donner à la Déclaration du 8 avril 1904 la plénitude de ses effets, tant dans la zone française du Maroc qu'en Égypte, où désormais les deux Gouvernements assument respectivement la responsabilité de la paix, de l'ordre et de la bonne administration;

Après avoir pris connaissance, le Gouvernement français, des garanties que lui

* Not printed.

† Communicated by the British Delegation, Paris, in September 1919, as being the latest draft available with amendments to May 7, 1919.

assure le projet de loi égyptien d'organisation judiciaire des tribunaux unifiés et le Gouvernement britannique, de celles que lui donnent les lois déjà promulguées dans la zone française du Maroc, ont décidé de remplacer le régime actuellement existant dans la zone française du Maroc pour les ressortissants britanniques et en Égypte pour les ressortissants français, par les dispositions suivantes:

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique renonce en faveur du Gouvernement de la République française à tous les droits et privilèges qu'il tient du régime des Capitulations dans la zone française du Protectorat de la France au Maroc.

ARTICLE 2.

Soixante jours après la mise en vigueur de la présente convention, les tribunaux consulaires britanniques de la zone française cesseront de siéger, si ce n'est pour terminer les affaires en cours.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants britanniques jouiront, dans la zone française, en ce qui concerne les libertés publiques, l'administration de la justice, les droits privés, y compris la propriété foncière et les droits miniers, les professions libérales, industrielles et commerciales, les impôts et taxes, du même traitement que les ressortissants français.

Les enfants nés dans la zone française d'un père ressortissant britannique y jouissant de privilèges de l'étranger auront droit à la nationalité britannique; ils ne deviendront pas sujets marocains.

Une liste sera dressée, d'accord entre la Résidence générale de France et le Consulat général de Grande-Bretagne, des indigènes marocains de la zone française qui, jouissant de la protection britannique, seront désormais, leur vie durant, justiciables des tribunaux français de l'Empire chérifien.

ARTICLE 4.

Les consuls généraux, consuls, vice-consuls et agents consulaires de Grande-Bretagne dans la zone française jouiront, dès la fermeture des tribunaux consulaires, des mêmes immunités qu'en France.

Ils continueront d'exercer, dans l'intérêt des particuliers, pour autant que les lois de zone française ne s'y opposeront pas toutes leurs fonctions non judiciaires, dans les mêmes conditions que par le passé.

ARTICLE 5.

En ce qui concerne la zone française, tous traités existant entre la Grande-Bretagne et le Maroc sont et demeurent abrogés.

Toutefois, jusqu'à la conclusion d'un nouveau traité de commerce et de navigation, la convention commerciale anglo-marocaine du 9 décembre 1856, complétée par l'article 68 de l'Acte d'Algésiras du 7 avril 1906 relatif à l'exportation des têtes de bétail de l'espèce bovine, reste en vigueur sauf en ce qui concerne toutes stipulations incompatibles avec l'article 1^{er} de la présente convention.

Sauf en ce qui concerne les conventions de commerce et de navigation, les traités en vigueur entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne s'étendent de plein droit à la zone française.

Pour l'application de la Convention anglo-française du 14 août 1876 relative à l'extradition des criminels, il est convenu que la période de quatorze jours stipulée par l'article 9 s'étendra à deux mois, et, en ce qui concerne la convention du 17 octobre 1908, que la faculté qu'elle donne à chacune des hautes parties contractantes de refuser à l'autre l'extradition de ses nationaux s'étendra, lorsqu'il s'agira de personnes réfugiées dans la zone française, tant aux sujets de Sa Majesté chérifienne qu'aux autres ressortissants français.

ARTICLE 6

En ce qui concerne le régime de la Banque d'État, le rôle de cette banque et la part de la Grande-Bretagne tant dans son capital que dans son administration, le Gouvernement de la Majesté britannique renonce, dans la zone française, à tous les droits qu'il tient de l'Acte d'Algésiras, sans que le Gouvernement de la République française puisse avoir d'autre obligation que de désintéresser pécuniairement, sur leur demande, les porteurs britanniques.

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ARTICLE 7.

Les écoles britanniques de tout ordre continueront à jouir dans la zone française, notamment au point de vue de l'enseignement de la langue anglaise, de la même liberté que par le passé; elles se soumettront aux lois de contrôle scolaire applicables à toutes les écoles européennes de la zone française.

ARTICLE 8.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique renonce à se prévaloir dans la zone française de la Convention de Madrid du 3 juillet 1880, de l'Acte d'Algésiras du 7 avril 1906 et de l'accord du 4 novembre 1911.

Cette renonciation portera effet dès que les autres Puissances alliées, associées ou amies signataires de ce traité, auront également renoncé à s'en prévaloir.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'engage à prêter au Gouvernement de la République française son appui pour obtenir cette renonciation.

ARTICLE 9.

Le Gouvernement de la République française renonce en faveur du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique à tous les droits et privilèges qu'il tient en Égypte du régime des Capitulations.

Il s'engage à prêter au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique son appui pour obtenir des autres Puissances qu'elles y renoncent également.

ARTICLE 10.

Soixante jours après la notification par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique à l'Ambassadeur de la République française à Londres de l'organisation judiciaire nouvelle instituée en Égypte sous l'autorité de la Puissance protectrice, les tribunaux consulaires français cesseront de siéger si ce n'est pour terminer les affaires en cours.

ARTICLE 11.

Les ressortissants français jouiront en Égypte en ce qui concerne les libertés publiques, l'administration de la justice, les droits privés, y compris la propriété foncière et les droits miniers, les professions libérales, industrielles et commerciales, les impôts et taxes, du même traitement que les ressortissants britanniques.

Les enfants nés en Égypte d'un père ressortissant français y jouissant des privilèges de l'étranger, auront droit à la nationalité française; ils ne deviendront pas sujets égyptiens.

ARTICLE 12.

Les consuls généraux, consuls, vice-consuls et agents consulaires de France en Égypte jouiront, dès la fermeture des tribunaux consulaires, des mêmes immunités qu'en Grande-Bretagne.

Ils continueront d'exercer, dans l'intérêt des particuliers, pour autant que les lois de l'Égypte ne s'y opposeront pas, toutes leurs fonctions non judiciaires dans les mêmes conditions que par le passé.

ARTICLE 13.

Tout traité existant entre la France et l'Égypte est et demeure abrogé.

Toutefois, jusqu'à la conclusion d'un nouveau traité de commerce et de navigation entre la France et l'Égypte, les stipulations de la Convention du 26 novembre 1902 restent en vigueur, sauf en ce qui concerne toutes stipulations incompatibles avec l'article 9 de la présente convention.

Sauf en ce qui concerne les conventions de commerce et de navigation, les traités en vigueur entre la Grande-Bretagne et la France s'étendent à l'Égypte.

Pour l'application de la convention anglo-française du 14 août 1876 relative à l'extradition des criminels, il est convenu que la période de quatorze jours stipulée à l'article 9 s'étendra à deux mois, et, en ce qui concerne la convention du 17 octobre 1908, que la faculté qu'elle donne à chacune des hautes parties contractantes de refuser à l'autre l'extradition de ses nationaux s'étendra, lorsqu'il s'agira de personnes réfugiées en Égypte, tant aux sujets de Sa Hautesse le Sultan qu'à tous ressortissants britanniques.

ARTICLE 14.

Pour sauvegarder la situation des porteurs de titres des emprunts émis par le Gouvernement égyptien, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare que, faute par le Gouvernement égyptien de payer l'annuité de la Dette garantie et l'intérêt des Dettes privilégiées ou unifiées, il prendra les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir l'équilibre financier et protéger les intérêts des porteurs de titres de la Dette publique égyptienne.

La Caisse de la Dette publique égyptienne n'ayant dans ces conditions plus de raison d'être pour la protection des porteurs de la Dette égyptienne, le Gouvernement de la République française consent au retrait ou à la modification, dans la mesure que le Gouvernement égyptien jugera convenable, du décret pris par Son Altesse le Khédive le 28 novembre 1904.

ARTICLE 15.

Les écoles françaises de tout ordre continueront à jouir en Égypte, notamment au point de vue de l'enseignement du français, de la même liberté que par le passé; elles se soumettront aux lois de contrôle scolaire applicables à toutes les écoles européennes du Protectorat.

Au cas où les écoles supérieures du Gouvernement égyptien se grouperaient en université, les écoles françaises auraient le droit de s'affilier à l'université ainsi fondée aux mêmes conditions que les autres écoles de même ordre.

Tant que les étrangers garderont au point de vue de l'administration de la justice par les tribunaux unifiés des privilèges quelconques, tout Français jouissant des privilèges de l'étranger en Égypte et muni d'un diplôme donnant accès au barreau de France sera admis au barreau en Égypte dans les mêmes conditions que les Égyptiens muni du diplôme égyptien.

Pendant le même délai, tout autre titulaire d'un diplôme français devra passer, avant d'être admis au barreau égyptien, un examen, au cours duquel il devra justifier d'une bonne instruction secondaire et d'une connaissance suffisante du droit égyptien. Les titulaires du diplôme de baccalauréat français seront dispensés de la première partie de cet examen, mais ils auront à subir les épreuves de langue arabe prescrites pour le baccalauréat égyptien. Quand il s'agira d'un élève de l'École française de Droit du Caire, le jury d'examen comprendra au moins un professeur désigné par la Faculté de Droit de Paris.

ARTICLE 16.

Jusqu'au 8 avril 1934, le poste de Directeur général des Antiquités en Égypte continuera à être confié à un Français.

ARTICLE 17.

En raison de la substitution du Gouvernement britannique au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman dans la charge de la défense territoriale et du maintien de l'ordre public de l'Égypte, le Gouvernement de la République française reconnaît que les pouvoirs conférés à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan par la Convention de Constantinople du 29 octobre 1888 relative à la libre navigation du Canal de Suez sont, par l'effet du Protectorat, transférés au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

ARTICLE 18.

Le Gouvernement de la République française accepte que, sans autre réserve que celle du consentement unanime des Puissances intéressées, tous les droits et devoirs de la Commission internationale de Quarantaine en Égypte passent aux autorités anglo-égyptiennes.

ARTICLE 19.

La présente convention entrera en vigueur dès l'échange des ratifications.

No. 297.

Mr. Delany (*Reuter's Correspondent in Egypt*) to Sir R. Graham.—(Received May 7.)

(Private and Confidential.)

Reuter's, Limited, 24, Old Jewry, London, E.C.,

Dear Sir Ronald Graham,

May 5, 1919.

I HAVE endeavoured, in the accompanying note, to portray the situation in Egypt as it was prior to my departure on the 17th ultimo.

I shall be happy to provide you with supplementary details, should you require these.

Yours sincerely,

G. C. DELANY.

Enclosure in No. 297.

Note.

NO statement, official or otherwise, was published in Egypt regarding the decision arrived at in London, in November, that Rushdy Pasha and Yeghen Pasha should postpone their visit to England until the first week in January, and that the request of the Zaghlul group to leave for Europe should be refused. The people in Egypt would appear to have been under the impression that the refusal in both cases had been categorical, and the first real light thrown on this matter was Earl Curzon's speech published in Egypt at the end of March. I had on more than one occasion endeavoured to treat upon the political situation, but could not obtain the required permission to do so from either the Residency or general headquarters; in fact, the chief censor at general headquarters indicated that I should make myself "very unpopular with the Residency" if I did attempt to do so. The prevailing opinion at that time among British residents was that Egyptians—members of Zaghlul's party or otherwise—should have been allowed the liberty of unrestricted travel.

The riots which occurred in Cairo on the morning of the 11th March, following the deportations to Malta, should never have taken place. In view of the incidents which occurred on the 10th, it was generally thought that the authorities would have been on the *qui vive*, but, as it happened, a mob from Giza was allowed unchecked progress into the town. Early police action should have prevented the mob from crossing the Nile bridge, and thus saved the town from the damage which it subsequently sustained. Riots ensued for two hours until the military assumed control.

While it is possible that an outbreak would have occurred in Egypt in any case, had the situation in Cairo on the 10th and 11th March been properly handled it is very doubtful if the troubles in the provinces would have assumed the proportions they did.

The situation was well controlled by the military authorities until the arrival of General Allenby. Proclamations had been issued to deal with various phases of the situation with desired results. Demonstrations had ceased, and, with a few minor exceptions, Government employes were loyally carrying out their duties, and the anxiety of European residents had largely subsided. I cabled on the 25th March a résumé of the fortnight's events, indicating that although trouble was not yet over, we had seen the worst.

On the 2nd April, when General Allenby was then in Cairo, political agitators were making every effort to promote a three-day strike of Government servants as a protest against Earl Curzon's statement that "one gratifying feature of the deplorable occurrences in Egypt had been the behaviour of many Egyptian officials." It would have been a simple matter to have averted this strike, which subsequently assumed such a grave character, destroying all the hitherto favourable prospects of the early termination of trouble, and so seriously affecting the general economic and political situation of the country. A proclamation by General Allenby, identical in terms to that which he issued three weeks later, should have been promulgated at that moment, for a large majority of Government employes had literally to be dragged from their offices to join the movement. These men really had no option but to leave their work in the face of the intimidation to which they were subjected, and in the absence of any word from General Allenby. With nothing else to occupy their thoughts during the idle days which followed, these men also became obsessed with the idea of "Egypt for the Egyptians." Intimidation reigned supreme, and the European communities were dumb-founded at official inaction, admitting of the total paralysis of trade, and altogether of an unparalleled and dangerous situation.

Throughout this period I was in constant touch with the Nationalist leaders. I had enquired as to their state of mind on the 21st March, after General Bulfin had issued a warning to them, and a record of this interview I gave to general headquarters. They stated that there were two ways of restoring order in the country:—

1. By force. In this connexion they admitted the Egyptian people could be exterminated in five days.
2. By concessions.

Asked as to what they meant by "concessions," they said that if Great Britain, for instance, would only declare that she would act as the mandatory Power over Egypt for a specified number of years, Egypt eventually to obtain self-governing powers, they thought that would appease the people. But, they added, "n'importe quelle concession" should appease the wrath of the people, and it would immediately enable the formation of a Ministry to which they would give all their support. If, in such circumstances, disorders still continued, Great Britain would be justified in resorting to any measure to restore law and order in the country.

The release of Zaghlul was a concession never anticipated. In fact, the impression I gained was that the leaders were greatly alarmed at the turn of events, had been particularly impressed by General Bulfin's warning that he intended to take repressive measures which would bring tremendous suffering upon the country, and that, at any rate for the moment, they were prepared to obliterate Zaghlul from their minds, and to concentrate their energies on helping to form a Ministry, which they declared was the first vital necessity for the restoration of tranquillity.

General Allenby's proclamation of the 7th April came as a bombshell to all of us, and can only be described as a most disastrous decision. The manner in which this inadvisable and totally unlooked-for concession was received by the Egyptian people is well known. The state of mind in which it left the European communities is, perhaps, not so well appreciated.

While it was generally felt—perhaps in the absence of full details—that the November decision was not fair to the Egyptians, the situation in the meantime had undergone such a vital change that the release of Zaghlul should not have been contemplated for a single instant. As affecting British prestige and security in Egypt, General Allenby's action is regarded as nothing short of calamitous. Having regard to that fact that Zaghlul is considered not to have been without knowledge of the organisation which culminated in a rebellion on his deportation, it is strongly felt that his return to Egypt should never be permitted.

The Egyptians misunderstood the whole situation, translating General Allenby's action in releasing Zaghlul into a concession wrung from the British authorities. It led to truculence never hitherto experienced or even imagined, and Egyptians naturally think that they have only to repeat their tactics to wring still larger concessions from us. It must be admitted that General Allenby was faced with a very serious situation on the 7th April, the date of the issue of the Zaghlul proclamation, but it was a situation brought about simply and solely by his own inaction. Men who previously were prepared to stand by us simply had to go over to the other side for their own protection, and the band of intimidators and political adventurers who were permitted so successfully to gain their own ends were, on the 7th April, able to vindicate themselves in the eyes of the whole populace. Zaghlul had been released; the intimidators had won!

The position of British residents in Egypt when I left Cairo on the 15th April was intolerable. On the 10th April, I myself had to take refuge in the Standard Buildings opposite general headquarters from a most fanatical mob, which should never have been permitted to assemble. This menacing mob was even allowed to pass through our own patrols instead of being immediately dispersed and its ringleaders arrested. It was under such circumstances that British soldiers were murdered, and Armenians sought out and killed. One felt that even a little display of force would have effectually stopped all demonstrations which were taking place daily in defiance of proclamations issued prior to General Allenby's arrival. It was necessary for all Englishmen to be armed when venturing into the streets, and none of us felt secure, even in our own residences. Overt insults to Englishmen and women were the order of the day, and nothing was being done to our knowledge to counteract this humiliating situation. British prestige had reached its low-water mark, and, unless there be some radical and instant change of policy to restore British prestige and security to its former level, life in Egypt for an Englishman will become impossible.

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No. 298.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 552.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 7, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 711: Penultimate paragraph.

"Times" inform us privately that they have received reports from persons who have returned from Egypt of abduction or outrage of British women during disturbances in Egypt. Wife of British official of railways, who was murdered at Wasta, is said to have been ill-treated by mob. What are facts, and are civilians still missing from outlying districts?

It is very desirable that official statement should be made here to contradict impression that we conceal news.

Please telegraph approximate casualties, killed and wounded, not only of troops but also British civilians.

It would be useful also for propaganda purposes to know of any casualties to foreigners, other than British, or loyal native officials.

No. 299.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 558.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 8, 1919.

MY telegram No. 539. (Refers to a request from General Allenby that M. Vayssié, Editor of the "Journal du Caire," who went to Paris to organise propaganda on behalf of the Nationalists, should be prevented from returning to Egypt.)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris was instructed by Mr. Balfour to approach French Government with a view to preventing return of Vayssié to Egypt. They consider it extremely difficult to do so in view of his domicile being in Cairo, and his position as editor of a French newspaper, which receives a small Government subvention. They thought that Vayssié, who was hand in glove with the Egyptian delegation, and was carrying on propaganda for them, would be more likely to do harm in France than in Egypt, where he could be more easily controlled. Lord Derby concurs in this view. French Government promise that he will be severely spoken to and warned that an anti-British campaign will be considered an anti-French campaign, which may get him into serious trouble.

French Foreign Minister has assured Lord Derby that he has given instructions to French press to stop publication of false news concerning Egyptian situation. Lord Derby has discussed with French Foreign Minister despatch of suitable French newspaper correspondent. M. Pichon appears willing to support this proposal, but thinks a representative for some general agency would be better than one for a single paper.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 814.)

No. 300.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 739.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 8, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 552.*

Position of British women in provinces has frequently been extremely unpleasant, but no reports, official or unofficial, of outrage or abduction have been received. Origin of rumours was probably grave anxiety at first felt as to whether nurses were on same train as officers murdered at Deirut. Wife of British railway official murdered at Wasta was hustled but not otherwise molested, and she and her children were protected by native official. There is no reason to suppose any civilians are still missing from outlying districts. Information desired as to casualties will follow.

* See No. 298.

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No. 301.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 733.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 8, 1919.

MY despatch No. 204 of 4th May.

Following is résumé of a further report received from Governor-General of Soudan: there has been a rapid development in regard to apprehension of Soudanese Nationalist movement in Egypt should result in British leaving Soudan or handing it over to Egyptians. Principal religious leaders and an independent religious man of great influence have presented two letters to Governor-General for transmission to High Commission and His Majesty's Government, in which they claim to speak for people of Soudan and emphatically disassociate themselves from any sympathy whatever with Nationalist activities in Egypt. Letters are entirely spontaneous, Governor-General having discouraged any expression of feeling because he thought it would be a mistake at this time to make it appear that we were counting on Soudanese support against Egyptian movement. General Stack is convinced that letters represent what people of Soudan think, and adds that he has no doubt that attitude of Soudanese is known to Egyptians in Soudan, and has had effect of making latter feel that their best policy would be to keep in with British.

Egyptian community in Khartoum had intended to send a telegram of congratulation to Rushdy Pasha expressing sympathy with Nationalist movement. A meeting was held at the Coptic Club on Easter Sunday to discuss the project; it was, however, discountenanced by most of senior men and has not matured.

General Stack points out that Soudan must be affected by any policy developed by His Majesty's Government in regard to future Government of Egypt, and asks for early intimation of what policy will be. Can this be given in form of a message from His Majesty's Government in reply to letters of religious leaders, copies of which I am sending by next post?

No. 302.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 742.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 8, 1919.

AZHARIST students and some roughs made a demonstration last night in direction of the residency. Troops rapidly arrived on the scene, and dispersed demonstrators, who numbered about 2,000; 50 arrests were made.

Two thousand Alexandria dock labourers, who had been on strike since 5th May, returned to work to-day.

No. 303.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 748.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 9, 1919.

EXCEPT for attempted demonstration by about 100 persons yesterday evening situation has remained quiet. Publication of peace terms has thrown extremists into deep depression. Prospects of the formation of a new Ministry have improved and I have discussed matter with Sultan, but it seems still too early to take action.

No. 304.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 574.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 10, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 630 of 23rd April.

It is not proposed to send a Royal Commission, but rather a Special Mission. Although this Mission would be charged with the task of enquiring into and reporti n

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upon recent events, its principal object would be to advise His Majesty's Government as to the future Government of Egypt, and its terms of reference might be as follows:—

"To enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests."

The Mission would, therefore, be entirely independent of the Residency, although Lord Milner would naturally keep in the closest touch with the latter, and the supreme administrative authority of the special High Commissioner would remain quite unaffected by his presence in Egypt.

It appears to us to be important to emphasise the wider rather than the narrower aspect of the work of the Mission, and to represent it as a deliberate act of policy and a necessary stage in the constitutional evolution of the country, rather than as a step that has been directly forced upon us by recent rising. With regard to the date of the Mission, the position is as follows: Lord Milner for various reasons cannot go before September. If, therefore, in your opinion, its immediate despatch is necessary, another head must be found.

It appears to us, however, that it may be possible and even advantageous, to prepare the ground by an immediate local enquiry, instituted by yourself, into the direct causes of the recent disorders and the grievances of the fellahen in respect of forced labour, requisitions, and abuses of power by local authorities, &c. On such a Commission a native official or officials might serve along with experienced British officers to investigate these questions of fact. The evidence collected by this Commission would be invaluable to the Special Mission when it reaches Egypt, while its appointment would satisfy people that something was being done.

If you agree with policy here suggested, we would propose to announce it in Parliament at an early date, probably next week.

No. 305.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 738.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, May 8, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 526.*

Egyptian Navigation Companies may now register their ships in Egyptian ports, and fly the Egyptian flag.

Scheme is in preparation by which procedure of registration similar to that carried on in the United Kingdom can be established in Egypt.

No. 306.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 758.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 11, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 460.†

Following is rough preliminary estimate of cost of restoration in Egyptian pounds: State railways 200,000, State irrigation works 40,000, State buildings 50,000, State roads 75,000, Light railway companies 50,000, Cairo Tramways Company 20,000, gas and electric companies, 1,000.

Damage to irrigation works touches buildings and stores, canals and regulating works have scarcely suffered. Damage to roads mainly affects superstructure bridges. Damage to light railways is chiefly to station buildings. As far as is known no damage was done to monuments or antiques. Damage to material of water supply companies is trivial. More accurate and detailed information will be sent by despatch as soon as possible.

* See No. 262.

† See No. 177.

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No. 307.

Inter-Departmental Pilgrimage Quarantine Committee.

Minutes of Meeting held at the Foreign Office on Tuesday, May 13, 1919, at 3 P.M.

Present:

Dr. G. BUCHANAN, C.B., Local Government Board (*in the Chair*)

Lieut.-Colonel E. WILKINSON, Local Government Board.

Sir HAVELOCK CHARLES, G.C.V.O., India Office.

Major H. W. YOUNG, D.S.O., Foreign Office.

The Committee had before them—

Foreign Office letter No. 2770 of the 6th May to Mr. Balfour.

Foreign Office letter No. 66693/M.E. 44 of the 7th May to Local Government Board.

General Allenby's telegram No. 694 of the 2nd May to Foreign Office.

Notes by Major C. P. Thomson of the 8th May.

1. *Points arising out of the last Meeting.*

It was decided to await replies from Mr. Balfour and the Local Government Board to the Foreign Office letters.

Sir Havelock Charles said that the India Office had telegraphed to the Government of India informing them of Colonel Wilkinson's proposed mission, and a reply was awaited.

2. *Colonel Wilkinson's Mission.*

The Chairman said that Dr. Granville, the President of the International Egyptian Quarantine Board, was now in London, and had kindly undertaken to do all he could to assist Colonel Wilkinson.

It was decided to ask the Foreign Office to telegraph to General Allenby as soon as Colonel Wilkinson's mission was finally sanctioned, asking him (i) to instruct the Resident at Aden and the British Agent at Jeddah to give every facility for cable communication, as it was essential that Colonel Wilkinson's report should not be delayed; (ii) to arrange with the naval or other authorities for steamer accommodation.

It was decided that it was unnecessary for Colonel Wilkinson to go on to Bombay, as all requirements of urgency would be met if he kept the G.O.C., Aden, and the High Commissioner, Cairo, informed of the recommendations he was making to the Committee. He should, however, make a note of any spare material in Egypt on his way through and mention that it was available there when submitting his telegraphic report.

Colonel Wilkinson said that he proposed to sail from Marseilles on the "Malwa" on the 28th May, and it was decided to ask the Foreign Office to arrange for his passage as soon as the reply of the Local Government Board and the Treasury had been received, and to furnish him with the necessary credentials.

3. *Dr. Granville.*

The Chairman read a note by Dr. Granville on the Inter-Departmental Conference of the 18th March, from which it appeared that some time was in any case likely to elapse before the Egyptian and Sudan Governments could take over the duties of the International Egyptian Quarantine Board. It was decided that, as a matter of courtesy, Dr. Granville should be invited to attend future meetings of the Committee while he was in England.

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4. *General Allenby's Telegram.*

It was decided that the Committee adhered to the principles—

- (a.) That the international obligations on the Constantinople Board to maintain quarantine regulations at Jeddah, &c., ought to be carried out under the present régime, and that an efficient station there should be established and worked on lines approved by the next Sanitary Conference; and
- (b.) That efficiency cannot be secured by the station being under the control of King Hussein, except as a matter of form.

1. It was pointed out that the only alternative to some form of British control at Jeddah and Yembo, in view of King Hussein's inability to organise effective measures, would be international control.

The Committee fully recognised the necessity for reducing quarantine work in the Hejaz itself to a minimum, but deprecated General Allenby's conclusion that quarantine arrangements in the Hejaz should for this year be left in the hands of King Hussein. It was pointed out that it was precisely for this year that it was essential to institute effective measures in order to obviate the danger of a demand for international control in the future. British control was therefore desirable, but with an Arab façade. An analogy was drawn between the quarantine situation at Jeddah and the military situation at Akaba during the war. The proportion of King Hussein's subsidy necessary for Feisal's operations had been deducted by the British representative before it was paid to King Hussein, and general supervision was exercised over the manner in which this sum was spent, though the appearance of British control was avoided. It was suggested that the same procedure could now be adopted with regard to quarantine arrangements. Whatever sum was reported by Colonel Wilkinson to be necessary for quarantine arrangements at Jeddah and Yembo could be set aside from the King's subsidy for quarantine work before the subsidy was paid, and the actual quarantine arrangements could be supervised by medical officers working on the same footing as those who had advised Feisal's army during the war. King Hussein's objection to the medical mission which had visited Jeddah in 1918 was that it was sent by the Egyptian Government. No such objection seemed likely to be raised if, for example, the King were offered the services of Major Marshall or Captain Ramsay, who had worked with Feisal's army and thoroughly understood the method of the façade. It was decided to ask the Foreign Office to suggest the procedure to General Allenby and to point out to him that while it would not entail definite British responsibility it would at least ensure a degree of efficiency which might obviate the necessity for international control in the future. In any case the Treasury would not welcome any charge on Imperial funds over and above the subsidy.

2. It was presumed that the Foreign Office would take necessary action. *The Chairman* asked what steps should be taken towards notifying the Governments and shipping companies concerned that the duties of the International Board at Constantinople would for this year be carried out at Kamaran by the British authorities, and what powers His Majesty's Government would have to enforce the detention of pilgrim ships. It was decided that any such notification would more suitably emanate from King Hussein, and that the Foreign Office should be asked to suggest to General Allenby in their reply to his telegram that, in the event of his concurring in the façade method at Jeddah and Yembo, he should move the King to notify all concerned through the British authorities.

3. It was explained that the Netherlands Government had already removed the restrictions on the pilgrimage from the Dutch East Indies.

4. It was noted that pilgrimages by the land route would be discouraged in every way.

5. It was decided to ask the Foreign Office to suggest to General Allenby that the British Agent at Jeddah should be given discretion not to insist on the return of unquarantined ships to Kamaran unless the quarantine staff at Jeddah were unable to cope with them, and that in any case the order to return should come nominally from King Hussein who should be asked to warn all concerned that this would be done when he sent out the notifications suggested under (2).

6. It was pointed out that General Allenby was being kept fully informed of the decisions of the Committee.

7. Noted.
8. Noted.
9. Noted.

The last sentence of General Allenby's telegram was noted with satisfaction by the Committee, who had previously arrived at the same conclusion. They hoped that the suggested arrangement, by which a proportion of the subsidy should be set aside for quarantine arrangements under camouflaged British control, would be concurred in.

5. *Notes by Major C. P. Thomson.*

The Committee concurred generally in Major Thomson's conclusions. They felt that they had been established as an expert body which knew the serious risks of the widespread extension of plague and cholera in other countries which would arise if the sanitary protection of the Haj were not properly secured, and had a duty to advise how such a calamity could be prevented, and how the principles of the international agreements relating to the pilgrimage danger could be maintained under the new conditions.

The Committee could not advise the Government to countenance any proposal even for this year which would leave the precautions at Jeddah and other Hejaz ports in practice under Arab control. From the public health point of view, an efficient British-run system was required at these ports, linked up with Kamaran and Tor under a system which could be presented to, and justified at, the next International Conference. If political reasons made the establishment of an efficient British-run system impracticable, then on health grounds it seemed imperative to secure the same results in another way, even if this involved the establishment of an international controlling body for the Hejaz ports.

If the proposals for the façade system were adopted, the King could be represented as having selected His Majesty's Government to assist him in his quarantine service. The quarantine arrangements would be under him as an independent potentate, but the British staff would be fully at liberty to make efficient arrangements and to insist that efficiency must be a condition of the service.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1919.

No. 308.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 760.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 11, 1919.

MY telegram No. 676.

Governor-General suggests that end of June would be most suitable time for visit of Soudanese notables to England, presuming that peace has been signed by then (see first paragraph of my telegram No. 654). Ramazan fast will then be over, and weather in England will be warm.

Governor-General considers announcement of visit should not be made until peace terms have been or are just about to be signed—otherwise, he fears, it would be thought here that we were exploiting our good relations with the Soudan as a counterblast to the Egyptian Nationalist movement, and thus increase in the Soudan the strained feeling between Egyptians and Soudanese, and aggravate a situation which is already delicate.

No. 309.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 762.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 11, 1919.

THE last twenty-four hours have been quiet in Cairo and provinces, but agitation in Azhar still continues.

Regular daily telegrams will not be sent in future if situation remains unchanged.

No. 310.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris).(No. 670.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, May 12, 1919.*

FOLLOWING received from General Allenby, Cairo, No. 731:—

"Following telegram translated from the French was sent on 3rd May by the Armenian Patriarch, Cairo, to Boghos Pasha Nubar, Paris:—

"We thank you for your warm sympathy. Our victims, Cairo, 18 killed wounded 19, damage to property considerable, detailed list in preparation. Church schools and nearly all Armenian shops still shut. About 4,000 Armenians sheltered in camp at Heliopolis, have for the last four days been fed by military authorities. In Alexandria and provinces damage to property only. Thanks to military protection panic diminished everywhere, but anti-Armenian rumours continue among lower classes, despite promises and appeals by Egyptian notables. We have categorically denied the accusations, spread intentionally, no Armenian having committed any hostile act, a fact which we asked to have confirmed by mixed commission of enquiry."

(Repeated to Rome, No. 500; Berne (by bag), No. 512; and Paris (by bag), No. 841.)

No. 311.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).(No. 580.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, May 12, 1919.*

YOUR despatch No. 168* and your telegram No. 731.

Egyptian Nationalists in Paris appear to be making propaganda on allegation that outbreak in Egypt was in no sense characterised by xenophobia. Mr. Balfour would be glad to have in form, suitable, if necessary, for communication, statement of attacks on Greeks and Armenians, together with total approximate casualties.

I have transmitted copies of your communications quoted above. Please supply any further information available, especially with regard to attacks on Greeks.

No. 312.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 13.)(No. 753.)
(Telegraphic.)*Cairo, May 10, 1919.*

THREE small disturbances took place in Cairo last night. Fourteen natives were wounded, and thirty arrests were made. Otherwise all quiet. Peace terms have subdued the enthusiasm of all but absolute extremists.

(Repeated to India and Khartoum.)

No. 313.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).(No. 582.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, May 13, 1919.*

YOUR telegram No. 711: Press campaign against alleged atrocities committed by British troops.

It would be useful to have further independent favourable testimony, such as that referred to in paragraph 5, from foreign witnesses.

It would also be well if any information or proof could be obtained respecting the faking of photographs which the Egyptian nationalists have already begun to show in Paris.

* Not printed

No. 314.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 583.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 13, 1919.

IT has been seriously represented to us that one of the chief causes of the present discontent among educated native classes is the large increase in number of government posts held by British officials.

It is very desirable that we should know the facts, and I should be glad if you would transmit by bag a statement showing the number of posts held by British as compared with those held by natives in the different Ministries during the last ten years, including therein budget proposals for 1919-20.

No. 315.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14).

(No. 712.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 12, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's immediate despatch No. 2793 of the 6th May,* I consider that it would be preferable to get the draft agreement, of which a copy has already been sent to your Lordship, settled and signed with the French Government as soon as possible, before anything is said either to them or to any other Power as to the necessity of reconsidering the schemes for the introduction of Courts of universal jurisdiction in Egypt and for introducing new codes upon the lines on which we have hitherto worked. When the agreement with the French Government is signed, the whole situation, so far as concerns the termination of the Consular Courts and mixed tribunals and the ending of the present conflicting jurisdictions, can be re-examined on its merits either at the same time as the impending mission to Egypt or at a later date in the light of its report.

The draft agreement with France, now practically ready for signature, only provides for the closing of the French Courts sixty days after notice that there is something else ready to take its place, and though it may be necessary to keep the French informed as to any radical alterations which we may make in this system adopted in the draft law of judicial organisation, I see no reason to assume that they will make difficulties for us provided that French nationals are treated on the same footing as British nationals. Re-examination of the position may entail a further prolongation of the mixed tribunals, but this is a minor evil.

With regard to the latter part of Lord Allenby's telegram No. 672 of the 29th April enclosed in your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, paragraph 5 may stand over until the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, which does not appear imminent, is under consideration. Paragraph 6 is covered by article 118 in the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany. Paragraph 7 is covered by article 151 of the same draft treaty. With regard to paragraph 8, it is not intended to guarantee foreign privileges to Ottoman subjects in Egypt.

I am, &c.
(For Mr. Balfour)
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 316.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 776.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 13, 1919.

SIR R. WINGATE'S despatch No. 353† last year.

Neguib Boutros Pasha Ghali, late Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and son of murdered Coptic Prime Minister Boutros Pasha, has left for France. He resigned office in March with President of the Council and Adly Pasha, his great friends and supporters. He served four years under Protectorate with a very ill grace.

He is conceited, ambitious, and anti-English; is fond of drink, and at such times extremely indiscreet; rich but very mean. His wife is an Armenian and near relative

* See 294.

† Not printed. (Interview of Mr. Grag with Neguib Pasha.)

of Boghos Nubar Pasha. His relations with Egyptian delegates will presumably be intimate. His brother, Wassif Ghali, resides in Paris.

I do not consider he carries much weight with Coptic community, who regard him as idle and self-seeking.

(Sent to Peace Delegation, No. 776.)

No. 317.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 780.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 13, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 558.*

Fact that "Le Journal du Caire" is subsidised as stated seems to be an additional reason either for dismissal of Vayssié or for insistence on change of attitude in a journal which is systematically anti-British (see my despatch No. 130, 25th March). Apart from censorship we have no local means of controlling Vayssié's activities, and cannot count upon support from French agency who have not rendered smallest assistance during present crisis, and are, indeed, constantly complaining about our censorship of French news and newspapers.

No. 318.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 782.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 13, 1919.

MY telegram No 739.†

Military casualties for all Egypt since the 9th March are: British and colonial officers killed, 5; wounded, 2. British and colonial other ranks killed, 22; wounded, 68. Indian officers killed, 1; wounded, 3. Indian other ranks killed, 8; wounded, 37.

British civilian casualties 4 killed, including Majors Jarvis and Pope, and several narrow escapes.

Corrected foreign casualties for Cairo only are: Armenians killed, 15; wounded,

11. Greeks killed, 4; wounded, 2.

Details regarding civilian foreigners in provinces will be telegraphed later.

No. 319.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 788.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 14, 1919.

SUEZ Canal Company's employes struck work at 9.45 yesterday evening.

Personnel of shipping and coaling agencies followed suit.

Coal coolies wavering, but it is still hoped that they may continue to work.

Water supply was completely cut off for six hours yesterday, but is now working satisfactorily.

Canal and commercial services maintained by military and naval help.

Situation complicated by other labour joining movement. Measures taken to cope with coaling if coolies strike, also measures taken to prevent intimidation. No disorders yet, but these may occur after two or three days.

(Repeated to Khartoum.)

* See No. 299.

† See No. 300.

No. 320.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 592.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 14, 1919.

MY telegram No. 574.*

A discussion on Egypt will take place in both Houses of Parliament to-morrow, Thursday, afternoon.

A declaration of policy of His Majesty's Government will have to be made.

Please reply Sub-Committee if you have not already done so.

No. 321.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 794.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 14, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 592 of 14th May.†

Arrival of Special Commission in Egypt should not, in my opinion, be later than next month.

I think that it would be a mistake to defer it until September.

I concur in terms of reference stated in your telegram No. 574.

As regards local commission suggested in penultimate paragraph of that telegram, I should state that a considerable amount of material bearing on grievances of fellahen already exists in shape of reports of political officers and recorded opinions of experienced observers amongst various classes of community, British, native, and foreign. Every effort will be made to collect as much further information as is possible respecting direct causes of recent troubles and to collect existing material for use of mission. But I consider that main causes of outbreak are of a political nature, and that we could not usefully institute a preliminary local enquiry involving summoning and examining of witnesses without anticipating work of special mission. It must be borne in mind that investigation of political dissatisfaction might, in many instances, bring under review measures taken by British, military, and civil authorities. Formation of a local commission, and especially employment of native Egyptian officials, would therefore present great difficulties, but I think by systematising present methods of enquiry useful preparatory work can be done.

No. 322.

Statement on the Situation in Egypt made by Earl Curzon of Kedleston in the House of Lords on May 15, 1919.

MY Lords: I gladly respond to the invitation addressed to me by the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition. Indeed, I welcome the opportunity of making such a statement to the House as Parliament, in view of the circumstance to which the noble Marquess has just drawn attention—namely, the singular reticence displayed in both Houses of Parliament on this subject—is undoubtedly entitled to receive. Six weeks have elapsed since I made my last statement in your Lordships' House on this subject, and during that period there has certainly been an improvement in the situation in Egypt, although it cannot yet be described as satisfactory. All the information at our disposal, as the noble Marquess hinted, has been given to the press, and full reports on recent occurrences have appeared.

In the provinces order has been generally restored and the cultivators have returned to work. In some of the towns, however, and especially in Cairo, there have been sporadic disturbances, which have had to be quelled by force. The Azhar University continues to be a centre of agitation, and the students have throughout taken a leading part in fomenting disorders. As regards what occurred in the provinces, your Lordships will have read with horror and indignation of the dastardly murder of eight unarmed British officers and men returning from a holiday at Luxor in the Upper Egypt express. That is now many weeks ago and in the earlier stages of the outbreak. Later reports show that this crime was perpetrated by the local fellahen, and not, as was at first

* See No. 304.

† See No. 320.

supposed, by the Bedouin. The peasant of Upper Egypt is naturally violent in character, and on the present occasion reports, for which there was not the remotest vestige of foundation, of outrages alleged to have been committed by British troops, such as the burning of mosques and assaults on women, may have led to such an outbreak of ferocity. The whole matter is being made the subject of judicial enquiry, and justice will be done. There was also in Cairo an organised attack on the peaceful Armenian inhabitants, forty of whom were killed or injured and several thousand others had to be collected in a refugee camp under British military protection. Such an incident had clearly nothing to do with British rule, and revealed only too obviously the hand of the Young Turk in the background. These outrages and the destruction of Greek property in the provincial towns form an instructive commentary on the Nationalist protestations that their movement is devoid of xenophobia.

Attempts have been made to represent that atrocities have been committed by the British troops in Egypt. Such allegations are a natural form for Nationalist propaganda to take. They are entirely devoid of truth. The troops have shown most praiseworthy restraint under very trying circumstances, especially when it is remembered that, apart from the outrage on the Luxor express, to which I have already referred, there have been a number of brutal murders of isolated, unarmed British soldiers by the native mob, and that patrols and sentries have been sniped and ambushed without the least provocation.

I am glad to say that various reports received, and in some cases published, as to outrages and murders of British civilians and women in outlying districts do not appear to have any foundation in fact, beyond that of the murder of a British railway inspector at Wasta and the ill-treatment of his wife. But several civilians had narrow escapes, and in certain cases Egyptians have shown courage and devotion in saving them.

In my last statement to your Lordships I alluded to the good behaviour of many of the Egyptian officials and of the army and police. In so far as certain of the first of these categories is concerned, my statement was destined to be falsified. At the beginning of April nearly all the officials in Government offices struck work, to their own detriment and to the loss and inconvenience of their fellow-countrymen, and all efforts of Rushdy Pasha and the Egyptian Ministers to induce them to return to their duties failed. Among their demands were complete independence for Egypt and immediate official recognition of Saad Zaghlul and the Nationalist leaders as the representatives of the Egyptian nation. On the 22nd April General Allenby issued a proclamation calling upon them to return to work at once under penalty of dismissal. This proclamation had the desired effect, and within a short period the majority of the officials concerned had returned to their duties. Similarly the students who had left their schools and colleges were ordered to return to work by the 3rd May. Only a very small percentage have done so, and the schools have been closed.

Immediately after his arrival General Allenby, in the exercise of the full discretionary powers granted to him as Special High Commissioner, decided that the principal Nationalists should be permitted to leave Egypt for Europe, and that the four leaders, including Zaghlul Pasha, who had been interned at Malta, should be given the same freedom. This concession led to the immediate formation of an Egyptian Ministry under Rushdy Pasha. The principal task of this Ministry was to induce the Government officials to return to work, but in this task it failed completely, and after barely a fortnight in office it resigned on the 22nd April, since which date the affairs of Egypt have been conducted without the assistance of native Ministers. In the meantime Zaghlul Pasha and his partisans arrived in Paris on the 19th April. They have styled themselves "The Egyptian National Deputation," but the enjoyment of ample funds and the capacity to spend them does not appear, so far, to have been attended by definite results.

On the 22nd April President Wilson recognised the British Protectorate over Egypt proclaimed on the 18th December, 1914. Our Protectorate had been recognised by the French and by the late Imperial Russian Governments at the time that the declaration was made. As your Lordships are aware, a clause has been inserted in the Peace Treaties with the enemy Powers under which they will all be called upon to recognise the British Protectorate over Egypt, nor can a long period elapse before it will have received universal recognition. The moment must shortly come, if it has not already arrived, when moderate and sober-minded Egyptians, for such there are, will ask themselves whether the game has been worth playing and will begin to apportion responsibilities.

I regret to record that the damage inflicted on railway equipment and communications during the outbreak has been very serious. Indispensable structures and

instruments have been destroyed which cannot easily be repaired or replaced. The difficulties of transport and travelling are already causing inconvenience, but will be more severely felt at the end of the summer when the crops have to be moved. The loss and hardship will fall, not on the agitators, the students who have organised and led the campaign of destruction, but upon the landowners and cultivators who may have taken part in it, but will soon realise that they themselves are the principal sufferers, and that they have been grievously misled.

For, my Lords, what in the end will this Egyptian outbreak, with its concomitant loss of life, widespread suffering, and destruction of property, have achieved? If it was undertaken for the purpose of terminating the British connection with Egypt and of obtaining Egyptian independence, it was foredoomed to failure. I cannot declare too emphatically that His Majesty's Government have no intention whatsoever of ignoring or abandoning the obligations and responsibilities which they incurred when the task of governing Egypt was placed upon their shoulders. These obligations and responsibilities have been confirmed by the declaration of our Protectorate over the country. This fact is generally appreciated not only here but by all well-instructed foreign opinion which holds a stake in Egypt or is interested in its future prosperity and good government.

If, on the other hand, the agitation had been intended to call attention to legitimate aspirations and to grievances or dissatisfaction with the existing system of administration, it was hardly the method by which that end could best be attained. The British Government have always been ready to lend a most sympathetic ear to whatever Egyptian Ministers, or any responsible representatives of Egyptian opinion, had to say on these subjects. We have never had any intention of coming to a decision with regard to the definition of the Protectorate and to such constitutional or administrative changes as may be necessary—all of them matters vitally affecting Egyptian interests—without affording the Egyptians a full opportunity of stating their views, and an assurance to this effect had been given to the present Sultan. We should, indeed, have been quite ready to have heard Zaghlul Pasha and his friends if they had not opened the proceedings by demanding our complete retirement from the country. This was an impossible condition, which did not even provide a basis for reasonable discussion.

That there are no legitimate Egyptian aspirations or grievances His Majesty's Government would be the last to declare. The former will, as time passes and as the case is established, receive an ever-increasing measure of satisfaction. The latter must be recognised, but should not be exaggerated. There are few nations that have not suffered grievances and hardships during the period of the war. Few have been in such a fortunate position as Egypt in escaping to such a large extent, owing to British protection, the losses, privations, and sufferings of the last four years. In Egypt the Government Reserve Fund has been increased threefold, and, owing to the enhanced prices of cotton and of every form of agricultural produce, the national wealth has grown by leaps and bounds. Nor is there any reason to believe that the population as a whole has not shared in the general wave of prosperity. But in Egypt, as elsewhere, the official and professional classes and the town inhabitants have not benefited to the same degree as the cultivator, and have seen a rise in prices out of all proportion to the increase of their resources. This has naturally caused discontent. Egypt could scarcely escape being affected by the general wave of unrest, dissatisfaction, and vague political aspirations which is passing over the entire world as the after effect of four years of crisis.

There is, further, no doubt that the *amour-propre* of the intellectual classes has been wounded by the fact that no place was found for Egypt at the Peace Conference, to which representatives of our Indian Empire and of the Arab Kingdom and of the Hedjaz had been admitted. The widespread resentment caused by the fact that Saad Zaghlul and his party were not originally allowed to proceed to Europe to advocate the cause of Egyptian independence shows the considerable amount of success that their agitation had achieved. The forthcoming abolition of Capitulations has raised exaggerated apprehensions as to the future Anglicisation of the Egyptian Courts. There have also been fears that we contemplated replacing Egyptian by British officials on a large scale, although no such policy would meet with any favour here. A rough draft of proposals for constitutional reforms, shown privately to Rushdy Pasha, seems also to have created unnecessary alarm.

Nor are the causes of dissatisfaction among the agricultural classes far to seek. Successive British Commanders-in-chief in the East have all borne witness to the valuable services rendered to our armies by the Egyptian Labour and Camel Corps. During the last two years their numbers have been maintained at a high figure, and

their recruitment has undoubtedly given opportunities to the class of minor native official for corruption and favouritism, which escaped proper control owing to the depletion in the ranks of the British inspectorate, absorbed in other war duties. The same may be said as regards the requisition of fodder and foodstuffs. Stories of the ill-treatment of this Labour Corps have appeared in the press and are now under investigation by the military authorities. Personally I should be slow to believe that proceedings can have occurred which would be foreign to the traditions of the British Army, or that the treatment of the Labour Corps was less good than were certainly the pay and nourishment given to them. Full use has been made by unscrupulous agitators of a state of mind and of grievances, some imaginary and others undoubtedly real, but nearly all of them arising from war conditions, which predisposed the Egyptians to revolt. The result has been a systematically organised outbreak of extreme violence, and on an extended scale, in which enemy instigation and influence and prolonged preparation are clearly discernible. So much for the past.

Your Lordships will now expect me—indeed the noble Marquess directly invited me—to say something about the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government as regards the future. It had always been the intention of His Majesty's Government to take the very earliest opportunity, when the war was over and the peace negotiations had reached a stage which rendered it possible, to form and send out to Egypt a strong Commission. This Commission would determine the nature of the new Protectorate, and would submit recommendations with regard to the future administration of the country. Recent events have increased instead of diminished the need for such an enquiry. His Majesty's Government propose, therefore, to dispatch a special Mission, over which Lord Milner has been invited to preside, to enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests. The Mission will be sent with the full knowledge and approval of the Special High Commissioner in Egypt, and will rely upon his advice and assistance. In the meantime General Allenby is preparing the ground by a systematic local enquiry into the direct causes of the recent disorders and the grievances of the fellaheen in respect of forced labour, requisitions, and abuses of power by local authorities. The evidence thus collected will be invaluable to the special Mission when it reaches Egypt.

I sincerely trust and believe, my Lords, that the result of the proposed Mission will be to clear away misunderstandings and to confirm the British Protectorate of Egypt on conditions which will be equally satisfactory to the protecting Power and to the inhabitants of the country. We have never had the least wish to repress Egyptian individuality. On the contrary, we accept the principle that Egyptians should be given an ever-increasing share in the government of their country, and it is our earnest desire to see Egypt, under our Protectorate, advance in prosperity and enlightenment, and take her rightful place as a leading Islamic Power.

No. 323.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 773.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, May 13, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 516.*

Nothing is known here of any such present to Sayed Mohammed of Idrisi.

No. 324.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 521.)

My Lord.

Paris, May 13, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Balfour, enclosing copy of a letter from the head of the African Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, containing a notification communicated

* See No. 257

to the French press regarding the recognition by the French Government in 1914 of the British protectorate over Egypt and the question of the Capitulations.

I have, &c.

DERBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 324.

The Earl of Derby to Mr Balfour

(No. 9.)

Sir,

Paris, May 13, 1919.

IN a private letter dated the 5th instant Sir Louis Mallet informed me that you desired that some sort of reminder should be published in the French press of the fact that the French Government recognised in 1914 the British protectorate over Egypt.

I accordingly directed Mr. Henderson to enquire semi-officially at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether M. Pichon would be prepared to suggest to the French journalists that in referring to the Egyptian question they should recall this fact, and mention that the French Government in so recognising our protectorate had merely reserved for future discussion certain details relating to the Capitulations.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from M. Peretti della Rocca, the head of the African Department of that Ministry, enclosing the text of a notification to this effect, which, he states, has been communicated to the French press, but which has not yet been published by it.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

DERBY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 324.

M. Peretti della Rocca to Mr. Henderson.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,

Paris, le 12 mai 1919.

Mon cher Collègue,

J'AI l'honneur de vous communiquer sous ce pli le texte d'une note que le Département remet à la presse française, pour répondre au désir que vous avez exprimé au sujet de la reconnaissance du protectorat britannique sur l'Égypte. Déjà une note semblable avait été donnée aux journaux; mais l'abondance des matières en ces temps-ci les avait sans doute amenés à négliger des nouvelles d'une date qu'ils ont trouvée un peu ancienne.

Veuillez, &c.

E. DE PERETTI DELLA ROCCA.

Enclosure 3 in No. 324.

Note issued to Press.

LES États-Unis viennent de reconnaître officiellement l'établissement du protectorat britannique sur l'Égypte. Par l'application de l'accord franco-anglais du 8 avril 1904, la France avait reconnu au mois de décembre 1914 l'établissement du protectorat de la Grande-Bretagne sur l'Égypte, en même temps que le Grand-Bretagne reconnaissait l'établissement du protectorat de la France sur le Maroc. Cette double reconnaissance ne mettait pas fin *ipso facto* au régime des capitulations au Maroc et en Égypte, mais elle faisait prévoir la suppression de ce régime dans les deux pays désormais dotés de tribunaux européens. Des négociations sont en cours entre les Gouvernements britannique et français en vue de cette suppression et de la détermination du nouveau régime auquel doivent être soumis les Anglais au Maroc et les Français en Égypte.

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No. 325.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 722.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Paris, May 13, 1919.

MY despatch No. 521 of to-day.

"Temps" and "Journal des Débats" this evening publish following statement under heading of "Suppression of Capitulations in Egypt and Morocco":—

The United States have just recognised officially the establishment of the British protectorate over Egypt. In accordance with terms of Franco-British agreement of 8th April, 1904, France recognised in December 1914 the establishment of the British protectorate over Egypt at the same time that Great Britain recognised the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco. This double recognition did not *ipso facto* put an end to régime of Capitulations in Morocco and Egypt, but it foreshadowed the suppression of this régime in the two countries, henceforward endowed with European courts of justice. Negotiations are being carried on between the British and French Governments with a view to such suppression, and to settlement of the new régime to which the British in Morocco and the French in Egypt will be subject.

Copy to Peace Delegation.

(Repeated by telegram to Cairo.)

No. 326.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 800. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 16, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 580.*

The Greek Minister here states that, according to information so far received, the total loss sustained by Greeks during recent troubles in Egypt exceed sum of 600,000L. There have been ten persons killed and as many wounded. He adds that these figures are approximate, as, owing to the disorganisation of communications he has been unable up to the present to obtain a complete list of material damage and loss of human life.

This statement by Greek Minister appears to be accurate so far as appearance goes. Four cases of Greeks killed in Cairo and two serious injuries have actually been verified by military authorities. Each case was one of deliberation combined attack. Full reports from province have not been received yet.

The message of the Armenian Patriarch given in my telegram No. 731 is an accurate statement of the figures given by him; 15 killed and 11 wounded have been verified. Here again, information from the provinces is still lacking.

There is no doubt that some of the extremists at one time deliberately excited xenophobia in order to sustain agitation, but a section of the students saw their mistake and succeeded in checking movement. It should be remembered that the Italian Minister appealed to me on behalf of his colony for a military protection, and that I had to take steps to prepare a campaign for the reception of 500 Europeans in case of necessity.

(Repeated to Mr. Balfour, Paris.)

No. 327.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 606.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 16, 1919.

MY telegram No. 558.

French Foreign Minister has informed Lord Derby that censorship has been instructed to stop publication in French press of information regarding Egyptian situation suspected to be from Nationalist sources or savouring of propaganda dangerous to French and British interests in Asia Minor and North Africa.

* See No. 311.

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Ismail Pasha Sidky called at French Foreign Office. He was told that all Nationalist efforts to find support in France would be futile, and that they had better address themselves to British Government, whose protectorate was recognised by France.

French Foreign Office have summoned Vayssié. He declared explicitly that his presence in France was not connected with Egyptian Nationalist Delegation, and stated he had not been in communication with them in Paris except through having once met Ismail Pasha Sidky. Vayssié was requested to return to Egypt immediately, and to take care that nothing appeared in the "Journal du Caire" which would lead people to think that he was encouraging Nationalists. He was reminded that his paper was intended to represent French interests in Egypt. Vayssié gave assurances that he would not depart from line of conduct indicated.

No. 328.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 798. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 16, 1919.

IMPROVEMENT reported in my telegram No. 673 of 29th April continues save on the Canal, where a strike on a big scale broke out on 13th instant, mainly on economic grounds, though political situation is no doubt in a measure responsible. Thanks to the action and assistance of British soldiers and sailors, shipping in the Canal not seriously impeded and the situation well in hand. French agency being kept fully informed.

Azharites, students, and roughs have recently attempted nightly demonstrations near the Residency, but have easily been dispersed without recourse to firing.

Provinces are quiet, and there is a tendency on the part of small cultivators to blame lawyer and student class for promoting an agitation which has not succeeded, and has resulted in grave material damage and restriction of railway facilities. Communications are beginning to open up in Delta, but it will be a long time before they return to normal owing to damage to rolling stock and prolonged strike of workmen only recently ended. In Upper Egypt conditions are less favourable, though a tri-weekly mail service to the Soudan has been opened.

Permit restrictions are still in force south of Cairo, but will be removed as soon as the supply of rolling-stock makes it possible to resume passenger service.

It is to be hoped that foreign interests will not be seriously affected, but, so far as this turns out to be the case, it should be remembered that disorders were deliberately encouraged by certain European elements.

Damage to State railways alone estimated at about a quarter of a million.

Grotesque legends are circulating in regard to alleged atrocities by British troops, and detailed account in the "Times" of revolting murder of unarmed British officers and men in railway train in Upper Egypt last March will probably redouble efforts of Nationalists to divert attention from this painful subject. With the exception of two incidents mentioned in my telegram No. 711 of 4th May, no punishments on large scale have taken place lately, and any sensational report from native or foreign sources of reprisals by British troops may be categorically denied. Armenian refugees in camp at Heliopolis have been invited to return to their homes, as police consider the danger over. Greeks have suffered severely, and damage to Greek-owned property exceeds 600,000L. Ten Greeks have been murdered in all and a certain number injured.

No immediate prospect of a Ministry being formed, but native officials are carrying on adequately under British control.

German peace conditions following on the announcement of American recognition of protectorate have had sobering effect on saner elements of population, who are already discounting effect of Saad Zaghlul's mission to Europe.

Alleged coldness between Italy and Great Britain and Afghanistan and Indian news is unfortunately producing a certain impression, as extremists are following foreign complications carefully.

(Sent to Paris, Berne, and Rome.)

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No. 329.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 195.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 27, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 181 of the 20th April, I have the honour to forward a record of the events of the week 20th to the 26th April inclusive.

I have, &c.

E. H. ALLENBY

Enclosure in No. 329.

Supplementary Information for the week April 13 to 19, 1919.

ONE death by shooting occurred at Shubra on the 17th April.

At a meeting held at El Azhar at 9.30 P.M. on the 18th April, speakers laid stress on the strained relations between England and France over the Syrian question, and also between England and Italy over the western boundary of Egypt. "England has her hands full. Germany is raising an army of millions of Bolsheviks, with which to fight England. If we fight to the end, we shall win."

On the 19th, a large number of employes met in mosques, and prepared lists for the salaries to be paid to the strikers at the end of the month.

At a meeting at El Azhar on the same day, an employe of the State Railways complained that all they had received since the beginning of the strike was £ E. 1 per head. Many had spent their savings, and their wives and children would starve. He said "we can face British bullets, but not starvation."

In the afternoon, a large number of workmen from the railway shops and other railwaymen met at a mosque, and agreed to send a protest to Rushdy Pasha to the effect that Neguib Bey Fahmi (an official of the State Railways, who had been arrested on a charge of intimidation and instigating a strike), was innocent of the charge brought against him; the workmen had struck of their own accord to show their political sympathies.

At Abu Tor near Tanta, on the 19th, an ambush was laid for a small body of Indian troops, one of whom was killed and three wounded. The party replied with fire, and killed nine of the assailants. A number of arrests were made.

At 5.30 P.M. on the 19th, a deputation of Cairo lawyers called on the Armenian Union to demand once more that all Armenians should return to their houses, and offering to help in the removal. The Armenians appear to have refused more brusquely than they had ventured to before, declining to discuss the question, and saying no promise by any Egyptian party could be trusted.

An Account of the Progress of Events in Cairo and the Provinces from April 20 to 26, 1919.

Cairo, April 20, 1919.

The day passed quietly. The situation at the Ministries and on the railways remained unchanged.

A postal employe was attacked and injured on his way to work.

Employes of the Heliopolis trams struck, as their demands for improved conditions had not been granted in full.

Rumours got about that five sheikhs were arrested at El Azhar by their colleagues for embezzling sums amounting to 3,000L., which had been collected for the families of those killed during the recent disturbances.

Sheikh Abdulla Nur El Dain, a Sudanese of the Sammania Tarika, now resident in Egypt, suggested that a deputation of Sudanese, consisting of himself, Sayed Sir Ali El Morghani, and three or four other loyal Sudanese notables, should be sent to Paris to express to the Conference their loyalty to the British, and their happiness and progress under British rule.

The Extremists were reported to be adopting a new attitude towards Bolshevism, which they had at first repudiated as utterly foreign to Egypt. They were now taking a line similar to what they conceived was to be Germany's, should she be asked to sign

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a humiliating peace; Egypt would turn Bolshevik if her demand for full independence were not granted.

At a meeting in the evening at El Azhar, a member of the "Black Hand" Society, said the society had been astonished to hear of employes wishing to return to work. Any man, whether humble workman or high official, who returned to work, would immediately be condemned and put to death.

It was reported that 1,000 houses in Cairo and suburbs had now been abandoned by their Armenian inhabitants.

At El Azhar, at a great meeting at which 12,000 people were present, a sheikh read an alleged telegram from President Wilson to the French agent in Egypt, to the effect that all British residents were to leave Egypt at once for seaports, but senior British officials could remain till the end of the month to hand over their duties to Egyptians. All present cheered enthusiastically, and called for it to be read again and again. Written copies were distributed among the people in the Mosque.

Provinces, April 20, 1919.

A further disturbance occurred at Abu Tor, where the villagers assembled and stoned the camp of an Indian unit. The village was surrounded, six ringleaders arrested, and 23 rioters publicly flogged.

Reports were received from Alexandria that students were trying to buy vitriol.

At Port Said 400 coolies from the engineering works were on strike apparently for political reasons.

In the Eastern Delta the strike continued at Zagazig, and at Tel-el-Kebir and Abu Seir a partial strike of railway employes began.

At Defra the traffic staff struck; at night fire was opened on the station from a neighbouring field. South of Talkha some slight damage was done to the line.

According to a report received from Wasta, 181 arrests had been made in that district. Sixty-seven were convicted, 57 acquitted or released after preliminary interrogation, and the remainder were awaiting trial.

In the Western Delta two villages obeyed under pressure the order to remove sand from the railway line, and two failed to obey, whereupon they were subjected to a punitive fine.

Cairo, April 21, 1919.

The Ministries were closed for the holiday of "Shem-el-Nessim." The position on the railways was practically unchanged.

The holiday passed exceptionally quietly. Much less than the normal number of holiday-makers visited the public gardens, &c., the general attitude of the natives appeared subdued and apprehensive, and no signs of political excitement were visible.

The removal of British families from isolated positions in the outskirts of Cairo to places of safety, a step which had been taken by way of precaution, combined with other measures of military preparation, real or reported, had apparently thoroughly alarmed the native population, and was thought to be a prelude to vigorous action.

A meeting of the strike committee of Government employees decided to await a reply from Rushdy Pasha to their demand that the Zaghlul deputation should be considered representative of the nation. If the reply was favourable they would resume work; if unfavourable, they would reconsider their position at a meeting on the 22nd.

There were further signs of the weakening of the strikers, and of a growing tendency to assert itself on the part of moderate opinion. The Director of the Law School was approached privately by a member of his staff, who told him, on the authority, as he hinted, of the strike committee, that the employees were only too anxious to resume work, though they were not yet ready to do so unconditionally. A senior British officer had previously been approached by certain Egyptians of standing, who, whatever their political opinions, were opposed to the present methods of strikes and attempted demonstrations, wished to co-operate with the authorities in putting an end to them, and to provide a centre round which moderates, a large but unorganised and leaderless body according to them, might rally without fear of intimidation.

Provinces, April 21, 1919.

Alexandria was quiet, but guards, firemen, and brakemen of Egyptian Service Railway were on strike.

At Suez and Port Said strenuous efforts were being made to induce all Government employees to strike.

In Upper Egypt threatening "Black Hand" letters were sent to the Mamour of Manfalut, who is investigating recent disturbances. Troops have been sent to protect him.

In Tahta Markaz it was reported that trouble was brewing between Copts and Moslems, but no actual disturbances occurred.

Two large but orderly demonstrations took place at Rosetta.

Cairo, April 22, 1919.

The situation remained quiet. Rather fewer officials came to the Ministries, i.e., at the Ministry of Finance, 4 per cent.; Public Works, 16 per cent.; Interior, 18 per cent. The High Commissioner's Proclamation, calling on all Government officials to resume their work on pain of dismissal, became known during the morning.

The tone of conversation in public places was one of defiance, but that there was an alteration in public feeling was illustrated at a meeting of El Azhar in the evening, where a speech by a popular orator deprecating violence was loudly applauded, and an excited interruption in the opposite sense sternly suppressed.

A native attempting to steal a sentry's rifle in Cairo was shot. A crowd collected, but dispersed on the arrival of a Lewis gun.

An affray occurred at Matarieh between camel-drivers and villagers. Civil police, with military assistance, restored order.

Provinces, April 22, 1919.

At Alexandria the partial strike of railway employees continued. Three drivers were reported to have been arrested for intimidating workmen.

At Port Said Greek employees at engineering works joined natives on strike. Government officials were working, but heads of departments were receiving threatening letters.

At Zagazig all was quiet, but at Mudiria only heads of departments returned to work.

At Mansura the railway telegraphists returned to work.

A patrol on the railway was fired on at midnight near Teh-el-Barud.

It was reported from Behera that an omda who had been suspended for some offence, complained that he had always done his work well, and had raised 1,500l. from his village for the Red Cross, more than had been contributed from any other village in the Markaz. On being asked if the subscribers had been willing givers, he exclaimed: "Willing. Every millieme was wrung from them by force."

Cairo, April 23, 1919.

As a result of the proclamation issued on the 22nd, the great majority of Government officials returned to work. The principal exceptions were in the Public Works Department, where 33 per cent. of the staff were still absent, and the Ministries of Education and Wakfs, with 28 per cent. absent in each case. In the State railways most of the clerks returned, but most of the workmen remained out.

The prevailing mood of the officials on their return to work was one of deep dejection. For this the announcement of the recognition by the United States of America of the British Protectorate over Egypt was probably even more largely responsible than was the failure of the strike.

The Heliopolis trams re-commenced running with a limited service, a small percentage of employees having returned to duty.

Attempts were still being made to intimidate Armenian residents, their houses being marked with white crosses.

In the Barrage area, most of the irrigation and prison clerks were back at work, but the workmen of both services were still out.

The Nationalist Party addressed a telegram to President Wilson, protesting against his recognition of the British Protectorate.

The Armenian National Union in Cairo sent a telegram to Nubar Pasha in Paris, detailing Armenian casualties and sufferings, and expressing gratitude for British protection.

Provinces, April 23, 1919.

At Alexandria the drivers and firemen returned to work. The guards refused to work on the main line.

At Port Said the telegraph clerks were still on strike, but the messengers returned to duty.

At Zagazig the post office and telegraphs resumed work. Most of the railwaymen were still out. The majority of shops were closed owing to "Black Hand" threats.

At Tanta the Mudiria officials resumed work, and the railwaymen also showed a tendency to return.

Several cases of murder and robbery were reported from Manfalut Markaz.

Near Biba the telegraph wires were cut and 200 metres removed.

Banub village was searched and 25 arms taken. Other villages in Deirut district have voluntarily handed in 90 firearms.

Cairo, April 24, 1919.

One British N.C.O. was wounded in an individual attack.

In the early morning, seven Egyptians, who had been prominent either as members of the strike committee or as agitators, were arrested. Six of them were employees of the Ministry of Education.

There were reports from several Ministries of intimidation on the arrival of employees in the morning. Crowds armed with sticks collected near the Ministries of Finance and the Interior, but dispersed on the arrival of troops, who made some arrests. The "pickets" were largely composed of women and students.

At the railways all the clerks had returned to work, but the workmen were still only coming in slowly.

At the cafés and bars the extremists were still active, and were making their pressure felt, though the moderates were now bold enough to declare openly that they would rather make sure of their pensions and positions than trust to an unreliable strike committee.

The fall of the Cabinet excited little comment. The American recognition of the British protectorate continued to cause much depression.

Provinces, April 24, 1919.

All was quiet at Alexandria. The lawyers decided to resume work in the courts. Government employees were reported to be still undecided, but to be unlikely to strike. Industrial strikes continued.

The Government officials throughout the provinces were on the whole returning well. The railways were not so satisfactory, but were returning slowly, though at Alexandria the train personnel still refused to work the main line trains.

It was reported from Karida that a State Domains official had been shot at and severely wounded.

A signalman at Beni Hodeir was attacked in the morning by five men from Meimun. The police arrested the culprits.

Cairo, April 25, 1919.

The day passed quietly. The Ministries were closed for the weekly holiday. The majority of Post Office employees returned, and many of the absentee railway clerks. The majority of the railway workmen remained on strike on the other hand.

A split was reported between the officials on the one hand, and the students, who have always been the backbone of the extremist party, on the other. The

students accused the officials of cowardice and base ingratitude, pointing out that they had cost the various Egyptian committees large sums in strike pay.

The workmen who remained out on strike complained openly of the position into which they had been led. They were faced with the alternatives of losing their posts if they remained on strike, or forfeiting the sums promised them by the strike committees if they returned to work.

At Matarieh a sentry was stoned by natives.

The Ghaffir guarding a pumping station near Marg was shot by natives, probably Bedouin.

Provinces, April 25, 1919.

Alexandria was quiet. The Greek diplomatic agent reported this morning that he had for the last six months been aware of a movement in Alexandria of Royalist and Bolshevik tendencies. He had suggested in October that the leaders should be deported, but when the armistice intervened the question was allowed to lapse. He suggested they should now be deported to Malta.

It was reported that conditions at Tanta, Dessuk, and Kafr-esh-Sheikh gave cause for anxiety, and that the behaviour of the commandant of police at Gharbia was regarded with suspicion.

Reports arrived from Upper Egypt, showing that the economic effects of the interruption of communications were being increasingly felt.

Cairo, April 26, 1919.

The town remained quiet. Practically all Government officials had returned to work, and there was no more intimidation in the neighbourhood of the Ministries. The employés of the State railways were gradually returning to work, and the situation was regarded hopefully.

Speeches and sermons were made in mosques directed against methods of violence, and, on the whole, moderate views seemed to be gaining ground.

On the night of the 25th-26th April, an attempt was made to set fire to stores in the station yard at Sharabia (near the main railway station); one man was wounded.

Provinces, April 26, 1919.

In Alexandria slight industrial strikes still continued, and agitators were still making seditious speeches in mosques and spreading reports of alleged atrocities by British troops, but there was no disturbance, and the situation was generally quiet.

In Mansura a printed circular was posted up by Nationalists threatening to cut off the light and water supplies. Preventive measures were taken.

At Port Said all telegraph employees had returned to work.

In Upper Egypt the situation was quiet. The Omda of Ghayada-el-Gharbieh was arrested in connection with a theft of Government property. Twenty-nine arrests had been made to date in connection with recent disturbances at Aulad Amr. Some arms were seized at Deirut.

Otherwise there was nothing to report.

No. 330.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 201.)
My Lord,

Cairo, May 4, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 195, I have the honour to forward a brief summary of events of the week April 27th to May 3rd inclusive, a period which has been comparatively uneventful.

I have, &c.,
E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 330.

Summary of Events of the week April 27 to May 3 (inclusive), with some supplementary information regarding the previous week.

April 25.—The Strike Committee of Government officials held a meeting. They were mainly anxious, as the majority of officials had returned to work, to cover up the collapse of the strike movement by insisting that the decision to return was taken before the publication of the High Commissioner's proclamation on the subject, and that the determining factor had been knowledge of the approaching resignation of the Ministry.

April 26.—The following was the line taken by a certain Sheikh of El-Azhar in a speech in a Cairo Mosque:—

"The Moslems of India after 150 years of British rule, hearing of the unrest in Egypt, had copied the Egyptian example. England could not cope with trouble both in Egypt and India, and she had demobilised half her Army. A general rebellion therefore would have a great chance of success. Let them keep quiet and make preparations for such a movement on the 10th May. Italy does not agree with Wilson and the Italians wish to see us free." Speeches of similar purport were delivered at El-Azhar itself.

The date mentioned, the 10th May, has been referred to in speeches by other agitators.

At Alexandria inflammatory speeches were made in a mosque about alleged atrocities of British troops.

April 27.—Seditious agitation was still reported from El-Azhar and elsewhere. It was directed chiefly toward inciting Government employees to strike again, unless they were allowed to return unconditionally.

In the evening a ground wire was cut in several places at the Barrage. A patrol fired on natives near one of the cuts.

More "Black Hand" letters were reported from Minia, and considerable fresh seizures of firearms from villages adjacent to Deirut.

Three villages near Qenah were searched. Nine firearms and some stolen railway property were found. Considerable resistance was offered and one native was killed and five wounded.

April 28.—Notices were published by the Ministries of Education, Justice and Agriculture warning the students of the schools under them that they must return to their work on Saturday, 3rd May.

All workmen at the railway workshops returned to work except 295. This is not an unusual number of absentees even in normal times.

It was stated that the discussion of local politics had greatly diminished in the bars and cafés; so far as it continued it took the form mainly of abuse of Rushdi Pasha for having assisted the British during the War. Much interest was also shown in the disturbances in India, and the Italian withdrawal from the Peace Conference, both of which were considered favourable to the Egyptian Nationalist cause.

From Alexandria seven arrests were reported on the ground of making seditious speeches, and from Ismailia four arrests for intimidation.

April 29.—A meeting was held at El-Azhar at 10 A.M. at which students of the Higher and Secondary schools, as well as of El-Azhar, were present. They decided to remain on strike unless the following conditions were fulfilled:

1. The post of British Adviser to the Ministry of Education must be abolished.
2. All English officials, headmasters and teachers under the said Ministry must be dismissed.
3. The teaching of the English language must be immediately and entirely abolished in Government schools.
4. It must be recognised that the protectorate has ceased, and that the movement in Egypt is neither religious nor predatory, but is a peaceful national demand for complete independence.

Government employees were talking of renewing their strike if their salaries were not paid in full at the end of the month.

At Alexandria there were two arrests for intimidation.

[2568]

2 N 2

April 30.—A steady improvement in the general tone was reported. The public was clearly tired of political excitement and anxious that things should settle down as soon as possible. Wednesday was the day of the week on which the closing of all shops had been "ordered," as a weekly political protest. The order was almost entirely disregarded even in native quarters, and some attempts to enforce it were far from successful. The shopkeepers, like the rest of the people, have lost their fear of intimidation propaganda, and openly declare that they had had more than enough of the whole matter.

A couple of the rumours that are being circulated with a view to maintaining the public excitement are the following:

1. An Italian army of 300,000 men has arrived at Tripoli and is waiting for orders from the Italian Diplomatic Agent in Cairo before marching on Egypt.

2. Enver Pasha, who is at the head of a big army at Gaza, will at the same time march on Egypt from the East.

The employees of the Cairo Tramway Company returned to duty. There was a partial strike of railway workmen at Alexandria.

May 1.—In Cairo there was an attempted demonstration by 400 students and dismissed railway employees which was dispersed without trouble.

At the railway workshops the situation was not so satisfactory, about 1,000 men being again on strike.

A sentry at Giza Level Crossing was wounded by a rifle shot. The guard fired in reply without effect.

At Manshiet-el-Sadr, near Cairo, one arrest for intimidation was effected.

From Deirut was reported another small seizure of firearms.

May 2.—This day was Friday, the weekly holiday in the Government Departments. There were no incidents to report.

Further small seizures of arms were reported from Deirut district.

May 3.—The Government employees returned to work in spite of rumours of an intended renewal of the strike in protest against deductions of pay.

The normal number of workmen in the railway workshops were again present.

In the morning there was a small demonstration by Azharists and students, of which the exact purpose was doubtful, in the neighbourhood of the Residency and the American Agency, but it was easily dispersed.

Hardly any students of the Higher schools obeyed last Monday's order to return to their classes, and very few of the Secondary schools.

A rather larger proportion returned to the Secondary schools in Alexandria and the Provinces.

A native printing office, believed to be the official press of the Nationalist Party, was raided and a newly printed seditious leaflet found. The printer and workmen were arrested.

It was stated that the extremists were still trying to counteract the steady growth of the moderates by inflammatory propaganda. Open quarrels between extremists and moderates were reported, and also some angry discussions between Moslems and Copts. The Extremists were in particular preaching hostility towards the Commission which was reported to be coming from England to investigate the Egyptian question.

No 331

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 205.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 4, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 136* of the 12th April, 1919.

1. Undoubtedly, the violence and the suddenness of the recent outbreak in Egypt came as a surprise to the authorities, civil and military; and also surprised those of the unofficial inhabitants who best know the country.

2. At the time Sir Milne Cheetham's despatch of the 24th February† was written, the popularity of Saad Zaghlul was on the wane. Numbers of those who

* See No. 170.

† See No. 55.

had signed his manifesto felt they had been deceived. An attempt was being made to form a party of moderates who, putting the question of the protectorate aside, would interest themselves in questions of practical politics dealing with education, irrigation and agriculture. Saad Zaghlul was being bitterly attacked by the stalwarts of the old Nationalist Party. Reports from the Provinces and from political quarters in Cairo pointed to a growing lack of interest in the movement.

Now, between Sir Milne Cheetham's telegram of the 24th February and that of the 19th March, a complete change came over the situation; but only after the arrest of the Pasha. The immediate effects of this arrest were to make Saad Zaghlul and his fellows popular heroes and, more important than this, heal the breach between the Nationalist of the old school and the Pasha's Party. Another result which recent events have shown to be of almost equal importance was the students' strike.

3. But the apparent organisation in the series of outbreaks which followed the arrests was, I think, due to the fact that the extremists got the upper hand in almost every town in Egypt on the Committees of those who sympathised with aspiration for independence. They were joined by Nationalists of the old school who had hitherto held aloof from the movement from suspicion that the Pasha and his closest associates were only aiming at personal advancement. There were also causes of complaint among the fellaheen which rendered them susceptible to inflammatory propaganda.

In the minds of the great majority of those who instigated the outbreaks there was an idea that peaceful methods having failed to attract the attention of those in office to their claim to be heard in Paris, it was necessary to show that Government could not go on without their consent. I have been told that the very precautions taken to guard the railway line showed the populace that communications were our weak point, but I believe that the agitators had no organised plan for cutting communications. To the fellaheen who sacked the stations, the sight of the grain which had been collected for the Army was often the sole inducement necessary to incite them to pillage. The goods trains laden with cereals proved an irresistible attraction in places near Cairo, where high prices had been reached for wheat and dourra owing to the demands of the urban population. I would point out, in this connection, that prompt measures were taken by both civil and military authorities to meet the danger to Government property, and more especially the railway lines, directly there seemed a possibility of real trouble.

On Sunday night, 9th March, troops were brought in to Cairo; and on Monday, 10th March, when the civil police found it impossible to cope with disorderly crowds of students and the riff-raff from the town who followed them, the military authorities took charge.

Troops were sent down to Tantah on Tuesday night and helped to save the railway station which was attacked on Wednesday the 12th. Arrangements were made at once to send detachments of troops to all big centres. In Assiut, Fayum, Beni-Suef, Chebin-el-Kom, Zagazig, Damanhur and Mansura, there were troops before any serious trouble occurred. All the usual precautions to guard the railway-lines—troops on the Nile bridges and village watchmen on the track—had been taken by the 14th March.

4. There has been the closest connection between the Army Intelligence Department and the Ministry of the Interior throughout the War. The Director-General of Public Security, and the English police officials in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said, and the seven Inspectors of the Interior in the Provinces have always worked hand in hand with the Army. The Provinces were effectively disarmed in 1916-1917.

5. The present acute agitation is but a violent outburst of the political unrest which began in or about the year 1906, and which has ever since smouldered. All thoughtful observers knew of its existence. During the war, the knowledge of the gravity of the military situation kept political agitators quiet. With the removal of the Turkish menace, and the approach of Peace, Egypt began to ask what reward she was to receive for her correct attitude during the war, and for the valuable assistance which she undoubtedly rendered to our armies—in men, money and material.

Your Lordship knows the history of the last six months, and is aware of the bitter disappointment felt by Egypt at what she considers her cavalier treatment by England. The resentment caused by this disappointment has been aggravated by what Egypt regards as preference shown to other small nations, whose delegates have been allowed access to the Peace Conference while hers have been refused. Foreign intrigue, Bolshevism, Pan Turanianism have had their influence; but, I think, not largely.

6. The Intelligence Service of Egypt has been starved in the past. During the war Egypt has given largely of her skilled personnel to the Army; and this has further depleted the Staff, already inadequate.

7. Under the circumstances, I have not taken, nor do I propose to take, any immediate action with regard to the conduct of those whose duty it was to supply His Majesty's Residency with information.

My Staff which, as your Lordship knows, I consider insufficient in numbers, is fully occupied at the present time.

I would suggest that this matter might well be one for enquiry by the Commission which is to arrive shortly under the Presidency of Lord Milner.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

No. 332.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 197.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 30, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 188, I have the honour to forward two more memoranda expressive of different shades of local opinion.

One contains notes of a conversation with Habib Antonius Bey, Director of the Agricultural Section of the Sultan's Private Wakfs; the other is a letter from Mr. A. Hafiz Awad, of Alexandria.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 332.

Notes of a Conversation with Habib Antonius Bey.

I RECEIVED a visit this afternoon from Habib Antonius Bey, who is Director of the Agricultural Section of the Sultan's private Wakfs. He is a Syrian Christian of Lebanese origin, and has spent his life in Egypt, where he has been a landowner and agricultural expert until a year and a-half ago, when he was obliged by force of circumstances to take up his present employment. He is in a position to know what happens in the upper Egyptian circles of Cairo, and is also in touch—through persons employed on, or helping to manage, the 50,000 acres or so of land which he administers—with opinion in many parts of the Delta. He is imbued with the oriental Christian's distrust of the Moslem, with the Syrian's contempt of the Egyptian of either religion, is politically unprogressive, Anglophil, and is not much interested in functions of Government other than the maintenance of order and security. He is no doubt suspicious of change, and his class—though not, I think, himself or his family—of course stands to lose by any development of autonomy in Egypt. He is a capable, honourable, independent, and very shrewd man, who has had an intimate knowledge of the people and internal affairs of Egypt for the last forty years; he is regarded with general respect, and had, I understand, the confidence of Lord Cromer. In view of his position with respect to the Sultan, he desires that his remarks should be regarded as confidential.

He came primarily in order to say that he took a very serious view of the situation, which he considered, in spite of the superficial restoration of order, and the partial cessation of strikes—to be going from bad to worse, and tending towards renewed rebellion and massacre; in particular, he regarded Tantah and, among less important places, Dessouk and Kafr-esh-Sheikh, as points of immediate danger. Anti-foreign excitement in Tantah had almost reached the point of eruption: there was no Mudir, the Commandant of Police was *enflammé* and at the root of the mischief, and his chief abettors were the native judges. (These judges, he remarked, *en passant*, might profess to be willing to sit themselves, but it was they who ensured by terrorism that no advocate would present himself to plead in their Courts.) By way of contrast, he pointed to Behera, ordinarily a criminal province, the greater part of which had been kept quiet by a strong and straightforward Mudir, helped lately by a particularly efficient commander of British troops.

He then enlarged upon the situation generally. British prestige in Egypt had been steadily waning throughout the war, and since last June things had been definitely heading for a crisis. His own point of view was no doubt a purely local one,

but he was mystified by the way affairs had been allowed to drift towards catastrophe without any attempt to stop them: how inconceivable if the hand of Lord Cromer or Lord Kitchener had been guiding the country. Apparently we had not the men: the interior was the one Ministry in Egypt which counted, and our representative there was good as a man, good as an inspector, but not in the least the man to be an adviser: Mudirs and Mamours regarded him as ridiculous. As his Chief of Public Security he had a man who had not the faintest notion of what was going on in the country. The result was that, not only had we no friends among the Egyptians, but we had not even been competent enough to provide anybody worth speaking of with any motive at all for wanting to help us. Mudirs, Mamours, police, secret police, Ghatirs, Omdas, persuaded, intimidated, or bought unrestrained by fear, relieved of the sense of personal responsibility, had turned against us: the only Government in Egypt that counted was the Azhar Government. Military proclamations were openly defied in Cairo. Meetings were held in cafés (he instanced the Fagala quarter), where seditious speeches were applauded by the police.

Meanwhile, such order as was maintained was maintained by soldiers: force exercised by them only made the English more detested; it was also useless, for they struck at the tail instead of the head.

The whole movement could have been stopped four, three, or two months ago by judicious arrests, not necessarily deportations, of a few prominent landowners, and the temporary sequestration of their property: even threats of this might have sufficed. Why had Zaghlul, Sidky, Mahmud, and Hamed-el-Bassal been selected for arrest? Zaghlul, who had lost his money gambling; Sidky, a womaniser of no substance; Mahmud, a man hardly fit to be a Mamur; Hamed-el-Bassal, a harmless imbecile. Why leave Sharawy untouched, a man of sufficient wealth to have mainly financed the movement, whose latest act had been to purchase the "Ahram" for £ E. 12,000? (I may mention that Dr. Nimir told me a month ago that Sharawy had been to see him, weeping, and seeking some means of avoiding the confiscation of his property, which he then believed was threatened.)

Antonius Bey thought it might still be possible to re-invigorate the old Government machine to restore the discipline of the country. The late Ministry would be useless for the purpose. It had never intended even to bring the strike to an end. Rushdy Pasha was not fundamentally false, but he was a puppet; Adly an upright man, but of no great capacity; Sarwat, insidious and deeply treacherous, whose long-standing influence, not only with the lawyers but also with the students, far exceeded that of Zaghlul.

Zaghlul was chiefly responsible for the whole agitation, and it was from him, only the other day, that the order emanated to Government officials not to return to work as long the Ministry retained office; Gaafar Wali, an honest man, good some time as a Minister of Education; Waliba, answering well the sound maxim for Ministry-makers ("parmi les Coptes, cherchez la nullité"). He barely knows Midhat Yeghen, and said nothing about Hassan Hassib.

There was, he thought, only one Egyptian who could cope with the situation—Mohammed Pasha Said. His methods were not methods to be applied in ordinary times, but they were the methods for such a crisis as this. If he were made Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, and given a free hand, with responsibility for restoring order, he could probably succeed in doing it. As to his colleagues, it was a matter of indifference who they were, and they might be chosen to please the Sultan, who, unfortunately, did not like Mohammed Said.

After a few reminiscences of the methods of Ismail and of Lord Cromer, Antonius Bey remarked that the Egyptians were sensitive only in their skins and their purses, and mentioned a few of the steps which he thought should be taken:—

Purchase of some Azharites as informers;

Arrest and contumelious treatment of other selected Azharites;

Arrest of a few leading agitators;

Temporary sequestration of the property of a few large landowners in each province as a guarantee for the good behaviour of their neighbourhood (e.g., Mahmud Pasha Abu Husein, of Menufia—as being particularly influential, not particularly noxious—and Ibrahim Pasha Said, of Gharbia).

Above all, inculcating in officials by fear the sense of personal responsibility which they had lost: making each Mudir, and through the Mudir each Mamur, and through the Mamur each Omda, feel that if he failed to restore good order and security he would be a broken man for ever.

Antonius Bey praised the punitive measures adopted by Mr. Macnaughten at Assiut. It was not the moment to attach any importance to popularity; the end of every action now should be the regaining of respect; afterwards there might be opportunities for kindness.

Enclosure 2 in No. 332.

M. Hafiz Awad to Sir E. Allenby.

43, Moharrem Bey Street,

Alexandria, April 7, 1919.

Excellency,

AS you have expressed the wish that every Egyptian who has the knowledge and experience of the affairs in Egypt should send you a written statement of what he considers to be the means conducive to the tranquillity and the re-establishment of law and order in this country, and as I am one of those who have worked in politics of this country for a long time and am well known to the English in Egypt, and notwithstanding the fact that I have made a vow not to touch politics as long as I live, the present circumstances have compelled me to write to you what I think, in my humble judgment, to be the means of facilitating your mission, and at the same time satisfy the aspirations of the Egyptian nation.

The causes of the present situation are simply these: The Egyptians thought that Egypt would be given the right (like other nations) of self-determination as to its future. The Egyptians also believed that America and the European Powers had only consented to the stay of the English in Egypt because the Egyptians were satisfied with English protection and were willing to have the English in their country. From such misconceptions have sprung the misunderstandings which led to these troubles. If there had been no talk of "the League of Nations," "self-determination," and like expressions, it would have been impressed on the minds of the people that to the victors fall the spoils; and that the possession of Egypt by Britain would be one of Britain's rights as a result of the fall of Turkey.

Wise and thinking Egyptians know for certain that Egypt is very vital to the British Empire, and they reason that it is not in the interest of Egypt not in the interest of Great Britain that the present agitation and troubles should exist, with their inevitable consequences, viz., the sowing of ill-feeling, enmity, and rancour in the heart of both parties—a state of mind which will cause the renewal of such troubles from time to time.

Reasonable Egyptians know also that English self-respect and English traditional policy will not permit the undertaking of discussion of methods of satisfying Egyptian aspirations (extremist or moderate) as long as the people are in such a state of agitation and disorder. The pacifying of the country, and the re-establishment of order will inevitably take some time; meanwhile it will cause great loss and damage to the economic interests of the country.

In such a state, it is impossible for wise and moderate people to come forward, because they will be stigmatised as traitors; and moreover they will not be listened to, and no value will be placed on their demands.

It is evident, therefore, that a breathing space must be given to both parties to calm the agitation and give hope to the nation's heart. The solution which I submit to your Excellency is as follows, and it is such a solution that I venture to think is compatible with British self-respect and prestige. It is also one which I hope will satisfy Egyptian aspirations and lead easily to the re-establishment of law and order.

The Government should convene a general meeting or congress (on the lines of that convened by the British Government in Ireland in 1916) representing all Egyptian classes and communities, to discuss and give its full opinion on the present situation—to explain the demands of the responsible and moderate men for the future system of administration in the country.

It would be easy to call, in a very short time, a meeting like this. The mere announcement of it would, I believe, have the effect of bringing things back to the normal, and at the same time give the Egyptians some hope.

The assembly, which should be representative of those Egyptian classes whose judgment could be relied on, might be composed of the following elements:—

1. All present ex-Ministers.
2. Members of the present legislative assembly.
3. Members of the Provincial Councils.

4. Native judges of the Court of Appeal.
5. Presidents of the Native Courts.
6. Presidents of the Mehkemeh Sharia Courts.
7. Ten or fifteen lawyers elected by the Bar.
8. Ten or fifteen doctors elected.
9. Mudirs of first degree Mudiriehs.
10. Privileged persons—like Sheikh Al Azhar, Nekib el-Ashraf, Sheikh Bakry, a representative of the Coptic Patriarch, &c.

An assembly like this would, roughly, be composed of about 600 members, all representing different shades of opinion and classes. The British point of view, and the wishes of His Majesty's Government for the welfare of Egypt, ought to be presented to the assembly in the form of an official memorandum.

Of course the working of detail and the forms of procedure of such an assembly, are things which I do not wish to enter into, and which could be easily entrusted to a committee of able men.

I am, &c.

A. HAFIZ AWAD.

No. 333.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 199.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 2, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 197 of 30th April, the following information regarding M. Ahmed Hafiz Awad, copy of whose letter I transmitted to your Lordship, may be of interest:—

He was a member of the staff of the Arabic newspaper "Moayad," and subsequently started the "Minbar." He was subsequently English translator to the Khedivial Cabinet, and finally editor of the "Moayad." Early in 1918 he was arraigned by the military authorities for making seditious speeches and inciting the natives of Delingat (where he had property) to disaffection, on the expectation of the imminent return of the Khedive. His movements were therefore confined to Alexandria, where he lived. He thereupon petitioned Sir Reginald Wingate, stating that the charges were calumnious and that, in the opinion of many Egyptians, he was even regarded as a spy in British pay. Enquiries proved that he was a Germanophile, and that the charges were well founded.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

No. 334.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 202.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 3, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 197, I have the honour to forward two more letters which illustrate different phases of local opinion. One is signed "A Young Egyptian"; the other is from M. Morcos Fahmy, a lawyer.

I have, &c.,

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 334.

"A Young Egyptian" to Sir E. Allenby.

Sir,

Cairo, April 30, 1919.

THE English newspapers have taken up the Egyptian question lately, and it is remarkable to observe how entirely erroneous their view of the situation is. They seem to ignore the very facts which nobody ever doubts, facts which have been set down by treaties, by the Queen and by the British Ministers, either because they are really ignorant of them, or they may be trying to hide the truth, a thing which we are

not inclined to believe Englishmen will ever do. We do not think that the Government is of the same opinion as them, but the English public opinion may be misled, and it is the duty of the Government to set it right.

They have been fond of suggesting that the Egyptians should have a greater share in their own government, and they seem to regard this as a favour which the Egyptians will readily accept, and they compare us to India and ask the Government to give us similar constitution, a thing which startles the Egyptian and makes him mad. It is as if somebody had taken 100*l.* from me and promised to return them (with their interest), and when the time comes and I ask him to give them up he denies or ignores that he ever gave me such a promise, and, what is worst of all, he gives me 10*l.* as a boon for which I ought to be thankful!! I think the Egyptians are no fools, and will never allow a suggestion of this sort. It is extraordinary that the papers seem to regard Egypt as worse than India and ought to be brought to the same standard; they seem to think that we are an English colony, but all that amount of rubbish, lies, and ignorance that is so conspicuous in every article about Egypt sets the Egyptian thinking of his country as having been stolen from him, and while he regarded himself an independent man, he suddenly found himself considered as the most hopeless of Colonies.

Egypt cannot bear all these insults. It has never been an English colony, and any influence Englishmen had was given them (never by law but by custom) by Egyptians simply because we were good-natured enough to think that your promises were right and that you really meant our welfare. It is our unhappy confidence in your promises that gave you all this influence, and we never dreamt that England will play with us the same part as the man of "scraps of paper" played with Belgium (in fact, our case is the more dishonourable). Doesn't it startle the English Parliament to remember that the result of improving a semi-independent country and making it fit to govern itself is to reduce it so much that "a greater share in their own government" is considered a great boon as the insolent "Times" was ignorant enough to say. They say the country has been improved, and that Tanta is now better than it was before, and they think that this is a sufficient reason for your enslaving us more and more from a temporary occupation to a permanent one to a protectorate to a total annexation. Now, Sir, this is a sort of reasoning for the Central Africans to accept but not for the Egyptians, who look now on every improvement made by the English as a source of servitude and a burden which will keep us always down. The declaration of the protectorate turned every Egyptian against you, every favour was looked upon as an evil, all your supporters were turned adversaries and opponents once for all. The whole of Egypt says, with Saad Pasha, "they are trying to throttle us with a silk and jewelled rope." The broad facts, Sir, are as follows: Egypt, by the international law which you claim to respect, is now an independent country; the occupation was only for a time, and the time has come for leaving off. Any good that you have done we are ready to appreciate and pay for, but not at the cost of our liberty. If the Egyptians were starved and General Allenby dropped manna in their way they are sure to be disgusted at him so long as he is the emblem of the protectorate. Any amount of flogging in the provinces and any amount of arresting in Cairo will not alter these facts, and will never remove from the Egyptian the sense that he is being robbed with his mouth tightly closed. Our belief in British honour was much better than this. They say our movement is for Home Rule, and that we want to get it by force as President Wilson said. We thoroughly know that with all the amount of work that the President has to do he took for granted what Mr. Ward and Lord Curzon and the papers said, and what we wondered at was not the President's declaration but the mass of lies which were represented to the world about our movement by English authorities. Please, Sir, for the sake of the celebrated British honour, tell the Government to be a little more truthful in its reports.

If you are right, why not face the question bravely? If you are honourable, why not admit the undoubted facts and why not allow us to converse with the world? Why hide the truth of everything if you have done nothing wrong? The truth of it is that our movement, apart from all details, from all the petty English intrigues that permeated it, apart from the horrors and brutality which characterised your proceedings and which were described by the honourable Government as *forbearance*, was nothing of a revolution, it was simply protestation and struggle of a man who is being robbed with his mouth shut. And where does the responsibility lie? In spite of the description by Lord Curzon, it still lies on the man who arrested Saad, and yet the lord says it lies on the Egyptians.

"Yet Brutus says he was ambitious,
And Brutus is an honourable man."

Trying to find the reason and relieve it by suggestions for improving the administration is simply waste of time. The Englishmen who know the Egyptians like Lord Milner may ask: "Where are the friends of England now?" The friends knew that they were deceived, and by one magical stroke England turned them all opponents. And what is that stroke? It is the protectorate, and the stealthy policy that followed it.

The trick of shelving up the question, the grand question of ours, by enquiring into the little grievances, is too transparent not to be seen through.

They say Saad is an extremist, and were impudent enough to insult him, and thereby insulting every Egyptian. But your lordship must remember that one day he was a supporter of England, and he is by far the mildest of all Egyptians, for he is ready to give England anything except our liberty.

"A YOUNG EGYPTIAN."

Your lordship has to arrest 3,000,000 Egyptians before you come to the writer of this paper, and before you arrest him, and a good deal more after him, these ideas will not be exterminated. You may consider then the effect of arresting on the Egyptian feelings, and how useless it is for supporting the protectorate.

Enclosure 2 in No. 334.

Morcos Fahmy to Sir E. Allenby.

Excellence,

Caire, le 29 avril 1919.

DANS une crise aussi intense que celle que nous traversons, personne ne peut se désintéresser du sort de son pays.

L'autorité cherche les moyens pour apaiser et calmer les esprits.

Je crois que ce but doit être celui de tout Égyptien qui a la conscience de la situation.

Les moyens employés pour arriver au but poursuivi me paraissent de nature à produire un résultat diamétralement opposé.

Je crois de mon devoir, répondant d'ailleurs à l'appel depuis longtemps fait par votre Excellence aux Égyptiens de vous exprimer leurs vœux, de soumettre à votre sagacité quelques observations à ce sujet contenues dans la note ci-jointe.

Je serai heureux, si, en attirant l'attention de votre Excellence sur ce point, j'aurai pu arriver à alléger les souffrances.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

MORCOS FAHMY.

Note.

Le peuple est surexcité parce qu'il se croit, selon ses prétentions, oppressé.

A-t-il tort ou raison, ce n'est pas la question pour le moment, mais telle est la cause de cette convulsion qui agite fiévreusement le pays depuis un mois et demi.

Cette excitation augmente naturellement en proportion de l'accroissement de la cause qui l'a fait naître.

Effet d'une oppression, réelle ou supposée, toute oppression nouvelle ne peut qu'aggraver la situation sans pouvoir l'améliorer.

De tous les moyens d'oppression, le plus insupportable et le plus dangereux est la défense de parler et d'écrire.

On craint que la liberté d'écrire ne puisse servir de moyen d'excitation.

Grave erreur!

Le pays est déjà excité, et la liberté d'écrire, qui n'existe pas, n'y est pour rien.

Il faut trouver une mesure d'apaisement et non point appliquer un acte d'étouffement.

Quelle que soit l'opinion que l'on se fasse sur le mouvement actuel, personne ne peut nier que l'on se trouve en présence de cœurs qui souffrent.

Jamais une créature souffrante ne saurait se résigner au silence.

En la condamnant à comprimer ses sentiments, on ne peut qu'augmenter et compliquer sa douleur.

Donner aux cœurs surexcités le moyen de se décharger de leurs angoisses, c'est leur donner le sentiment, en vertu de cette décharge même, qu'ils sont soulagés.

Un certain apaisement, au moins relatif, ne peut manquer de se produire.

[2568]

2 O 2

Qu'est-ce que parler et écrire si ce n'est vider son cœur des amertumes qui le gonflent et le martyrisent ; c'est, là, le calme et l'apaisement que l'on cherche, mais, malheureusement, par des mesures qui doivent porter au paroxysme cette surexcitation même.

Comment peut-on espérer qu'une foule agitée et furieuse puisse être calmée en ajoutant aux causes mêmes de sa fureur ?

Laissez-la crier, faites-lui sentir qu'elle a ce droit naturel : elle s'apaisera d'elle-même, naturellement et sans efforts.

Les partisans de la force pourront peut-être arriver à imposer silence.

Mais silence n'est pas apaisement : c'est un mutisme haineux, rageur et menaçant.

Le cri de la douleur est un des mouvements forcés que ni l'homme ni l'animal ne peuvent comprimer.

Une douleur comprimée se traduit toujours par des agitations convulsives, déraisonnées et souvent dangereuses.

Les mesures de coercition que l'on applique, font elles-mêmes le mal que l'on veut extirper.

Je ne parle ici que de la liberté de parler sans compromettre l'ordre public.

Ainsi des attroupements ou des discours sur la voie publique doivent continuer à être interdits.

Mais de là à dire que toute liberté d'écrire et d'exprimer sa pensée doit être bannie, il y a un abîme qui ne peut être facilement comblé.

Interrogeons les faits.

Le mouvement actuel n'a pas été la suite d'une excitation parlée ou écrite.

Il a été la suite immédiate et directe de l'arrestation des quatre ; ce sont donc toujours les sévérités effectives qui donnent naissance à ces sortes d'effervescences.

En outre, quels ont été les effets des restrictions imposées à la liberté d'écrire ?

Ont-elles eu vraiment pour résultat d'empêcher les écrits furieux et les propagandes subversives ?

Au contraire, elles ont eu pour seul effet de laisser le champ libre à tous les pamphlets violents qui s'impriment on ne sait comment et qui circulent dans le pays avec une rapidité inouïe.

Il ne faut pas s'en étonner : cela a toujours été et ce sera toujours la conséquence nécessaire de toute restriction exagérée.

D'un autre côté, les rédacteurs de ces pamphlets, écrivant sous la sensation d'une espèce de suffocation, sont par cela même portés à être beaucoup plus violents que s'ils agissaient avec un esprit plus tranquille ou moins impressionné.

Même les plus pondérés, gênés et révoltés, se laissent emporter à leur insu.

Tout ce qui arrive au public est donc nécessairement empreint d'un certain caractère de violence, dont les restrictions actuelles sont pour la plus large part les causes efficientes.

Les dangers du régime ne s'arrêtent pas aux violents qui écrivent.

Le public qui lit ces pamphlets est, lui aussi, mis dans une disposition éminemment favorable à tout ce qui lui viendra de ce côté.

Il attend chaque pamphlet avec une impatience et une surexcitation disproportionnées.

Il exagérera ce qu'il lit, il ira au delà des incitations de son idole caché.

Les pamphlets circulent comme le vent qui court, on se les passe avec une fureur agitative.

Et c'est ainsi que l'on voudrait ne pas exciter le public !

On croit que ces restrictions peuvent localiser au moins les effets de la fermentation dans ces centres déterminés.

Grave erreur ! On plonge le pays dans un atmosphère de ténèbres, où tous les bruits les plus invraisemblables et les faits les plus incroyables, tellement ils sont atroces, sont colportés partout avec une rapidité étonnante.

Les Anglais seront les premiers effrayés s'ils pouvaient savoir les nouvelles qui viennent des villages, on ne sait comment, sur leur compte.

Inventions et calomnies, dira-t-on. Mais, alors, laissez au pays et à vous-même le seul moyen de savoir la vérité.

Ne le plongez pas dans ces ténèbres aveuglantes quand il faut au pays et à vous-même la lumière et l'apaisement.

Il faut toujours se rappeler que la mesure appliquée ne peut avoir pour effet que de rendre les violents encore plus effrénés et impossible l'action des esprits pondérés.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 206.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 4, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 202 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inform you that certain facts have been brought to my notice with regard to the M. Morcos Fahmy, a lawyer, a memorandum by whom on the political situation was forwarded.

In January, 1911, M. Morcos Fahmy was brought to trial on various charges of unprofessional conduct.—He was tried by five judges at the Court of Appeal, and after a hearing lasting six days, though several of the charges failed, he was disbarred.

In March, 1917, he appealed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, asking him to obtain for him a reconsideration of his case.

The High Commissioner referred the matter to Sir William Brunyate, who advised that no case had been made out for a reversal of the sentence, and was unfavourably impressed as to M. Morcos Fahmy's standard of professional conduct by the argument he had put forward.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 204.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 4, 1919.

I SEND for your Lordship's information the following observations by General Stack on the present situation in the Soudan :—

"First of all, I think I can say fairly confidently that there is no immediate cause for alarm in this country—that is to say, I do not believe we shall have any revolutionary or rebellious outbreak here.

"My reasons for saying this are twofold.

"In the first place, the Egyptians, of whom we have a large number, and who have been strongly affected by the movement in Egypt, are handicapped by the fact that they live in a remote country where they feel that any active movement would be ineffective and would probably recoil on themselves. Also, being relatively a small community they are susceptible to the influence of the senior men among them, who I am glad to say are steady and level headed. Further, being all Government servants, and having no independent element among them, such as lawyers, pressmen, or landowners, they have a good deal to lose in setting themselves against the Government, if they were to fail.

"In the second place, a reason which also strongly affects the attitude of the Egyptians is that the Soudanese population have no sympathy with the movement. They are not in themselves politically ready for self-Government—they are not sufficiently organised or coherent for such an idea to occur to them, I think, for some time yet—and they much prefer us as rulers to the Egyptians.

"In order to give you as precisely as possible my reading of the situation, I had better develop in fuller detail the above summary of the two elements we have to deal with.

"I will take the Egyptians first as they are in the present instance the inflammable element. It must be remembered that in this country we get practically no open demonstration of feeling. We get to know it only by reports of conversations in clubs and cafés.

"When the suggestion was first made in Egypt that a deputation should be sent to represent the aspirations of Egyptians at the Peace Conference there was great excitement among the Egyptians here. It was proposed to persuade the Soudanese, on grounds of community of religion, to join the 'Nationalist' movement and protest against British domination. This was, however, abandoned. The Soudanese were known to be apathetic and their leaders pro-British and, therefore, untrustworthy. The news of the demonstrations of protest against the removal of the Pashas was received with great satisfaction by the younger men, but as the demonstrations developed into outbreaks of violence their satisfaction gave place to some extent to

anxiety about the safety of their families and property. Nevertheless, an undercurrent of sympathy with the agitation survived, and there was a certain amount of disappointment among the civilians that the army to whom they looked for a lead made no movement. Their feeling, however, only took the form of one or two anonymous attempts to intimidate senior Egyptian officers, and to enlist prominent Soudanese religious leaders on their side. These attempts met with no success at all, as the individuals in question at once communicated the letters they had received to the Government.

Your appointment had a very good effect, and your declaration to the notables, followed by their manifesto, for a while silenced most of the folk. The release of the four Pashas was hailed with delight as heralding the complete independence of Egypt, and with the formation of the Ministry the Egyptians are now waiting on events. They hope for a good deal, and I think if the results do not come up to their expectations they will become restless again. This has again shown itself since the arrival of the last mail, the effect of which I have described to you in my telegram of to-day.

"I should not think a great deal of this if it were not for the effect it has on the Soudanese. I shall have to go back a little way to make clear to you what the attitude of the Soudanese has been throughout. Before Saad Zaghlul made his application to go home there was a good deal of talk and conversation, and Egyptians gave many of the Soudanese to understand that there was going to be a big change in politics which would lead to the retirement of the British from this country.

"This caused some alarm among the Soudanese. As I mentioned above, they prefer us to the Egyptians. It led to some of the prominent religious men, who, as you know, are the chief political influence in this country, coming forward and formulating an idea which they said had been for some time in their minds. This was that they wished to see the Soudanese developing as a nation by themselves and not as a mere appanage to Egypt. This was said not in a spirit of hostility to British rule, but by way of suggesting that they knew their interests to be bound up with the British, and that what they look forward to is a closer identification with the British Empire rather than with the Egyptian Sultanate.

"I sent an account of their conversations, with my observations thereon, to Sir R. Wingate at home, and I think it may help to make the matter clearer if I send you a copy of what I wrote, so I am sending one down with this.

"Consequently the news of the disturbances in Egypt so far from exciting sympathy among the natives has been received by them with indifference. The only way in which Egyptian intrigues could raise trouble here is by means of the fact that grain is very scarce and expensive this year, and that there is a certain proportion of the lower orders who are always restless, if there is a shortage, until the new cultivation season begins. I think we have safeguarded the position in this respect by buying a considerable quantity of army millet from Kantara, which will help to keep our prices down and feed the poorer people.

"But the difference that the Egyptian movement does make to the Soudanese is this, that they are led to ask themselves, if the movement is successful what is to become of the Soudan. They are becoming nervous lest, after all, what the Egyptians told them may be true and the British are about to leave this country, or, at any rate, admit a larger measure of Egyptian control. In this connection I am convinced that the action of His Majesty's Government in confirming me in my appointment is most opportune. I do not, of course, speak with a personal meaning, but as believing that it will be accepted as a definite indication that we intend to stay here. For this reason I hope it may be found possible to publish the fact before long. I am sure you will not think I am putting this forward on any personal grounds—nothing could be further from my mind—but because I am apprehensive that prolonged disquiet in Egypt, together with an uncertainty about our policy here, cannot but have a bad effect."

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

No. 337.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 612.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 17, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 672 of 29th April: Capitulations in Egypt.

I am consulting Sir W. Brunyate and will inform you of any decisions taken,

In meantime I propose to conclude Egypt-Morocco Convention before saying anything to French or other Powers concerning reconsideration of judicial reform schemes. After signature of convention whole situation can be re-examined on its merits.

As regards paragraph 5 of your above-mentioned telegram, question can stand over till Peace Treaty with Turkey comes under consideration. Paragraphs 6 or 7 are covered already by articles in draft Peace Treaty with Germany. Answer to paragraph 8 is in the negative.

No 338.

Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Acting Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to enclose copy of a telegram dated the 11th May received from General Allenby.

Major-General Thwaites ventures to anticipate that Sir Ronald Graham will concur in considering that it is necessary to take immediate action to ensure that the group of papers controlled by Mr. Boutigny remains under the influence of the British Government.

General Thwaites would be glad if Sir Ronald Graham would give him early instructions regarding the reply which should be returned to General Allenby.

May 17, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 338.

Telegram from General Headquarters, Egypt, to the Director of Military Intelligence.

THE Société orientale de Publicité owns a group of about eight Egyptian newspapers. It has bought the "Palestine News" and has the purchase of several others in view. This company is controlled by Mr. Boutigny, a British subject of Maltese extraction, who has in Constantinople similar newspaper interests, and contemplates developing activities in Turkey, Palestine and Syria. Of the shares in the Société, Boutigny holds about 90 per cent., the remainder being divided between two Italians and an Egyptian. He has recently been offered through the Banco di Roma 200,000*l.* for the purchase of all his rights. This sum is considerably in excess of the present value of the concern and can only have been made for political and commercial reasons. Boutigny has so far declined the offer, but as he is in debt to the Banco di Roma for some 50,000*l.*, pressure may be exerted upon him. Throughout the war and during recent disturbances he has shown himself entirely pro-British and is anxious to form a British group for the control of the business. He has already offered the post of general manager to a British officer here. If this business fell under French, Italian or Egyptian control it would be most unfortunate and would react seriously against British interests in the Near East. Every endeavour should be made to arrange for Boutigny to be financed by a British combine. He has already made overtures to Boulton, of the Alliance Bank of Simla, which will shortly open a branch here, but it is important to assist him to break away from the Banco di Roma and it may be necessary to arrange immediate temporary accommodation for this purpose. The Anglo-Egyptian Bank have financial dealings with him, and if assured he had Government's sympathy would no doubt assist. Please let me know what can be done in London to ensure Boutigny remaining in control of group. Big issues are involved and matter is urgent.

Memorandum by Mr. Patterson, Director-General of State Accounts.

Causes of Outbreak.

IN spite of the apparent unanimity of all classes of Egyptians the motives that sway them are various. The plan of campaign with its Bolshevik character put in action by the extremists is, as in Russia, of German origin. The plan was originally sent to Egypt and seized by us on a German spy, Mors, in the very early days of the war. There can be no doubt that similar copies found their way into the country.

I was informed by Egyptians that on two previous occasions it was proposed to put the plan into execution—on the outbreak of war with Turkey and after the fall of Kut. On both occasions it was Saad Pasha Zaghul who restrained the movement. The explanation of this lies in the absolute certainty of the extremists that the Central Powers must win, and that there was, therefore, no need for Egypt to risk anything or to endanger her economic situation. The sudden change in the fortunes of war staggered them. They decided to put their case before the Peace Conference, with, I am convinced, the plan always in reserve in case of failure. The explosion was premature: it was timed for the summer when the army had been demobilised and the heads of Government were absent on leave. To prevent leakage the secret had to be kept within a very narrow circle, with the consequent disadvantage of a premature explosion due to the ignorance of their sympathisers. The expulsion of the four leaders led to this premature explosion, and it is to this fortunate action that we owe our escape from what might have been a very serious situation.

At the time of the Armistice the great bulk of the population, peasant as well as *intelligentsia*, had more or less accepted the fact of our presence in Egypt, and though looking for extension of native control had no thought of attempting to drive us from Egypt. The ground was most unpromising for the extremists. Each class had its grievances, but the cement of a common grievance was needed to enable the extremists to play upon the grievances of each class. This was forthcoming in the refusal of the Government to allow the national delegates to travel. In Egypt it is almost an axiom that the native will accept the refusal of almost any demand, provided his case is heard and he feels that it has not been judged on *ex parte* grounds. The refusal to allow the delegates to plead their case in person was regarded as a flaming injustice, and swept the country off its legs. Up to this time the so-called delegates were the reverse of popular. Their election had been engineered by the forcing of signatures from the ignorant class and from schoolboys. As an instance of the methods employed I may cite the following: My cook in the market was stopped by two or three men who asked him: "Are you for the English or for the Egyptians?" He was unaware of what they were talking about, but played for safety and replied, "For the Egyptians." He was then asked to produce his seal which was affixed to a document of the contents of which he was ignorant. Among the upper classes, the wealthy young men of good family, the document met with a mixed reception, and I know of many cases where refusal to sign was accompanied by expressions of contempt. Notable among these were the sons of Elwi Pasha, whose late father had been a prominent Nationalist member of the Legislative Assembly, who replied that if the country was going to be governed by such a crew they would emigrate. Like all others, however, they later felt the injustice of not letting the self-styled delegates put their case.

Grievances.

On the feeling thus engendered the extremists played, fostering the sense of grievance by a skilful but absolutely unscrupulous campaign of calumny. To the peasants they harped on the tyranny of the Labour Corps and of the collection of crops for the army. Except in the actual recruitment, the former had not been unpopular, as the actual service was comfortable and lucrative. This was plain from the peasants' songs on the subject, which lacked all element of bitterness. The crops had been a more serious grievance as only a very small proportion had found their way to the army. The bulk had been sold by Omdas and Mamurs to grain dealers, who re-sold to the fellahen at exorbitant prices. The fortunes made in this way were always under their eyes. Without the machinations of agitators, however, there would have been no

lasting effects, as the Oriental is accustomed to regard such action on the part of his countrymen as nothing abnormal.

The grievances of the educated classes were more closely concerned with the protectorate than with the army. Certain Englishmen in high places, more particularly Sir William Brunyate and Mr. Dunlop, were unfortunately selected objects of particular animosity. In the case of the former this rose to white heat as a result of his confidential draft constitution handed to Rushdy Pasha. Its effect on the latter I heard from his nephew who happened to visit him just as he had finished writing his reply. He found him shaking all over and unable to speak. He threw him the draft constitution, saying, "Just read that! I ask you just read that!" The draft was never published, but Rushdy's reply, which was scattered broadcast, left the public imagination to read into it things more offensive to the national consciousness than actually appeared in the document. Sir William had frequently also emphasised the fact that the abolition of the Capitulations would free the hands of the Government in imposing taxation. This was seized on to create the impression that the British were going to increase taxation, especially the land tax, to a considerable extent. Colour was given to this by the somewhat unfortunate report of the Public Health Commission, with its over ambitious programme and its proposals for an enormous increase both in British staff and British salaries. The fact that this report was communicated to the press before it was put before the Cabinet or the responsible officials of the Government, helped to create the belief that all its recommendations were to be forced through. The cry then arose that the country was about to be flooded with English officials to the exclusion naturally of the Egyptian.

The attitude to the Ministry of Education can best be illustrated by another conversation. Mr. Dunlop's unpopularity, it must be remembered, is of no recent date. In discussing with the son of Yehia Pasha, the much respected President of the Court of Appeal, the time-honoured question of the possibilities of Egyptian self-government, the usual argument of their lack of education, was adduced. The young man burst into a passionate flood of tears and said: "It always comes back to that. For your own purposes you deliberately give us a bad education and then you throw it in our teeth." Unhappily, there is a universal impression that the unfortunate Mr. Dunlop has been acting all these years on this Machiavellian principle. The root of the matter is that he is unapproachable and uncongenial, and his policy is consequently suspect.

If we are to succeed again in Egypt, this feeling must be borne in mind. It will be a capital mistake to force on them high officials whose manners offend and whose sympathies they mistrust. They have no desire to do away with English officialdom, but they resent the presence of inefficient Englishmen and of unnecessary Englishmen, i.e., of Englishmen occupying posts which Egyptians are perfectly competent to fill. Our policy in this respect must be revised even at the risk of loss of a certain efficiency. Not too many Englishmen, and those there are men of tact and efficiency, should be the watchword.

Capitulations.

What roused the gravest discontent, however, among the educated classes, was the perception, first realised in Sir William's draft constitution, that the abolition of the Capitulations must lead not to less, but to infinitely greater British control. Hitherto the more intelligent, though admitting their inability for immediate self-government, had always cherished the ideal of ultimate self-government, arrived at by gradual stages. This ideal they found rudely shattered, as under the new conditions there was no place left for such aspirations.

They found support for their opposition among the foreign element who wished to continue to evade taxation, and more particularly among the foreign lawyers who resented the introduction of English law and English language into the Courts. This support locally, aided by the knowledge that America and Italy had not recognised the protectorate, persuaded the sanguine Egyptian temperament that Europe and the United States (particularly the latter) would compel the evacuation. Much as such a course was dreaded by a very large section of moderate opinion, the reality of the danger in their eyes prevented them from risking airing their opinions.

Amour-propre.

Mr. Hampson Gary, the United States Minister, diagnosed the root of the trouble as wounded *amour-propre*, and there is no doubt that this played a strong part in

stirring up feeling. The spectacle of Cyprus, Syria, Palestine, the Hedjaz and even the Cairo Jews, proceeding to the Peace Conference from which they were excluded, was a bitter pill to swallow.

Strike of Government Officials.

The great majority of Government officials were strongly opposed to striking, and it may not be without interest to indicate the sort of pressure brought upon them. The extremists, of course, laid great stress on the importance of continuing agitation with the object of influencing the Peace Conference, and, small though their numbers were, they were able, mainly by the use of anonymous letters, to inspire a considerable amount of terror. The strongest pressure, however, and the most difficult to resist, came from the students and railway workers, both of whom were able to represent the real sacrifices they had made for the national cause, the former by postponing for a year the taking of their diplomas, the latter by a serious financial loss in wages. Were the Government officials, it was asked, to be the only ones who made no sacrifice, particularly when their continuance at work was being used by England as political capital. Such social pressure was hard to withstand.

Release of the Malta Prisoners.

The effect of this is yet to be seen. Their imprisonment had made them popular heroes, and it is quite possible that their popularity may be damped when they return from Paris with nothing accomplished. The immediate effect hoped for was the cessation of disorder and the formation of a Cabinet, but Sir Edmund Allenby was quite alive to the risk he was taking, as on the evening before his proclamation he told the heads of departments that within a week there would either be calm or things would have got so much worse that more drastic measures might be necessary. The release of the four was, I think, in Sir Edmund's mind from the beginning. I saw him, just after Sir Alexander Baird, within twenty-four hours of his arrival, and he hinted as much. I respectfully pointed out that I thought their return would make all Government impossible, and as the High Commissioner made no comment on my remark I received the impression that he disagreed with it.

The great danger ahead now seems to me not further violence, but the possibility of passive resistance to the tax collector. If the peasants are persuaded to this course—and such persuasion would not be difficult—a really awkward situation might arise.

What Does the Egyptian Really Want?

The great bulk of the Egyptians are, as I have said, at heart contented with the continuance of English control. They really do not know definitely what they want, and would be unable to formulate any concrete proposals for reform. They can therefore be satisfied with outward changes (I do not wish to imply that these should be illusory), and the two fields for these changes should be constitutional and educational. The method of abolishing the capitulations will require complete re-consideration, and, as previously stated, the choice of English officials must be more carefully made. With a sound policy in these respects, I do not personally fear the existence of any lasting bitterness, whether among the educated classes or among the fellaheen. The fellah is easily roused to outbursts of murderous passion, but this passion quickly subsides. He requires firm government, but at heart he is a child, and like a child is quite ready after his fit of temper to be good and be friends.

No. 340.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 805. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 17, 1919.

MY telegram No. 760.

Following received from Governor-General, Soudan:—

"Will you kindly inform Foreign Office that I propose to allow following delegation of Soudanese notables to proceed to London in order to congratulate His Majesty on the conclusion of a victorious peace:—

"El Sheikh-el-Tayyib Ahmed Hashem, M.B.E., Mufti of the Soudan.

"El Sheikh Abul Ghasim Ahmed Hashem, President of Board of Ulemas.

"Sheikh Ismail-el-Azhari, Kadi of the Darfour Province.

"Above represent native element in Government.

"Abd-el-Azim Bey Khalifa, Nazir of the Ababda Arabs of Berber Province.

"Ali Wad-el-Tom, Nazir of the Kababish Arabs of Kordofan Province.

"Ibrahim Musa, Nazir of the Wadendowa tribes of Kassala Province.

"Awad-el-Kerim Abu Sin, Deputy Nazir of the Shukria Arabs of the Blue Nile Province.

"Above are the principal Mahommedan chiefs in the Soudan.

"El Sayed Sir Ali-el-Morghani, K.C.M.G.

"El Sherif Yusef-el-Hindi, M.B.E.

"El Sayed Abderrahman Mohammed Ahmed.

"Above are the three principal religious leaders in country.

"Last-named is the eldest son of well-known Mahdi. He was brought up since youth under British guidance, is intelligent, and has great influence in Soudan, which he uses in an entirely loyal manner.

"Presume His Majesty's Government will have no objection to his inclusion, which I am convinced would have excellent effect. Deputation would leave Khartoum about the end of first week in July. Exact date could be arranged later.

"Please inform me if the composition of the party and date of departure are agreeable to His Majesty's Government. I should be grateful for reply by telegraph as soon as possible, as I must give at least a month's notice, if possible six weeks."

I concur in this proposal.

No. 341.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 818. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 19, 1919.

MY telegram No. 748.

I saw Sultan of Egypt this morning and discussed question of a new Ministry, which I expect to be able to form in a few days.

No. 342.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 802.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 16, 1919.

MY telegram No. 788.

Following on the strike of Suez Canal employees, all classes of low skilled and unskilled mechanics at Port Said ceased work. The strike has spread to Suez and Ismailia, where an almost similar situation now prevails.

Canal work continues with naval and military assistance.

No. 343.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 826. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 21, 1919.

MY telegram No. 818.

Mohammed Said Pasha was recommended to me as most suitable Prime Minister in present circumstances. I have interviewed him, and have received from him satisfactory assurances as to his recognition of British protectorate over Egypt, and as to lines on which he is prepared to conduct Government pending decisions of special commission as to future administration of the country.

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(R.) Accordingly a new Ministry has been formed to-day, consisting of the following:—

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior: Mohammed Said Pasha.
Public Works: Ismail Sirri Pasha.
Finance: Yusuf Wahba Pasha.
Education: Ahmed Ziwar Pasha.
Agriculture: Abd el Rahim Sabei Pasha.
Justice: Ahmed Zulficar Pasha.
Wakfs: Mohammed Tewfik Nessim Bey. (End of R.)

No. 344.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 823. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 21, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 583* and your telegram No. 603,† latter of which only arrived last night.

A rumour has been put about here that 600 new posts have been provided in current estimates for Europeans.

This is quoted as one of the substantial causes of discontent, but there is no reason to suppose it to be a serious factor.

Statement appears to have originated in two misunderstandings.

Firstly, the reinstatement in current estimates of previously existing posts of European officials who during last five years were allowed to join Allied armies on guarantee of their posts being so reinstated at the termination of the war. Secondly, training accorded to British soldiers in Government workshops in order to facilitate their finding employment upon demobilisation which was misinterpreted to foreshadow projected engagement of such soldiers when trained under Egyptian Government to displace Egyptian artisans. Actual new posts indicated for Europeans are in the neighbourhood of 100. Of these, roughly half are for technical services, *e.g.*, irrigation, buildings, public health, survey, and are required by double necessity of making good leeway of last few years and of meeting greatly needed reforms.

Bulk of remainder are to strengthen police in view of anticipated abolition of capitulations. It should be pointed out that creation of possible European posts is almost invariably accompanied by much greater proportion of Egyptian posts, and that except in lower ranks of police every individual recommendation to appointment of a European to a new post undergoes double scrutiny, and requires double sanction of board of advisers and of Council of Ministers.

With regard to staff figures for 1900, 1914, and 1918, I regret that Egyptian Government have never kept statistics of their officials by nationality. Accordingly while statement relative to numbers of various foreigners and Egyptians in the service can be compiled for current year, no reliable statistics are available for past year.

Steps are being taken to compile reliable statistics for information of future commission, and I am most desirous to avoid diverting efforts to this end by any scratch collections of imperfect figures in meantime. Careful compilation closely supervised by British officials, is necessary in order to obtain reliable statistics. Number of officials, never excessive, is now depleted by war service, prolonged cessation of recruitment, posting to provinces as political officers, and leave of absence from Egypt rendered imperative by strain of last five years.

In view of impossibility of carrying out your instructions, I trust above explanations may be sufficient. It would greatly assist us if in present conditions requests for information could be carefully considered, and when possible take the form of asking for this to be prepared for special commission.

* See No. 314.

† Not printed.

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No. 345.

Question asked in the House of Commons, May 21, 1919.

Captain Ormsby-Gore to ask the President of the Board of Education whether any support from public funds is given to any school in Egypt which has for its object the education of children of Englishmen engaged in the public service in Egypt; whether the only schools in Cairo before the war where a European education could be obtained by English children were State-supported German, French and Italian schools; and whether he will examine the question with a view to assisting British parents in the Egyptian service to educate their families in Egypt.

Answer.

Mr. Harmsworth.—The answer to the first part of the honourable and gallant Member's question is in the negative. As regards the second part, I understand that previous to the war the only British schools in Egypt were the Victoria College in Alexandria, which owes its existence to private generosity, and a day school in Cairo. Since the war, a new English school has been started in Cairo which has over 100 pupils and has been of great assistance to British parents.

His Majesty's High Commissioner reported at length in 1916 on the serious lack of educational facilities for British children in Egypt, and he was assured that the whole question would be carefully and sympathetically examined at the end of the war. It is now being so considered.

No. 346.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(Private.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 22, 1919.

QUESTION of date of despatch of Lord Milner's Mission is one of great difficulty, about which we shall be grateful for your matured advice. Lord Milner is strongly of opinion that departure of Mission should be delayed till early autumn, and is not prepared to undertake its duties at an earlier date. Slowness in restoration of order and good feeling in Egypt, possibility of boycott or bad reception of Mission if it arrived prematurely, unrest in Eastern world, and uncertainty as to decisions of Peace Conference in respect both of Turkey and other enemy Powers, are used as arguments for postponement to later period, when there may be greater stability in all these respects. It may also be difficult to get together representative and powerful Mission in summer months. Please balance against these the considerations, with which you are familiar, in favour of early appointment and despatch of Mission, which would in that case require to be under another head, and favour me with your considered opinion.

No. 347.

Mr. Vansittart to Mr. Hubbard.—(Received May 23.)

Dear Hubbard,

Paris, May 22, 1919.

FOREIGN Office despatch No. 2783 of the 6th May. I enclose a draft of the covering letter which I propose to send to the French with the final text of the convention. Please let me have your observations on it at once. I understand from your despatch that Rabino is now on leave. Perhaps he had better look at it too. I want to finish the business off as soon as possible.

I think this draft covers your points—except that respecting the Antiquities Department. I think that is made quite sufficiently clear in the text of the convention, and there is no need to labour the point further.

Would you return 1751/1919, with your comments on my draft to Pichon. Please make any alterations you wish.

When you return the draft to me, may I take it as final as far as Foreign Office is concerned.

Yours sincerely,
ROBERT VANSITTART.

Enclosure in No. 347.

Draft Letter to M. Pichon.

M. le Ministre,

British Delegation, Paris, May , 1919.

1. THE British and French Delegates have now agreed upon the text of the convention respecting Egypt and Morocco which has long been under discussion. I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy for convenience of reference.

2. There are, however, a number of points on which, to avoid future misunderstanding, the two Governments should be clear that there is no difference of interpretation between them before the convention is actually ratified.

3. The explanation of these points, especially those succinctly dealt with in article 3, is somewhat lengthy, and His Majesty's Government have thought it might be preferable for both parties to deal with them by an exchange of letters rather than by further labouring the text of the convention.

4. Article 3 stipulates that "British nationals shall enjoy in the French zone the same treatment as French nationals in all matters concerning . . . individual rights (including the tenure of real property and mining rights) . . ."

5. His Majesty's Government understand that the expression "mining rights" will be interpreted in a wide sense, and will include the right to prospect, to obtain licences and concessions, to import mining machinery, to construct means of transport for removing the output of mines and to export ores.

6. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn that the French Government are in agreement with them as to this interpretation.

7. A further important point arises in connection with this article, viz., the export duties leviable upon ores sent to different destinations. His Majesty's Government consider it essential that there should be no discrimination between exports from Morocco to Great Britain and those to France, whether of ore or of any other goods. This point is one which would fall to be dealt with in a commercial convention. The matter of export duties, however, appears to be somewhat outside the scope of the present agreement. I should therefore be glad to agree by this exchange of notes with the French Government that, pending the conclusion of a commercial convention, there shall be no discrimination in either Egypt or Morocco in the matter of export duties levied on goods exported to Great Britain and France.

Pending also the conclusion of a new commercial treaty His Majesty's Government would desire to receive an assurance that the fishing rights at present enjoyed by British subjects in the waters and harbours of the French zone, and the right for British vessels to trade on an equal footing with French vessels between French and Moroccan ports shall remain intact.

His Majesty's Government would also request that it may be understood that if, after the convention comes into force, there should still remain outstanding any disputes between British subjects and the protectorate authorities concerning the title to Habous or Makhzen properties, benevolent treatment shall be given to the British claimants. Further, that, as regards private properties at Agadir the titles to which are disputed by the Makhzen, the same treatment should be extended to British subjects holding such properties as is accorded to the French owners of properties who are understood to have purchased their estates originally at the instigation of the French authorities, provided always that the titles of the British owners are not vitiated by fraud.

The question of freehold property also requires, in the view of His Majesty's Government, some further elucidation. They would suggest the following arrangement:—

Within six months of the ratification of this convention His Britannic Majesty's agent in Morocco will present to the Resident-General a list of all claims by British subjects to land in Morocco showing, with regard to each, the boundaries and the extent of the land claimed.

If any of these claims are not admitted by the Moroccan authorities a notice to that effect and of the ground upon which the claim is objected to will be given to His Britannic Majesty's agent within six months.

The claim should then be investigated by experts appointed by the Resident-General and Agency respectively.

If the experts agree as to the extent to which the claims should be admitted, and their report is approved by the Resident-General and the Agency respectively, the

decision shall be final. If they are unable to agree, the question shall be referred to arbitration.

Titles in accordance with the decision of the experts or the arbitrators as the case may be shall be registered and shall be indefeasible.

Where no objection is made by the Moroccan authorities to the claim put forward by the British subject, the title of the claim shall be registered and be indefeasible.

In dealing with claims under this article undisputed occupation for a period of twenty-five years shall be regarded as conferring valid title which shall be entitled to registration even if at the time when the land first passed into private occupation it might have been claimed as Habous, Makhzen or State land.

In regard to the matter of taxation, also dealt with in article 3, His Majesty's Government have the following observations to make with regard to the increment tax ("droit de plus-value"), which they understand to have been already claimed from British subjects. It is the view of His Majesty's Government that, as they have not made the dahir imposing this tax operative on British subjects by King's Regulations, British subjects are under no obligation to pay it. In order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding arising after the present convention comes into force, His Majesty's Government consider it desirable that an understanding should exist beforehand as to the non-retroactive effect of the convention in this respect. His Majesty's Government have no doubt that the French Government share the view that the abolition of the capitulations will not render British subjects, who may previously have sold lands or houses in the French zone, liable to payment of increment tax on such a scale or to any penalty for their previous refusal to pay. They would therefore be glad to receive an assurance in this sense as requested of the Resident-General by His Majesty's Minister at Tangier in his note of the 30th November, 1918. His Majesty's Government also trust they may be assured that the original value of the properties would, when desired, be estimated without waiting for the tax to become due, and they take this opportunity of recalling the promise made in 1915 by Count Saint Aulaire to Sir H. White that, having regard to the peculiar position of British property owners in Morocco, the valuations and assessment of the tax upon their property when sold would be effected "in a very liberal spirit."

In regard to article 5, His Majesty's Government would be glad of an assurance that the French Government will consider a proposal from His Majesty's Government for a special agreement respecting the surrender by the authorities of the French zone of criminals who have taken refuge there from British justice from the Tangier or Spanish zones or from Gibraltar.

His Majesty's Government would also wish it to be understood that article 8 of the present convention shall not prejudice the right to be regarded as British subjects of persons who acquired British nationality by naturalisation in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 2 of article 15 of the Madrid Convention of 1880.

In regard to the phrase "lois de contrôle scolaire" occurring in paragraph 11 article 15, the Egyptian Government would no doubt wish to regulate the curriculum to be pursued in schools to which they accord recognition, and understand this to be included in the phrase above quoted. They would, however, be glad to be sure that this is also the view of the French Government.

No. 348.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 637.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 23, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 805.

I concur in proposed constitution of delegation of Soudanese notables.

It is, however, essential that they should arrive in England not later than the third week of July, as official engagements would render it inconvenient to receive them in August. Please arrange accordingly.

The Soudan Government will presumably delegate a British official to accompany the deputation, and I should be glad if Mr. MacMichael, of Soudan Civil Service, whose services have been placed at our disposal in connection with discussions in Paris regarding boundaries, might remain here to act as liaison between the deputation and this Department.

No. 349.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 209.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 7, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 202, I have the honour to forward two more expressions of opinion on the present situation here.

One is from Mr. Percy W. Carver, one of the leading members of the British Community in Alexandria; and the other is an extract from a report by a British Political Officer in the Provinces.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 349.

Mr. Carver to Sir E. Allenby.

Excellency,

Alexandria, April 29, 1919.

I TAKE the liberty of submitting for your Excellency's consideration my views on the origin, development and effect of the present agitation, and trust that your Excellency will believe that this expression is not actuated by any feeling other than that of wishing well to a country in which I have lived for forty years, and have large interests.

Origin.—The position before the outbreak of war was that the Nationalist Party was confined to native leaders and residents in the chief towns. Cultivators and labourers, as a class, did not trouble about politics. The leaders had obvious reasons for wishing to be rid of the English. The residents of the towns were sub-divided into three classes, namely, those in Government employ; those wishful to get that employment, either at once or at a future date; and the idle rich. There were not and could not be sufficient posts to fill the increasing demand due to the influx into towns of people, the proper place of many of whom was on the land. Too many educational facilities had made them despise the quiet village life.

Development.—On the outbreak of war, there was a natural sympathy for the Turk, though in the case of cultivators it was only latent. The sympathy of cultivators and labouring classes increased by degrees owing to various causes, notably among them being the requisitioning of cereals and cattle; loss of relatives in the Camel and Labour Corps; and the collection of funds for the Lord Kitchener Memorial and the British Red Cross. The circumstances in which cereals were requisitioned and subscriptions collected were such that there were abuses which led to hardships and caused resentment. Even now it might be advisable to return the subscriptions collected for the Red Cross in 1918, as nothing hurts the native so much as touching his pocket, nor gives him so much pleasure as receiving money, however small the amount.

The residents in the towns paid attention to the class and capabilities of the English officials; but the cultivator and labourer did not trouble themselves on this head until they were encouraged to do so by sympathy with Turkey and the abuses connected with the collection of cereals and subscriptions which caused them to have grievances. England has not in the past been sufficiently careful to put good Englishmen into some of the higher posts and they, in return, have not been sufficiently careful over junior appointments. There are, of course, splendid exceptions, but as a whole Egypt has not received as good English officials as she ought to have had. The natives are fully aware of this and have made a grievance of it. The faults of English officials are often not of capability, but of tact and manners, both of which could be remedied with proper supervision.

Discontent which was noticeable proceeded unchecked. In December last the British Chamber of Commerce petitioned the Residency on the subject, urging a declaration of Great Britain's policy, so that the increasing discontent might be promptly checked. Too little interest has been shown towards Egypt either by His Majesty's Government, the House of Commons, or the British public. The native is sure to have noticed this.

The climax came with the mention of "self determination."

Effect—Recent troubles have shown cultivators that a disorderly revolution cannot succeed, and that their best friends are not the town classes who let them into

this trouble with such disastrous results to their lives and their crops, both as regards value of existing crops and risk to the growing ones. There is no reason to think the cultivator is radically changed, and he is still, before anything, a cultivator devoted to his farm and keen on making money. He is quite capable of seeing for himself who are his best friends and that no native administration can do for him what a thoroughly efficient English one can do.

Future.—Egypt is not fitted for "self-government," and the bulk of the population knows it. Natives know the vital importance of Egypt to the British Empire; the necessity for European capital and protection of same; and that leadership in all governmental and commercial enterprises must come from Europeans.

More interest in Egypt should be shown by His Majesty's Government and the House of Commons, so that the native may see that Egypt is considered of some importance. The English administration in the country should be thorough, and sources of irritation should be avoided. In many respects the cultivator is like a child and is easily led; it has been shown by recent experience that, if recent causes of dissatisfaction are not removed, he can be led into doing mischief.

I am, &c.

PERCY W. CARVER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 349.

*Extracts from a letter from a British Political Officer.**Reasons for Discontent.*

ON Sunday the 27th April, we paid our promised visit to the father of the Omdeh, Mustapha Bey Beker, who is an intelligent and well-to-do fellah. His family has held the office of Omdeh for five generations.

He received us very cordially, stating he realised the true purpose of our visit was to bring about a better understanding between Englishmen and Egyptians. He proposed to show his appreciation of the honour we had done him, not by insincere flattery but by outspokenness.

A very interesting conversation followed in which Mustapha Bey touched on:—

1. *Education.*—Out of a revenue of £E. 18–20 millions, only £E. 400,000 is devoted to education. The masters are underpaid and consequently inferior. If the Government cannot afford to establish better schools, the better class people would willingly pay higher fees for higher education. He wanted to see a university on the lines of Oxford in Egypt.

He produced an "English Reader," an abridged copy of "Don Quixote," and asked if that were a suitable book for a boy of nineteen to study. Mustapha Bey cannot read English himself but spoke of it as a silly story full of "Afrits" and devils.

2. *The British Official.*—He is resigned to the British occupation and compared the Egyptians to a flock of sheep, the English being the shepherd. It is the duty of the shepherd to know all about his flock, to look after their wants and not to live apart from them. He instanced the British inspector of his district who had only visited his home once in eight years.

He is old enough to remember the rule of the Turks and how the idea of British rule was welcomed, as administered by the type of Englishman they saw at the beginning of the occupation. The modern type of British official does not come up to the old standard.

He compared the courtesy and sympathy of men like Lord Kitchener and Sir Reginald Wingate who came to the door to welcome him, with the attitude of the British inspector in his district who never pays friendly, only official visits and barely gives two fingers in shaking hands. Of Lord Kitchener, he said the present troubles could never have arisen had he been here.

I suggested that the aim of the British Government had been to give Egypt

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freedom in local administration, by appointing native governors with British inspectors under them, and it could not be expected that a very good type of Englishman would apply for the post of inspector on those terms.

He agreed, but suggested that there could perhaps be a different office created, that of a British commissioner for the district, a man of higher standard than an inspector, who would be responsible to the High Commissioner for carrying out schemes of reasonable progress on wise lines, and who would remedy grievances (see next paragraph). He did not wish to see Englishmen holding the office of Mudir. I asked what would happen if the Mudir obstructed the suggested commissioner's schemes, and he replied that in that case, the Mudir could be removed from office.

3. *Some Grievances.*—(a.) There is urgent need for the construction of about half a kilometre of agricultural road which, with the repairing of the canal bank, would place his village in connection with the main agricultural road of the district. This road was applied for in 1913 and refused by the Provincial Council on the grounds of lack of funds. He said his neighbours would be willing to defray the cost, if the Government would undertake the work.

(b.) In 1916 a new Menail Canal was made by the first circle of irrigation, Ismailia Canal, and serves to water the high land on its eastern bank but it does harm to the low-lying land on the western side belonging to himself and other farmers. A drain is an urgent necessity. He stated that no British inspector visited the place during the construction of the canal.

(c.) *Recruiting for Labour Corps.*—In his village there was no grievance, about thirty men had gone voluntarily and all had returned contented with their pay. He attributed the dissatisfaction in other places, not to the action of the British authorities, but to that of the Mamurs and others of his own nation. These people with an eye to their own advancement and in the hope of currying favour, had often produced by force twice the number of men asked for, without regard to their suitability.

Mustapha Bey stated he was totally unprepared for the present disturbances and could not understand them. They came as a complete surprise.

No. 350

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 833. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 23, 1919.

THERE has been little comment so far on new Ministry, but moderate opinion thoroughly approves of it, and amongst extremists there is some disappointment that it has been found possible to form so strong a Ministry.

No. 351.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 832. Urgent.)

Cairo, May 23, 1919.

I FIND that although, as stated in my telegram No. 823,* the Egyptian Government has never kept statistics of its officials by nationalities, statistics of numbers of Egyptian and European officials respectively were specially collected in 1898 and 1906, and results were embodied in Lord Cromer's reports for those years. The report for 1906 gives comparison between numbers in 1898 and 1906. The figures will no doubt serve for comparison with those which it is proposed to collect for current year.

* See No. 341

The following table of European employees of the Egyptian Government, serving in the Army or engaged in war work (forwarded with a memorandum by Sir M. Cheetham to the High Commissioner, dated the 7th June, 1918) is appended:—

Departments.	Definitely released from Government service.			Lent.				Total Released or Lent.	Less number returned to duty.	Net Total.
	Still serving.	Deceased.	Returned to duty with Government.	To Military Authorities.	For special War Services.	Still working.	Returned to ordinary duty.			
Ministry of Finance—										
State accounts	3	..	3	..	..	1	..	7	3	4
Secretariat	4	2	..	3	..	4	..	13	..	13
Legal Department	2	..	2	..	..	..	..	4	2	2
Mines Department	4	1	..	..	..	3	..	8	..	8
Government Press	2	1	2	..	..	..	..	5	2	3
Domains	8	3	2	..	..	..	..	13	2	11
Coastguards	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	3
Customs	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2
Statistical Department..	..	..	..	1	..	1	2	4	2	2
Post Office	8	1	3	2	..	4	..	18	3	15
Ports and Lights	21	..	5	2	2	1	..	31	7	24
Survey Department	9	3	4	15	8	2	1	42	13	29
Frontier Districts Administration	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	..	5
	71	11	21	23	10	16	3	155	34	121
Ministry of the Interior—										
Central Administration ..	4	1	..	5	2	1	..	13	2	11
Police	37	2	7	1	3	..	..	50	10	40
Prisons	..	..	..	1	2	..	..	3	2	1
Public Health Department ..	10	1	4	..	2	1	..	18	6	12
Municipal and Local Dir. ..	3	2	3	..	..	..	..	8	3	5
	54	6	14	7	9	2	..	92	23	69
Ministry of Education—										
General Education	36	4	5	3	19	2	..	69	24	45
Department of Technical Ind. and Com. Education.. ..	7	1	1	..	..	1	..	10	1	9
	43	5	6	3	19	3	..	79	25	54
Ministry of Public Works ..	101	9	7	5	35	..	..	157	42	115
Ministry of Agriculture ..	12	..	..	6	2	1	..	21	2	19
Ministry of Foreign Affairs ..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	2
Ministry of Justice	89	10	25	3	..	..	..	127	25	102
State Railways and Telegraphs ..	76	5	11	..	..	29	..	121	11	110
General Total	448	46	84	47	75	51	3	754	162	592

Extract from Sir M. Cheetham's Memorandum.

"Your Excellency will observe that (in round numbers) 800 have been released altogether for Army purposes, 50 have been killed, 150 have returned to Government service, and 600 are at present unavailable for civil employment."

"Of this last number, the considerably larger half is British, and the loss in this respect is far more important in its effects than the reduction in non-British European official elements (chiefly French and Italian), since the mass of the latter serving in the armies or lent to the forces here are small, employees in the Mixed Courts and

Railways, and, to a lesser extent, in the Finance and Interior. The British quota on the contrary includes a very large number of senior officials. . . .

"It will be noticed that it shows the numbers of Government servants who have been either released for military service or lent to the military authorities and special services connected with the war. It should, however, be stated that there are many officials who, while continuing to carry out their usual duties, are at the same time giving part of their time to war work. These are not, of course, included in the statement, but their number is very large. As an example, I may quote the case of the Department of Technical, Industrial, and Commercial Education. The Director-General of this Department (which has sent ten of its complement to join the forces) has undertaken, in addition to his ordinary responsibilities, the duties of a civilian employment bureau for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Under his direction several members of the Department give all their time to this object, others work extra hours. The practical utility of their activities is proved by the fact that the bureau has set free 8,000 British soldiers for service at the front, competent men being found and trained to carry on their duties at the base. The ideal to which the bureau set out to work was 10,000. . . ."

The above material provides sufficient evidence of the strain on the British elements of the Civil Services (particularly the Finance, Interior, and Railways). These were only too few before the war began, and the point has now been reached when we are obliged, as had already occurred, to ask the military authorities for the return of officials lent to them. You will also remember that a Frontiers Administration has been formed and staffed by Englishmen, and that the Capitulations Commission throws an immense amount of extra work on the judicial services. The latest call for extra staff has resulted from the creation of the Supplies Control Board.

No. 352.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 217.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 11, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 201 of the 3rd May, I have the honour to forward a summary of the events of the week from the 4th to the 10th May inclusive.

I also enclose a copy of a declaration by the Union Nationale Armenienne, described by themselves as an "official communiqué," which they submitted for publication to the editor of the "Journal du Caire."

I have, &c.,

(For High Commissioner),

M. CHEETHAM.

Enclosure 1 in No. 352.

Summary of Events of the Week May 4 to May 10 inclusive.

May 4.

Students were still mostly absent from the schools, but a few returned to the Trade School.

Dr. Ismail Sidky, a leading member of El Hizb el Watani (Nationalist Party) was arrested as a sequel to the raid on the printing press on the previous day. The owner had denounced him, and Sidky admitted verbally that the press was that of his party.

At Alexandria demonstrations of students and Copts were dispersed without bloodshed.

The provinces were quiet. The arrest and deportation of agitators from Zagazig had had a good effect.

A leaflet was being circulated in Cairo attacking the expected Commission of Enquiry from England. It argued that the Commission must be boycotted, and any Egyptian who had anything to do with it was a traitor. If the Commission were recognised, it would show:—

1. That the English had the right to interfere in Egyptian affairs, and give and take what they liked.
2. That not independence but merely internal reform was Egypt's demand.
3. That the delegation which went to Paris was unrepresentative, since Egypt had agreed to discuss matters with the Commission.

The attitude of every Egyptian therefore must be "The Egyptian question is not an internal but an international question, to be discussed only between the Peace Conference and an Egyptian deputation representing the Egyptian people."

There seemed reasons for believing that the sympathy shown by the Italians for the Nationalist movement was largely governed by a desire to advance their business interests, the Banco di Roma, for example, being anxious to win over the native *clientèle*.

It was reported from Deirut that more arms had been seized and more arrests made. Thirty-seven persons implicated in the train murder had been despatched to Assiut for trial.

May 5.

A proclamation by the High Commissioner was published, warning students of higher and secondary schools that those who did not return to their classes on the 7th would be debarred from sitting for any examinations during the year.

A small demonstration near the Residency in the morning was dispersed by the troops.

Attempts by the students to persuade tramway employees to strike on the 6th (Accession Day) met with no encouragement.

The editor of "Al Ahram" was reported to have received a communication from certain Copts, who, within the last week have formed a schismatic sect which they call "Gimayat et Towhid" (Unitarian-). They no longer accept the doctrine of the Trinity, and wish to approach nearer to Islam.

There was great excitement on account of the proclamation among the students in the cafés in the evening. The general tone was that, in comparison with their great task of ensuring the complete independence of Egypt, examinations mattered nothing.

There was great talk of counter-propaganda by students, to neutralise the effect of the leaflets distributed by the British.

May 6.

It was reported that in the late afternoon in the native quarters men went round and intimidated some foreigners and natives, who had hung out flags in honour of Accession Day, into taking them down.

It was also reported that the students intended to try the experiment of demonstrating at night, as likely to be safer for themselves and more annoying for the authorities than the daytime.

More voluntary surrenders of arms were reported from a village near Deirut.

At Mansura 50 per cent. of the students of the Technical School went on strike

May 7.

At about 11.30 P.M., 2,000 people, chiefly students and roughs, tried to demonstrate, but were caught between two bodies of troops and dispersed. The troops handled them severely with their entrenching tool handles, and about fifty arrests were made.

The proclamation was disobeyed by the students of the higher schools, an attendance of 3 being the largest recorded. At the three secondary schools in Cairo 200 attended out of a total of 1,200.

The extremists were reported to be extremely disgusted by the fact that, except for a grandiose luncheon party offered to the press, no activities whatever had been reported on the part of the deputation in Paris.

The railway workmen were reported to feel considerable resentment against the leaders who had made them unfulfilled promises of strike pay, but none against British railway officials.

An Effendi informed a meeting at El Azhar that students, dressed as fellaheen, had already left for the provinces to incite the populace to a general uprising on the arrival of a Commission from England.

Further seizures of arms to the number of ninety-one were reported from Deirut.

May 8.

In the evening a small procession of Azharists with banners dispersed hastily near the Abdin Square on the sound of an approaching motor lorry.

Otherwise no incidents were reported.

Abdel Khalik Pasha Madkur started for Paris, and made a speech to some 400 people who assembled to see him off at the station. It is reported that he took with him a letter of credit on the Banco di Roma for 150,000L., being part of a sum of 282,000L. collected for propaganda purposes.

May 9.

The situation remained quiet.

The publication of the Peace Terms, including international recognition of the protectorate, caused the extremists the deepest depression. They were also said to be frightened by the arrests of demonstrators on the 7th.

The students were said to have appointed among themselves "secret police." These note down the name of those who attend school; the names are reported to the students who are on strike, and then those who have attended school are assaulted, if opportunity offers, on their way home.

May 10.

During the night of the 9th and 10th May three small demonstrations took place. Troops returning to their quarters were stoned near Abu-el-Ela. Ten arrests were made. A procession in the Muski was dispersed, and ten more arrests made. Another procession, organised by the Azharists, was stopped on its way towards the Residency. There was a good deal of stone-throwing, and finally the troops were obliged to use their bayonets. Fourteen natives were wounded, and another ten arrests made.

At Alexandria a small peaceful demonstration took place as send-off to Madkur Pasha on his start for Europe.

Forty firearms were seized at villages near Assiut.

Enclosure 2 in No. 352.

Communiqué from the Armenian National Union.

L'UNION nationale arménienne, qui représente toutes les institutions nationales d'Égypte, d'accord avec Mgr. Torghom, Evêque des Arméniens orthodoxes, et S. G. Mgr. Kouzian, Evêque des Arméniens catholiques, a déjà maintes fois déclaré qu'elle ne pouvait admettre que des Arméniens aient pu commettre quelques actes hostiles contre les Égyptiens, et que, après enquête judicieuse, elle était à même de donner le plus formel démenti aux rumeurs malveillantes ayant pour but de compromettre dans ce pays l'honneur et la sécurité de nos compatriotes.

Malgré ces déclarations franches et loyales et les regrets exprimés par les chefs et dirigeants égyptiens pour les incidents dont ont été victimes plusieurs Arméniens innocents, nous sommes surpris de constater que ces rumeurs persistent à circuler, et certains journaux s'en font l'écho.

L'Union nationale arménienne tient donc à réitérer ses précédentes déclarations et repousse avec énergie ces insinuations, qui ne sont basées sur aucune enquête ayant établi qu'un Arménien ait tiré sur les manifestants.

Nous ne pouvions d'ailleurs mieux faire que de demander une enquête à nos amis égyptiens, qui n'ont même pas cru nécessaire d'y procéder, tout malentendu s'étant définitivement dissipé.

Au surplus, notre Commission d'Informations et d'Enquêtes, siégeant 3, Rue Mouillard, se tient à la disposition de toute personne qui s'intéresserait à la question et désirerait avoir de plus amples renseignements à ce sujet.

No. 33.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 216.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 11, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 147 of 6th April, I have the honour to forward notes on the attitude of the press in Egypt during the succeeding month.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

M. CHEETHAM.

Enclosure 1 in No. 353.

Notes on the Egyptian Press (April 6 to May 6, 1919).

1. General Remarks.

VERY brief notes on the contents and tendencies of the principal Egyptian papers, native and European, during the last month, are given below.

It may be noted that as a purveyor of news the press has a rival, formidable to a degree, unapproached in any educated western community in the verbal rumours which pass from mouth to mouth in cafés, trams, and other places where men congregate. It is an unfortunate result of the censorship, which it has been necessary to maintain since the beginning of the war, that the natives think, with some justice, that we only allow them to know those things which it suits us they should know. The result is that the wildest rumours fly about and excite even those who have sufficient education to be not altogether convinced by them. Examples are as follows: When the British embarked Zaghul and his party on one of their ships they tried to take him to England, but a German submarine emerged from the sea as the ship turned west and ordered it to Marseilles; when the High Commissioner heard of Zaghul's arrival in France he committed suicide, or according to another version died of apoplexy; there was—after Italy's withdrawal from the Peace Conference—an Italian army of 300,000 men waiting at Tripoli to march on Egypt, while Enver Pasha was waiting with another large army at Ghaza. Immense credulity, therefore, combined with distrust of all that appears in the regularly licensed newspapers, characterise in different degrees both educated and uneducated.

Similar causes make the newspapers a very imperfect register of the tendencies of public opinion. From the moment of the release of Zaghul Pasha and his friends, and the formation of the Rushdy Ministry, to the collapse of the strike on the 23rd April, the authorised newspapers were unanimous in urging support of the Ministry and a general resumption of work, but their arguments produced no effect whatever in opposition to the pamphlets and unlicensed "newspapers," secretly printed and circulated by the extremists, and reinforced later on by organised intimidation when its actual inconveniences rather than newspaper exhortations had weakened the desire to continue the strike.

When Nationalist feeling was at its height the authorised newspapers, as they were debarred from printing the bitter and inflammatory matter which alone would have pleased the mass of the public at the moment, made up for it by the more than

usually flowery and hyperbolic language in which they described the spectacle of the Egyptian people rejoicing, the unity and concord of all classes, and the hospitality of the Egyptians towards foreigners. The last subject, in particular, was elaborated in innumerable articles after the attacks on foreigners had begun, probably not so much from conscious policy as from the characteristic Egyptian instinct that the most awkward of facts can be annihilated by a sufficient weight and volume of words.

More significant than what appeared in the press were often the things which were entirely ignored. There were endless general expressions of admiration for the noble hospitality of the Egyptian people, and for its wonderful success in proving its political solidarity by demonstrations, modified only by a repudiation on behalf of the intellectuals of any responsibility for the excesses of the mob; but there was no explicit condemnation of, for instance, the Deirut murders. Very significant also is the sudden silence about political matters, when the collapse of the officials' strike coincided with the announcement of American recognition of the British protectorate, put a sudden end to the atmosphere of excitement and exaggerated hopes which the extremists had been ceaselessly engaged in stimulating during the preceding fortnight. The resignation of the Rushdy Ministry passed almost without comment, and henceforth references to Zaghlul Pasha's delegation were comparatively few and far between. Attention was henceforth diverted mainly to such matters as the necessity of more interest on the part of Egyptians in trade, the uses of trade unionism, the necessity of charity on the part of the rich towards the poor, with occasionally some speculation as to the Royal Commission which was generally reported to be coming to Egypt.

2. Native Papers.

"Al Mokattam," which had welcomed the arrival of the Special High Commissioner as a man of sincerity and energy, coming armed both with the sword and the olive branch, suffered during the first half of April on account of its moderate attitude. On the 5th April it received threats from the "Black Hand"; on the 8th there was a hostile demonstration in front of its offices, with shouts of "Down with the Mokattam!"; the campaign against it was intensified about the middle of the month, a special pamphlet being devoted to it and its proprietors. There were certain suspicions that this pamphlet had been printed at the offices of "Al Ahram," which was of course, delighted at the attempted boycott of its chief rival. The proprietors at one time appealed to the military authorities for protection, and expressed a fear that they would not be able to carry on, but the paper has, of course, profited of late by the revulsion of feeling against the extremists.

In its issue of the 10th April it gave a very cordial reception to the newly-formed Ministry of Rushdy Pasha, and it consistently supported this Ministry, and the cause of law and order.

During the last ten days of April and the early days of May it devoted much attention to Syria. It was opposed to the division into separate political spheres of a country which is described as homogeneous as regards race and language, a step, it said, which was in opposition to the principles followed by the Allies in their reorganisation of Europe; it was also concerned to point out that the United States of America would be a most advantageous protector to Syria; that it was a highly liberal and magnanimous power, and that therefore neither Moslems nor Catholics need have misgivings on the ground of its Christian and predominantly Protestant character.

"Al Ahram," like all native papers, in varying degrees supported the Rushdy Ministry and urged a resumption of work by Government employees, but with a considerable contrast of tone as compared with the "Mokattam." Characteristic of the "Ahram" was its readiness to become lyrical in its admiration of those manifestations of the nobility of the Egyptian character called forth by the critical times through which the country was passing. Its appreciation of the spectacle of a generous people rejoicing at the liberation of Saad Pasha and his associates could only be expressed in a leading article in rhymed prose of a highly political character, while its prominent display of the motto "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" on the following day, was more a sign of its desire to live up to the occasion than of a genuine wish to see these principles literally applied, since at other times when it was a question of disclaiming responsibility for disorder it emphasised the gulf that divided the intellectuals from the rabble.

While the Government employees were still on strike it grew enthusiastic at times—the particular occasion of the enthusiasm being the outbreaks of mob hostility

against Armenians, Greeks, &c.—on the nation's sentiments of respects for its guests, as shown by letters it received from readers in the provinces. History would record this fine attitude of magnanimity. Especially moving did it find visits of Ulema, Agharists, students, &c., to Christian dignitaries to offer them Easter good wishes.

In the quieter times which followed the collapse of the strike its attention was diverted from politics.

In its issue of the 25th April it attempts to refute the statements of the "Egyptian Mail," which had pointed out the very poor part played by the young Egyptian in the open arena of business competition, and blamed him for always trying to take cover in a Government post. The "Egyptian Mail's" remarks had, however, evidently made some impression. On the 28th April it is pointed out that to be a progressive nation, the Egyptians must try to shine not only in the moral, but in the economic domain. On the 5th May it says that what is wrong with the Egyptian is that he has interpreted patriotism in a purely political sense, but the trader, farmer, teacher, &c., help forward the country as well as the politician.

Inspired by the same motive is its advocacy of a "native bank." It is full of enthusiasm over the advance of the Egyptian women, who during the crisis have made the progress which might normally have been expected in half a century. It advocates that the Sheikh-ul-Islam should be a Minister, and should control the Wakfs, and pays considerable attention to a project for an "asylum of liberty," the precise object of which is obscure, but which draws from its readers some generous suggestions of vicarious charity, i.e., that the members of the Legislative Assembly should subscribe a month's pay, and the merchants 2 per cent. on a week's takings.

There were reports that "Al Ahram" shares had changed hands, but the responsibility for editorship and direction *vis-à-vis* the authorities remains unchanged.

"Al Misr" had been suspended from the 23rd March till the 8th April on account of a mischievous article about "The Demon," i.e., England. On the latter date the suspension was withdrawn. The paper restarted on the 13th April with a good article advocating a return to work on the part of the Government employees. On the 17th it published an open letter to the High Commissioner urging that the Zaghlul deputation should be recognised as official. On the 23rd it published an ecstatic article by a student describing how "truly beautiful is this spectacle of our social and psychological evolution . . . a celestial light descends on us and electrifies all hearts, &c."

On the 23rd Mr. Morcos Fahmy criticises those orators of the time who elaborate abstruse historical explanations of the present Coptic-Moslem *entente*; the one and sufficient cause is found in common nationality.

On the 26th the "Misr" disclaimed the special demands which the Copts were supposed to be inclined to formulate; they were above all Egyptians, and their experiences during centuries of Moslem domination did not lead them to fear that they would be excluded from their share in the governing of the country.

On the 30th a reply was made to the article in the "Egyptian Mail" on Egyptian commercial lethargy, previously referred to. The blame was placed on the Government which had only recently and under pressure begun to develop technical and commercial education.

In the issue of the 29th, a law student indulged in some characteristic verbiage: "As the Egyptian was hospitable and easy-going it behoved him to have for his watchword: calm, moderation, patience, and hospitality. These qualities which characterised the ancient Egyptians should remain the ornament of their descendants." Of the same type was an article on the 3rd May urging solidarity among all who wished the prosperity of the country, without which solidarity Egypt could never gain the dignity due to it.

"Al Watan": On the formation of Rushdy Pasha's Ministry "Al Watan" took the line that the nation must now leave its hopes in the Ministers' keeping and in that of the High Commissioner. The attitude of the English press gave them no grounds for despair.

On the 14th April, possibly under some pressure since intimidation was rife at the time, "Al Watan" urged that all Egypt had given the Zaghlul Mission its mandate, either by written support or by demonstrating.

On the 25th, on the conclusion of the officials' strike, a conciliatory article appeared, begging the High Commissioner to be lenient, so that the officials should appreciate English generosity. This article, which had a boldly pro-British tone, drew down on "Al Watan" the wrath of the students, who "prohibited" its sale.

The "Watan" maintained its courageous support of the protectorate and the Government, and on the 26th the editor was summoned to a meeting of Azharists and Coptic students, and told that unless he changed his tone his paper would be boycotted like the "Mokattam".

On the 28th April the "Watan," following the example of the "Misr" of the 26th, answers attacks by most of the native papers backed by the "Journal du Caire," and disclaims any special claims on behalf of the Copts; so long as there is real unity it would not matter to the Copts if all Government posts were filled by Moslems or *vice versa*.

On the 2nd May, when the question of the deduction of pay for the period of the strike was occupying all minds, "Al Watan," perhaps under pressure, published a justification of the employees.

On the 6th May "Al Watan" made some comments on the doings of the Egyptian Delegation in Paris. It had offered a banquet to members of the Anglo-American press, which was very natural considering what a great part the press played in both those countries. This did not mean that it was neglecting the French or Italian press, nor that it was doing nothing but banquetting.

With reference to the King's accession an article appeared suggesting that this was a suitable occasion for an act of clemency on the part of the High Commissioner with regard to deductions of officials' pay.

"Al Afkar": After the formation of the Rushdy Ministry this paper joined the rest of the press in advocating support of the Government and a return to work. Sheikh El Ghamrawy exhorted the intellectuals to restrain themselves and their friends for the sake of Egypt's repute. On the 17th it repudiated Bolshevism as foreign to Egypt.

On the 22nd, with reference to the proclamation forbidding an unofficial police force, it says that the High Commissioner has nevertheless approved of the spirit of the proposal in saying that it was the duty of every patriot to assist in maintaining order. It indulges in some of the customary verbiage on the subject of Zaghlul Pasha's Delegation in France: "When it was necessary to demonstrate Egyptians have been the object of the admiration of the world, but now the watchword is calm."

On the 24th El Ghamrawy joins in the chorus of protest against the "Egyptian Mail's" statement that young Egyptians are not prepared to fight for success in commerce, &c., but think only of getting safe Government posts.

On the 25th "Al Afkar," referring to the order forbidding subscriptions for illegal purposes, points out that charitable purposes are not illegal. It returns to the subject on the 1st May when Abu Shady Bey advocates generosity on the part of the rich to relieve hardship resulting from the war, and on the 4th May when it says that a committee presided over by Osman Pasha Murtada has decided to create several "hygienic kitchens" in the poorer quarters of Cairo.

On the 27th, writing on the "Times" suggestion of a Royal Commission, the "Afkar" says: "It is clear that the British people and Government view the aspirations of the Egyptians with sympathy. . . . In describing the Commission as independent the 'Times' certainly implies that its members should be chosen from those having no official ties, and therefore free to base their enquiry on right and justice."

"Al Ahali": On the 4th April the "Ahali" had not appeared, as nearly all its matter had been deleted by the censor. It telegraphed a protest: "Impossible to work with censorship." On the 5th, however, it reappeared with a sensible article deprecating demonstrations.

On the 11th it explains how the incident of the 8th between British soldiers and natives in front of the Ezbekieh Gardens had arisen from a misunderstanding over the Turkish flag. It hopes that such incidents are now ended, and that the High Commissioner's wise attitude will soon lead to an end of all disturbances.

On the 15th it describes the Egyptian Delegation as the flower of the nation. It intends to give the biographies of its members and begins with Saad Pasha Zaghlul.

On the 25th it reported that Government employees had decided to create "syndicates" for members of each branch of the Government service. On the 26th it sang the praises of "syndicalism" as a factor in the advance of commercial prosperity.

"Wadi-en-Nil": Early in April the dominant note in this newspaper had been admiration of the Egyptian attitude towards foreigners, and enthusiasm for the Coptic-Moslem *entente*.

On the 6th it published an account of an interview granted to its editor by the High Commissioner and subsequently much discussed in the native press. The editor, in answer to his assertion that the Zaghlul delegation was truly representative and that the way to restore order was to allow Egypt's voice to be heard at the Peace Conference, was given to understand that, though order must be restored first, the High Commissioner was ready to listen to all reasonable demands, among which was not, however, included the Zaghlul party's demand for complete independence.

On the 16th it joins in the general effort to cover up or misrepresent the anti-Armenian movement. It says it has received several letters from Armenian notables, thanking Egypt for its hospitality, and pointing out the services rendered by Nubar Pasha and others of their countrymen. The paper replies that it realises these services, and that hospitality to foreigners is being preached, but that Armenians must restrain the evil-minded members of their colony.

On the 23rd the formation of a committee, under Ahmed Pasha Yehya, to represent the Egyptian delegation at Alexandria, is announced.

On the 27th it urges the raising of money for charitable purposes using the same text and the same arguments as previously noted with regard to "Al Afkar." Everywhere committees for the aid of the poor have been formed except at Alexandria which is a reproach to that town.

On the 28th, joining in the general movement, it devotes attention to the need of energy and interest in trade.

On the 3rd May it strikes the same note, evoking memories of the greatness of Egypt under the Pharaohs, in order to exhort the modern Egyptian to return to the traditions of his ancestors, and live a life of toil. On the 6th May it publishes a letter containing the same suggestion as that which appeared in "Al Ahram"; that the salaries of members of the legislative assembly for the period during which that body has not been sitting should be devoted to charitable purposes.

"Al Minbar": This paper was suspended early in April. It had published articles of an inflammatory tendency. There were reasons to suspect also that it was used as a centre for printing propaganda. After its reappearance it stated, on the 20th, that the cause of Egypt was about to be submitted to judges charged with deciding the lot of peoples, and it was impossible to prophesy what would happen. One thing, however, was certain: they would not see again, thanks to the victorious principles of liberty and justice, the sword reddened with the blood of the feeble.

"Al Bassir": Early in April "Al Bassir" paid particular attention to the evil economic effects of the disturbances. On the 5th April it dwelt on the possibility of a collapse of the strike of lawyers, on account of their lack of solidarity. On the 28th it expresses a hope that the Government employees will exert themselves to get through arrears of work now that they have returned, and thanks the authorities for the advice which it says has been given to English heads of departments to treat their subordinates with consideration. On the 29th it dwells on Egypt's deserving attitude during the last five years, but it has made the Allies' enemies its enemies, and it hopes that the Versailles Conference will accord it a lot worthy of a civilised nation.

"Al Omma": Early in April "Al Omma" anticipated the "Mokattam" by publishing articles supporting American control of Syria.

On the 25th it published an article which created much comment, claiming for the Copts their share of such posts as those of Ministers, Mudirs, sub-Mudirs, Governors, &c.

(3.) *European Papers.*

The "Bourse égyptienne" and the "Egyptian Mail" consistently took the line most helpful to the cause of law and order, and to the maintenance of the protectorate. The former in particular published some very generously-worded articles on the advantages derivable from British suzerainty.

The tendency of the "Egyptian Gazette," on the other hand, was far from helpful. On the 5th it appeared with the Sultan's proclamation undated, the High Commissioner's wrongly dated, the official communiqué with the last line omitted, no editorial matter on the situation, and numerous blanks attesting how many extracts which it had wished to print from other papers had required deletion. For some days, from the 10th onwards, it showed a general improvement, and managed to appear as a rule without blanks; the editor, Mr. Snelling, being absent in Palestine.

On the 16th, however, it reproduced a letter from "Al Ahram" congratulating the Greek Catholic community on having joined in the recent demonstrations, and on the 20th it was enthusiastic over Coptic-Moslem fraternisation in Alexandria, and quoted the "Misr" to show that crop prospects were really quite satisfactory, and that little economic harm had been done by disorder. During the rest of the period under review, the "Gazette" maintained its record by appearing regularly with a certain number of eloquent blanks; among the articles thus deleted by the censor as being far from helpful in the present state of public feeling were extracts from the "Nation," "Westminster Gazette," and "Manchester Guardian" tending to pour contempt on the Peace Conference, to show that the Allies mean to abandon their war aims, break their pledges, quarrel among themselves, &c., and also an extract from a speech by Sir Harry Johnston containing such statements as "Egyptians do not like us because the most unlikeable of our great and less great men go to Egypt . . . the most eye-glassed and insolent superiors of our civil servants . . ."

The "Journal du Caire," though it joined the native press in supporting the Rushdy Ministry, and in urging the resumption of work, and even on one occasion went so far as to express open approval of an order under martial law—that directed against vitriol throwing—took as a rule the line which it thought would be most embarrassing to the British.

The "Messaggero," controlled like the "Bourse," by M. Boutigny, published a strong pro-British article on the 7th April. It recalled the benefits the British had brought to Egypt, referred to the sympathetic character of the High Commissioner's declarations, and said that anger was a bad guide and violence a bad master, and every effort should be made to restore kindly relations.

The "Roma" took a different line. It had wished, for instance, to reprint an article from the "Corriere della Sera," which implied that England depended for her position in the Mediterranean on Italian forbearance. This was stopped by the censor. The editor asked to have his copy of the article returned to him. A few days afterwards a French translation of the article was circulated in the cafés. The "Roma" in general was ready to fall in with the mass of native extremist opinion which, during Italy's absence from the Peace Conference, saw in Italy a possible ally against the Anglo-Saxon Powers, or at any rate, a fellow victim. In an article on the 4th May, however, the "Roma" altered its tone, and, while expressing sympathy with Egyptians, deprecated "certain exaggerations concerning the action of Italy in Egypt, spread probably on purpose by persons who hope to profit by the disillusion which will follow."

No. 354.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 224. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 14, 1919.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 151 of the 29th April, and recent correspondence on the attitude of the foreign diplomatic body here, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a note by Mr. Greg recording a conversation he recently had with Mr. Hampson Gary, the American agent and consul-general, who is about to sail for Paris and the United States on a long holiday.

The rôle played by Mr. Gary in the recent crisis has been a very important one, and no stone has been left unturned by the Nationalists to compromise him. Mr. Gary, I have reason to believe, displayed considerable indecision in the earlier phases of the crisis in making up his mind as to what policy to advocate, but as soon as the true nature of the movement had unmistakably revealed itself, he, in my opinion, has handled a difficult situation with unusual skill and tact, and I think it certain that his reports to his Government have materially contributed to the recognition of the British Protectorate by the American Government at a moment when a declaration of America's intentions could not fail to exercise the maximum effect in depressing the Extremists. The latter had confidently counted on the support of the President in their campaign, and had sedulously spread this view broadcast throughout the country.

I may add that Mr. Gary, in conversation, has always advocated an increase of direct British control with a corresponding extension of Anglo-Saxon ideas and principles.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 354.

Note.

(Confidential.)

AS Mr. Gary is leaving for Paris and Washington for his summer holiday, I called on him to say goodbye. I said that, much as I regretted his departure at the moment when the Commission was perhaps coming out to Egypt, I felt that the situation was comparatively quiet and that this happy state of things was very largely thanks to America's recognition of our Protectorate. Mr. Gary said no one here could realise the pains he had taken to get the American Government to publish this announcement, although in principle they had always been in favour of greater British control here. I said that the result ought to compensate him for the trouble he had taken. The effect of his note to the High Commissioner had indeed been instantaneous and magical. Mr. Gary then asked me whether there was any particular point which I would like him to bring before the American representative in Paris. I said that I believed the British case was such a strong one that I hoped he would give as much publicity as possible to it. I felt we had everything to gain and nothing to lose by the very fullest scrutiny and discussion. I reminded him that when he had arrived in Cairo in 1918 he had not found a normal state of things. Many British officials had been withdrawn for direct war work, and the others were overworked and worried. To have obtained a normal impression of British administration here, he ought to have arrived four years earlier. He said, on the contrary, that he had been amazed at the high state of civilisation which he found, and particularly cited the railways as being admirably managed. I said I was flattered, as he had selected for praise the most British run concern in Egypt. As Mr. Gary had always laid great stress on the importance of making the Anglo-Saxon spirit dominant here, I thought it prudent to remind him that, however desirable such a policy might be in theory, it was open in practice to considerable objections. I reminded him of the size and importance of the foreign colonies, French, Italian, and Greek, and explained to him that Egypt was essentially Mediterranean in character and that any attempt to introduce ideals and modes of thought natural to him and myself as Anglo-Saxons would inevitably meet with an opposition which at first sight seemed merely wilful, but which, in fact, was not so unnatural in the circumstances as it seemed on the surface. I was convinced that we should have to go slow here and that the present upheaval, while affording an indisputable argument for increasing British military and police control throughout the country, was also a warning not to try and change accepted habits and institutions too rapidly.

Mr. Gary finally spoke about the Sultan, whom he described as thoroughly loyal to the British connection. This, I may say, is a point of view he has always been at special pains to impress upon me. I said that, without wishing in any way to contest his opinion, I was afraid that some disappointment had been aroused by His Highness's apparent inability to check or guide the extreme National movement, and that I felt it might be some time before complete confidence was restored, not so much in His Highness's wish as in his power to assist us. Mr. Gary said that the Sultan had had a very difficult rôle to play, to which I readily agreed. He then went on to talk about the retention of the diplomatic body in Cairo, which he believed would go far to reconcile the Sultan to his rôle of ornamental and ultra constitutional monarch. I explained that the question was still under discussion and that, though I personally welcomed the presence of so friendly and enlightened a diplomatist as himself, some of his colleagues in the past had not shown themselves equally accommodating, and the appointment after the peace of a Turkish accredited diplomatic agent, for instance, might give rise to serious difficulties, which he himself would be the first to appreciate. The Sultan has always gone out of his way to be civil to Mr. and Mrs. Gary, and the latter have been unquestionably influenced by these attentions, as well as by the fact that they are in close touch with His Highness's greatest friends here, the Rolo's. It is therefore not unnatural that Mr. Gary should to some extent have made himself an advocate of what are known to be His Highness's personal aspirations.

No. 355.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 843.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Cairo, May 25, 1919.

MY telegram No. 705.*

Messrs. Percy and Harold Carver, who have transacted most of business of Cotton Seed Control Board, wish to leave Egypt on the 4th June, but consider they ought not to finally leave before public notice is given here that purchase is to cease at end of season.

I see Ministry of Food on the 3rd May gave public notice of cessation. Can announcement to same effect now be made in Egypt?

No. 356.

Air Ministry to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

Sir,

Strand, London, May 23, 1920.

FINANCIAL contributions—Egypt.

With reference to paragraph 4 of your letter of the 3rd January last,† I am commanded by the Air Council to enquire whether you have yet received any report from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt regarding the contribution of the Egyptian Government towards the cost of the Royal Air Force in Egypt.

I am to add that the Army Council have expressed the opinion that the amount of the contribution to be paid by the Egyptian Government in respect of the cost of the Army of Occupation will require to be reconsidered as soon as the size and composition of the after-war garrison is settled.

The Army Council have further stated, in reply to a communication addressed to them by the Air Council on the subject, that they consider that the present annual contribution of 150,000L. which is made by the Egyptian Government (and which is stated to represent the estimated extra cost of maintaining the pre-war garrison in Egypt instead of at home) should continue to be credited in full to army votes.

I am, &c.

No. 357.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 651.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 27, 1919.

MY telegram No. 533 of the 30th April.‡

Crawford finds that his recovery is taking much longer than he anticipated, owing largely to a very severe attack of influenza. His doctors consider that he should not take up active work for another three months. I fear this may cause you inconvenience, but he will enter on his duties as soon as he can.

No. 358.

Mr. Hubbard to Mr. Vansittart.

Dear Vansittart,

Foreign Office, May 27, 1919

YOUR letter of May 22nd.§ I have shown the draft to Graham, and it seems to cover all our points with the exception of that concerning the Antiquities Department and the two or three minor ones mentioned at the end of this letter. Graham does not at all agree that the text of the Convention makes the new situation sufficiently clear in this respect, and considers it very important to avoid all ambiguity. As the text stands the French might perfectly well maintain that the confirmation of the French Director-General until 1934 confirms the existing situation, which is that the control of the Egyptian Administration over the

* See No. 288.

† See No. 6.

‡ See No. 270.

§ See No. 347.

Antiquities Department is nominal and the Department is to all intents and purposes a French Department. It is true that M. de Fleuriau has given Graham an assurance to the contrary effect, but we had better have something in writing. Graham thinks, therefore, that if the text of the reservation made in the original letter to M. de Fleuriau is thought to dot the "i's" unnecessarily, something should be said to the effect that nothing in article 16 shall be held to impair or limit the full control of the Egyptian Administration over the Antiquities Department.

The other points which you have, I see, cut out of the original draft to de Fleuriau are (1) an assurance that persons who have always been recognised hitherto as British subjects but who lack documentary proof of their nationality shall be dealt with gently; (2) that "écoles de tout ordre" includes the Law School; (3) that "ressortissants" shall be interpreted "with due regard to the distinction established by the draft judicature law between the two categories of nationals."

(1) and (2) you have, I presume, ruled to be superfluous, which I think they perhaps are.

(3) was designed to prevent the French from claiming privileges (*e.g.*, in regard to the administration of justice under Article 3 of the Convention) for their colonial "sujets" or "protégés" on the same footing as *pukka* French citizens. The Egyptian draft judicature law confers (as you doubtless know) special legal privileges on "foreigners" and proceeds to define "foreigners" as excluding Africans and Asiatics of European nationality. As the distinction applies equally to British nationals and French nationals, I should be inclined to think that the stipulation that French "ressortissants" should receive the same treatment as British "ressortissants" is clear enough as it stands—it seems obviously to mean that French of either category shall be on the same footing as British of the corresponding category. I rather think that Hurst originally suggested the clause in the draft letter to de Fleuriau, so if practicable, you may like to consult him as to the need for retaining it. Of course, one must remember that in the meantime the prospect of the draft judicature law being passed into law in Egypt has become rather remote, and it may end by being radically altered.

I have failed to get hold of Rabino, but I would suggest the insertion of the words "the freehold of" before "land" in the 11th paragraph of your draft note to M. Pichon, which begins "Within six months." It is only freehold properties that we need worry about. Two paragraphs above there should be an "of" between "French owners" and properties.

As I have already told you, the point about the Dominions and the 1856 Treaty can now be entirely disregarded. I enclose a copy of the last Colonial Office letter.* It is presumed that the letter to M. Pichon will be signed by Mr. Balfour.

No. 359.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 862.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 27, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 612.†

1. I should be glad to be informed if I am right in assuming that on its conclusion Egypt-Morocco Convention will be made public.

2. Convention refers in its preamble to draft of judicature law. Publication of convention will presumably involve publication of draft of judicature law.

3. I think it desirable that new Ministers should be fully informed beforehand as to terms of this draft law (which has already received assent of three of their predecessors) and as to work of Capitulations Commission.

I propose with your approval to give them this information.

I desire also your instructions as to explanations I may properly give Ministers as to extent, if any, to which His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider modifications of draft in response to their own or to public criticism.

4. I presume judicial reforms, which excite great interest here, will be included in purview of Lord Milner's Commission: and that consequently it will not be proposed to promulgate draft of judicature law before Commission has reported.

* Not printed.

† See No. 337.

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I have already called your attention to difficulty of securing adoption of far-reaching judicial reforms under present circumstances.

5. If judicature law (article 150 of which provides for temporary continuance of mixed courts) is not promulgated before the 21st October (date on which present mandate of these courts expires) it will be necessary to make other provisions for their temporary maintenance.

Such provision would presumably take form of an Egyptian decree made with the explicit assent of such other Powers only as may not by then have consented to abrogation of Capitulations.

6. I should be glad to know what probability there is that by the 31st October Capitulations will remain in existence as regards any of Powers. I should welcome an immediate reply.

No. 360.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 835.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, May 24, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 533 of the 30th April.*

I should be glad to know that date of Crawford's arrival is now more certain. In the interval and in view of Dowson's inability to do whole work of advisership I have arranged for Hayter to act as financial adviser. He will sit on Council of Ministers and deal with general business, while Dowson will be responsible as Under-Secretary of State for purely financial questions.

No. 361.

Memorandum by Sir William Brunyate, dated May 28, 1919.

MY attention has been called to General Allenby's urgent telegram No. 862 of 27th May,† as to measures to be taken consequent on the conclusion of the Egypt-Morocco Convention.

I have only recently seen the later files as to the situation in Egypt and as to the Convention in question, and I was already proposing to submit observations based on the same kind of anxiety as is evidently felt by Cairo.

Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 712 of 12th May states that it is considered preferable to continue the French negotiations and obtain the signature of the French Government to the proposed Convention as soon as possible, leaving the date at which the proposed reforms should be introduced an open one. I do not feel sure that it is fully realised to what extent this clause ties our hands as to the line of future reform in Egypt. As mentioned in General Allenby's telegram under comment, the draft judicature law is referred to in the preamble of the draft Convention, and the guarantees offered by it are, in fact, the guarantees upon the strength of which the French Government concurs in the new status of Egypt. It may be remembered that at an earlier stage the Foreign Office would have been called to put forward complete codes as the basis of the Egyptian part of the Convention, and that I have at all times urged that the draft judicature law ought to be adequate for the purpose. Should some system be adopted in the future, widely differing from that incorporated in the draft judicature law, the French Government would, I think, be justified in complaining. Practically, therefore, we should be tying ourselves down to set up unified courts—and unified courts of a particular type—in the near future. Has it been fully considered to what extent this would tie the hands of Lord Milner's Commission?

The theoretical alternative would be to take out the specific guarantees of special importance included in the draft judicature law and place them in the Convention. The objections to this course are, however, so numerous that I cannot regard it as a practical one.

In a minute by Mr. Hayter, transmitted in General Allenby's despatch 150 of April 7th (see 63214), it is suggested that under existing political conditions in

* See No. 270.

† See No. 359.

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Egypt the abolition of the Capitulations must be regarded as indefinitely postponed. While I am fully alive to the difficulties in the way of immediate action, I am more than convinced that when the whole question comes to be examined by Lord Milner's Commission it will be found quite indispensable to get rid of Capitulations. Whether from the judicial or from the legislative point of view, their continuance would render good government impossible so soon as martial law disappears, and I feel sure that this will be recognised later by all serious sections of public opinion. But that is a wholly different matter from announcing a decision in that sense at the present moment, and such an announcement would, to my mind, be implied by the publication of the Egypt-Morocco Convention.

The Paris negotiations apart, it is clear that the settings of a reconstituted Capitulations Commission can scarcely be resumed until a date practically simultaneous with the arrival of Lord Milner's Commission. Neither the new Financial Adviser nor myself are likely to reach Egypt very much before that date. The summer is not the time for new Ministers to take up the matter, which would involve very full study of papers, while any attempt to resume the sittings of the Commission before the arrival of Lord Milner's Mission would probably have a more serious effect on public opinion than the publication of the Egypt-Morocco Convention.

If I may suggest outlines for a reply to the telegram under comment, they would be much as follows:—

The decision of the Council of Ministers setting up the Capitulations Commission directed that body to report to the President of the Council, and the full record of the Commission's proceedings is in the hands of the Presidency. I see no objection to Mohamed Said's attention being specifically drawn to the matter, and approve such discussion with his colleagues as you may think useful.

I shall be glad to have the opinion of Mohamed Said and his colleagues as to the general scheme of the draft judicature law, but am reluctant to state in advance to what extent the draft might now be modified to meet their views. Modification in response to public criticism appears to be impossible.

Mr. Balfour is at present in favour of the French negotiations continuing, but I am once more bringing to his notice the possible embarrassment in Egypt which may be caused by the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your telegram. The convention, whenever concluded, would almost necessarily be made public.

The question of renewal of Mixed Courts is receiving my attention.

I see no probability that the Capitulations will be abolished, save as regards enemy Powers, before October 31st.

W. E. BRUNYATE.

May 28, 1919.

No. 362.

Earl Curzon to Sir E. General Allenby.

(No. 662.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 29, 1919.

FORAGE for army animals of Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

In view of impossibility of providing shipping transport for oats, and having regard to financial saving that would be effected if barley were supplied even at an excessive price within Egypt itself, War Cabinet desire that you should examine the whole question and report at an early date whether barley could not be provided locally.

No. 363.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 229.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 18, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 217 of 11th May, I have the honour to forward a summary of the events of the week, 11th to 17th May inclusive.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 363.

Summary of Events of the week, May 11 to 17 inclusive.

THREE New Zealanders, of whom one has since died, were injured in a brawl at Mehallet Kubra on the night of the 10th-11th.

Otherwise all was quiet in Cairo and the provinces.

May 11.

Fiery and fanatical speeches continue to be delivered at El Azhar, where the demonstrations of the 8th and 9th originated; these speeches, according to some reports, were tending to neutralise the good effects of the arrests of demonstrators, and the publication of the peace terms.

Industrial unrest was reported from the canal zone. A deputation of employees of the Canal Company informed the Base Commandant at Port Said that they would strike unless their demands, which were of an economic character, were conceded by the 15th.

Four raids by police and one by the military were carried out in Cairo in the evening. A small quantity of seditious literature was seized, and a few arrests made, but otherwise little of importance resulted.

May 12.

From Port Said it was reported that the canal labourers continued firm in their intention to strike, and there was some reason to fear that they would succeed in persuading employees of shipping and coaling companies to strike in sympathy.

A small one day strike of coal porters took place at Gabbari and at Alexandria.

From Deirut district it was reported that over 1,000 firearms had been taken in the last four days.

A strong undercurrent of agitation was reported from Mehallet Kubra.

May 13.

At Port Said employees of the Canal Company struck at 9.45 A.M., thirty hours before the hour of which warning was given. The personnel of all shipping and coaling agencies followed suit. The water supply was cut off for six hours, but was then restored. All canal and commercial services were maintained, though at the cost of considerable inconvenience, with naval and military help.

Apart from this the situation was reported to be quiet throughout the country.

The distribution of seditious pamphlets was reported from Damietta and Mahallet Kubra.

May 14.

Coaling coolies at Port Said went out on strike, and it appeared possible that movement might spread still further. No disorders were reported, and steps had been taken to prevent intimidation.

The time was not considered opportune for military intervention, but the governor and base commandant were keeping in touch with the company and also saw the strikers' deputation several times.

The strike of the coaling coolies appeared to indicate that some powerful influence was at work, as their pay is good and even high, and they had formulated no grievances. The coaling of transports was undertaken by the Egyptian Labour Corps who worked willingly, but more slowly than the professional coolies.

At Suez, all Canal Company employees struck at 5.30 P.M., launch and lighter hands also struck, but apparently only from fear.

At Alexandria, at the Abu Abbas Mosque in the evening, speeches were delivered, and on leaving the mosque, some 2,300 people, including 200 Effendis and students, made a demonstration. They were easily dispersed by troops with entrenching tool handles.

In upper Egypt, over 200 firearms were collected in various villages.

May 15.

At Port Said, practically all labour, skilled and unskilled (including even cigarette makers) with the exception of casual military dock labourers, went on strike.

At Ismailia a peaceful strike was threatened. Electricity and ice men promised not to strike.

At Suez the strike continued to spread, employees of the English coaling companies ceasing work.

Cavalry visiting Tuna, in Mallawi Markaz, met with resistance. Two cavalymen were wounded, one very seriously. Fifty firearms were seized, and seven arrests made.

At Mahallet Kubra, six arrests had been made up to date in connection with the disturbance on the 10th May. The trouble is apparently caused by seditious pamphlets sent from Cairo, but it is difficult to obtain direct evidence.

In Cairo, all informants agreed that a more subdued tone was noticeable at El Azhar. The speeches were as violent as ever, but the audience displayed nothing like its former fanatical enthusiasm.

General Allenby was, in Azharist circles, reported to have gone, not to Palestine, but to England to be tried by court-martial for the atrocities committed by his orders in Egypt. The British position in India was announced to be so desperate that the river boats were being sold.

Political officers' reports from the provinces had for some time, with rare exceptions, been unanimous in stating that the local situation was quiet and improving, that there was growing resentment among cultivators of all classes against the Effendi class of the towns, particularly for having led them into the attacks on means of communication which had resulted so much to their own detriment, and that the British propaganda—directed towards emphasising the benefits they had derived from the British and the evil results of the recent disturbances—was having greater and more rapid results than could have been anticipated.

At Abbassia a meeting was held to discuss the advisability of the Armenians in the camp at Heliopolis returning to their homes. This was opposed by the refugees' representative, who said that a refusal by the Germans to sign the peace terms, or some other incident, might be the signal for a fresh outbreak of trouble in the native quarters, in which the Armenians would suffer. It was decided that the Armenians should be allowed to remain another ten days.

May 16.

In Cairo the situation was quiet, but a new disagreement was reported between the Tramway Company and its workmen, the latter threatening to go on strike on the 26th if their demands were not granted.

There was no change as regards the Canal Company strike, except that the electric light employees, who had promised not to strike, went out in the morning, and troops were put in to work the plant.

At Mit Gaber, near Bilbeis, a number of villagers attacked and burnt property belonging to Ibrahim Pasha Mured, a well-known "moderate." Damage was done estimated at 300l. The police effected several arrests, and an enquiry was initiated.

The seizure of another 130 firearms from other villages near Deirut was reported.

A reliable informant reported a recent conversation with the Coptic editor of a local paper. He said the Copts had been obliged to join the movement because they would otherwise have shared the fate of the Armenians, but by so doing they had earned the displeasure of the British. The students, who were now maintaining the agitation, had more influence and better organisation than was generally recognised. They had gained a hold over the fellahcen by instilling into their heads that the cause was a religious one, and telling them that when the Government was overthrown they would receive large free grants of land, and immunity from taxation. This Copt considered that the spirit of fanaticism was rife, and that things would not easily settle down.

It was reported also that the young extremists were now redoubling their efforts in the matter of the circulation of seditious pamphlets, secret newspapers, &c. A noteworthy new feature of these was attacks on prominent individuals, such as Mudirs, and Mamours, who were accused of being traitors. It was reported that it was intended to organise a great demonstration of protest against the expected Commission of Investigation whenever it should arrive.

May 17.

The whole country was reported to be quiet except for the fact that the strike in the Canal zone was slowly spreading. At Port Said those employees at Dowrie's

Engineering Works who had hitherto remained at work, went on strike. The civilian workers employed at the Army Bakery went on strike, though some returned later.

The probability of a further extension of the strike was reported from Suez.

Twenty-four arrests for the contravention of local orders under Martial Law were reported from the Canal Zone.

No. 364.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(Private.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 24, 1919.

I HAVE carefully considered arguments you have sent me in favour of postponement of mission until early autumn.

Conditions here have altered since my last telegram to you; it has been possible to form a Ministry, and I now consider it is desirable to give this Ministry time to settle down and prove their worth. If arrival of mission is delayed until September, the new Ministry should have established itself firmly and would be of assistance to mission in bringing before that body carefully considered and matured views as to future government of country.

I have consulted both Sultan and Prime Minister, and they both agree with me as to this. I therefore recommend that mission should not arrive in this country until September. In the meantime, I am appointing a committee here to collaborate and collect such evidence as may be useful when it arrives.

No. 365.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 886.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 30, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 651 of the 27th May.*

There are at present a great many important financial and administrative questions calling for attention of Ministry of Finance arising out of reconstruction and need of preparing for coming commission which cannot be properly dealt with in absence of a financial adviser, and will make heavy demand on available responsible staff. In the circumstances I hope you will be able to send out a financial adviser in place of Crawford, as my present staff is overworked, and I fear a breakdown if I must wait for Crawford.

No. 366.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 874.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 28, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 582 of 13th May.†

It is difficult to produce any specific cases, but from all I hear it is clear all classes of Egyptians as well as foreigners have been struck by the admirable behaviour of our troops both during acute crisis when provocation was extreme and under present comparative normal conditions.

There have been some exceptions, and some cases of theft and assault were reported last month by natives, in one or two cases highly-placed natives, namely, Mazlum Pasha, Sarwat Pasha, and one of Sultan's entourage, Zulficar Bey.

These appear to have taken place during search by troops for revolvers, while regrettable they are not, even on native showing, very numerous, and appear to have accepted with good temper, and as an inevitable result of upheaval for which they themselves were responsible. They have in any case ceased, and for some time past the streets have resumed their normal appearance.

As regards provinces several cases have come to my notice, where local authorities expressly begged for retention of troops in general interests of public. A few cases of thieving have occurred round Mataria, when a search for arms was made.

* See No. 357.

† See No. 313.

It is extremely easy for dishonesty to spread rumours which even when untrue are difficult to run to earth and refute. Anyone acquainted with Egypt and village life could corroborate this.

Dr. Nimr of Mokattam informed me he believed faking of photographs of atrocities was taking place, but, although highly probable, I am not able to confirm rumour. If you could send specimens of such photographs from Paris, I could of course say what degree of truth there is in allegations.

Undoubtedly a certain number of genuine photographs of admitted victims of recent disorders have been made, notably of fellaheen flogged at Saft-el-Mulk (see my telegram No. 711 of 4th May).

The photograph of a person flogged, hanged, or shot is always an unpleasant sight, but it does not in itself constitute an atrocity.

Number of deaths, as already reported, is extremely small compared with magnitude of disturbances and brutal improvised murders in Luxor express at beginning of outbreak seems to provide best reply to any complaints of delegation. Censorship of foreign letter shows, especially in case of French, that surprise verging on annoyance is expressed at our leniency by foreign colonies.

No. 367.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 875.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, May 28, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 222 of the 19th February.*

Following is statement of extraordinary expenditure in Egypt caused by war from August 1914 up to the 31st December, 1915:—

Egypt State Railways military works, 1,827,061. Soudan defence and special camp, 633,723.

Hedjaz operations in connection with Shereef Mecca, 231,057.

Defence of Egypt, 160,469. Interned aliens, political prisoners, &c., 162,774.

Refugees and sundry relief, 208,500.

Special services created on account of war, 141,087.

Indemnities for destruction of property, 19,060.

Difference on cost of barley requisitioned by military, 19,151.

Extra public health expenditure, 55,528.

Extra expenses for public security, 31,583.

Special grants and allowances, 11,016.

Government's share in transport of pilgrims to and from Hedjaz, 4,131.

Rent and repairs of premises for schools transferred from Government buildings lent to army, 4,445.

Miscellaneous, 57,749.

Total, 3,567,334.

Figures are in pounds Egyptian.

No. 368.

Ministry of Shipping to Foreign Office.—(Received June 2.)

Sir,

Ministry of Shipping, May 31, 1919.

I AM directed by the Shipping Controller to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he has had under consideration the question of the post-war use of the wharves at Kantara on the Suez Canal. These were constructed by the military authorities, and are at present controlled by the Principal Naval Transport Officer, Eastern Mediterranean, but it is probable that very shortly the wharves will no longer be required for military purposes, and their use has already been considerably curtailed. The arrangement with the Suez Canal Company was that the wharves would be removed immediately after peace, but the Principal Naval Transport Officer, Eastern Mediterranean, has been instructed to sound the Canal Company as to the possibility of some of the wharves being taken over by them.

* See No. 44.

I am to say, however, that Kantara may possibly be of importance to the Egyptian Government from the railway and strategic point of view, and therefore I am to suggest that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should ascertain the views of the Egyptian Government on the general post-war utility of Kantara.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Admiralty and to the War Office.

I am, &c.

E. J. FOLEY.

No. 369.

Memorandum by Mr. A. Alexander.—(Communicated to Foreign Office June 2.)

The Egyptian Disorders.

THE outbreak in Egypt was sudden and extensive. The immediate signal was the arrest and deportation of the four Nationalist leaders. The Englishmen, the foreign colony, and most of the Egyptians themselves were taken by surprise. There had been a prolonged Cabinet crisis which pointed to a complete breach between the English and the Moderate Egyptian elements. This gave the extremists their opportunity, and their spokesmen grew bolder and bolder in their utterances and in their writings until the abuse and slander of the British administration reached breaking point. Following on some organised protest in Cairo, which was not surprising, came the disorders which spread rapidly throughout the country, and it was the extent of these disorders and the persons by whom they were committed that caused the surprise. The moment chosen for the outbreak was from the point of view of successful insurrection the worst possible. The country was well provided with troops, our hands were freer in Palestine and in the world than they had been, and we were in close alliance with the Powers to whom the Nationalists had in the past looked for sympathy and encouragement. Further, Egypt was at the height of its prosperity. One can hardly believe that the moment had been carefully chosen in advance. For nearly five years the country had been calm. No disorders followed the declaration of the British Protectorate in 1914, and the ending of what had, in fact, become the merely theoretic Turkish suzerainty over the country. The issue under martial law of a vast number of proclamations had hardly raised a protest. In the early days of the war when the price of cotton was very low, when things went badly for the Allies, when Turkey secured her success in the Dardanelles and the Turks reached the banks of the canal, there was no sign of dangerous dissatisfaction. Requisitions followed, the Labour Corps was raised, there was grumbling, but it never assumed grave proportions. The country prospered and British control seemed more assured than ever. Apart from the Labour Corps, thousands of natives voluntarily joined the British military administration as clerks, and large numbers enlisted as servants to the army. I think it would be correct to say that the army was popular—it brought prosperity in its train and martial law with all its restrictions seemed to lie lightly on the country. One heard occasional complaints about the army, but there was nothing seditious or revolutionary in these complaints, impressment of the Labour Corps, rioting by soldiers in Cairo, harsh judgments by Military Courts were some of the things natives complained about, but as I have previously said, these complaints were not of so violent or grave a character as to have led to the subsequent disorders. By themselves they would never have caused the bitterness and the excesses that subsequently arose. In any case they hardly touched the religious and intellectual class which subsequently took the lead of the Nationalist movement. During the war one hardly heard of the extreme Nationalists, who have their headquarters in Switzerland, and I cannot believe that the present movement was directed to any extent by the leaders of the old school. Through the presence of its armies and the alliance with France and Italy, British power had enormously increased. During the war, Egyptian power, by which I mean the possibility of the natives exercising any decisive influence in the directive policy of the country had almost disappeared. Egypt was governed throughout the war by the High Commissioner in consultation with his British advisers, and there is nothing to show that the military authorities ever controlled this policy to any extent. The Egyptians played no important part. The new departments set up to deal with the particular problems raised by the war were run by the British, and the native had but a very subordinate part. I refer to war trading, trading with the enemy, supplies, censorship, &c. In very big questions

of national politics, change of Sultan, the creation of new departments, new irrigation schemes, legal reform, the Egyptian was hardly consulted. We never defined the British Protectorate; all changes were towards the strengthening of British influence and control, and Egypt was, in fact, more in the position of a crown colony run by a handful of Englishmen in Egypt than of a legal Protectorate. Looking at the actual facts of the situation, a more complete share in the Government of the country by the Egyptians themselves must have appeared to them to be a very remote possibility indeed; there was no independent press, there was little public expression of opinion about Egypt in England, there was none on the Continent or in America, there was no British declaration of policy in Egypt itself, and it is only fair to believe that the Egyptian thought that the system of increasing English domination was to be the rule in the future. The constitutional experiments of the past were set aside. During the course of the war Egyptian opinion was silent and neglected—our past promises were entirely forgotten—the social breach between Englishmen and native widened while the control increased. The whole atmosphere is very well represented in our attitude towards legal reform. There never existed a better case for drastic legal reform than exists in Egypt to-day. The existence of the capitulations and the mixed Courts constitute a very real bar to progress (more especially political progress) in Egypt, and their continued existence cannot be tolerated by any British Administration or by any self-respecting Nationalist Party. To abolish the capitulations, to set up a unified system of Courts would have been a most important step in Egyptian Nationalism. With National Courts and the right to tax the foreigner which prevails in all civilised countries Egypt would have won the greatest victory in its national history, and yet this step met with the most bitter opposition from the Egyptian Nationalists. The steps taken to prepare the way for the reform were the most bitterly criticised of all the acts of the British Administration. The reform was shrouded in secrecy and mystery. It was quite impossible even for an Englishman to find out exactly what it was intended to do. Such public declarations as were made were vague and guarded. The natives, who had everything to gain, were not taken into the confidence of the authorities, and in the result the foreign colonies were alarmed, the country was full of the most absurd rumours, we were to be flooded with English judges, the English language was to be the sole language of the Courts, hundreds of English lawyers were coming in from England, &c. No authoritative and definite denials were ever made of these rumours. I think the question of legal reform will be found to have been at the bottom of most of the recent trouble. Most of the extremists in Nationalist opinion in Egypt to-day are to be found among the native lawyers, and they are backed and encouraged by the foreign lawyers in the mixed Courts who have a vested interest to defend. Yet when one was allowed to get at the truth one found that the English proposals were reasonable and necessary. By sympathetic collaboration with the native lawyers, by candid declaration through the press, native opinion must have been won over, because, as I say, the case for drastic legal form in Egypt is unanswerable, and our own success in directing native justice in Egypt was living evidence of our care for native tradition and collaboration. Instead of this we worked practically independently of the native bar and of native opinion, we brought in Englishmen from abroad to draft codes, and the only defence that I ever heard offered of this close and autocratic method of doing things was that offered when the penal code was first presented to the Egyptian public and the drawer of the code said that he had confined his collaboration to a few English friends because they lived in the same part of the town and could easily meet together. This is typical of our whole position in Egypt. The fault is in the means employed and not in the end aimed at. Broadly there is precious little upon which a great national movement of protest could be based. Even under martial law the essentials of liberty were little interfered with, justice was well administered, personal security was assured, and the administration, so far as the English portion thereof is concerned, was honest and devoted. There is nothing which savours of oppression or exploitation. Egypt has been well governed by an uncontrolled and benevolent autocracy, but the age of autocracy, however benevolent, is gone. Egypt wanted its status defined, and expected it at a time when the constitutions of the world were under review. It must have been very galling to the native to find the world being reconstructed with the position in Egypt, which has been so vague and so undefined for forty years, totally neglected. All manner of experiments were to be made with races and governments, and Egypt was not even to be allowed for the time being to discuss its own position with its own protecting power, for this was the situation when Rushdy was refused permission to go to England. The Egyptian was left completely in the cold. He was not consulted about the future of Islam or about the

future of his own country. He became exasperated. I think we had grown overbold through our undoubted successes in Egypt, and we had become too jealous of the control we had exercised during the war. Our complete neglect of local opinion and our apparent indifference as to Egyptian support drove the Egyptian to extremes. It cannot be expected that in these days there will ever be much love by the governed in favour of alien rulers, but we have been in this position in Egypt for forty years and no trouble on the present scale had previously occurred. Many a finer opportunity had been let slip by the Egyptians and they had been soothed by strong and sympathetic hands. We can only hope to weaken the dislike by a broad sympathetic attitude towards the Egyptians. The social and constitutional barrier which prevails in Egypt to-day between the Englishman and the natives of the country leaves us without a friend in crises like these. The conception of British prestige as the divine right of the Englishmen in Egypt to command the respect of the native and the foreigner without regard to merit is no longer suited to modern conditions. It is an undoubted fact that we have worked in the interests of the Egyptians, and our record in Egypt, from the purely material point of view, is a remarkable one. The Englishmen have toiled hard for Egypt and the administrators work for only small remuneration. We have secured no privilege or monopoly for British trade. With our position in Egypt so fundamentally strong, it is a pity that we should be so misunderstood, simply owing to the secret autocratic and uncontrolled methods which prevail. It is no use being blind to the fact that the time has come when we must define our position in Egypt, when we must say what the Protectorate means, when the rights and duties of the English administrator should be set out, and when a far greater control shall be exercised by this country over the doings of our representatives in Egypt than has been the case in the past. This may appear to weaken our power in Egypt, but it will in reality strengthen the British position, while weakening the uncontrolled power of particular Englishmen. Public opinion in England is amazingly ill-informed about our doings in Egypt—there is no such thing as an Egyptian party in the House of Commons, there are few friends of Egypt in England—all these safety valves that help us along so much in the far more difficult task of governing India do not exist in the case of Egypt. Unfortunately, the outbreak in Egypt was responsible for some fearful and disgraceful crimes—I refer to the outrages on the troops and on the Armenians. There was no manner of justification for these crimes. Unfortunately, too, the Egyptian leaders do not appear to be sufficiently capable, or to have the necessary moral force to arrange for any immediate solution on a satisfactory basis. The rowdy extremists are to-day stampeding the Egyptians. For the immediate present, until the rise of the necessary Egyptian patriots, we shall have to run the country without much advice or assistance from the Egyptians, but there is no reason in the world why in the future we should continue to strengthen our critics position by that policy of neglect of Egyptian opinion and Egyptian friendship that we appear to have adopted in the past. The present troubles cannot last. The fundamentals that favour sedition do not exist. Sedition cannot be nurtured by prosperity, justice, and honesty. If only we will define our position and policy in Egypt, and then carry out our work through strong and sympathetic hands, we will soon win over sufficient Egyptian support. It is so obvious that for many years to come the interests of England in Egypt and of the Egyptians are in no way conflicting.

A. ALEXANDER.

Reform Club, London, May 27, 1919.

No. 370.

Foreign Office to Air Ministry.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 3, 1919.

IN reply to your letter of the 23rd ultimo relative to the financial contribution of Egypt towards the cost of the Royal Air Force, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state, for the information of the Air Council, that he has received no further communication from His Majesty's Special High Commissioner for Egypt and the Soudan since Sir M. Cheetham's telegram of the 13th February (No. 241), copy of which was transmitted to you on the 26th February. A further copy of this telegram is enclosed for reference.

* See No. 42.

Lord Curzon is of opinion that it might be convenient at this stage to refer to the original letter addressed to him by the Air Council of the 22nd November. It was suggested in this letter that the Governments of Egypt and the Soudan should contribute towards the cost of the Royal Air Force for two reasons:—

1. Aircraft now constitutes an essential adjunct to all military forces.
2. Aircraft might be utilised for civil purposes, such as postal and police service.

It is clear from Sir M. Cheetham's telegram No. 241, referred to above, that at the present stage neither the Egyptian Government nor the Government of the Soudan contemplate the use of service aircraft for civil purposes. Consequently the aspect of the question which now requires attention is whether these Governments should contribute to the cost of the Royal Air Force as an adjunct to the Army of Occupation.

The second paragraph of Sir M. Cheetham's telegram points out that the Egyptian Government have, in the past, paid a fixed annual contribution to the cost of the British Army of Occupation without distinguishing one category of the force from another.

Lord Curzon considers that it may well prove that the payment of a single lump sum, to be apportioned as the Army Council and Air Council may agree, will be the most satisfactory method by which the Egyptian Government should make their contribution in the future. In any case, it does not appear to his Lordship that the Egyptian Government can be asked to increase the amount which they pay at present until a definite decision is taken as to the ultimate post-war establishments of the Army of Occupation and the Royal Air Force. He desires to remind the Air Council that the Egyptian Government have not been asked to make any special contribution towards the greatly increased army now stationed in Egypt, and he would find it difficult to represent to them that a special contribution should be made now towards the cost of the Royal Air Force. He would suggest, for the consideration of the Air Council, that the decision as to the post-war establishments is one which concerns primarily the Air Council and Army Council, to whom a copy of this letter has been transmitted.

I am, &c.

No. 371.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 909.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, June 4, 1919.

NEW Ministry was formed on 21st May under Mohammed Said Pasha, who was Prime Minister under Lord Kitchener and Sir E. Gorst. He is of Turkish extraction, and passes as a strong man with a greater knowledge of the provinces than Rushdy Pasha, and likely to keep order with a strong hand. Sirry, Wahba and Ziwar Pashas are again in Ministry, the other appointments being new ones. Extremists are very angry at formation of a Ministry, and especially at Said Pasha's appointment, which they regard as a severe blow to their cause. Apart from possible danger of assassination, Ministry appears fairly firm on its seat and is doing well.

Extremists are endeavouring to get up another strike of Government officials and lawyers, but it is impossible that their efforts will succeed, as country is grown tired of disorders. Situation will not, however, improve until a peace is signed, as great hopes are set on Germany's refusal to sign.

Strike continues on canal, but of a peaceful character. Otherwise, situation is to all intents and purposes normal. Trial of villagers involved in murder of British officers in Luxor express is proceeding, and is likely to involve punishment of a large number of persons. This will give further material for atrocity campaign, which Egyptians at Paris are carrying on with great zeal.

(Repeated to Paris, Rome, and Berne.)

No. 372.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 682.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 4, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 343 of 25th May.*

You may make public announcement that cotton-seed control will be abolished as from 1st August.

* See No. 355.

No. 373.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 166.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 24, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward a series of extracts from reports rendered during the last six weeks or so by British political officers working with the various detached military forces in the provinces.

These political officers are volunteers chosen from among British non-official civilians, or British officials in Egyptian Government service who, for one reason or another, can be spared from their ordinary work. Their duty is, by virtue of their knowledge of the language and the country, to assist the military commanders to whom they are attached, particularly by acting as liaison officers between them and the Egyptian civil authorities; they are also expected to make any enquiries for which opportunity offers, and to forward information and expressions of opinion.

The extracts are arranged roughly in chronological order, but little effort is made at selection, except to choose, as far as possible, passages of some general, rather than of entirely local and temporary significance. There is consequently on the one hand considerable repetition, and on the other some divergence of opinion, resulting from differences of locality or point of view, but I have endeavoured to make the selection as representative as possible.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 373.

Expressions of Opinion on Political Conditions in Provinces Extracted mainly from the Reports of British Political Officers.

April 12.—A former British Egyptian official's appreciation.

A strong reaction has set in among practically all the better class people in the provinces.

Landowners and Omdas generally are seriously alarmed at the attitude of the fellahen, the damage done to property, cattle lifting, danger to the water supply, and the likelihood of further unrest. They were prepared for a flare-up of a few days, but are now exasperated with Cairo and the lawyers, whom they hold responsible for a state of affairs which is causing considerable material loss to the landowners.

Further, they are uneasy at the appearance among the fellahen of what is from the landowners point of view the worst symptom of Bolshevism, i.e., the proposal to partition large estates for the benefit of the small holders and the landless.

April 14.—Zagazig. From a political officer's report.

The military dominate the whole situation, and by an admirable mixture of persuasion and strength the Egyptian State Railway lines in the area are now in working order. The Delta Light Railway lines are also being rapidly restored to normal conditions.

The behaviour of the troops under extremely trying conditions has been beyond all praise.

The country districts have practically all returned to normal conditions. The Groeks, many of whom left their estates and came into the large towns, in some cases under military protection, are gradually plucking up courage and returning to their properties. Their attitude after they had got over their first fright has been entirely pro-British.

The behaviour of the police under difficult circumstances has been distinctly good.

The unrest is promulgated by local committees. These committees are to a large extent composed of "out-of-work" lawyers who are living on party funds which, having shown signs of depletion, are now being replenished by means of "blackmail." Owing to this action certain of the moderate members show signs of breaking off their adherence.

There is an increasing feeling evinced by the large landowners and better class Omdas, and also to a certain extent among the fellahen themselves, that they have been duped by the lawyer and effendi classes residing in the town.

Threats of actual violence to various Europeans and well-affected natives show signs of increase, and a small supply of automatic pistols is said to have been obtained and distributed to the "hotheads" of the party.

April 13 to 20.

Behera. From a political officer's report.

On Sunday, 13th April, a large meeting of Moslems and Copts was held at the Coptic Church, Damanhour, which was peaceful; there were cheers for "unity" and "independence." But this week-end the Copts seem to be showing a genuine distress at the idea that perhaps Moslems should attend the Easter services.

The extravagant expectations aroused by the release of the Pashas are fading among the better-informed classes; but in the villages the belief is still general that it is only a matter of days or weeks before every Englishman leaves the country.

Meanwhile, in Teh-el-Barud and Kafr-el-Dawar Markazes, the police, uncertain on which side of the fence to come down, are making no efforts to arrest suspects. In Damanhour, Kom Hamada, and Shubrakhit, the influence of a strong chief is holding them to their duty.

Western Delta Area. Chief political officer's report.

The fellahen are discontented because after many years of protection from exploitation they have been seriously exploited during the war, since the declaration of the Protectorate, viz. :—

1. Enlistments to E.L.C. and C.T.C. were entirely in the hands of Omdas, who sold exemptions and enlisted their personal enemies. Men were enlisted often after exemptions had been paid.
2. Red Cross subscriptions extorted by Omdas, who did not even bother with the formality of a receipt. What proportion of the sum collected reached the Red Cross will never be known.
3. Forage and grain requisitions imposed by the Omda regardless of the man's ability to meet the requisition; consequently a man often had to purchase for cash some of his quota while he had to wait as much as four months for payment.

These payments too, when made, were, I understand, frequently made through the Omda, regardless of the order that the Mamour or police officer must make them personally; again what the fellah lost in this way cannot be known.

The fellah has thus had ample cause for discontent, which has obliterated the causes for gratitude on which the English never cease congratulating themselves, though no English official now in Egypt had anything to do with the removal of old grievances any more than the bulk of the present generation of fellahen suffered from them. It is needless to show how the Omdas shifted the blame off their shoulders to ours.

Finally as concerns the fellahen. The motor-car enables the English official to get about so fast that he never speaks to a fellah. A few years ago the English inspectors rode horses, and would overtake or be overtaken by Omdas, Sheiks, or others on their donkeys, and they would ride a mile or two together, and each would get to know the other's point of view, whereas now the car flies past, covering the native with dust, scaring his family and animals, and, even if the official does shout a greeting, he is gone before it can be returned, which is hardly mannerly.

The effendi class can be dealt with more briefly. This class got into European clothes and education for the sole purpose of getting a government job. The attraction of a government job lies in the social standing it confers—its certainty, its short hours, its lack of responsibility (in all clerical branches), and its ultimate pension. The effendi class then is discontented because the tree of state does not bear enough plums.

April 21.—Behera Province. From a political officer's report.

An Omda who had been suspended for some offence, complained that he had always done his work well and had raised more (£ E.1,500) from his village for the Red Cross than any other in the Markaz. On being asked if the subscribers were willing givers, he exclaimed: "Willing! Every millieme was wrung from them by force."

April 20.—*East Delta.* Extracts from chief political officer's report.

... The country districts are settling down more or less to their normal pursuits in spite of attempts by the agitator class to create trouble. ...

I have visited all the Markazes of Sharkieh Province (except Bilbeis, which I have arranged to visit on the 22nd) with the Mudir and have met the Notables and Omdas. ... The meetings at Faqus, Zagazig and Kafr Sakr were excellent, and no attempt at introducing political discussion was made. At Minet-el-Gambh, a student from El Azhar began to address the meeting, but was promptly made to sit down.

At Hehia, the meeting was by no means satisfactory. We were greeted at the Markaz by cries of "Long live the independence of Egypt!" followed by "Long live the Mudir!" The cries were led and engineered by a Copt, about whom I am having full enquiries made. Numerous attempts to introduce political discussions were made by the Omdas, which the Mudir suppressed with difficulty. At one time he got up with the intention of leaving the room.

The Omdas who attempted to introduce political discussion were without exception former students of El Azhar, and if there is any further trouble in the villages, it will certainly come from these centres.

The speeches of the Mudir were exceptionally good and reasonable in tone. He advised the people to restore all railway property to the Omdas. No questions would be asked if that was done, except in cases where the damage or theft was the work of known criminals. With regard to the damage or theft of Greek property, he suggested that the Markaz concerned should appoint a committee of four to arrange with the Greek owners the amount of compensation, and to pay the amount at once. This course was approved by the Greek Consul at Zagazig.

At Zagazig and Mansura strikes are fomented by the local committees in each place, assisted by the students. Circulars are issued almost every day, urging the communities to continue the strikes. Intimidation is being employed broadcast, including threats of death, throwing of vitriol, &c.

The circulars of late have evinced somewhat of a tone of desperation at the lethargy of the populace, which is a good sign.

Every endeavour is being made to raise funds. The political officer at Mansura informs me that the Syrians have been the latest unwilling victims and have subscribed up-to-date 700*l.*, including 200*l.* from Count Sab. The various committees are also hard at work trying to raise money out of the Omdas.

April 21.—*Alexandria.*

A correspondent says the Moslems think they have the following reasons for dissatisfaction with British rule:—

1. *Treachery.*—The British Foreign Office promised Egypt independence, if she remained loyal in the war. They believe Saad Zaghlul has the letter from the Foreign Office, although the British have tried to steal it.

The British bribed six of the leading Sheiks, including the Sheikh-ul-Islam, to obtain signatures to a document in English, really in favour of British rule, headed in Arabic "We desire Independence."

The heading was to be detached when taken to Paris by Zaghlul.

2. *Finance.*—Great Britain is claiming 350,000,000*l.* from Egypt to cover her war expenses in Egypt.

Great Britain misappropriated large sums of money paid by the Egyptian Government for relief of the unemployed.

Egyptian money was spent to build the railway to Syria, and also for improvements in Syria. Large sums have also been spent on houses and gardens for English officials.

3. *Language.*—English will replace Arabic.

4. *Pay.*—No Egyptian is to receive more than 10*l.* a month in any Government office.

5. *Slavery.*—The British wherever they live raise prices until the poor become slaves (e.g., India).

6. *Reaction.*—The British prevent progress in education, commerce, or manufacture. Saad Pasha was not allowed to introduce compulsory education. Trade was not allowed except with Great Britain. Taxation of machinery, &c. prohibited manufacture.

These charges, as they are never denied, are also believed by the Copts and Moslems.

April 24.—*Behera Province.* Political officer reports:—

"The reasons for discontent amongst the fellaheen in districts I have visited appear to be in part—

"(a.) The way in which they have been exploited by Omdehs and other unscrupulous officials over the grain and forage requisitioning (owing to insufficiency of British supervision). Apparently it was a common occurrence for these officials to extort a larger quantity than was required by the military authorities, the balance of which they used to their own benefit.

"(b.) The unfair way in which Omdehs and other heads of villages and Ezbehs produced candidates for recruiting, favouritism and baksheesh having apparently been deciding factors for exemption in many cases.

"In both (a) and (b) any apparent ruthlessness would be ascribed to 'order from the military authorities.'

"(c.) The unusually wealthy position of the fellaheen appears to have given them a false sense of independence which, together with the machinations of the Nationalist (?) Party, has led to the present position. Even to the present day the defeat of Turkey and Germany is not generally believed by the fellaheen; the sale of army animals they look upon as a proof of British defeat."

April 25.—A political officer writes:—

"I have been throughout spreading the gospel of the fellah and good omda and landowner class as opposed to the effendi, and I think it is already bearing fruit, as I see the opinion of the fellah is veering round. I also go further than this and point out that the lawyer class, being out of work, are only too pleased to live on party funds, and that further, having advised the fellah to pull up railways, &c., whilst they are safe in their houses, they refuse to defend him when he appears before the military courts, and he has in consequence, when he can afford it, to be defended by English lawyers.

"With regard to strikes, I point out that no one is suffering except the Egyptians themselves, and that the troops are being fed by ration trains run by the military authorities, and it does not inconvenience the English in the very least but only paralyses Egyptian trade."

April 26.

Benha. Political officer reports:—

"With regard to complaints, I believe that the idea that there are thousands of Englishmen in Government posts is one of the most deepseated and general of complaints.

"It is obviously the main grievance in the towns, and I believe that even in the villages it is more general than one would suppose, affecting, as it is considered to do, the sons of a large number of fellaheen who would otherwise all become 'Government officials.'"

Delta. An Englishman, with long experience of the district, writes:—

"Village visiting is quite impossible at present, and I should say likely to remain so for some time to come. There is still a great amount of unrest, and the 'reported quiet condition of the Delta' is only on the surface. I ride round about here occasionally with the officers of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and the crops are looking all right, but what is going to happen to the cotton later on when it wants water? I can arrive at but one conclusion, viz., it will want."

April 27.

Bilbeis. Political officer says:—

"Reasons for discontent: Among the illiterates there appears to be a vague, poorly expressed idea that the authorities are not doing enough for them in the way of

education. I can only ascribe this to propaganda by effendis, for it is certain that forcible measures would have to be taken to secure attendance at schools, if the latter existed. The effendis regard the rumoured appointment of 600 more British officials in the Government as a death-blow to Egyptians' aspirations to senior posts. A novel point put to me recently was that a ranker granted a commission becomes *ipso facto* eligible for a Government position to which the best-educated native cannot aspire."

Behera Province. Political officer writes:—

"I have not come across any indication to show that the Bedouin, as a body, are taking an active part in the Nationalist agitation, though there probably are bad characters amongst those settled amongst the fellahen who have been persuaded to use their influence in the Nationalist cause on the promise of future favours.

"Amongst the people, even junior police officers, much ignorance and doubt appears to exist as to the outcome of the war, and few people appear to believe that the downfall of Turkey is as complete as is really the case. The widespread publication of the peace terms should have an enlightening effect."

April 29.

Behera Province. Political officer writes:—

"Dr. Wilson's recognition of the Protectorate has had a great effect in depressing Nationalist hopes, while our few supporters have been correspondingly delighted.

"The rumour is current and believed that the Delegation at Paris has been referred to London by both Dr. Wilson and M. Clemenceau.

"Week end news from Cairo of the arrests of leaders has been unsettling, but in Damahour there is a general disinclination to join in any further action.

"*Attitude of natives:* Considerable improvement, much greater respect being shown to political officers in outlying districts.

"The stoppage of military transport is already having a salutary and chastening effect. The price of necessities not produced locally has risen enormously, and in addition the villagers are compelled to pay exorbitant fees for cartage."

East Delta.

"The country districts are now more or less normal, and are beginning to realise the stupidity of their past conduct, especially with regard to the stoppage of railway communication.

"The shortness of petroleum, especially with regard to the working of irrigation pumps and flour mills in the district, is being felt more and more each day, which is an excellent thing.

Arrangements are being made to supply the irrigation pumps, but flour mills have to take second place as the fellahen can always resort to their old method of crushing with stones, much as they dislike the additional labour.

The committees have appeared to be less active of late, the issue of circulars has also diminished, activity with regard to party funds still reigns.

In Mansura I questioned Awadein Bey, who is the omda of the town and treasurer of the committee, with regard to the distribution of these funds; he informed me that the money is only being given to the poor, and no strike pay has been allotted. I warned him that I thought it was time for the activity with regard to the collection of funds should cease, and also told him that I was quite sure the Syrians were unwilling contributors.

I am convinced that by far the best policy for political officers is to talk quite openly and let the various committees think they are being continually watched and not try to be mysterious, in this way the Egyptian cannot understand how much or how little you know, and probably gives you credit for knowing much more with regard to their machinations than you really do.

The Mudir of Dakalia, Hafiz Pasha Hassan, who originally showed signs of considerable weakness, is rapidly plucking up courage.

The attitude of the police in both Mudiria has improved, and they have lost the sullen look they used to wear.

All Administrations of the Government are now working, the employees with few

exceptions have returned, lists have been made out of those who returned late, and full enquiries are being made as to whether there are any extenuating circumstances.

On the whole I think the employees were glad to be at work again.

The fall of the Rushdy Ministry caused much less excitement than I anticipated, and the better classes appear indifferent as to what the next line of action may be.

President Wilson's statement was also received quite calmly.

To sum up, the present situation may be a lull before the storm, which may or may not arise, when the fate of the Egyptian delegates is known out here, if it is an unfavourable one; on the other hand, there is an equal chance that the verdict may be taken as the will of "Allah." In any case I consider we should be prepared for trouble.

Arrangements are completed for the safety of the European population in the event of further disturbances."

April 30.—*Damietta.* Political officer reports reason for discontent among the fellahen.

The Fellahen.—The fellah has unbounded confidence in the educated class of his countrymen; a crowd of fellahen like a flock of sheep will blindly follow a leader regardless of consequences. Unscrupulous agitators have grossly abused and betrayed this confidence.

Grievances.—Some of the Mamurs and Omdahs in the country forcibly impressed men for the Labour Corps alleging that this was done by order of the "sullia"—the British military authority. As an instance of this, the Moawen of Faraskur, now charged with inciting the mob to destroy telegraphs, railways, and to demand rifles, stated in his defence that he was greatly hated in the town on account of his work for the British in getting men for the Labour Corps, and since his arrest several statements have been made to me to the effect that this Moawen had even seized men coming in from the villages to sell farm produce and forcibly enrolled them in the Labour Corps. When troubles first started in Cairo the villagers were told that British soldiers would be brought down to lie with their wives; this calumny was the direct cause of the destruction of the railway and telegraphs at Faraskur and was given to the telegraph clerks at Damietta as the reason for which the mob destroyed the telegraph. Stories such as these needed little further venom to influence the villagers against the British.

The Effendi Class.—The veneration of the ignorant for presumed learning acting upon the effendi class has made them over-weeningly conceited. When they find that Europeans are unimpressed by their pretensions and more or less contemptuous of their knowledge a feeling of hatred is aroused which has gradually been fanned into a flame.

Government Employees.—Government employees are often discontented because of their impatience of British control. Low salaries, slow or rare increase of pay, lack of opportunity of enriching themselves by corrupt means are all grievances against British control; many believe that Egyptian rule would give them much greater advantages. There is also some complaint of want of sympathy and of hectoring manners on the part of British officials, unfounded for the most part, but magnified and exaggerated where some slight justification exists.

The Copts.—So far as the Copts are concerned, I am of opinion that any action or discontent manifested against the British by them arises entirely from fear of the consequences of abstaining from a popular movement which they were afraid might gain its ends.

May 1.—*Upper Egypt.* Political officer writes:—

"The feature of this week has been the official recognition of the British Protectorate by the United States of America. This has removed from most Egyptians' minds the hope that any action by them would receive the support of that country as well as of Italy.

"Meanwhile the steady progress of investigations, arrests, trials and convictions has reassured the law-abiding elements. The arrest of leading agitators and rioters and the desire of the owners of pillaged shops for revenge have encouraged several useful witnesses to come forward.

"The poorer Copts, who have with foreigners usually been the subjects of pillage are more helpful than their richer co-religionists. The latter are not, of course, so closely acquainted personally with recent events as they kept to their houses, and so cannot give quite as useful testimony. The professional element are not free from suspicion of implication in the agitation. There is, therefore, no definite and general split as yet between the Muslim and Copt.

"The fellahs resentment against the educated man is gradually growing as he realises into what trouble the latter has led him. Failure to market his garnered crops and the prospect of being unable to sow or water the usual summer crops hits hard the man whose ordinary prospect is so very material.

"It becomes more apparent as enquiries proceed that the majority of native officials were regrettably weak or timorous during the disturbances where they were not totally disaffected, whilst the senior officials failed to give them a bold lead, such as would undoubtedly have been successful. It is still too early to say definitely, but it appears only too probable that they forgot their duty to the State, and attempted both to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. Every attempt was made to oppose the introduction of British troops, although without them no arrests were ever made. The reason probably was that when such troops were present there was no excuse for failing in one's duty, and one was therefore compelled to show one's colours.

"The attitude of the Arab tribes gives no cause for alarm. A separate report is being made on the subject. In Qena and Assouan provinces they have been thoroughly loyal, not to the Egyptian Government, but to the British Crown.

"To summarise, affairs are generally rather in our favour, and public confidence and order are gradually being restored accordingly."

May 4.

Fayoum.—The political officer states in conversation that the district is decidedly quiet, and, on the whole, there is good feeling towards the British. He has been going about alone in certain districts, and finds there is a strong feeling amongst the inhabitants against the Cairo Nationalists, because they now realise that the agitation has resulted only in considerable material loss to them, the inhabitants.

East Delta Area.—The country seems to be settling down to its normal pursuits, but in my opinion this is due to the presence of troops and patrols, and it will be a long time before the present system of supervision can be relaxed, without risking a recrudescence of past troubles.

Rifle stealing, mostly from tents where men are sleeping, is on the increase, probably owing to the high price effendis are willing to pay for them.

May 5.—Alexandria District.—An intelligence officer sends the following report:—

(a.) *Fellaheen.*—(Farmers of all classes and farm labourers).

1. The natives allege that gross abuses were committed with the cognizance of the British authorities by the officials charged with recruiting for the Labour Corps. Recruiting, although nominally voluntary, was in reality compulsory. Exemption was only secured by heavy bribes. Junior officials, Omdas, and Sheikhs used it as a weapon against their personal enemies, as well as for the purpose of extortion. The story is current amongst natives that Mamours, on inspecting batches of pressed recruits for the Egyptian Labour Corps, would exclaim "these are much too dirty for the Army. Are there no clean-turbaned ones?"

The better-class recruits produced in response to this hint would have to ransom themselves and produce substitutes.

Time-expired men spread exaggerated reports of their ill-treatment in the E.L.C. They alleged that they were flogged for the slightest offence, and that the bulk of their pay went to bribe the N.C.O.s, and even hospital "tamargis" when they were sick.

2. The fellaheen also declare that the requisitioning of supplies were carried out in a vexatious manner. Extortion and revenge were again given full play. During the first two years of the war grain was requisitioned at the lowest tariff prices. Certain cereals, as soon as the Army requirements were satisfied, would then be struck off the tariff and sold at sometimes as much as double the tariff price. The owners of the requisitioned grain would consequently suffer heavy loss. The system was changed later, but was no less vexatious. The local authorities exacted for the Army a contribution of one kela per feddan of wheat, barley, dhurra, and tibn. This, the fellaheen allege, was not paid for. They also complain that their cattle were requisitioned at the lowest prices, and are now being resold to them, in war work condition, at double and even treble the requisitioned price. They keenly resent this profiteering on the part of the British army.

3. Coercion was used in raising funds for the Red Cross and in collecting debts for the Agricultural Bank.

(b.) *The Effendis.*—The chief cause of discontent amongst the effendis and upper classes seems to be their conviction that Britain, victorious in the war, intends to pursue an Imperialistic policy in Egypt without regard to the aspirations of the Egyptians. They declare that the activities of certain British civil officials in Cairo, just before and since the armistice, betrayed the fact that a programme for the Anglicisation of Egypt was in course of preparation. The budgetary provisions for fresh British officials and the judicial language question were unmistakable signs of this. Their hopes of self-government, stimulated by President Wilson's utterances, were disappointed.

The junior officials complain that European officials of little education are better paid than they are. For instance, a native second-lieutenant of police, after graduating in the Police School, gets less pay than an almost illiterate European constable. Formerly an Egyptian holding the "Baccalaureat" degree entered the Government service at £E. 12 per mensem. He now gets only £E. 8.

In spite of all the above grievances, imaginary or otherwise, it should be borne in mind that the vast majority of Egyptians of the effendi class were Turco and Germanophile throughout the war, and were deeply mortified at the defeat of the Turks.

May 6.

Fayoum.—Political officer reports no demonstrations have been proposed and few, if any, public signs of hostile Nationalist feeling are observable. Most of the notables and merchants of Fayoum express great regret at what has happened in Egypt, and irritation at the conduct of strikers and politicians in Cairo, who have paralysed the commercial life of the country. Landowners are also alarmed at the fact that during the few days in which the outlying districts were out of hand Bedouins made a paper division of large estates among themselves. Although I do not believe that Bolshevik and Communist doctrines have really been preached in the provinces, this action of the Bedouin may prove to be useful as a warning to the landowning class against the probable consequences of a successful revolution.

Qaliubia.—The Omda of Khanka asked that the military post should not be withdrawn from the station, as the country was still in an unsettled state. This indicates the feeling of security given to law-abiding people by the presence of a friendly guard.

Serious complaints are constantly being received from the inhabitants of Mataria and neighbourhood with regard to the manner in which the search was carried out by Indian troops. The complaints were forwarded to the proper quarter.

The Omda of Mataria explained that he quite recognised the right of the British to search the village for stolen property, but as the village had not been guilty of any crime, he wished that the soldiers in occupation had been English and not "heathen" Indians.

No complaints have been received about the searching of Tel-el-Hessin, which was carried out by English troops on the same day.

May 10.

Upper Egypt.—Political officer states: The situation is improving on all sides. The arrest of notables and of Government officials in Assiut has had a good effect. In the usually lawless district of Deirut the daily patrolling and collection of arms are producing good results. There is, however, a good deal of investigation to be done, and this proceeds slowly owing to shortage of political officers and reliable interpreters; the reluctance from fear or camaraderie of natives to give evidence, and the lukewarm support received from the native civil authorities.

There is little evidence so far of widespread organisation in the recent disturbances in Upper Egypt, and although various bodies with hostile purposes are known to have been formed. The simultaneous outbreak of disorders throughout the provinces can probably be connected with the closing of Cairo schools and the dispersal of students to their homes at this period. That central committees and funds existed, and that plans of campaign for demonstrations and even measures of violence had been formed to be put into action in Cairo, is not questioned; but it is doubtful whether agitators made provision for activity in the provinces.

Damietta.—The town has been quiet during the week, and there have been no incidents of importance, but there is still a good deal of sullen hostility, and the Christians are in a state of fear as to what may happen when the garrison leaves.

Hostile propaganda leaflets have been distributed in the streets. Our leaflet No. 2 has been distributed and well received. Talk in the cafés is mostly about the expected mission from England.

May 11.—*Bilbeis*. A political officer writes:—

"I have visited some twenty-five villages during the week, and find everywhere (in the country) an almost complete return to normal, or the desire to do so. Disturbing elements exist, I am told, in some of the smaller and remoter villages, in the form of bands of thieves who meet at night and plan cattle-lifting exploits, shop and house-breaking, &c. An anonymous report has just come of such a band at Qoreish having murdered a man. Steps are being taken to round up this band."

May 14.—*Heliopolis*. A political officer reports:—

"I accompanied the General Officer Commanding, Area to Mostorod and Bahtim. At Mostorod the Omda was requested to read out leaflets and to hold a meeting in the evening when field workers had returned. The reference to the nature of the Protectorate did not excite much comment, but the audience was greatly interested in the passage concerning cost of food and necessities. We impressed on the people the fact that the war, which had been caused by the Germans, was responsible for high prices. The Omda and notables said they realised this, and that the British had protected them from a worse fate."

At Bahtim, copies of some pamphlets had been received, but various leading men asked for further copies, including the Fiqi, who wished to read them in the Mosque.

We were informed that the price at which tbn was bought last year for the Government was 50 piastres per haml (5 cwt.) against a market price of 200 piastres. Moreover, it seemed doubtful whether the 50 piastres had been paid in full.

May 17.

Upper Egypt. Chief political officer reports reasons for discontent:—

Fellaheen.—It was not so much the actual service in the Labour Corps which was resented as the compulsory and unjust selections of the Omdas. At the same time, the heavy casualties due to exposure in Syria in the winter of 1917-18 have been felt by relatives and friends. South of Assiut, where the population is accustomed to leaving home to work for contractors in Lower Egypt, disturbances have been fewer and more confined to the educated class.

The usual complaints are made of requisitioning of crops in exorbitant quantities and at unfair rates. Finally, payment was dilatory, and there were unexpected deductions, such as for dirty grains. At El Hawata (Deirut Markaz) recently, 1,000L was still owing for supplies made eight months previously, and an inhabitant of Kharga Oasis had not been paid for 1916 requisitions.

Camels taken for the army were often the fellah's only means of transport. The price paid was 9L to 16L; bribes of 30L are said to have been paid in attempts to retain an animal. After three years' service a camel was resold at a minimum of 20L. (N.B.—The fellah took no account of the improved condition of the beast.) Similar complaints are made about donkeys, and it is alleged that they were always resold in Lower Egypt, so that the people of the south have had no chance of replacing requisitioned animals.

Of course, the inefficiency and dishonesty of the native official are usually at the bottom of the trouble, but it has been easy for him to put the blame on to English shoulders. It is worth noting that in Deirut Markaz, where the administration in such matters was the subject of grave charges, there was much rioting, whereas in the adjoining Markaz of Mallawi, where the administration was unusually good, very little happened.

Effendis.—(a.) The refusal of the Residency and the Home Government to negotiate with Saad Zaghlul has dashed the hopes which the effendis had of their education giving them an ascendancy in an autonomous State. They have been further disturbed by the rumoured programme of Sir William Brunyate, said to include:—

1. Exclusive use of English in Law Courts.

2. Sweeping changes in the Legislative Assembly, undertaken without reference to the country, and including the subordination of a Lower House, elected by Egyptians, to an Upper House of Ministers, Government nominees and foreigners.

3. Large increase in posts allotted to foreigners.

(b.) The present system of education does not equip them for a business career.

(c.) Increased cost of living and railway travelling and shortage of house accommodation.

(d.) Articles reproduced in native press from the 'Times' advocating annexation.

Beni Suef. Chief political officer writes:—

"There is a party which favours the idea of Egypt being included in the British Empire, with a few capable foreigners as advisers. The Finance, Irrigation, and Education Departments are specially mentioned as requiring English officials.

"Regarding education, the opinion is that there is not enough discipline in the schools, nor enough personal influence to develop character.

"The British official, who is in touch and sympathy with the Egyptian, has more influence with him than any other foreigner. There appears to be a long list of petty grievances against European officials, whose duties are, or have been made, of a perfunctory nature and who acquire perquisites in various forms, but personal touch and sympathy more than counterbalance these."

Upper Egypt.—Various reports.

Bolshevism.—There has been nothing to suggest the presence of Bolshevik ideas, nor has any local committee called itself a Soviet.

Reports by British officers and civilians have occasionally referred to local committees, such as that of Minia, as Soviets, but examination of such bodies' proposals and acts reveals nothing peculiarly Bolshevik in their aims.

Heliopolis.—Political officer writes:—

"Several villages have been visited during the last few days. Everywhere the inhabitants are very friendly and expressed their thanks for the interest taken in their welfare by the General. They crowded round without fear at the unwonted sight of British visitors, and listened with interest to what was said. An attempt at getting an opinion on the destruction of railways, &c., was always answered by a disclaimer of any connection with the troubles at distant places.

"In every village a few men were found able to read the leaflets, although none of them were 'effendis' or in European dress. At Salmania, a young Egyptian invited us to visit his farm. He spoke a little English, which he had acquired during twelve years spent at school; but for the lack of practice during the two years since he had left school, he had forgotten all but a few words.

"At Khosus, the Omda being absent, leaflets were left with the Sheikh El Ghaffir. This man has been reported as an instigator at the beginning of the disturbances. His manner is nervous, but there is no proof of his guilt.

"At Hazzania complaints were made about requisitioning of crops. A few men who had been with the Labour Corps were satisfied with their treatment. Other men at Kom Es Semn and Gaafra expressed themselves as well pleased with the conditions of service in the Egyptian Labour Corps.

"Everywhere the state of the cultivation appeared to be good, and work normal."

Zeitoun.—The week has been very uneventful; the fellaheen seem to have forgotten all about the trouble, and are working peacefully and quietly. Seditious printed matter is still being distributed.

Several further arrests have been made in connection with the murder of two Gurkhas on the 8th April. Investigations are still proceeding.

Wasta.—"The area has been quiet during the week. The general demeanour of the people has improved most noticeably. Whether this is due to our insistence on proper respect being paid to His Majesty's uniform or to other causes, I cannot say, but

the fact remains that wherever one goes, in village or open country, the natives stand up and exchange greetings. In Meidun, where hitherto they have been sullen, the men were particularly good on the 15th May when I rode through the village with only one orderly. This may be due to the fact that they have seen their great Omda, Emin Bey Er Ridi, actually under arrest and shut up behind a barbed wire fence.

"The military courts continue their sittings, and investigation of recent crimes and destruction of property is proceeding. It is now thought time to arrest certain Omdas who were implicated in the revolt. The evidence against them is sufficient to justify the arrest. The Omdas, generally speaking, suffer from a 'rot' which it is hard to believe is of recent origin.

"No signs have been noticed of the black hand or of collection of illicit funds."

May 18.—*Damanhur*. Political officer reports:—

"The week has been without incidents.

"The supporters of Zaghlul's deputation have circulated leaflets broadcast, but are losing ground. The fellahen and better class cultivators are against any agitation that may lead to further loss; even among townsmen a moderate opinion is gaining support, that it is better to resign all hope of independence and co-operate with the British.

"Several notables in each Markaz have agreed to act as propagandists for us."

May 19.—Senior British Official reports:—

"I had a long talk last night with Dr. Faris Nimr, editor of 'Al Mokattam,' who, as usual, had a good deal of interest to say.

"He was satisfied that the Nationalist windbag was much reduced. The 'Zikr' spirit was fast disappearing; people were becoming accessible to argument, but did not yet dare to express sensible opinions in public.

"Dr. Nimr had just returned from a visit to his ruined property, where he had had conversations with the Nationalist members of the Commission to assess the damage and with the local people. The feeling amongst the fellahen was vastly improved, but could not yet be considered normal. Natives described to him the false reports and spurious excitement which had induced them to believe that the English Government in Egypt was finished and that all Christians were to be expelled. They explained, 'how could they have done, otherwise when each village was competing with the other to show its enthusiasm for the new "Islamic" order'?

"A sense of insecurity from recent events was being kept alive by false reports, such as the early arrival of Senussist armies, the return of the ex-Khedive, &c. The circulation of these reports was, Dr. Nimr felt convinced, carried out under the direction of the 200 (?) members of the 'Dar el Ulum' (Madrasset el Muallimin), speaking both Nationalist and Islamic patter to suit circumstances."

No. 374.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 914.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 662.*

Cairo, June 5, 1919.

During ten years previous to 1918 an average area of 400,000 feddans was under barley and an average of 13,000 tons was imported approximately. In 1918 327,000 feddans were under barley; imports were negligible; 29,000 tons were supplied to the army and an acute shortage resulted.

This year 265,000 feddans are under barley and imports are improbable, particularly since army are purchasing in Syria and Palestine.

There will, therefore, again be a shortage in any case, and if Egyptian barley were supplied to army great hardship would be caused to owners of animals, especially cammen and carters in large towns.

I consider it undesirable that army should purchase barley in Egypt this year.

* See No. 362.

No. 375.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 239.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 25, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 229 of the 18th May, I have the honour to forward a brief summary of the events of the week, 18th May to the 24th May, inclusive.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 375.

Summary of Events of the Week, May 18 to May 24, inclusive.

May 18.

Some military telephone wires were cut in the morning near Benha. Otherwise no disorder of any kind was reported. There was, however, no sign of a return to work in the Canal zone.

The extremists were reported to be making what capital they could out of the troubles in Afghanistan, which, in conjunction with a "revolution" in India, they represented as a deadly blow to England.

May 19.

A military telephone wire was again cut near Benha.

A three days' patrol in Deirut district brought in 534 firearms, mostly modern. 295 firearms were taken at Beni Mazar, near Minia.

At Suez the employees of the Electricity and Ice Company returned to work. Otherwise no change was reported from the Canal zone.

May 20.

The whole country remained quiet. The electricity workers at Ismailia followed the example of those at Suez and returned to work. Otherwise the strike in the Canal zone was maintained.

May 21.

The whole country was again quiet, but it was reported from the Canal zone that efforts were being made to persuade military casual labour to join in the strike.

May 22.

Both in Cairo and Alexandria the new Cabinet, and especially the President, were strongly attacked in student and effendi circles. At Cairo the boys at the Tewfikia Secondary School went on strike in protest. At Alexandria, soon after 7 p.m., a few effendis called on the natives sitting in the cafés to demonstrate against Mohammed Said Pasha. Some hundred persons who responded to the invitation were easily dispersed by the native police, aided by a few British soldiers. Type-written invitations to take part in a larger demonstration on the following day were also distributed.

In the Canal zone all was quiet, and the efforts to retain military casual labour at work had so far been successful.

In Kena district a total of 147 arms were siezed.

In the evening seditious speeches were delivered at the Sayedna-el-Hussein Mosque in Cairo.

May 23.

At Alexandria students and Sheikhs after a service in the Abu Abbas Mosque, marched in procession through the town. They were dispersed by police and military picquets, a few bricks and bottles were thrown and one policeman slightly injured.

In the evening at El Azhar speeches were delivered advocating a renewal of the general strike, in order to bring about the downfall of the new Ministry.

May 24.

In Cairo in the morning there was a small demonstration opposite the Sultan's private palace.

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It was reported from the Canal zone that the coaling coolies were showing signs of giving way. Otherwise there was no change.

The following arms were reported to have been collected: at Beni Mazar 282 in four days, at Nag Hamadi 148, and at Kena 34.

No. 376.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 697.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 6, 1919.

THE following from "Astoria":—

"(Secret.)

"Ismail Sidki is applying to Consul-General, Paris, for permission to return to Egypt. It appears that others also intend to apply. It seems most inadvisable to allow Delegation here to split up; part remaining, and part coming and going as agents and couriers who would bring photographs, &c. Would it not be preferable to treat Delegation as a whole, and to tell individual applicants their applications to return will be considered when the whole deputation applies? An alternative might be, if individual members are allowed to return, to keep them in Egypt; but first course seems preferable. What are your views? Consul-General has received instructions to take no action pending your reply."

No. 377.

Mr. Balfour to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, June 5, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 862*: Communications to new Ministers of records of Capitulations Commission in Egypt and publication of Egypt-Morocco Convention when concluded with France.

Sir W. Brunyate points out that decision of Council of Ministers appointing Capitulations Commission directed that body to report to President of Council, and the full record of the Commission's proceedings is in the hands of the presidency. I see no objection to attention of Mohammed Pasha Said being specifically drawn to the matter, and approve such discussion with his colleagues as you may think useful.

I shall be glad to have opinion of Mohammed Pasha Said and his colleagues as to the general scheme of the draft Judicature Law, but I am reluctant to state in advance to what extent the draft might now be modified to meet their views. Modification in response to public criticism appears to be impossible.

As stated in my telegram No. 612, we are at present in favour of continuing negotiations with the French, but I am bringing to Mr. Balfour's notice the possible embarrassment which might be caused in Egypt by the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your telegram noted above. The convention, whenever concluded, would almost necessarily be made public. There is, however, a possibility that the convention may not be signed at present.

The question of renewal of the Mixed Courts is receiving my attention.

I see no probability that the Capitulations will be abolished, save as regards enemy Powers, before the 31st October.

Despatched by Peace Delegation on receipt from Foreign Office.

No. 378.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 700.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 6, 1919.

YOUR despatch No. 215 of 8th May. (Transmits text of letters mentioned in No. 11.)

Please instruct Sir Lee Stack to inform writers that His Majesty's Government have received with great satisfaction their expressions of loyalty, and cordially appreciate

* See No. 359.

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the assistance rendered by them to the British Empire and its local representatives during the great war, which has now ended in glorious victory.

His Majesty's Government regard with genuine pleasure the impending visit to Great Britain of eminent notables of the Soudan as tending to bind them together in still closer union and sympathy with the British Empire and further cementing the ties of loyalty, friendship, and co-operation, which alone can conduce to the true advancement and progress of their country.

(Confidential.)

Do you or Governor-General of Soudan see any objection to our now publishing information regarding visit of Soudan notables with summary of letters forwarded in your despatch quoted above? (See your telegram No. 733.)*

No. 379.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 903)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 2, 1919.

REFERENCE Reuter telegram of 27th May (Major Ormsby-Gore's questions in House of Commons regarding education of British children in Egypt)† and Sir H. McMahon's despatch No. 361 of the 22nd December, 1916, p. 4. English school in Cairo was closed for lack of funds, and staff has resigned and returned to England. School cannot possibly be restored unless His Majesty's Government can guarantee deficits, which are not likely to be more than 2,000l. per annum.

It is highly advisable, in interests of poorer families, that school should continue, and it is impossible to charge high fees.

Further difficulty is staff, as without at least two years' contract it is unlikely teachers will take posts out here. Nor could such a contract be given without certain Government support for at least two years. It is most advisable to reopen in October, and as staff will have to be engaged in England immediately, I shall be grateful for a reply as soon as possible as to whether His Majesty's Government will sanction a grant of 2,000l. per annum for two years at least. Chairman of School Committee, Rev. C. T. Horan (address, Junior Army and Navy Club), and Mr. A. T. Loyd, of Foreign Office, may be referred to.

No. 380.

Foreign Office to Parliamentary Commercial Committee, House of Commons.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 9, 1919.

WITH reference to my letter of the 12th April, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to advert to the resolutions concerning reforms in the Egyptian judicature which were passed by your Committee on the 2nd April and communicated in your letter to the Secretary of State of the following day.‡

The tenor of the resolutions, as understood by Lord Curzon, is to the effect that, in the view of the Committee, the form and substance of the proposed new codes of law should be to the greatest possible extent anglicised and freed from the international, and particularly French, influences which have characterised the legal system of Egypt since the establishment of European control in that country.

The question involved is—as the Committee cannot fail to recognise—one of very great political moment and cannot be considered otherwise than in close relationship with the general political situation in Egypt. This fact is all the more strongly emphasised by the recent risings in Egypt, among the causes of which a definite part must be assigned to the violent hostility entertained by large numbers of the cosmopolitan and educated native population to any real or supposed attempts by the Egyptian Government to impose radical changes in regard to such matters as the use of the French language in the law courts, &c.

It is essential to bear in mind that for several generations past French has been the almost universal medium of business intercourse in Egypt, and that the process of introducing English as the common European language through the influence of

* See No. 301.

† See No. 345.

‡ See No. 137.

national education dates from such comparatively recent time that nearly all Egyptians above the age of thirty-five or forty who command a foreign language speak French rather than English. The same applies to the large bodies of non-British European residents in the principal towns, so that French still remains the *lingua franca* of Egypt. It results that any abrupt substitution of English for French through official action would seriously affect these two classes of the population and would, there is every reason to believe, tend not only to unite in opposition to the Protectorate Government the discontented elements among both, but also, in the case of many Egyptians, to render it a fashionable and—in their eyes—a patriotic course to cultivate French as against English, so that the compulsory measures adopted would actually defeat their own object.

There can, at the same time, be no doubt that the natural replacement of French by English as the commonly used European language is proceeding steadily and surely. If this process, aided by the effect of good English teaching in the schools and, it may be hoped, by greater enterprise on the part of British merchants in developing trade between Great Britain and Egypt and in sending out representatives to the country, continues without interruption, it may be confidently predicted that the general use of French will automatically cease before many years have elapsed, as has happened already in the case of Italian, and that the English language will become universally established without the resentment and ill-feeling which would inevitably be evoked by an attempt to impose it forcibly at the present moment.

To proceed to the separate consideration of the clauses of the Committee's resolution, I am to point out, with regard to the first, that the question of the language employed at meetings of the Capitulations Commission must obviously be governed primarily by considerations of convenience and efficiency. French has, in practice, been used because it is the language most generally known by the members of the Commission, the composition of which, when constituted, consisted of three Egyptian Ministers, three British officials in the Egyptian Government and two foreign legal experts—one of French and one of Italian nationality.

As regards the minutes of the Commission's meetings it would, in Lord Curzon's opinion, impose an unjustifiable restriction upon the freedom of the members to discuss all matters, including those of a political nature, which bear upon the subject of their labours, if the records of their discussions were to be made accessible to non-official circles. Such a condition would, Lord Curzon considers, tend, by rendering it difficult for the British members to communicate anything of a confidential character to their colleagues, to lessen their power of directing the Commission's work along the most desirable lines.

The third point in the resolutions concerns a matter, namely, the selection of members of the Commission, which was carefully considered by the Secretary of State at the time of the creation of that body, and in regard to which Lord Curzon regrets that he cannot accept suggestions for any alterations of decisions then taken.

Clause 4.—The question of an appeal to the Privy Council is one which is still under consideration. In general the view of the Committee's has the sympathy of Lord Curzon, but it is not yet possible to say what provision it will be found possible to make in the matter. The language question has already been dealt with in the early part of this letter.

Clause 5.—The work of the Commission is proceeding very largely upon the basis which the Committee desire to see adopted, and although, owing to the difference which exists in some spheres between the conditions in Egypt and in this country, the adaptation of English models cannot obviously be made universal, the groundwork of the new system will, so far as possible, be in accordance with English legal principles.

I am to add, finally, that Lord Curzon is suggesting to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Egypt that a further report on the work performed by the Capitulations Commission up to the present date should be issued to the public, and Lord Curzon does not doubt that this will be done as soon as the present situation in Egypt will permit.

I am, &c.
J. A. C. TILLEY.

No. 381.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 223.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 9, 1919.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 148 of the 7th April, I transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence with the Commercial Committee of the House of Commons relative to the reform of the Egyptian judicature.*

With regard to the concluding paragraph of the Foreign Office letter of the 9th instant, it appears very desirable, in view of the considerable agitation in this country on the subject of the new legislation which is typified by the Committee's resolutions, that a further communiqué regarding the Commission's work should be issued in Egypt on the same lines as that which was made public in 1917.

It is possible that you will not consider the present moment opportune for any official statement in Egypt respecting the proposed reforms, especially if it is decided that the question of abolishing the Capitulations must be deferred for the present. I shall be glad, however, if you will cause a communiqué to appear as soon as you think that this can be done without the risk of provoking excessive criticism in native or foreign circles.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 382.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 956.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 11, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 697.†

I have no objection to Ismail Sidky returning to Egypt. My proclamation 7th April allowed free travel to all Egyptians who are eligible for passports. I have never recognised Egyptians in Paris as a Delegation, or as having any political mission. I do not propose to place any restriction on movement of Egyptians now in Paris, collectively or individually, so long as they keep within law.

No. 383.

Foreign Office to Director of Military Intelligence.

THE Acting Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Director of Military Intelligence, and begs to acknowledge the receipt of his letter of the 17th May† on the subject of the papers controlled by Mr. Boutigny.

Sir Ronald Graham approached Lord Faringdon confidentially to ascertain whether the British Trade Corporation, or his Lordship personally, would be willing to take a financial interest in the operations suggested.

Lord Faringdon has replied that he would not be willing to take any financial interest in the operations suggested, either on his own account or on that of the British Trade Corporation, but that the latter would be quite willing to give every kind of assistance in their power, and to be nominally at the back of the parties who might be put forward to acquire the Boutigny interest. One essential condition, however, would be an indemnity from the Government for any liabilities which they might incur.

Sir Ronald Graham caused unofficial enquiries to be made from the Treasury as to the possibility of His Majesty's Government accepting this liability, and he was informed that such a transaction would require the special sanction of Parliament, even assuming that the Treasury felt able to support the proposal. Major-General Thwaites will appreciate the fact that, under these circumstances, it is not possible for this Department to make any move in the matter.

Foreign Office, June 11, 1919.

* Nos. 137 and 380.

[2568]

† See No. 376.

‡ See No. 338.

No. 384.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 253.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 1, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 239 of the 25th May, I have the honour to forward a brief summary of the events of the week the 25th to the 31st May inclusive. Since my summary of events of the preceding week was made up and sent off, there has been accumulating evidence that the extremists have recently made another great effort. They tried to take advantage of the formation of the new Ministry in order to rouse up Nationalist and anti British feeling once more, and they even hoped to bring about another general strike.

At first they seemed likely to have some success in causing a renewed bitterness of feeling. For instance, at Al Azhar on the night of the 23rd, it appears that there was a very large crowd in the Mosque, including many of the educated and well-to-do classes.

Four very violent speeches were delivered against the new Ministry and its President. Its fall must be brought about by a general strike, and a revolt of the people on a bigger scale than the last. When the audience was asked to shout at the end of each speech, "Down with the new Ministry!" there was a large and ready response. Much more enthusiasm and excitement were reported than had been noticed for some time.

It is satisfactory to note that the latest information received does not promise success for these efforts. The meetings at Al Azhar appear to be declining once more in numbers and enthusiasm, and there is reason to think that the predominant feeling in the country is a desire to avoid renewed interruptions of the normal routine.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 384.

Summary of Events of the Week May 25 to May 31 inclusive.

SUPPLEMENTARY to previous week's summary :—

May 24.

There was a demonstration of 400 people at Desuq; east of Desuq Bridge a French engineer was stoned, but a military picket arriving dispersed the crowd and prevented it from approaching the bridge.

May 25.

In Cairo the agitation against the new Ministry continued in extremist circle.

At Alexandria a small demonstration was dispersed by a military picket. A British officer was stabbed in the leg, and his assailant shot dead.

In the Canal zone it was reported that a few workers at Port Said showed signs of returning.

May 26.

At Port Said the employees of the Salt and Soda Company resumed work, otherwise the situation in the Canal zone remained unchanged.

At Cairo seditious speeches were delivered at a crowded meeting in the evening at Al Azhar, at which many officials, railway workmen, and others, were present. Later on an attempt by Azharists to demonstrate was quickly suppressed. Twenty-three arrests were made. The extremists were reported to be still extremely active in agitation.

From Luxor the collection of 52 firearms was reported, and from Minia the collection of 110.

May 27.

The situation was reported to be quiet in the Canal zone and throughout the provinces. At Mansura the arrival was reported of much propagandist literature from Cairo.

In Cairo there were numerous rumours of growing agitation against the Ministry, preparations for disorder during Ramadan, &c.

At a meeting at 5 p.m. at Al Azhar there was again a very large attendance. Representatives of the railway workmen were present, and also many lawyers and notables. It was reported that it had been decided to organise a big demonstration on the following day, and to organise another general strike.

Later on in the evening there were several attempted small demonstrations, which in every case dispersed before the arrival of the troops.

May 28.

The situation throughout the provinces was reported unchanged.

In Cairo there was still some excitement, and rumours of coming trouble were being circulated. It was said, for instance, that the lawyers had decided to strike for seven days.

The usual meeting was held at Al Azhar, and more seditious speeches were made.

At night a small, half-hearted demonstration took place outside the Sultan's Palace. About 100 persons shouted in rather subdued fashion, "Down with the Sultan!" "Down with Mohammed Said!" and then scattered without waiting to be dispersed.

Five large cafés were raided by the police with a view to the arrest of persons found with seditious pamphlets. In every case such papers were hastily thrown on the floor, which was littered with them. Seven arrests were made, but no literature of importance was secured.

May 29.

In Cairo no further demonstrations were attempted. A meeting at Al Azhar in the evening was a very half-hearted affair. Rumours of demonstrations and riots during Ramadan were still too numerous and wild to be worth detailing, but, nevertheless, the general tone of public feeling had again become perceptibly calmer. The raids on cafés had produced a moral effect, especially on the Copts. Mixed with the extremists' hatred of the Prime Minister was a good deal of fear. He was regarded as an obstinate and pertinacious Turk who would do all in his power to serve the English and harm the Nationalist cause.

The whole country outside Cairo was reported quiet. At Alexandria there was outward calm, but considerable suppressed excitement. A new and significant feature of the situation was an openly unsympathetic attitude on the part of the general public towards the demonstrators. During the disturbances on the 25th, for instance, insults had been hurled at them by native passers-by. Another new development was a growing animosity between the native police and the agitators. The crowd on Sunday hesitated to disperse, and suffered very rough handling by the mounted police commanded by a native officer of hitherto Nationalist sympathies. The individual policemen were afterwards heard boasting of the casualties they had inflicted on the crowd.

From Kena the seizure of 120 firearms was reported.

May 30.

In Cairo the usual meeting at Al Azhar took place at 9 p.m., but less than 300 attended, and the usual speeches evoked little enthusiasm. Towards midnight a very small demonstration started off in the direction of the Residency. It was easily dispersed, eleven arrests being made.

At Port Said some strikers assembled in the streets in the afternoon, and assumed a menacing attitude, but dispersed before the arrival of troops.

May 31.

The whole country was reported quiet. The usual meeting at Al Azhar in the evening was better attended than on most recent occasions, but nothing of note appears to have occurred there, and no attempts at demonstrations followed.

No. 385.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 261.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 4, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 204 of the 4th May, I have the honour to enclose copies of another letter from his Excellency the Governor-General of the Soudan, giving further details as to the political conditions in that country.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 385.

Major-General Sir Lee Stack to General Sir E. Allenby.

My dear General,

Erkowitz, May 24, 1919.

SINCE I reported to you in my telegram of the 30th April the incident that occurred at Port Soudan when the Egyptian army details returning from Egypt made a slight demonstration at that place, and subsequently on the train to Atbara, there have been two incidents of a similar nature at Port Soudan and Atbara.

At Port Soudan, the arrival of the Coptic bishop from Egypt on his way to Khartoum was the occasion. A few railway battalion men and young Egyptians from the town gathered in front of his house, and subsequently paraded the streets waving flags and shouting. No action was taken beyond telling the demonstrators to go home, which they did.

The Coptic bishop refused to address the gathering, and told the Governor afterwards confidentially that the Copts were only forced into an attitude of sympathy with the Moslems by reason of the smallness of their numbers, and that he personally was most anxious to avoid such displays of feeling as this in the Soudan.

The Atbara affair was on a somewhat larger scale. Large numbers of Egyptian employees and railway battalion soldiers demonstrated in a peaceful but very noisy manner on two successive nights in the streets of the town. The excitement was caused by the spreading of a strong rumour that the British Government had communicated to Rushdy Pasha an announcement of the independence of Egypt.

It appeared that the railwaymen were induced to go out by the civilian employees, and they immediately obeyed the order of their officers to return to barracks.

On hearing of the cause which led to this outbreak, I immediately wired contradicting the rumour, and the general manager issued a circular to the effect that such demonstrations would not be permitted. Despite this prohibition, three clerks on the following day—two belonging to the Egyptian Irrigation Department and one to the Sudan Railways—started shouting in the streets. They were arrested and sent to the headquarters of the province for the disposal of the Governor. I have ordered all three to be deported to Egypt.

There has been no attempt at violence on any of these occasions, and the attitude of the Sudan natives has been one of indifference and even disgust.

The senior Egyptian officers and officials have done their best to control the junior and more excitable men and to discourage any demonstrating.

The only other item of interest is the subscriptions started for the benefit of those who have suffered in the recent riots in Egypt, with regard to which I have already telegraphed to you. Though I think the Grand Kadi thought this the most suitable outlet for the feelings of Egyptians here and the most innocuous form in which they could show their sympathy, I was disappointed that he did not mention it to me before he started it.

The combination of all these incidents tends to keep general feeling in a more or less unsettled state, which I fear must be the case until something is definitely announced as to the future Government of Egypt.

Yours very sincerely,

LEE STACK.

No. 386.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 734. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 14, 1919.

SIDKI, Khayat, and Sharaawi have applied for permission to return. Subject to your observations, I remain of the opinion expressed in my telegram No. 697* of 6th June, that their return now, or in any case a return piecemeal, would be undesirable; and it seems likely that Mohammed Said might have objections to their return in present conditions. I should be glad of your early observations on this and my telegram above mentioned.

Sidki is apparently out of favour in Delegation, and Lutfi in the ascendant. Latter is now urging that they should obtain permission from their supporters in Egypt to deal with His Majesty's Government. If they obtain this assent, they will probably ask for an interview with the Prime Minister. If this change of front occurs, what course would you desire to see followed here? I suggest that they might be received by some prominent member of the British Delegation, and that it should then be made clear to them, after listening to what they have to say, that His Majesty's Government will only discuss practical measures with Egyptian Ministers, and that even such discussion can hardly be seriously undertaken before the impending commission has done its work. What are your views on this, and also of the suggestion made that the Ministry should send to London their own Delegation, including such elements as Adly.

No. 387.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 732.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 14, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 862† of May 27th: Capitulations and Egypt, Morocco Convention, and Peace Delegation telegram to you No. 54.

There is no doubt that Mixed Tribunals mandate must be reviewed in October next. I will instruct you later as to period for which renewal must be made.

No. 388.

Mr. Armstrong to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord,

Guatemala, May 19, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a note which I have received from the Guatemalan Minister for Foreign Affairs informing me that, in the absence of an accredited representative in Egypt, his Government has asked the Spanish Government to take charge of Guatemalan interests in that country.

Sir Alban Young tells me that in saying good-bye to the Minister for Foreign Affairs he asked him privately what had prompted the Guatemalan Government to write this note. Sir Alban pointed out that several of the European Powers had special privileges in Egypt under their treaties with Turkey, and if, as was likely, Spain was one, it was not probable that the Egyptian Government would admit Guatemalan citizens to any special treatment to which Spanish subjects might be entitled, especially as it had long been the desire of His Majesty's Government to restrict and eventually abolish their privileged treatment, which had been found very prejudicial to the administration of the country. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told Sir Alban that the Guatemalan Government had been invited by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to take this action. Sir Alban understood from His Excellency that Spain was by way of protecting Guatemalan citizens in Egypt, but, as a matter of fact, there were no Guatemalan citizens in Egypt that he knew of.

I have replied to Don Guillermo Aguirre that I should have pleasure in acquainting

* See No. 376.

† See No. 359.

your Lordship of the contents of His Excellency's note and of drawing attention to his request that the Government of Egypt be notified of this disposition of the Guatemalan Government.

I have, &c.

J. P. ARMSTRONG.

Enclosure in No. 388.

Don Guillermo Aguirre to Mr. Armstrong.

M. le Ministre,

Guatemala, May 12, 1919.

AS the Government of Guatemala has no representative accredited in Egypt, it has asked the Spanish Government to extend, through its consular representatives, to Guatemalan citizens who may be residing in that country the same protection which Spanish subjects enjoy in their persons and interests.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to transmit the foregoing to your Government; and if, at the same time, you will use your good offices in order that the Government of Egypt may be notified of this disposition.

I remain, &c.

GUILLERMO AGUIRRE.

No. 389.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 939.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 805.

Cairo, June 9, 1919.

Governor-General of the Soudan wishes to add to delegation, Sheik Ibrahim Ferah, Head Sheik Jaalin Arabs, who with his two tribes rendered notable services to expedition during reconquest of Soudan.

No. 390.

Foreign Office Minute.

I HAD a visit this morning from Major W. Tudor Pole, who left with me the enclosed memorandum, which he had addressed to the D.M.I.

It will be seen that there is no question of Mr. Boutigny selling his papers, but that on condition that Major Tudor Pole joins him as general manager of the business, he will transfer his banking accounts from the Banco di Roma to a British bank. It is interesting to note the attitude of the Banco di Roma towards Mr. Boutigny. See p. 3, IV.

As regards V on p. 3, I understand from Major Tudor Pole that condition (c) amounts to this. He wants:—

1. A confidential letter from the Foreign Office addressed to him, which he can show to the directors of various business concerns with which he is now connected, saying that the proposal that he should join Mr. Boutigny is considered officially to be in British interests.
2. He wants to have facilities for travel which would enable him to visit Constantinople, Athens, or anywhere else, without incurring the long delays which procuring permits entails.
3. He wants an assurance that if the Residency support this group of papers their attitude will be approved by the Foreign Office.
4. In view of the financial risks which he would run he desires personal assurances, and would like to have some more or less definite connection with the Foreign Office.

Note.—I do not understand this last to mean that he wishes to have a definite official appointment. He appreciates the fact that he is taking considerable risks, and does not wish to be classed as a mere adventurer. If he failed in this enterprise I conclude that he would come down on us and ask us to help him elsewhere.

I gather from him that he proposes, subject to our approval, to approach Messrs. Boulton Bros. with a view to getting them to finance the company. I asked him whether it was not possible that Boulton Bros. would say that they were unable to take such a risk unless they had a guarantee that the Government would indemnify them for any liabilities which they might incur. He did not think that this would be necessary, but thought that official approval of the principle of the scheme would be sufficient.

A. V. L.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 390.

Memorandum from Major W. Tudor Pole to the Director of Military Intelligence.

Subject: The Boutigny group of Egyptian newspapers.

Reference: Brigadier-General, Intelligence, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Memorandum of May 17, 1919, attached.

1. In accordance with instructions received from the Brigadier-General, Intelligence, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, having just arrived in England, writer holds himself in readiness to call upon you when required.

Attached please find the Brigadier-General, Intelligence, Egyptian Expeditionary Force's Memorandum dated May 17, 1919, relating to the above subject, and handed to writer on his departure from Cairo.

2. In order to make his own position clear, writer begs to attach herewith the following documents:—

- (a.) Copy of Memorandum dated April 16, 1919, addressed by Major Tudor Pole to the Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
- (b.) Copy of letter dated April 18, 1919, from Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to the Chief Administrator, Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (south).
- (c.) Copy of letter dated 26 April, 1919, from the Chief Administrator, Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (south), to the Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
- (d.) List of newspapers owned or controlled by Mr. H. Boutigny of the Société orientale de Publicité, Cairo.

3. In order to make the attached (original) letter of May 17, 1919 from the Brigadier-General, Intelligence, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to the Director of Military Intelligence, London, clear, writer ventures to make the following comments:—

The first intimation received by the military authorities concerning the Banco di Roma's offer to Mr. Boutigny was contained in Memorandum (A) April 16, 1919, addressed by Major Tudor Pole to the Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force. This being the case, writer is in a position to correct certain inaccuracies that have crept into Egyptian Expeditionary Force's despatch No. 1 8719 D of the 11th May, 1919, addressed to the Director of Military Intelligence, London.

(a.) Paragraph 1 is correct. A complete list of the newspapers in question is attached herewith (Memorandum (D)).

(b.) Paragraph 2 contains inaccuracies.

Mr. Boutigny's uncovered overdraft with the Banco di Roma is under £E. 20,000. A further overdraft of £E. 15,000 is fully covered by the deposit of sound securities.

(c.) The statement in paragraph 3 concerning the formation of a British group is inexact. Mr. Boutigny himself has no wish to form a British or other group to take over his 94 per cent. interest in the Société Orientale de Publicité. He is not a seller. On friendly pressure being brought to bear upon him by the present writer, he expressed willingness to transfer his banking accounts from the Banco di Roma to a British bank, provided that the writer would join Société as general manager with full editorial and business powers.

(d.) In the interview between the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and Mr. Boutigny, at which the Chief Political Officer and the Brigadier-General, Intelligence, were present, Mr. Boutigny did not ask for financial support from the British authorities. It appears that he asked for a measure of diplomatic support from the Residency for his newspaper group (which group has been ignored by the Residency for many years), and he also expressed the strong desire that the services of the present writer should be placed at his disposal.

4. In view of the situation that has arisen and the continued pressure now being brought to bear on Mr. Boutigny by the Banco di Roma (their last offer is £E. 50,000 in cash plus £E. 1,200 per month for the lease of all the papers for a period of three years from date), writer invited Mr. Boutigny to meet him in London on the 20th June, 1919, when matters could be further discussed, after writer's interview with the Director of Military Intelligence.

5. If writer is to be demobilised at this juncture he would be willing to consider Mr. Boutigny's offer on the following terms:—

- (a.) Resignation of the two Italian directors of the Société orientale de Publicité.
- (b.) Transfer of accounts to a British bank.
- (c.) Certain personal guarantees from the British authorities which would make it practicable for writer to relinquish his present business interests in England.

6. In view of Italian, Greek and Japanese business expansion in the Near East and of the present Nationalist situation in Egypt, it would seem necessary both for political and commercial reasons that Britain should secure the full support of the Near Eastern press.

The Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, told the writer that he wished him to join Mr. Boutigny if at all possible, but writer is anxious to be clear on the following points:—

- (a.) Can he be demobilised now?
- (b.) What support would be forthcoming from the British authorities to enable writer to wind up his business affairs in England and take up newspaper and political work in the Near East?

W. TUDOR POLE, Major.

June 2, 1919.

(A.)

Major Tudor Pole to the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

1. THE Banco di Roma recently made a very good cash offer for the assets of the Société orientale de Publicité, which concern owns a large number of Egyptian newspapers published in French, English, Italian, Greek and Arabic.

2. The above Société is controlled at present by M. Henri Boutigny who is inclined to refuse the offer referred to above.

M. Boutigny is a financier first and a journalist second. Should a crisis take place in his affairs he might be compelled, although of British sentiment, to allow the control of his papers to pass into Italian, French, or even Nationalist hands. Should this occur at the time the censorship were abolished, British might lose the support of a considerable portion of the Egyptian Press.

3. The Société intends publishing newspapers throughout the Levant, including Smyrna and Constantinople, and has just purchased the "Palestine News" which will become a daily in due course.

4. Under the circumstances mentioned above it is to be presumed that the British authorities in Egypt would welcome the control of this group of newspapers passing into the hands of an Englishman of strong pro-British sentiments who was not unfriendly to reasonable Nationalist aspirations?

5. M. Boutigny has offered the writer a share in the Société he controls, with complete editorial and business control over the Société's newspapers and other enterprises.

6. The present crisis has resulted in M. Boutigny pressing the writer for an early decision and writer is inclined to liquidate his English interests, and take up proprietary rights in the Société.

7. The Chief Administrator is willing to release writer at once, but as demobilisation from Egyptian Expeditionary Force is suspended, would the military authorities have any objection to allowing him to spend some hours daily during the present crisis on work connected with the Egyptian newspaper world?

Upon the Commander-in-Chief's reply will depend writer's decision concerning future work in the direction indicated above.

(B.)

Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to Chief Administrator, Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South).

April 18, 1919.

I ATTACH copy of a letter I have received from Tudor Pole. He referred the question to me in order to ascertain whether there were any political objections, before taking the matter up with you. I have spoken to the Commander-in-Chief, and he is in favour of permitting Tudor Pole to carry out his scheme and of giving him every facility.

The Commander-in-Chief is prepared to support any request for early demobilisation which Tudor Pole may make in order to arrange his affairs in England before embarking upon the new enterprise proposed in his letter to me. . . .

Tudor Pole is, I understand, going to Jerusalem in a day or two, and he will discuss the whole matter with you.

(C.)

Chief Administrator, Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South), to Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Forces.

April 26, 1919.

1. I WRITE in reply to your letter of April 18, 1919, re Major Tudor Pole, to say that I quite approve of his being given facilities for carrying out the scheme he proposes, though he will be a loss to Occupied Enemy Territory Administration.

2. I understand that it is necessary for him to proceed home to settle certain business affairs; and he has already obtained leave and received his number.

There, however, the matter stands, and I shall be much obliged if you will lend your influence by informing the Deputy Adjutant-General that the Chief wishes him to be sent home at the earliest possible date, and there demobilized.

3. He has mentioned to me his ideas on a certain political point which, I think, you might find it worth while to discuss with him.

(D.)

Newspapers owned by the Société orientale de Publicité of Cairo and Alexandria (controlled by Mr. H. Boutigny).

Published in Cairo—"La Bourse égyptienne" (daily); "Egyptian Mail" (daily); "Le Progrès" (daily); "Imparziale" (Italian daily); "Sphinx" (Greek weekly); "Palestine News" (English and Arabic editions weekly).

Published in Alexandria—"La Bourse d'Alexandrie" (daily); "Messaggero" (Italian daily); "Ephemeris" (Greek weekly); "Ah Aly" (Nationalist daily); "Etta Hade-el-Messrieh" (Nationalist weekly).

(In negotiation for purchase of "El Ahram," an important Arabic Nationalist daily.)

Papers controlled but not owned (i.e., printed and advertisement contracts placed by the Société): "Le Journal du Caire" (daily) and "El Ahram" (daily), of Cairo.

(N.B.—"El Ahram" is the Nationalist daily with 60,000 circulation, which has been very prominent in the recent disturbances, and is violently pro-Nationalist in tone.)

W. T. P.

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No. 391.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 737.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

YOUR telegram No. 939.

Addition approved.

Foreign Office, June 18, 1919.

No. 392.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 987.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, June 17, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 682.*

The announcement of abolition of cotton-seed control as from the 1st August has led owners of seed to hold their stocks in anticipation of higher prices, and a scarcity of oil is already apparent.

Cotton-seed Control Board having secured required supplies of seed for His Majesty's Government do not consider it their duty to take measures to enforce sale of remainder of this year's seed to local crushers, and Supplies Control Board do not think system of compulsory sales could become successfully operative before control ceases.

I propose therefore that seed prices should be removed now, and should be grateful if you would inform me as soon as possible whether His Majesty's Government consent. Supplies Control Board would then remove control price of oil and cake.

Commercial export of cake would for the present be allowed to United Kingdom without limit, but not to other destinations. Seed Board have shipped 2,770 tons against 20,000 mentioned in your telegram No. 620,† and it is now expected most of cake to be manufactured from remainder of this year's seed would go to United Kingdom.

No. 393.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 988. Secret. Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 18, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 734‡ (see my telegram No. 956 of 11th, to which I adhere).

You will see I have no objection to individual Egyptians being received by Prime Minister or other members of Government, but I strongly opposed Egyptians in Paris being received collectively. Nothing should be done in London or Paris which might give these Egyptians any reason for considering themselves a Delegation. I do not concur in suggestion made that Ministry should send to London their own Delegation. I know the Ministry themselves would not wish to do this. They are required here to help administer country, and will be able to give their views to Lord Milner's Commission.

No. 394.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 990.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 18, 1919.

PEACE Delegation telegram No. 54§ and your telegram No. 732.

1. It is to be desired that on a next renewal of mixed courts certain of immediate concessions should, if possible, be obtained by way of preparation for comprehensive judicial reform.

2. These concessions are:—

(a.) Power for Government to appoint Presidents of various courts who are at present elected by their colleagues.

(b.) Transfer from mixed court to Government of custody and management of registry of deeds.

* See No. 372.

† Not printed.

‡ See No. 386.

§ See No. 377.

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It is also:

(c.) Much to be desired, if possible, that Government should acquire liberty to appoint and promote to foreign judgeships and obtain freedom from obligation to replace outgoing foreign judges by same nationality.

3. The obtaining of these desiderata would appear to be compatible with provisional continuance of Capitulations—see Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 133 of 1914, putting forward somewhat analogous proposals at a time when abolition of Capitulations did not appear to be realisable. Of desiderata then put forward, first was obtained, the second is now repeated, the third modified and the fourth may for the time being be postponed.

4. Government has been considering grant of pension *ex gratia* to facilitate retirement of certain foreign judges who by reason of age are getting past work but will not act until position with regard to future liberty of appointment is clearer.

I should be glad to learn therefore what prospect there may be of gaining points mentioned in paragraph 2 (c) above.

5. Despatch follows dealing more fully with these subjects.

(Repeated to Peace Delegation.)

No. 395.

*Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 19, 1919.)**Paris, June 18, 1919.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 3170 of the 22nd ultimo,* and to other recent correspondence on the subject of the draft Anglo-French Convention respecting Egypt and Morocco, I have the honour to transmit, for convenience of reference, a copy of General Allenby's telegram to your Lordship of the 27th May,† and my reply thereto of the 5th June,‡ as well as copies of letters of the 5th and 11th June, respectively from Mr. Hurst to Sir R. Graham, and from Mr. Vansittart to Mr. Hubbard.*

On the 30th May, Count Peretti in conversation with Mr. Hurst stated that his Government would not now consent to sign the Convention until the question of Tangier and of the Spanish zone had been disposed of, and that they would be exposed to a rebuff if they were to lay this Convention before the French Chambers at the present moment.

The Convention was very near completion. In fact the text is agreed and a covering letter to M. Pichon had already been drafted. The questions of Tangier and of the Spanish zone, moreover (as the French Government know very well), have nothing to do with this Convention. If, therefore, the French Government really intended at the eleventh hour to refuse signature, this would have amounted to a bad breach of faith and I should have proposed to take a strong line with the French Government.

In view, however, of General Allenby's telegram and of Sir W. Brunyate's minute of the 28th May, and in consideration of the points raised therein concerning the question of legal reforms, it appears advisable not to press the French to signature of the Draft Convention, and to suspend all action for the present.

It will of course, therefore, not be possible to deal with the questions of Sheikh Said and Muscat in this connection for the present.

I am, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour),

LOUIS MALLET.

* Not printed.

[2568]

† Nos. 359 and 377.

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No. 396.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 747.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 19, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 886 of the 30th May.*

I have been in consultation with the Treasury with a view to supplying you with an Acting Financial Adviser until Crawford is ready to proceed to Egypt. Owing to Treasury requirements in Paris, it has unfortunately proved impossible to find one.

I do not know of any suitable candidate in place of Crawford as Financial Adviser, and Crawford's record and qualifications for the post are so exceptional that I hope you will feel able to await his arrival. He should be fit for service in a couple of months.

No. 397.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 258. Secret.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 4, 1919.

WITH reference to Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 7 of the 10th February, repeated to your Lordship No. 268, I have the honour to forward herewith fifteen copies of a note by Sir William Brunyate, dated the 24th April, on judicial and other reform in Egypt.†

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

No. 398.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 262.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 5, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note addressed by Mr. Cator, British Judge in the Mixed Court of Appeal at Alexandria, respecting the alleged intention of His Majesty's Government to substitute the English for the French language in the Mixed Courts. I also transmit a copy of a further communication from Mr. Cator on the subject, in which he suggests that some formal declaration should be made to the effect that any such measure is in fact contrary to the policy of the British Government, who are ready to allow French to continue as the official language in the Mixed Courts for a given period, say, of twenty years.

In view of the assurances contained in your telegram No. 417 of the 4th April,‡ it is clear that the apprehensions entertained by Mr. Cator and the Mixed and Native Bar here are groundless, but without instructions from your Lordship I do not propose to make any public pronouncement on the subject. I am inclined, however, to think that such a pronouncement, were it made, would go far to allay the suspicion that His Majesty's Government intend to boycott the French language, out of which so much political capital is being made. I do not know what form an announcement should take, but an assurance that for a period, say of fifteen to twenty years, no legislation would be introduced placing the French language in a less favourable position than that at present held by English might meet the case without in any way prejudicing the natural evolution of the English language in common use, and its consequent *de facto* adoption in the Courts. The younger generation of Egyptians, as a result of the present system of education, practically all speak English far better than French, and although the Native Bar has associated itself with its French-speaking foreign and Levantine colleagues, it is probable that this is largely due to political rather than practical considerations, and with the gradual removal of political friction the superior practical advantages of the use of the English language will assert themselves. It is indeed regrettable that more cultural, and in the broadest sense of the word, propagandist use cannot

* See No. 365.

† Printed separately.

‡ See No. 136.

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be made of the very widely diffused knowledge of English in this country, but for reasons which do not enter into the scope of this despatch it remains a fact that the spirit and sympathies of even the English-speaking section of the educated natives are Latin and Mediterranean, and not Anglo-Saxon. Probably the most successful attempt to introduce the latter spirit in the Near East has been made by America through their colleges in Constantinople and Beyrouth and their able missionaries in the Nile Valley—but it will be a long time before the best native society turns to England or America instead of France or Italy for its culture and inspirations.

As has been insisted upon in many previous reports respecting the genesis of the present unrest, the distorted and erroneous ideas as to the alleged policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the French language have played an important rôle, and are largely responsible for the present marked hostility of the lawyer class in Cairo and Alexandria. The dismay caused among the Mixed Judges by the decision communicated in Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 25 of the 4th January last, that the Mixed Courts should be prolonged for nine months only instead of the customary one year would have been almost comic had it not, coming at the moment it did, had a more serious aspect.

Any too precipitate an attempt to dethrone French from its present position of the agreed *lingua franca* of the Courts is open to a serious objection which has doubtless not escaped your notice. Were such an attempt to be made Italians would unquestionably demand to plead in Italian and possibly—an even more embarrassing state of things—Egyptians in Arabic. That this danger is not wholly illusory will be shown by a perusal of a letter, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, from Judge Booth to Mr. Amos regarding the recent activities of one of the leading British local lawyers Mr. Foster. This gentleman has for many years past taken up a line of marked hostility to the British authorities here and British policy generally, and it is probable, though I have no actual proof, that he has instigated certain recent questions in the House of Commons advocating the increased use of the English language in the Courts. The questions, however natural they may appear at home, unfortunately have not tended to allay the suspicions which form the subject of this despatch.

With regard to the last paragraph of your telegram No. 417, it is to be observed that the admission of a language as an official language in the Mixed Courts has not hitherto been taken to involve the provisions of facilities for hearing cases in that language, the most conspicuous example being furnished by the Arabic language which is, of course, the tongue of far the largest single group of litigants. It is, however, the fact that very few of the Foreign Judges have ever been equipped for hearing arguments in the language of the country. The admission of four judicial languages in the Mixed Courts cannot be regarded as more than a concession to diplomatic susceptibilities.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 398.

Note from Mr. Cator to Mr. Amos.

(Confidential.)

I HAVE often reflected upon the best method of introducing English as the principal foreign language in judicial proceedings in the Egyptian Courts. The question is a difficult one, for with every desire to hasten the change, I fear that a considerable time must elapse before English can attain the place now filled by the French language.

Not long since many Mixed Court judgments were delivered in Italian, but that practice has nearly ceased, and French is now almost invariably employed as well for judgments as for general purposes, but it is a curious fact that the personnel of the Mixed Courts is largely, if not predominantly, Italian, and it is remarkable that very few of the messengers know French, whereas many of them understand Italian.

I don't know if you are aware how greatly the fear that the British Government contemplates the substitution of English or French, either immediately or at an early date, has tended to alienate from us the sympathy of the Mixed Court Bar, but I believe that this factor has counted for much in the antagonism to the Protectorate not only of the Bar, but, through the profession, of the whole Levantine population.

It is useless to tell the lawyers that of course it will take a long time to effect

any radical change, and that they need not be afraid of hasty legislation. The fact remains that they are in a very suspicious frame of mind, and look askance at the whole question of reform. They are desperately afraid of two things:—

1. That they may lose their livelihood by the exclusion of the French language from the Courts, and
2. That their separate status as a body of European lawyers may be abolished, and the reticence of the Government on these points confirms their fears.

Politically, I believe it would have a most reassuring effect if the Government would give a guarantee that French should be retained as one of the judicial languages for, say, twenty years. I think it would be a wise measure, for we really ought to try and conciliate the Levantine element rather than antagonise it. It might and should become a most valuable aid to our rule, whereas our recent policy has tended to drive this element into alliance with the Nationalist Party. Such a promise as I suggest would not hurt us in the least, for if English establishes itself, permission to use French would become a bare right of which no one would avail himself.

Moreover, in the present temper of the people any attempt to force the use of English would almost certainly provoke a much more extended employment of Arabic, and as we must inevitably acquiesce in the use of that tongue as one of the judicial languages we might bring about a very inconvenient state of affairs in regard to all those European judges and lawyers who do not understand or speak it. I heard only recently a story (though I do not vouch for its truth) of an English lawyer who addressed the Court in English, whereupon his adversary did so in Italian, whereas the judges only knew French and Arabic.

Practically the whole European element in Alexandria knows a certain amount of French, and on several occasions when I was judge of the British Court I was able to dispense with an interpreter in the case of a French-speaking witness, finding that all the lawyers and jurors were acquainted with the language.

I may add that both advocates and clients are very nervous as to what alterations in procedure may be contemplated.

So much being stated by way of preliminary, I come to the question of how best to meet the requirements of the Foreign Office in regard to language, and can only reply that for the present we must depend upon a good staff of interpreters to meet the case of any lawyers or litigants who wish to communicate with the judges and Court officials in English.

But I believe that a great deal might be done in the near future to facilitate the extension of English if it were made a rule that no one would be engaged for Court service unless he could show himself to be reasonably conversant with that tongue, and if it were generally understood that a knowledge of English would be a valuable aid to promotion and advancement.

Moreover, this policy must not be confined to the Courts, but extended to other departments, which should be encouraged to communicate with each other and the public in English rather than in French. If this be done, and if English judges are increased, and a certain number of Englishmen are appointed to the higher administrative judicial posts if, and when, created (such as masters and registrars), I think that English may be trusted gradually to become the dominant foreign tongue. But we should go to work quietly, for, as Gambetta said of *la revanche*, it is a subject which should never be forgotten, but never spoken of.

It would create a most unfortunate impression if it could be said that the British Government were trying to force the premature use of English in the Courts solely for the benefit of a handful of English lawyers to the detriment of several hundreds of practitioners native to the country.

As I think you know, I have the hope and the ambition that, working under new forms of procedure and through the infusion of an increased number of good English judges, we may gradually succeed in raising the standard of professional conduct at the Bar, and thereby I hope also of the general moral standard of the commercial classes at large, but this can only be effected by enlisting the help and sympathy of the best elements in the profession.

Alexandria, April 15, 1919

Enclosure 2 in No. 398.

Extract from a Letter from Mr. Cator to a Member of the Residency.

THERE is another matter about which I have already written to Amos, but which I will repeat to you as I attach great importance to it. The sympathies of the Mixed Court Bar have unfortunately been alienated from our cause by the attitude of silence taken up by the Government on several matters which affect it nearly, and this is really serious, as the views of the lawyers go a long way to moulding the opinion of the Levantine and foreign elements in Egypt.

Briefly, they fear the abolition of the use of French in the Courts, and their extinction as a separate body by fusion with the Native Bar.

Now, it is certain that we cannot dispense altogether with French for a long time to come, and that being the case, I want the Government to give the country an assurance that French shall be admitted as a Court language for, say twenty years. This would not really hurt us at all, for if the English tongue makes the advance that I hope, French will gradually fall into desuetude, and in a few years' time no one will care to exercise the right.

I think, too, that it is very much to our interest to promise that, say for an equal period, the non-native Bar shall be allowed a separate organisation. For once the Capitulations are abolished, the foreign element in Egypt *must* lean upon the British Government for support, and I feel sure that the existence of a separate non-native Bar organisation would be a very useful prop to our rule. It would, of course, include the British lawyers and, if in time that element becomes predominant, we should have secured it from being swamped by the native lawyers.

But the important thing is that the Government should make up its mind definitely on these points and give the formal assurances which will alone allay anxiety. I wish I might be authorised to discuss the question semi-officially with the leading lawyers.

Incidentally, I may mention that reports have been circulated amongst the natives that we mean to abolish the use not only of French, but also of Arabic, either forthwith or in five years' time, so that the *sole* language which will be recognised in the Courts will be English.

As to the best method for extending the use of English in the country, I refer you to a letter which I wrote to Amos on the 15th April last."

Mixed Courts, May 2, 1919.

Enclosure 3 in No. 398.

Copy of Letter from Judge Booth to Mr. Amos.

IN reply to your telephonic request for an account of the "incident" in my Court on Monday the 7th, there is not really very much to tell.

Mr. Foster had a case for hearing before me, and exercised his right to make use of the English language at the Bar. His opponent, Maître Caneir, understands English pretty well, as I happened to know from the fact that at an "enquête" before me some months back he had agreed to evidence being given in English without calling for its interpretation. At the close of the "plaidoiries," Maître Caneir, who had listened with attention to Mr. Foster, turned to the latter and asked if he would be good enough to let him have a translation in French of his written "conclusions," which were to be put in on the following day. Mr. Foster demurred, and asked whether Mr. Caneir would supply him with an English translation of his own "conclusions." Maître Caneir then made a half appeal to me, to which I replied that I could not order Mr. Foster to provide a French translation. The matter then dropped so far as that case was concerned, and no formal request was made to the Court for an official translation of Mr. Foster's "conclusions," which were subsequently put in in English, bearing a remark by Maître Caneir to the following effect: "Vu, sous réserve d'obtenir traduction." I took no notice of this, and delivered judgment (in French) to-day on the pleadings and conclusions as put in. No protest or objection of any kind was made during the hearing of the above case, but the Court became very crowded, and there was some difficulty in maintaining the necessary degree of silence, but there was no disorder. Subse-

quently, as each of the remaining cases in the list came on, the advocates, whose native language was Arabic or Italian, proceeded to address the Court in those languages respectively. In these cases I was obliged to have recourse to interpretation for my own benefit. I made no comment, and except for the crowd in Court and a somewhat tense atmosphere, there was nothing to remark. I noticed that some of the Cairo delegates of the Conseil de l'Ordre des Avocats, headed by Mr. Moscha the "substitut Bâtonnier," were in Court; and after the close of the hearing they requested an interview. I received them, and they then told me that they had been present in Court with a view to securing tranquillity, and they went on to suggest that on any future occasion the judge might point out to Mr. Foster (or I suppose to any other advocate who understood French) that the present was not a desirable moment at which to exercise the right to use another language. They referred to a case or cases some years ago in which it had been suggested to Mr. Moscha—I understand, by the president of a bench of judges some of whom did not understand Italian—that he should abstain from exercising his right to plead in Italian. That seemed to me an entirely different case to the case of an advocate appearing before a single judge of his own nationality, who would be perfectly capable in case of need of ensuring that the other side understood all that was said. However, I only replied that I would take note of their observations, and would consider what course to adopt if the incident threatened to repeat itself. At the same time, I suggested that if the Bar Council considered that it was not desirable that advocates should exercise their legal rights in this respect at the present time, it was rather for the Bar Council to appeal to advocates in this sense than for the Court. This morning (14th April) no English advocate appeared before me, and there was no attempt to make use of any other language than French. The sitting was, in fact, a particularly quiet one. Mr. Foster has a case for hearing before me on the 28th, and I propose, as a matter of courtesy to the Bar Council delegates, to inform him of the fact of their communication to me, whilst guarding myself against being supposed to make any suggestion in the matter, which appears to me to be one for the advocate himself to decide. I want to avoid any discussion in open Court, and shall try and take some opportunity of speaking to Mr. Foster beforehand. I might add that some weeks ago, before the outbreak of the present political situation, an Italian advocate began to address me in Italian, and I replied in English that if he used Italian I should be obliged to use English. This had the desired effect of passing the matter off with a laugh, and no attempt was made to renew the use of Italian.

G. ARTHUR W. BOOTH.

April 14, 1919.

No. 399.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 264.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 7, 1919.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 97* of the 22nd March, and the letter therein enclosed addressed to the Board of Trade by the Empire Cotton-Growing Committee urging the necessity for the completion of the drainage of the Delta and the White Nile Barrage in order to increase the production of cotton, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a note on the subject prepared by the Under-Secretaries of State for Finance and Public Works.

I trust that this note will reassure the Committee that the Egyptian Government are sparing no effort to extend the cotton-growing area and improve its yield.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

* See No. 100.

Enclosure in No. 399.

Note by the Ministry of Public Works, dated Cairo, June 2, 1919.

The Residency.

COTTON production in Egypt.

With reference to your despatch of the 21st April, 1919, requesting the observations of the Public Works Ministry on a letter addressed on the 17th February, 1919, by the Empire Cotton-Growing Committee to the Board of Trade on the above subject, it is noted that the Committee is most anxious that the White Nile Dam and the drainage and irrigation schemes in the Delta—particularly those for the improvement of the Central Gharbia and Western Behera areas—should be pushed forward as early and energetically as possible, in order to obtain increased production of cotton in Egypt.

It will interest the Committee to know that 100,000l. has been granted for expenditure on the White Nile Dam during the year 1919. It will be devoted to supply of plant, material and excavation of site. Construction work waits on the supply of cement from the factory which is being erected at Sennar.

As regards schemes for increasing the cotton yield in the Delta, a sum of 250,000l. was granted in April, 1919, for the improvement of the drainage of lands which are already cultivated and supplied with adequate water, with a view to increasing the average yield of cotton per acre. Of this sum 70,000l. was to be devoted to Central Gharbia, 95,000l. to Western Behera and 85,000l. to other areas.

In addition to the above, 530,000l. was granted in April, 1919, for the improvement of irrigation and drainage in the Central Gharbia and Western Behera areas, viz.: 205,000l. for the former and 325,000l. for the latter. The major portion of these sums is to be devoted to enlargement of the main canals serving these two areas, so that their uncultivated and unreclaimed lands may be able to take advantage of the larger flood supply which will thus be provided for "washing" and for reclamation, pending arrival of the additional summer water to be provided on the completion of the White Nile Dam. The cotton crop being dependent on summer water and the supply at that season being only sufficient in average years for the existing cotton area, it will be clear that no very appreciable increase of cotton from these partially cultivated and unreclaimed lands can be expected until the White Nile Dam has been completed and a larger summer water supply thus obtained.

During the intervening period of five years, it is intended to devote such sums as may be necessary finally to complete both the drainage and irrigation of these two great areas on the lines laid down by Sir Murdoch Macdonald, in order that, when the extra summer water arrives, the fullest advantage of it may be taken. At the same time everything possible will be done, throughout the Delta, to improve the drainage of the cultivated lands with a view to increasing the average yield of cotton per acre.

Owing to the recent disturbances and consequent interference with public security, a considerable temporary curtailment of the above proposals has been forced upon Government for the current year, but it is hoped that the delay thus caused will be made up during the next financial year, provided nothing unforeseen occurs. As work has had to be curtailed this year effort is being concentrated upon preparations, particularly the acquisition of land, so that with greater freedom next year speed of construction may be appreciably accelerated. The Empire Cotton-Growing Committee may in any case rest assured that the extension of the cotton-growing area and the improvement of its yield are matters of constant solicitude to the Egyptian Government. The progress of new works has naturally suffered very considerably during the last five years owing principally to the withdrawal of European staff and to the heavy demands made on the country for labour and supplies during the last two years. It is disappointing that the country should have suffered a further setback when it was on the eve of peace.

P. M. TOTTENHAM,

Acting Under-Secretary of State

P.S.—The last paragraph of this letter has been drafted by Mr. Dowson, Under-Secretary of State for Finance.

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No. 400.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 265.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 8, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 253 of the 1st June, I have the honour to forward a summary of the events of the week the 1st to the 7th June inclusive.

The summary itself will provide evidence that open disorder has continued to decrease till it has almost reached vanishing point, and there is reason to hope that below the surface also the process of tranquillisation has proceeded steadily. Reports from political officers in the provinces still frequently speak of activity in the distribution of Nationalist propaganda; the Azharists are still eager to exploit dissatisfaction, such as that reported among the tramway employees; and reports are still current as to coming strikes and demonstrations at mid-Ramadan, on the arrival of the Commission from England, and at other dates in the future. But it is certain that, up to the present, the movement to organise an officials' strike, or even to induce them to sign a circular, in protest against the formation of Mohammed Pasha Said's Ministry, has been a failure; while Ramadan has hitherto brought an increase rather than a decrease of outward tranquillity, and no reports have been received from any quarter of abuses of the greater freedom lately granted as regards gatherings by night, showing of lights, and moving out of doors after dark.

One of the most noticeable survivals of more disturbed times is a certain amount of ostentatious fraternising between Copts and Moslems, but this is probably neither very sincere nor very important.

The general tenour of news from the Soudan has been that, while the younger Egyptians employed there have been anxious to demonstrate their solidarity with Egyptian Nationalism, their seniors have on the whole kept them in check, while the native-born Soudanese have been indifferent or hostile. It was reported from Khartoum that on Friday, the 30th May, a discharged officer of mixed descent had addressed the congregation in Omdurman mosque in a manner likely to cause disaffection. He was commanded by the president of the Board of Ulema to desist, but refused. The president then called on the congregation to withdraw, which the majority did, only a few of Egyptian or mixed origin remaining.

In Upper Egypt the collection of arms continues, totals seized up to date for Kena Mudiria being 3,000, Assiut and Hirga 9,000, and Minia 2,000.

I have, &c.

E. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 400.

Summary of Events for the week June 1 to 7 inclusive.

ON the 31st May, about 200 coaling coolies returned to work at Port Said. There were attempts at intimidation by European strikers directed against a few French employees, who had returned to work, but no serious incidents occurred.

On the 1st June, the majority of the coaling coolies returned to work. Otherwise, the situation remained unchanged.

At Cairo, the meeting at Al Azhar in the evening was attended by nearly 1,500 persons. A few Coptic priests were reported to have been present, and to have spoken at this meeting, preaching union and solidarity among Egyptians. No demonstrations followed.

At Cairo, on the 2nd June, it was reported that the tramway men were again contemplating a strike, which was fixed for the 8th. The causes for discontent were in no way political, but were what was considered to be the inadequacy or incomplete fulfilment of recent concessions.

A large meeting, at which some 5,000 persons were present, was held at Al Azhar in the evening. Representatives of the three tramway companies were present, but their moderation was not pleasing to the Azharists. They said they had called on the Governor of Cairo, who had held out hopes to them that their demands as to pay would be granted; in that case, they did not intend to strike. The Azharists, as a result of these declarations, postponed the big demonstration which they had proposed for the 3rd.

At Port Said, a few employees of the shipping and coaling companies resumed

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work, and some Egyptian employees of the canal company, but the bulk of the European strikers remained obstinate. The coaling coolies were working steadily.

At Alexandria, on the night of the 2nd-3rd, two small demonstrations were attempted, but were rapidly dispersed.

On the 3rd, a demonstration was reported in the native quarters of Cairo, but the police only arrived in time to see thirty or forty people running away in the distance.

At Port Said and Ismailia, incidents arose over attempted intimidation of canal company employees, who were willing to work. At the former place seven arrests were made.

Little was reported on the 4th, 5th, and 6th, except continued obstinacy on the part of the European employees on strike in the canal zone, and certain attempts at intimidation, which, however, caused no serious trouble. At Cairo, a small demonstration of about fifty students took place in the Ghuria quarter at about sunset on the 6th.

There was a similar small demonstration on the evening of the 7th, which day was otherwise again reported quiet.

No. 401.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 976.)

(Telegraphic)

Cairo, June 15, 1919.

OFFICER Commanding at Sollum reports that two Italian patrol boats from Bardia have begun making surprise visits to Sollum harbour.

In view of the present situation regarding western frontier of Egypt, I look on these visits with suspicion. It may be possible that Italians are trying to establish a right of way for themselves to patrol coast to Sollum itself.

Officer Commanding at Sollum has taken no action so far, but I should be glad of your instructions as to what action I should take if visits continue.

Despatch follows.

No. 402.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 979.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, June 16, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 700.*

(Confidential)

After consultation with Governor-General of Soudan, I am of opinion that summary of letters should not be published. Statements by eminent Soudanese notables expressly dissociating themselves from Egyptian Nationalist movement would tend to strain feeling between Soudanese and many Egyptians holding administrative posts in Soudan, with whom Soudanese have to maintain official and personal relations. To lay emphasis on want of sympathy between Soudanese and Egyptians would make situation difficult not only for Soudanese notables, but for Soudanese Government.

But I see no objection to publication of notices stating that deputation from Soudan is proceeding to England to congratulate King on victorious conclusion of war and to express loyalty and gratitude of Soudanese for benefits conferred by British administration.

[NOTE:—The Soudanese Deputation arrived in England on 19th July and remained until 4th August as the guests of His Majesty's Government. They were received by the King, who decorated them with the Victorian Order, and presented to His Majesty an address of loyalty and congratulation.]

• See No. 378.

[2568]

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No. 403.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 25.)(No. 1026. Secret.)
(Telegraphic)*Cairo, June 24, 1919.*

A GROUP of some eight Egyptian newspapers are owned by "Société orientale de Publicité." The "Palestine News" has been bought by it and it has the purchase of several others in view. The controller of this company is Mr. Boutigny, a British subject of Maltese extraction, who has similar newspaper interests in Constantinople and contemplates developing activities in Palestine, Syria and Turkey. Ninety per cent. of shares in company are held by Boutigny, remainder being divided between an Egyptian and two Italians.

An offer of 200,000l. for purchase of all his rights has recently been made to him through Banco di Roma. This sum is considerably in excess of present value of concern and can only have been made for political as well as commercial reasons. Offer so far has been declined by Boutigny, but pressure may be exerted upon him, as he is in debt to Banco di Roma for some 50,000l.

Throughout the war he has shown himself entirely pro-British and also during recent disturbances, and is anxious that a British group should be formed for controlling business. Post of general manager has been already offered by him to a British officer here. If this business fall under French, Italian or Egyptian control it would be most unfortunate and would certainly react seriously against British interests in the near East. Every endeavour should be made to arrange for a British combine to finance Boutigny.

Overtures have already been made by him to Boulton, of Alliance Bank, Simla, which will shortly open a branch here, but it is important to assist him to break away from Banco di Roma, and it may be necessary for this purpose to arrange immediate temporary accommodation. Anglo-Egyptian Bank have financed dealings with him, and if assured he had Government sympathy would no doubt assist. To ensure Boutigny remaining in control of group please let me know what can be done in London.

Big issues are involved, and I consider matter is urgent and of great importance. Italians are making every endeavour to obtain control and Boutigny is leaving shortly for Italy.

I suggest you should approach Mr. Raoul Foa, chairman of Anglo-Egyptian Bank, who, I understand, knows situation and who is now in London.

No. 404.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 774.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 25, 1919.

Mr. BALFOUR'S telegram to you No. 10th June: Egypt-Morocco Convention.

French Government are inclined to defer signature of Egypt-Morocco Convention pending arrangements for a general settlement of Moroccan question. In view of your telegram No. 862, it has been decided not to press French Government in the matter.

No. 405.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 290.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 26, 1919.

I TRANSMIT herewith copy of a despatch which has been received from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Guatemala, enclosing translation of a note from the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning the representation of Guatemalan interests in Egypt by the Spanish Government.

It is difficult to see why the latter should have invited the Guatemalan Government to take this action, unless they think it will increase the weight of any objections they

• See No. 377.

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may have to raise to the abolition of the Capitulations. But if, as it would appear, there are no Guatemalan citizens in Egypt, this would not appear to be a very convincing reason.

Before replying to Mr. Armstrong's despatch, I should be glad to know whether the Spanish Diplomatic Agent in Cairo has approached you on the subject and to receive any observations you may have to offer.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 406.

Earl Curzon to General Sir E. Allenby.

(No. 783.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 27, 1919.

WAR Office have informed me that military authorities in Egypt have asked to whom should be charged fees for counsel prosecuting, before Military Courts, the accused in recent disturbances.

I have informed them, with Treasury concurrence, that this liability should be met by Egyptian Government. Please make arrangements accordingly.

No. 407.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 28, 1919.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th March, I am directed by His Majesty's Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit for the information of the Board of Trade copy of a despatch No. 264† of the 7th June which he has received from His Majesty's Special High Commissioner for Egypt and the Soudan, relative to the recommendation made to the Board by the Empire Cotton-Growing Committee on the subject of the drainage of the Delta and the completion of the White Nile barrage, in order to increase the production of Egyptian cotton.

Lord Curzon would call attention to the fact that the Egyptian Government have provided no less than £ E. 880,000 towards the schemes in which the Empire Cotton-Growing Committee are so much interested.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

No. 408.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 277.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 5, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 265 of the 8th June, I have the honour to report that the country in general has remained quiet throughout the week. The few abnormal incidents or attempts at disorder reported scarcely provide material for a weekly summary of events in the form in which I have recently sent it.

In Cairo, at 11 P.M. on the evening of the 10th June, four shots were fired at the Prime Minister's house from a car containing four effendis and an Azharist, which drove rapidly past. There were some slight clues which gave hope of the eventual arrest of the offenders, but no arrests have yet been reported.

There have been a few half-hearted attempts at demonstrations during the week. The demonstrators have in each case only numbered between 20 and 100, and have invariably dispersed without waiting for the arrival of the police or the troops.

The meetings at Al Azhar have been well attended of late, but are reported to have been apathetic. On the evening of the 13th June it is said that a sheikh made a speech publicly advocating a cessation of demonstrations, which he said were futile and only did harm. Another sheikh thereupon got up and endeavoured to refute his arguments, calling on his audience to show their patriotism by marching out at once to burn, kill, and demonstrate. Both speeches were received with indifference.

• See No. 72.

† See No. 399.

All the available evidence, taken in the mass, still points strongly towards growing pessimism, and even indifference with regard to Saad Pasha Zaghlul's mission. There is a good deal of recrimination between Copts and Moslems, and between different sections of extremists. Desertions of the extremist party tend to become more open and more numerous.

The students and Azharists are the one section of the community who continue to furnish real enthusiasts for the cause. They are still active in propaganda. They find little in the course of events, either inside or outside Egypt, to encourage them, though they have a vague hope that the delays in the conclusion of peace and the general unrest and unsettlement throughout the world, will somehow provide them with a way out of what appears to be a blind alley.

The chief event of the week outside Cairo has been the return to work of the Canal Company employees on the morning of the 10th June. The Base Commandant at Port Said reports that the situation is normal. In the Canal zone, in Cairo, and elsewhere there are rumours of further possible industrial trouble, but such symptoms as have been reported point to discontent of a purely economic nature.

I have, &c.
E. ALLENBY.

No. 409.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 272.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 12, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 167* of the 3rd May, forwarding correspondence with Mr. Anstruther regarding the establishment, under the new judicial reorganisation, of a Court within the Suez Canal zone.

The sittings of the Capitulations Commission are now suspended; but when the question of the new judicial organisation is taken up again, the points put forward in Mr. Anstruther's letter will be given careful consideration.

I have, &c.
E. H. ALLENBY.

No. 410.

Inter-Departmental Pilgrimage Quarantine Committee.

Minutes of Meeting held at the Foreign Office on Monday, June 30, 1919, at 11 P.M.

Present:

Dr. G. BUCHANAN, C.B., Local Government Board (*in the Chair*).

Sir HAVELOCK CHARLES, G.C.V.O., India Office.

Major C. P. THOMSON, D.S.O., Egyptian Public Health Department.

Major H. W. YOUNG, D.S.O., Foreign Office.

Dr. H. GRANVILLE, C.M.G., President of the Sanitary Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt, also attended by invitation of the Committee.

The Committee had before them a note by Major C. P. Thomson of the 26th June, 1919, and telegrams which had been sent and received since the last meeting.

1. Colonel Wilkinson's Mission.

The Chairman read a letter which had been received from Colonel Wilkinson too late for circulation to the Committee, in which he reported that he had inspected the quarantine equipment at various places in Egypt, and that he was on his way to Tor.

It had not yet been found possible to arrange for his journey to Kamaran.

* See No. 276.

In his letter Colonel Wilkinson mentioned that disinfecting plant could not be spared by the Ordnance Service in Egypt, as it was required for the disinfection of equipment returned to store on demobilisation.

The Committee were of opinion that if it proved necessary to ask for further disinfecting plant for Kamaran or Jeddah this consideration would be of minor importance.

Colonel Wilkinson also reported that a condensing plant would be available from Kantara, but it would take a month to put it into proper repair. He stated that he was being given every assistance in Egypt.

The Committee decided—

That no immediate steps were necessary on their part in connection with this mission.

2. Recent Information regarding this Year's Pilgrimage.

G.H.Q. telegram (Egypt) No. M.F.A. 352 of the 13th June was discussed, and it was noted that it had not been possible entirely to prevent pilgrims proceeding by land.

Major Thomson pointed out that although quarantine arrangements were being made on the railway line for the 500 pilgrims proceeding from Occupied Enemy Territory Administration South, it would not be possible to ensure their being quarantined on the return journey. Besides the 500 who had originally proceeded by land, it was to be anticipated that a certain number of the 1,680 who were to proceed by sea would attempt to get back by land, and thus avoid a second period of quarantine at Tor.

It was decided to ask the Foreign Office to telegraph to General Allenby and point out to him that, from the point of view of the protection of Europe from infection, some steps would be necessary to quarantine all travellers returning from the Hejaz bound for Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations. This return quarantine used to be carried out at Tebuk when the Hejaz Railway was running.

It appeared from Egyptforce telegram No. M.F.A. 39992 of the 25th May, 1919, that the danger of infection being introduced into Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations by returning pilgrims was fully realised, but it was thought advisable to suggest to General Allenby that Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations South and East should provide a system of camel patrols corresponding to that on the eastern frontier of Egypt to obviate the danger of returning travellers escaping quarantine.

With regard to the pilgrimage by sea, this year's Indian pilgrimage was at present estimated at about 15,000, and the last information as to the Dutch East Indies pointed to only a small number of pilgrims this year—under 4,000.

In regard to Egypt and the African pilgrims generally, no figures were available. Dr. Granville pointed out that whereas the Government of India were apparently encouraging the pilgrimage by subsidising shipping, the High Commissioner of Egypt, on the other hand, appeared to be following the opposite policy and discouraging the pilgrimage.

On this matter it was pointed out that the steps taken by the Government of India did not amount in effect to encouraging a large pilgrimage, but had only been taken with a view to counteracting as far as possible the inconveniences entailed by the shortage of shipping. The apparent discrepancy was noted, but it appeared to be governed by questions of policy on which it was hardly within the province of the Committee to make further suggestions. It had already been suggested by the Interdepartmental Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 18th March that the policy of His Majesty's Government for this year should be neither to encourage nor to discourage the pilgrimage.

3. Future arrangements: Suggested Representations to the British Peace Delegation.

The question of the arrangements which will be required for future pilgrimages was discussed.

Major Thomson explained that he thought it was the duty of the Committee to point out that, if His Majesty's Government were to undertake the responsibility for King Hussein's arrangements in the future, as appeared to be the case from Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 817 of the 26th May, it must not be overlooked that certain financial obligations would necessarily be involved. Speaking from the point of view of the

Egyptian Government, he was rather afraid that if the suggestion in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the despatch quoted were to be followed, and the Sanitary Quarantine Service within the Hejaz were to be placed in practice under the supervision of the Egyptian Public Health Department—while that Department might also have to supervise the quarantine administration at Kamaran—there was a risk that the Egyptian Government would be called upon to bear the capital expenditure which would certainly be entailed at these places. He thought that the attention of the Foreign Office should be drawn to these considerations before it was finally decided to demand at the Peace Conference the special position with regard to King Hussein which appeared to be contemplated. He asked what reply would be given by our Peace Delegation if the representatives of other Powers were to enquire what steps His Majesty's Government proposed to take to replace that part of the duties of the International Board at Constantinople which related to the quarantine arrangements in the Hejaz and the Red Sea.

The Committee considered that the financial responsibilities involved in the special status of the Hejaz for which His Majesty's Government proposed to press at the Peace Conference were no doubt fully realised. It was not considered practicable or desirable at the present juncture to offer any suggestions on the ultimate incidence of cost as between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of Egypt and India: this was a domestic matter which would no doubt receive due consideration if and when His Majesty's Government obtained the special position they desired in Arabia.

It was presumed that, in the event of an enquiry such as that foreseen by Major Thomson being made in Paris by the representatives of the other Powers interested, our reply would be that His Majesty's Government, in maintaining a system of quarantine stations to safeguard the Hejaz pilgrimage and protect other countries from the importation of infectious disease by pilgrim traffic, would undertake to conform to the requirements of the International Sanitary Convention of 1903, and to any modification of those requirements which might be decided upon by any future International Sanitary Convention. They would also reserve to themselves the right to charge such dues from all pilgrims—including those in whom the other Powers were more particularly interested—as would ensure the satisfactory carrying out of all their international obligations. The recurring expenditure of the quarantine arrangements would normally be met by these dues. The question whether the other Powers should also be asked to bear their share in any capital expenditure involved appeared to the Committee to be a political question for consideration by the British Peace Delegation.

It was also suggested that it might be useful that the British Peace Delegation should be aware of the unanimous opinion of the Committee that the future land quarantine establishment on the line of the Hejaz Railway should not be within King Hussein's territory, but in controlled territory as near to the frontier as may be, consistently with the selection of a place which was suitable on health grounds.

It was decided—

That it would suffice, in record of the above views, to ask the Foreign Office to send a copy of the minutes of this meeting to the Peace Delegation in Paris.

Foreign Office, June 30, 1919.